IR 05000255/1993029
| ML18059A623 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 01/04/1994 |
| From: | Kobetz T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | Slade G CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18059A624 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9401120004 | |
| Download: ML18059A623 (14) | |
Text
,..
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Docket No. 50-255 Consumers Power Company ATTN:
Gerald General Manager REGION Ill 801 WARRENVILLE ROAD LISLE. ILLINOIS 60532-4351 JAN Cl
-~'. IS.34 27780 Blue Star Memorial Highway Covert, MI 49043-9530
Dear Mr. Slade:
SUBJECT:
ROUTINE RESIDENT INSPECTION AT PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT This.refers to the inspection conducted by Messrs**. M. E. Parker and D. G.
Passehl of this office, from November 16 through December 16, 1993.. The inspection included a review of authorized activities for your Palisades Nuclear Generating Facility. At the conclusion of the inspection, the findings were discussed with those members of your staff identified in the enclosed report.
Areas examined during the inspection are identified in the report.
Within these areas, the inspection consisted of a selective examination of procedures and representative records, interviews with personnel, and observation of activities in progress. The purpose of the inspection was to determine whether activities authorized by the license were conducted safely and in accordance with NRC requirements.
No violations of NRC requirements were identified during the course of this inspection.
In accordance with 10.CFR 2.790 of the Commission's regulations, a copy of this letter and the enclosed !nspection report will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
We will gladly discuss any questions you have concerning this inspection.
Enclosure:
Inspection Report
No. 50-255/93029(DRP}
See Attached Distribution
9401120004 940104
~:
ADOCK 05000255
G
PDR;
~~ce~ely
(
f'~~
tz, Acting Chief
Rea or Projects Section 2A
Consumers Power Company
Distribution:
REGION I II
Report No. 50-255/93029(DRP)
Docket No. 50-255
License No. DPR-20
Licensee: Consumers Power Company
212 West Michigan Avenue.
Jackson, MI
49201
Facility Name:
Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant
Inspection At:
Palisades Site, Covert, Michigan
Inspection Conducted:
November 16 through December 16, 1993.
Inspectors:
M. E. Parker
D. G. Passehl
Approved 8~9 Chief
Reacto Projects Section 2A
Inspection Summary
Inspection from November 16 through December 16. 1993.
(Report No. 50-255/93029CDRPll
Date '
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection by the resident inspectors
of actions on licensee event report followup, followup of events, operational
safety verification, maintenance, surveillance, cold weather preparations,
engineering and technical support, and Region III requests.
No Safety Issues
Management System (SIMS) items were reviewed.
Results:
No cited violations or deviations were identified in any of the
eight areas inspected.
The strengths, weaknesses, and Inspection Followup Items are discussed in
paragraph 1, "Management Interview."
9401120007 940104
--
ADDCK 05000255
G
---.1~
.,
1.
DETAILS
Management Interview (71707)
The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph
10) on December 16, 1993, and informally throughout the inspection
period to summarize the scope and findings of the inspection activities.
The inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the
inspection report, with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the
inspectors.
The licensee did not identify any such documents or
processes as proprietary.
Highlights of the exit interview are discussed below:
a.
Strengths noted:
Improved housekeeping and material condition of engineered
safeguards rooms.
Repair of longstanding emergency diesel generator fluid
leaks.
b.
Weaknesses noted:
Slow response to internal audit finding,concerning
replacement of red flexible hose covers for the emergency
diesel generators.
Cold weather checklists need updating to accurately reflect
installed plant equipment.
c.
Inspection Followup Items:
Licensee's actions in response to having an ungrounded rod
control system power source without an installed ground
detection system will be reviewed.
2.
Licensee Event Report Followup (92700, 92720)
The inspectors reviewed the following Licensee Event Reports (LERs) by
means of direct observation, discussions with licensee personnel, and
review of records.
The review addressed compliance to reporting
requirements and, as applicable, that immediate corrective action and
appropriate action to prevent recurrence had been accomplish~d.
a.
(Closed) LER 255/91013:
Operation of Plant with Leak in
Containment Spray Line Caused by Personnel Error:
On May 7, 1990,
the licensee identified a leak through a weld in a containment
spray header.
They determined that the leak did not require
repair before resuming power operation. Subsequent reviews found
- 3.
that the plant had been in an unanalyzed condition outside the
design basis of the plant.
The containment spray header weld was repaired.
No violation is
warranted since this issue was one of the examples used for a
notice of violation and proposed imposition of civil penalty as
discussed in enforcement conference report 50-255/9102l(DRS).
This LER is closed.
b.
(Closed) LER 255/92002:
Equipment Not Channel Checked In
Accordance With Technical Specifications Tables 3.17.1 and 4.1.1.
and 4.0.4:
On December 16, 1991, with the plant shutdown, the
licensee discovered that channel checks for reactor coolant flow
and wide range nuclear power instrumentation were not being
performed as required by technical-specifications.
