IR 05000261/2005005
| ML060270033 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Robinson  |
| Issue date: | 01/26/2005 |
| From: | Fredrickson P NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB4 |
| To: | Moyer J Carolina Power & Light Co |
| References | |
| IR-05-005 | |
| Download: ML060270033 (32) | |
Text
ary 26, 2005
SUBJECT:
H.B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000261/2005005
Dear Mr. Moyer:
On December 31, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your H.B. Robinson reactor facility. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed on January 5, 2006, with and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. On the basis of the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Paul E. Fredrickson, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No.: 50-261 License No.: DPR-23
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000261/2005005 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
REGION II==
Docket No: 50-261 License No: DPR-23 Report No: 05000261/2005005 Facility: H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit 2 Location: 3581 West Entrance Road Hartsville, SC 29550 Dates: October 1, 2005 - December 31, 2005 Inspectors: R. Hagar, Senior Resident Inspector D. Jones, Resident Inspector A. Hutto, Resident Inspector, Oconee (Sections 1R01, 1R05)
R. Hamilton, Senior Health Physicist (Sections 2OS1, 2OS2, 4OA1, 4OA5)
J. Lenahan, Senior Reactor Inspector (Section 1R08)
Approved by: P. Fredrickson, Chief Reactor Projects, Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000261/2005-005, 10/01/2005-12/31/2005; H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit 2;
Routine Integrated Report.
The report covered a three month period of inspection by resident inspectors and an announced inspection by a regional senior health physicist inspector, and a senior reactor inspector. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July 2000.
NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
None.
Licensee-Identified Violations
None.
REPORT DETAILS
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection
a. Inspection Scope
After the licensee completed preparations for seasonal low temperature, the inspectors walked down the refueling water storage tank and the main steam line header pressure transmitters. These systems were selected because their safety related functions could be affected by adverse weather. The inspectors reviewed work requests and observed plant conditions and cold weather mitigation equipment for both systems. The inspectors reviewed documents listed in the Attachment, observed plant conditions, and evaluated those conditions using criteria documented in Procedure
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment
a. Inspection Scope
Partial System Walkdowns:
The inspectors performed the following three partial system walkdowns, while the indicated structures, systems, and/or components (SSCs) were out-of-service for maintenance and testing:
System Walked Down SSC Out-of-Service Date Inspected A emergency diesel B EDG November 9 generator (EDG)
A and B train auxiliary Steam driven auxiliary November 21 feedwater system feedwater pump B EDG A EDG December 20 To evaluate the operability of the selected trains or systems under these conditions, the inspectors compared observed positions of valves, switches, and electrical power breakers to the procedures and drawings listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection
a. Inspection Scope
For the five areas identified below, the inspectors reviewed the control of transient combustible material and ignition sources, fire detection and suppression capabilities, fire barriers, and any related compensatory measures to verify that those items were consistent with Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Section 9.5.1, Fire Protection System, and UFSAR Appendix 9.5.A, Fire Hazards
Analysis.
The inspectors walked down accessible portions of each area and reviewed results from related surveillance tests to verify that conditions in these areas were consistent with descriptions of the areas in the UFSAR. Documents reviewed are listed in the
.
The following areas were inspected:
Fire Zone Description E-1/E-2 electrical switchgear room Auxiliary building hallway (ground floor)
Control room B EDG room Service water pump area
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R07 Heat Sink Performance
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the inspection results of the B motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump lube oil heat exchanger to verify that the results were appropriately categorized against the pre-established acceptance criteria described in Procedure CM-201, Safety Related and Non-Safety Related Heat Exchanger Maintenance. The inspectors also verified that the frequency of the inspection was sufficient to detect degradation prior to loss of heat removal capability below design basis values. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R08 Inservice Inspection Activities
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed inservice inspection ISI procedures, observed in-process ISI work activities, and reviewed selected ISI records. The observations and records were compared to the Technical Specifications (TS) and the applicable Code (ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI, 1995 Edition, 1996 Addenda) to verify compliance and to ensure that examination results were appropriately evaluated and dispositioned.
The inspectors observed the following non-destructive examination (NDE) activities.
areas:
- Liquid penetrant (PT) examination of loop B mainsteam line elbow to pipe weld C-F-2/C5.51,
- Visual inspection of pipe hanger (spring can) CON2-S29-14, main steam support MS-1B-1005,
- Visual inspection of valve RC-551B valve and flange bolting,
- Ultrasonic examination (UT) of tubesheet to head weld number 105A/01 on Steam Generator B.
The UT exams performed on weld number 105A/01 verified previously recorded indications. In addition, the inspectors examined snubbers, spring cans and pipe supports during a walkdown of the Unit 2 containment.
The inspectors reviewed records of the above inspections including calibrations, equipment certifications, consumable certifications, and personnel qualifications.
The inspectors also reviewed records documenting welding activities associated with Work Orders (WO) 00664066, Replace Check Valve SI-873B and WO 00664068, Replace Check Valve SI-873A for the replacement of Class 2 valves on the safety injection system. The inspectors also reviewed WO 00759301 for replacement of PCV-455A, a Class 1 valve in the reactor coolant system. The records were reviewed to verify that the welding process and examinations were performed in accordance with ASME Section XI repair/replacement requirements. The inspectors reviewed drawings, work instructions, weld process sheets, and weld travelers.
The inspectors reviewed implementation of the Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program to verify that commitments made in response to Generic Letter 88-05 and Bulletin 2002-01 were being effectively implemented. The inspectors reviewed a summary of boric acid leakage screening reports, evaluations, work orders, and corrective actions. The inspectors examined various components during walkdowns inside the containment to verify the leaks were properly assessed and corrective actions were implemented.
A sample of ISI issues in the licensees corrective action program were reviewed to confirm that problems were being identified and placed in the corrective action program, and appropriate corrective actions were being initiated. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification
a. Inspection Scope
On November 22, the inspectors observed licensed-operator performance during requalification simulator training for crew 4 to verify that operator performance was consistent with expected operator performance, as described in Operations Training Full Scope Scenario, LOCT-SEG-05-3 dated 11/10/05. This training tested the operators ability to respond to the failure of a pressure transmitter, a stuck open pressurizer relief valve, a reactor coolant pump seal failure and a loss of coolant accident. The inspectors focused on clarity and formality of communication, the use of procedures, alarm response, control board manipulations, group dynamics, and supervisory oversight.
The inspectors observed the post-exercise critique to verify that the licensee identified deficiencies and discrepancies that occurred during the simulator training.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed Action Request (AR) 162642, Dedicated Shutdown Diesel Output Breaker Failed to Close, to verify the appropriate handling of this performance problem in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, and 10 CFR 50.65, Maintenance Rule. Documents reviewed are listed in the
.
During the reviews, the inspectors focused on the following:
- Appropriate work practices,
- Identifying and addressing common cause failures,
- Scoping in accordance with 10 CFR 50,65(b),
- Characterizing reliability issues (performance),
- Charging unavailability (performance),
- Trending key parameters (condition monitoring),
- 10 CFR 50,65(a)(1) or (a)(2) classification and reclassification, and
- Appropriateness of performance criteria for SSCs/functions classified (a)(2) and/or appropriateness and adequacy of goals and corrective actions for SSCs/functions classified (a)(1).
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
For the three time periods listed below, the inspectors reviewed risk assessments and related activities to verify that the licensee performed adequate risk assessments and implemented appropriate risk-management actions when required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and as specified by Procedure OMM-048, Work Coordination and Risk Assessment. For emergent work, the inspectors also verified that any increase in risk was promptly assessed, and that appropriate risk-management actions were promptly implemented. Those periods included the following:
- The work week from November 4 - 11, including scheduled work in the switchyard and on one EDG
- The work week from November 12 - 18, including scheduled work on the B service water train and emergent work on the A component cooling water pump
- The work week from December 12 - 16, including scheduled work on the A and B component cooling water pumps and emergent work on the B service water booster pump
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the operability determination associated with AR 170576170576 This AR addressed the operability of the B main steam line after that line was struck during a refueling outage by a jib crane. The inspectors assessed the accuracy of the evaluation and compliance with the TS. The inspectors reviewed the operability determination against the criteria specified by Procedure PLP-102, Operability Determinations. The inspectors compared the justifications provided in the determination to the requirements from the TS and the UFSAR to verify that operability was properly justified and the main steam line and its associated instruments remained available, such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred. Documents reviewed are listed in the
.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R16 Operator Work-Arounds
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed Work-Around 05-09, Place [Loose Parts Monitoring System] in Disable on the [Reactor Turbine Gage Board] Prior to Moving Control Rods, to verify that this workaround did not affect either the functional capability of the related system in responding to an initiating event, or the operators ability to implement abnormal or emergency operating procedures.