The root cause
was a procedural weakness which resulted in the inadequate
implementation of Technical Specification requirements.
Procedure SH0-1, "Operations Shift Items," was revised to ensure
that any required shiftly*channel checks are performed prior to
entry into a reactor operating condition or special operating
condition which requires that equipment be operable.
This LER is
closed.
No violations, deviations, unresolved, or inspection followup items were
identified in this area.
Followup of Events (93702)
During the inspection period, the licensee experienced one event which
required prompt notification of the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72.
The
inspectors pursued the event onsite with licensee and/or other NRC
officials. The inspectors verified that the notification was correct
and timely, that activities were conducted within regulatory
requirements, and that corrective actions would prevent future
recurrence.
The specific event was as follows:
December 7, 1993 -
Electrical Containment Penetrations Not In
Conformance Wit~ Final Safety Analysis Report
And Technical Specifications.
On December 7, 1993, a plant design engineer identified electrical
containment penetrations which failed to meet design features described
in Technical Specifications (TS) and the Final Safety Analysis Report
(FSAR).
The FSAR and TS describe these electrical containment
penetrations as being double barrier _design.
The FSAR also states that.
all containment penetrations are seismically designed and tornado
protected.
The electrical penetrations in the north and southwest
penetration rooms do not appear to meet all of these requirements.
Electrical penetration eighteen in the southwest penetration room and
electrical penetration eighteen in the north penetration room are
- connected together by a nitrogen supply system.
This system provides an
inert-atmosphere to the penetrations for corrosion protection.
The
nitrogen supply bottles for the southwest room are located in the
turbine building; as such, the lines in the turbine building are not
seismically designed nor tornado protected.
In the north penetration
room a similar non-seismic nitrogen system exists. However, the
nitrogen bottles are connected to a header with a hose arrangement
rather than copper tubing.
The licensee and the inspectors are continuing to evaluate this issue.
The inspectors will evaluate corrective actions for this event when the
Licensee Event Report is issued.
No violations, deviations, unresolved, o~ inspection-followup items were
identified in this area.
4.
Operational Safety Verification (71707, 71710, 42700)
Routine facility operating activities were observed as conducted in the
plant and from the main control room.
Plant startup, steady power
operation, plant shutdown, and system lineup and operation were observed
as applicable.
The performance of reactor operators and senior reactor operators, shift
engineers, and auxiliary equipment operators was observed and evaluated.
Included in the review were procedure use and adherence, records and
logs, communications, shift/duty turnover, and the degree of
professionalism of control room activities.
Evaluation, corrective action, and response for off normal conditions
were examined.
This included compliance to any reporting requirements.
Observations of the control room monitors, indicators, and recorders
were made to verify the operability of emergency systems, radiation
monitoring systems, and nuclear reactor protection systems.
Reviews' of
surveillance, equipment condition, and tagout logs were conducted.
Proper return to service of selected components was verified.
Periodic verification of Engineered Safety Features status was conducted
by the inspectors.
Equipment alignment was verified against plant
procedures and drawings and detailed walkdowns selectively verified:
equipment labeling, the absence of leaks, housekeeping, calibration
dates, operability of support systems, breaker and switch alignment, as
appropriate.
a.
General
The plant has been online since the end of the 1993 refueling
outage.
On December 9, 1993, reactor power was lowered slightly
to approximately 99.5 percent power to minimize the number of
reactor protective system variable high power pre-trip actuations.
b.
These pre-trip actuations were due to indicated delta-T power*
swings and actual core power has been stable.
The cause of the pre-trip alarms appears to be caused by
temperature swings in the primary coolant system hot legs as a
consequence of the low leakage core design instituted following
the recent refueling outage. Just prior to lowering reactor power
the plant had been averaging about one to two pre-trips per day.
The licensee has taken appropriate action, including obtaining
outside assistance, to investigate and correct the cause of this
condition. These actions were ongoing at the close of this
inspection period.
The inspectors will continue to follow the
licensee's actions regarding this issue.
All other primary system data indicates normal plant performance.
Based on chemistry data there are no known fuel pin leaks.
Activity levels of the primary coolant system are stable and are
closely monitored and reported daily.
Walkdown of Emergency Diesel Generator Systems
The inspectors performed a walkdown of the mechanical portions of
the emergency diesel generator (EDG) starting air, lube oil, fuel
oil, and jacket water systems. Applicable plant drawings and other
design doc~ment~ were used.
No significant discrepancies were
identified and both EDGs were in their proper standby lineups.
Additionally, the inspector observed that the licensee had taken
action to resolve some outstanding work orders and other material
condition concerns that were identified in a previous NRC
inspection report 50-255/93017(DRP).