The inspectors reviewed the cumulative effects of the three operator workarounds that were in place on December 22, listed below. This review was to verify that the effects could not increase an initiating event frequency, affect multiple mitigating systems, or affect the ability of operators to respond in a correct and timely manner to plant transients and accidents. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- 05-09, Place [Loose Parts Monitoring System] in Disable on the [Reactor Turbine Gage Board] Prior to Moving Control Rods
- 05-11, South Service Water Strainer Blows down Continuously When Left in the Intermittent Position
- 05-12, Pressure Control Valve (PCV-1380) Is Not Operating Properly Therefore Valve MS-61 Is Throttled
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
For the five post-maintenance tests listed below, the inspectors witnessed the test and/or reviewed the test data to verify that test results adequately demonstrated restoration of the affected safety functions described in the UFSAR and TS. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
Related Test Procedure Title Maintenance Activity Date Inspected OST-930 Control System Installation of new Component Test for pressurizer power- October 11 PCV-455C and PCV- operated relief valve 456 key-locked isolation switches OST-918 Dedicated Shutdown Replacement of October 13 Equipment and component coolant Instrumentation water flow indicator Check (Monthly) (FI-660)
OST-409-1 [EDG] A Fast Speed Replacement of October 13 Start governor and low-speed relay OST-207 Comprehensive Flow Inspection and repair Test for the Motor of auxiliary feedwater October 19 Driven Auxiliary valves V2-20A and V2-Feedwater Pumps 20B OST-303-2 Service Water Replacement of December 12 Booster Pump B Test rotating assembly
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R20 Refueling and Outage Activities
For the refueling outage that was ongoing at the beginning of the inspection period and ended on October 28, the inspectors evaluated licensee outage activities as described below to verify that the licensee appropriately considered risk while implementing the outage schedule, adhered to administrative risk reduction methodologies developed to control plant configuration, and adhered to operating license and technical specification requirements that maintained defense-in-depth. Documents reviewed are listed in the
.
Mitigating Strategies The inspectors reviewed licensee mitigation strategies for losses of the following key safety functions:
- inventory control
- power availability
- reactivity control
- containment Licensee Control of Outage Activities During the outage, the inspectors observed the items or activities described below to verify that the licensee maintained defense-in-depth commensurate with the outage risk-control plan for key safety functions and applicable TS requirements when taking equipment out-of-service.
- Clearance Activities
- Reactor Coolant System Instrumentation
- Electrical Power
- Spent Fuel Pool Cooling
- Inventory Control
- Reactivity Control
- Containment Closure The inspectors also reviewed responses to emergent work and unexpected conditions to verify that resulting configuration changes were controlled in accordance with the outage risk control plan, and to verify that control room operators were kept cognizant of the plant configuration.
Refueling Activities The inspectors observed fuel handling operations (reconstitution and insertion) and other ongoing activities to verify that those operations and activities were being performed in accordance with TS requirements and approved procedures. Also, the inspectors observed refueling activities to verify that the location of the fuel assemblies was tracked, including new fuel, through core reload.
Monitoring of Heatup and Startup Activities Prior to mode changes and on a sampling basis, the inspectors reviewed system lineups and/or control board indications to verify that TS requirements, license conditions, and other requirements, commitments, and administrative procedure prerequisites for mode changes were met prior to changing modes or plant configurations. Also, the inspectors periodically reviewed reactor coolant system (RCS) boundary leakage data, and observed the setting of containment integrity to verify that the RCS and containment boundaries were in place and had integrity when necessary. Prior to reactor startup, the inspectors walked down containment to verify that debris has not been left which could affect performance of the containment sumps. In addition, the inspectors reviewed reactor physics testing results to verify that core operating limit parameters were consistent with the design.
Identification and Resolution of Problems Periodically, the inspectors reviewed the items that had been entered into the CAP to verify that the licensee had identified problems related to outage activities at an appropriate threshold and had entered them into the Corrective Action Program (CAP).
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
For the six surveillance tests listed below, the inspectors witnessed testing and/or reviewed the test data to verify that the SSCs involved in these tests satisfied the requirements described in the TS, the UFSAR, and applicable licensee procedures, and that the tests demonstrated that the SSCs were capable of performing their intended safety functions. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
Test Procedure Title Date Inspected MST-025 Emergency Bus E-2 Undervoltage and October 4 Load Shed Test (Refueling Shutdown),
Revision EST-023 Control Room Emergency Ventilation October 2 - 7 System (Once Per 18 Months, 720 Hours of Operation, & Filter Change)
EST-137* Local Leak Rate Test of Mechanical October 7 Penetration Sleeves, Radiation Monitoring Valves, Station Air Valves, Purge Exhaust Valves, Pressure Relief and Post-accident Venting Valves (Refueling Shutdown or Other Convenient Interval Not to Exceed 2 Years)
OST-253** Comprehensive Flow Test for the [Residual October 9 Heat Removal] Pumps EST-050 Refueling Start-Up Procedure October 24 OST-051*** Reactor Coolant System Leakage December 23 Evaluation
- This procedure included testing of a large containment isolation valve.
- This procedure included inservice testing requirements.
- This procedure was a Reactor Coolant System leakage detection surveillance.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the temporary modification described in Engineering Change 62809, Repair Steam Leak on C [Main Steam Isolation Valve] to verify that the modification did not affect the safety functions of important safety systems, and to verify that the modification satisfied the requirements of Procedure EGR-NGGC-005, Engineering Change, and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
1EP6 Drill Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the results of the November 8, emergency preparedness drill to verify licensee self-assessment of classification, notification, and protective action recommendation development in accordance with 10CFR50, Appendix E. The inspectors also reviewed the post-drill critique documents and applicable ARs to verify that the licensee properly identified and entered into the Corrective Action Program, the drill deficiencies as required by 10CFR50.47. Documents reviewed are listed in the
.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
RADIATION SAFETY
Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety
2OS1 Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas
a. Inspection Scope
Access Control Licensee activities for monitoring workers and controlling access to radiologically significant areas were inspected. The inspectors evaluated procedural guidance and directly observed implementation of administrative and physical controls; appraised radiation worker and technician knowledge of, and proficiency in implementing, Radiation Protection (RP) Program activities; and assessed worker exposures to radiation and radioactive material.
The inspectors reviewed quarterly area thermoluminescence dosimeter (TLD) results for the previous four quarters to assess the impact of the new independent spent fuel storage installation storage on site doses. The doses for the current quarter were not available and it would be the first full quarter with the modules loaded. The perimeters of both independent spent fuel storage installations (ISFSIs) were walked down to verify adequate postings and placement of area TLDs. Dose rates were taken at the high radiation boundaries around the cooling vents on the new casks to verify adequacy of postings.
Radiological postings and material labeling were directly observed during tours of the containment building, auxiliary building, radwaste processing area, yard and ISFSIs .
The inspectors conducted independent surveys in these areas and compared the results to licensees documented surveys that were provided for workers to reference. During plant tours, control of locked high radiation area (LHRA) keys and the physical status of LHRA doors were examined. In addition, the inspectors observed radiological controls for non-fuel items stored in the spent fuel pools. The inspectors also reviewed selected RP procedures and radiation work permits (RWPs), and discussed current access control program implementation with RP supervisors.
During the inspection, radiological controls for work activities in high radiation areas (HRA) were observed and discussed. The inspectors attended an RP pre-job planning meeting for removal of the old reactor head, its movement to the mausoleum and directly observed the work activities involved. The inspectors observed workers adherence to RWP guidance and radiation protection technician (RPT) proficiency in providing job coverage. This included the coverage of work in an HRA that was outside the normal radiologically controlled area and under inclement weather conditions. The inspectors evaluated dose controls, contamination controls and radioactive material control in a satellite radiologically controlled area. Work included application of contingency actions while entombing the old reactor head. Controls for limiting exposure to airborne radioactive material were reviewed and operation of ventilation units and positioning of air samplers were also observed in containment and auxiliary buildings. The inspectors evaluated electronic dosimeter alarm setpoints for consistency with radiological conditions in and around the containment, auxiliary building and radwaste processing areas. In addition, the inspectors interviewed workers to assess knowledge of RWP requirements.