Two observations were identified to the EDG system engineer:
(1)
Three hoses were installed in the fuel oil system on each
EDG that were not reflected on plant drawing M214, sheet 1.
Two of the hoses were installed at the suction to the fuel
oil booster pump and fuel oil priming pump.
The third hose
was installed on the return fuel oil line from the EDG to
the fuel oil reservoir in the base of the EDG.
(2)
Section 8.4.1.3 of the Final Safety Analysis Report listed
local alarms at each EDG with three missing from the list:
Low lube oil level
Engine trouble.
High/low fuel oil level
The system engineer agreed with the observations. Also, the red
flexible hose covers included in item (1) above appeared degraded.
.....
Licensee audit report in 1991 (QA-91-10) documented the same
observation. Although the response-to the audit report stated
that the hoses would be replaced in March/April 1992, no action
was taken nor was a reason for the delay evident.
However, there
were open work orders tracking completion of this action item.
Work to replace the hoses was completed prior to the close of this
inspection period.
The drawings will be updated to reflect the
installation of the hoses.
The licensee will evaluate the need to update Section 8.4.1.3 of
the FSAR to include the missing local alarms.
No violations, deviations, unresolved, or inspection followup items were
identified in this area.
5.
Maintenance (62703, 42700)
Maintenance activities in the plant were routinely inspected, including
both corrective maintenance (repairs) and preventive maintenance.
Mechanical, electrical, and instrument and control group maintenance
activities were included as available.
The focus of the inspection was to assure the maintenance activities
reviewed were conducted in acco~dance with approved procedures,
regulatory guides and industry codes or standards, and in conformance
with Technical Specifications. The following items were considered
during this review: the Limiting Conditions for Operation were met while
components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained
prior to jnitiating the work; activities were accomplished using
approved procedures; and post maintenance testing was performed as
applicable.
The following maintenance activities were observed:
a.
Emergency Diesel Generator (1-1), repair of several oil leaks and
hose replacement.
The inspector checked the licensee's progress on addressing a
small fuel oil fitting leak observed from.SV-1415, a one inch
s6lenoid valve in the fuel oil supply line to the emergency diesel
generator (EDG) 1-1 day tank.
The valve is about ten feet above
the floor with a tygon hose routed to a bucket to capture the
leakage. This was a material condition/housekeeping concern due
to the length of time the condition has existed.
It appears to
have been successfully repaired during a planned EDG maintenance
outage at the close of this inspection period.
A work request (No. 17640) was.submitted July 13, 1992, to repair
the valve and stop the leak.
The licensee has missed some prior
opportunities to repair this valve.
Since July 1992 there have
been at least two EDG maintenance outages when this valve could
have been fixed.
,,
6.
Upon further review the inspector found this valve had been worked
twice, just a few weeks prior to July 13, 1992.
The first work
activity in June 1992 replaced SV-1415 with a new model.
It was
subsequently found leaking and another repair attempt was made.
The valve was still found leaking through a fitting and was
scheduled for another repair attempt during the week of August 3,
1992, according to work request No. 017144.
However, the work was
never per,formed during this or subsequent EOG maintenance outages,
until December 1993.
Whether the leakage problem was due to valve
misapplication or poor maintenance work practices was unclear.
b:
Volume Control Tank Level Switch LS-0204
This level switch was found leaking at its flanged connection and
successfully repaired.
Good coord1nation and communication was
observed during the repair effort.
No violations, deviations, unresolved, or inspection followup items were
identified in this area.
Surveillance (61726, 42700)
The inspector reviewed technical specifications required surveillance
testing as described below, and verified that testing was performed in
accordance with adequate procedures, test instrumentation was
calibrated, limfting conditions for operation were met.
The inspector
further verified that the removal and restoration of the affected
components were properly accomplished, test results conformed with
technical specifications and procedure requirements, test results were
revi.ewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and
deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and
resolved by appropriate management personnel.
a.
QR-22, "Process Monitor Functional Checks - Quarterly," Rev.5
b.
DW0-13, "LLRT - local leak Rate Tests And Inner And Outer
Personnel Air lock Door Seals," Rev.7
c.
M0-7A-l,
"Em~rgen9 Diesel Generator 1-1 (K-6A)," Rev.29
d.
NMS-10, "Dual linear Power Current Measurements," Rev.6
No violations, deviations, unresolved, or inspection followup items were
identified in this area.
7.
Cold Weather Preparations (71714)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's cold weather protective measures
program.
The program was adequately implemented ensuring that safety-
rel ated systems are protected against cold weather.
n
'
The program consists of two operating checklists - CL-CWCL-1, Cold*
Weather Checklist," and CL-CWCL-2, "Cold Weather Checkltst
(Electrical)." The inspector conducted walkdowns of portions of both
checklists. There were no instances identified of unprotected safety-
related equipment.
Additionally, some components are routinely
monitored for the effects of cold weather through other plant procedures
or by auxiliary operator log sheets.