The inspectors evaluated worker exposures through review of data associated with discrete radioactive particle and dispersed skin contamination events. Controls used for monitoring extremity doses and the placement of dosimetry when work involved significant dose gradients were reviewed.
Radiation Protection Program activities were evaluated against 10 CFR Part 20; Regulatory Guide 8.38, Control of Access to High and Very High Radiation Areas in Nuclear Power Plants; and approved licensee procedures. Licensee guidance documents, records, and data reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
Problem Identification and Resolution.
Eight ARs associated with radiological controls, personnel monitoring, and exposure assessments were reviewed and discussed with RP supervisors. The inspectors assessed the licensees ability to identify, characterize, prioritize, and resolve the identified issues in accordance with Procedure CAP-NGGC-0200, Corrective Action Program, Rev. 16. Specific documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The inspectors completed 21 of the required 21 samples.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
2OS2 ALARA Planning and Controls
a. Inspection Scope
As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA)
Implementation of the licensee's ALARA program during Fall 2005 was observed and evaluated by the inspectors. The inspectors reviewed ALARA planning, dose estimates, and prescribed ALARA controls for outage work tasks expected to incur the maximum collective exposures. Incorporation of planning, established work controls, expected dose rates, and dose expenditure into the ALARA pre-job briefings and RWPs for those activities were also reviewed. The inspectors observed workers erecting a permanent LHRA boundary inside containment, shielding the old reactor vessel head, removal of interferences, seal table work and preparation of the old reactor vessel head for transport while evaluating the licensees use of engineering controls, low-dose waiting areas, and on-the-job supervision. Where practical, the inspectors observed the use of closed circuit TV and telemetry monitoring to reduce overall exposure for the job.
Selected elements of the licensee's source term reduction and control program were examined to evaluate its effectiveness in supporting ALARA goals. Shutdown chemistry program implementation and the resultant effect on the containment and auxiliary buildings dose rate trending data were reviewed and discussed with cognizant licensee representatives.
Trends in individual and collective personnel exposures at the facility were reviewed.
Trends in the plants three-year rolling average collective exposure history, outage, non-outage and total annual doses for selected years were reviewed and discussed with licensee representatives.
The licensee's ALARA program implementation and practices were evaluated for consistency with UFSAR Chapter 12, Radiation Protection; 10 CFR Part 20 requirements; and licensee procedures. Documents reviewed during the inspection of this program area are listed in the Attachment.
Problem Identification and Resolution The inspectors reviewed the corrective action documents listed in the Attachment that were related to the licensees ALARA program. The inspectors assessed the licensees ability to identify, characterize, prioritize, and resolve the identified issues in accordance with Procedure CAP-NGGC-0200, Corrective Action Program, Rev. 16.
The inspector completed five additional samples for their inspection procedure as part of inspection initiative to review ALARA controls for the reactor head replacement.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification
a. Inspection Scope
Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety
- Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness The inspectors sampled licensee records to verify the accuracy of reported Performance Indicator (PI) data for the period listed below. To verify the accuracy of the reported PI elements, the reviewed data were assessed against guidance contained in NEI 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline," Rev. 3, and the PI Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) list.
The inspectors reviewed the Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness PI results for the period of September 2004 through September 2005. For the assessment period, the inspectors interviewed several individuals and reviewed corrective action documents. Section 2OS1 contains additional details regarding the inspection of controls for exposure significant areas and review of related corrective action documents. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The inspector completed one of two required samples.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems
.1 Routine Review of ARs
To aid in the identification of repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for followup, the inspectors performed frequent screenings of items entered into the CAP. The review was accomplished by reviewing daily ARs.
.2 Annual Sample Review
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors selected AR 140413140413 [Nuclear Assessment Section] Issue R-TQ-04-01-I1 [Nuclear Condition Report] Investigations for detailed review. The inspectors selected this AR because it related specifically to the cross-cutting area of problem identification and resolution. The inspectors reviewed this report to verify:
- complete and accurate identification of the problem in a timely manner;
- evaluation and disposition of performance issues;
- evaluation and disposition of operability and reportability issues;
- consideration of extent of condition, generic implications, common cause, and previous occurrences;
- appropriate classification and prioritization of the problem;
- identification of root and contributing causes of the problem;
- identification of corrective actions which were appropriately focused to correct the problem; and
- completion of corrective actions in a timely manner.