For example, temperatures of the
safety injection and refueling water storage tank and the condensate
storage tank are monitored shiftly by the operators.
One observation was that the blank checklists need to be updated to
accurately reflect plant conditions. There were eleven changes
requested on the completed copies or the checklists that would clean up
the documents and help prevent all the p~n and ink changes.
One other item noted was the standing "Radwaste Area Fuel Handling
Freeze Protection" control room alarm.
The associated alarm response
procedure directed the operators to ensure the steam supply to heating
coils VHX-7A and VHX-78 was functioning properly, or else initiate work
requests, as necessary. Heating coils VHX-7A and 78 supply heat to the
area around the spent fuel pool floor in the auxiliary building.
They
are not technical specification-related nor safety-related.
Followup indicated there were work requests in place to repair the
heating coils.
However, it appears the licensee has experienced
difficulty in repairing the heating coils. The problem is that the
steam inlet valves for the coils (CV-1547A and CV-15478) have a history
of improper operation, possibly due to system design or poor
maintenance.
No violations, deviations, unresolved, or inspection followup items were
identified in this area.
8.
Engineering and Technical Support (37700,92705)
The inspector monitored engineering and technical support activities at
the site and, on occasion, as provided to the site from the corporate
office. The purpose was to assess the adequacy of these functions in
contributing properly to other functions such as operations,
maintenante, testing~ lraining, fire protection, and configuration
management.
The inspector checked the status of the licensee's investigation into a
related event that occurred at another nuclear facility.
On November 13, 1993, the Fort Calhoun Nuclear Plant was near the end of
a refueling outage when they experienced an uncontrolled withdrawal of a
The unexpected control motion was the result of the
contacts used to control rod motion being bypassed due to two grounds
that developed in unfavorable locations.
The licensee was unaware of
- the presence of the grounds until the undesired control rod motion
occurred because no ground detection system was installed at Fort
Calhoun.
The Palisades staff found that a similar problem could exist at their
facility. A control rod or even a group of rods could be inadvertently
raised or lowered as a result of two grounds developing in strategic
locations.
In reviewing this event, the inspectors noted that maintenance practices
on the control rod drive system appears good.
This should help reduce
the likelihood of a ground.
All accessible control rod drive cabling
was walked down at the end of the most recent refueling outage.
In
recent years, various cables and connectors in the system were replaced.
In addition, control room operators have-redundant indication of
unexpected control rod movement in the alarms, lights, computer
printouts, etc. Action could then be taken to remove power to the
control rod drive motors.
The event has been analyzed and is found in Section 14.2 of the Final
Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).
The FSAR discusses the uncontrolled
withdrawal of a control rod or a group of control rods from various
reactor conditions.
The licensee's response on this issue was excellent. They immediately
began to work through Combustion Engineering and the Fort Calhoun
licensee to understand the problem and formulate a plan of action.
The
licensee is still considering several actions in response to this issue,
including installing a ground detection feature within the control rod
drive system.
This is considered an inspection followup item
(255/93029-0l(DRS)) pending NRC review of the licensee's actions.
One inspection followup item was identified, and no violations,
deviations, or unresolved items were identified in this ~rea.
9.
Region III Requests (92705)
J
The inspector responded to a request to determine whether the licensee
uses Automatic Timing and Controls Company (ATC) relays in their
emergency diesel generator (DG) load sequencer circuitry.
The request
was in response to relay failures in the DG loading scheme at another
U.S. nuclear facility.
This concern does not exist at Palisades.
Palisades has three such
relays installed in a nonsafety related application.
They are used for
chlorination in the secondary plant...
No violations, deviations, unresolved, or inspection followup items were
identified in this area.
10.
Persons Contacted
Consumers Power Company
G. B.
- R. D.
- R. M.
D. D.
- T. J.
- D. W.
K. M.
R. B.
K. E.
- C. R.
-- -*J. c.
- H. A.
J. L.
D. J.
J. H.
Slade, Plant General Manager
Orosz, Nuclear Engineering & Construction Manager
Rice, Director, NPAD
Hice, Nuclear Training Manager
Palmisano, Plant Operations Manager
Rogers, Safety & Licensing Director
Haas~ Radiological Services Manager
Kasper, Maintenance Manager _
Osborne, System Engineering Manager
Ritt, Administrative Manager
Griggs, Human Resource Director
Heavin, Controller
Hanson, Operations Superintendent
Malone, Radiological Services Superintendent
Kuemin, Licensing Administrator
Nuclear Regulatory Commission CNRC)
- M. E. Parker, Senior Resident Inspector
- D. G. Passehl, Resident Inspector
- Denotes those present at the e~it meeting on December 16, 1993.
In addition, the inspectors interviewed other licensee personnel
including shift supervisors, control operators and engineering
personnel.
10