The inspectors also reviewed this AR to verify compliance with the requirements of the CAP as delineated in Procedure CAP-NGGC-0200 and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings and Observations
No findings of significance were identified.
.3 Semi-Annual Trend Review
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a review of the CAP and associated documents to identify trends that could indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue. The inspectors review focused on repetitive equipment issues, licensee trending efforts, licensee human performance results, and also considered the results of daily inspector CAP item screening as discussed in Section 4OA2.1. The inspectors review nominally considered the six month period of July, 2005, through December, 2005, although the review expanded beyond those dates when the extent of a potential trend warranted.
The review included issues documented outside the normal CAP in major equipment problem lists, repetitive and/or rework maintenance lists, departmental problem/challenges lists, system health reports, quality assurance audit/surveillance reports, self assessment reports, and Maintenance Rule assessments. The inspectors compared and contrasted their results with the results contained in the latest licensee monthly and quarterly trend reports. Corrective actions associated with a sample of the issues identified in the trend reports were reviewed for adequacy. The specific documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
The inspectors also evaluated the trend reports against the requirements of the CAP as specified in 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, and in Procedures CAP-NGGC-0200, Corrective Action Program, and CAP-NGGC-0206, Corrective Action Program Trending and
Analysis.
b. Assessment and Observations No findings of significance were identified. The inspectors evaluated trending methodology and observed that the licensee had performed a detailed review. The licensee routinely reviewed cause codes, involved organizations, key words, and system links to identify potential trends in the CAP data. The inspectors compared the licensee process results with the results of the inspectors daily screening, and did not identify any discrepancies or potential trends in the CAP data that the licensee had failed to identify.
4OA5 Other Activities
.1 Reactor Vessel Head Replacement Inspection (IP 71007)
a. Inspection Scope
The Inspectors reviewed the ALARA work plan for the reactor vessel head replacement.
The review included job dose estimates, broken down into individual tasks, exposure controls including temporary shielding, controls for airborne and surface contamination, radioactive materials controls and management, emergency contingencies and expected radiological source term. The inspectors observed portions of disassembly, shielding, wrapping and preparation for movement of the old reactor head. The inspectors observed the placement of the old reactor head into its storage tomb. The inspectors assessed the adequacy of radiological controls, staffing, and competence of the RPTs providing coverage for the movement and internment of the old reactor vessel head.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 (Closed) NRC Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/161, Transport of Control Rod Drive
(CRD) in Type A Packages
a. Inspection Scope
This TI was issued to address use of a Type A shipping container to ship control rod drives in a way that was inconsistent with its certificate of compliance. Inspectors reviewed shipping logs and questioned licensee personnel about the shipment of control rod drives and determined that none had been shipped since January 1, 2002.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
On January 5, 2006, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Bill Noll and other staff members. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.
- Supplemental Information
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee personnel
- C. Bach, Manager- Chemistry
- C. Baucom, Licensing Manager
- R. Baxley, Supervisor- Radiation Protection
- W. Brand, Supervisor- Radiation Protection
- E. Caba, Engineering Superintendent
- A. Cheatham, Radiation Protection Superintendent
- C. Church, Engineering Manager
- B. Clark, Nuclear Assurance Manager
- D. Dyksterhouse, Engineering Programs Manager
- W. Farmer, Engineering Superintendent
- R. Hitch, Supervisor- Radiochemistry
- J. Huegel, Maintenance Manager
- R. Ivey, Operations Manager
- E. Kapopoulos, Outage Management Manager
- J. Lucas, Manager, Support Services - Nuclear
- G. Ludlum, Training Manager
- J. Moyer, Vice President, Robinson Nuclear Plant
- W. Noll, Director of Site Operations
- L. Smith, Supervisor- Radiation Control Training
- D. Stoddard, Plant General Manager
- S. Wheeler, Supervisor, Regulatory Support
NRC personnel
- P. Fredrickson, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 4
- R. Bernhard, Senior Reactor Analyst
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened
None
Closed
- 05000261/2515/161 TI Transport of Control Rod Drive (CRD) in Type A Packages (Section 4OA5.2)
Opened/Closed
None
Discussed
None