IR 05000255/1993003
| ML18058B753 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 04/05/1993 |
| From: | Shafer W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | Slade G CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18058B754 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9304130133 | |
| Download: ML18058B753 (19) | |
Text
Docket No. 50-255 Consumers Power Company ATTN:
Gerald General Manager UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION Ill 799 ROOSEVELT ROAD GLEN ELLYN, ILLINOIS 60137 APR n :; '1:(i3 v
....
......_.
Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant 27780 Blue Star Memorial Highway Covert, MI 49043-9530
Dear Mr. Slade:
This refers to the inspection conducted by Messrs. J. K. Heller and D. G.
Passehl of this office, and Ms. M. K. Gamberoni of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, on February 9 through March 22, 1993.
The inspection included a review of authorized activities for the Palisades Nuclear Generating Facility.
At the conclusion of the inspection, the findings were discussed with those members of your staff identified in the enclosed report.
Areas examined during the inspection are identified in the report.
Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selective examinations of procedures and representative records, interviews with personnel, and observation of activities in progress.
During this inspection, two notable personnel errors occurred.
The first pertained to control rod testing (paragraph 3.d); the second pertained to movement of fuel in the spent fuel pool (paragraph 3.b). These errors and other personnel errors that have occurred over the past 6 months are of concern, because it appears that the frequency of personnel errors has increased.
Individually, none of the errors caused a significant safety problem, but collectively they may be a precursor to a decline in plant performance, or to a more significant problem.
We will continue to evaluate your actions in regard to this issue.
No violations of NRC requiremerits were identified during the course of this inspection.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the Commission's regulations, a copy of this letter will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
9304130133 930405 PDR ADOCK 05000255 G
...
APR C 2 1293
- .* Consumers Power Company
We will gladly discuss any questions you have concerning this inspection.
Enclosure:
Inspection Report
No. 50-255/93003(DRP)
Inspection Report
No. 50-255/93003(DRP)
cc w/enclosure:
David P. Hoffman, Vice President Nuclear Operations OC/LFDCB Resident Inspector,*RIII James R. Padgett, Michigan Public Service Commission Michigan Department of Public Health.
Palisades, LPM, NRR SRI, Big Rock Point M. K. Gamberoni, NRR
Sincerely, w Ds-~ a*
W. D. Sh~~f Reactor Projects Branch 2
- .. i
'** 1393
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I I I Report No. 50-255/93003(DRP)
Docket No. 50-255 Licensee: Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, MI 49201 Facility Name:
Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant Inspection At:
Palisades Site, Covert, MI Inspection Conducted:
February 9 through March 22, 1993 Inspectors: J. K. Heller D. G. Passehl M. K. GamAer?in);J. 'b
~II-~~'"'
Approved By:ki 8. L. Jorg~nsen, Chief p ~Reactor Projects Section 2A Inspection Summary Inspection from February 9 through March 22, 1993 (Report No. 50-255/93003(0RP))
License No. DPR-20 q-;;;.-93 DATE Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by the resident inspectors of actions on previously identified items, plant operations, maintenance, surveillance, engineering and technical support, quality program activities, and NRC Region III requests; routine announced inspection by an NRR engineer of dry cask storage operations; and participation by the SRI in a meeting with members of the public.
No Safety Issues Management System (SIMS) i*tems were reviewed.
Results:
No cited violations or deviations were identified in any of the nine areas inspected.
The strengths, weaknesses, and inspection followup items are discussed in paragraph l, "Management Interview."
In summary, a strength was noted in the recently initiated air operated valve program.
Weaknesses were noted in a spent fuel pool handling machine malfunction, and in~ control rod drive testing error, both due to personnel error.
9304130151 930405 PDR ADOCK 05000255 Q
1.
DETAILS Management Interview (71707)
The inspectors met with licensee representatives - denoted in paragraph 12 - on March 30, 1993, to discuss the scope and findings of the inspection.
In addition, the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection was also discussed.
The licensee did not identify any such documents or processes as proprietary.
Highlights of the management interview are discussed below:
a.
Strengths noted:
The licensee recently initiated an air operated valve (AOV)
program.
The program includes performing AOV walkdowns, design reviews, procedure development, and program upkeep (paragraph 6.a).
b.
Weaknesses noted:
The spent fuel pool handling machine malfunctioned due to a personnel error.
An operator inappropriately used an override key in an unsuccessful attempt to seat and ungrapple a fuel assembly that would not go in a storage location (paragraph 3.b).
A control rod testing error occurred due to a personnel error.
An operator mistakenly tested control rod drives 20 and 31 during biweekly testing (paragraph 3.d).
The licensee stated at the management meeting that they are aware of the weaknesses and have started to address them.
They are also taking action to address other personnel errors that have occurred over the past 6 months.
The inspector will continue to follow the licensee's corrective actions on these issues.
2.
Actions on Previously Identified Items (92701, 92702)
a.
(Closed) Violation 255/91021-01: Failure To Submit A Licensee Event Report (LER)
In February 1991, while the licensee was performing special test T-297, "Diesel Generator 1-1 Load Reject," an unanticipated undervoltage condition occurred which resulted in the start of the 1-2 diesel generator.
The licensee determined the event was reportable as an event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of an engineered safety feature.
However, the licensee did not submit an LER as required by 10 CFR 50.73.
The licensee attributed the cause of this event to a
- miscommunication between the Corrective Action Coordinator (CAC)
and the Plant Licensing Administrator.
The miscommunication occurred after a plant reorganization.
During the reorganization, responsibility for submitting LERs was transferred to the plant licensing section from the CAC.
However, the plant licensing section was not notified by the CAC that a reportable event had occurred.
This was an isolated instance.
The licensee changed administrative procedure 3.03, "Corrective Action," to ensure events deemed reportable are quickly delivered to the licensing section for action. There have been no other observed instances of missed LER submittal.
b.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 255-91012-02: Failure of CV-05228 To Stroke Fully Open The licensee was stroke timing, in the open direction, control valve CV-05228, "Steam Supply to the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump from the 11A 11 Steam Generator," when it failed to indicate fully open.
The stroke timing was part of surveillance test Q0-21, "Auxiliary Feedwater System Valves Inservice Test Procedure."
The test required that the open indication light on CV-05228 be illuminated within 200 seconds.
The open indication light never illuminated.
The shift engineer performed an operability determination and concluded that the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump was operable, because the discharge flow rate of 165 gpm was achieved.
The determination, however, did not consider the time to achieve 165 gpm. The licensee delayed corrective maintenance on CV-05228 about 4 days based on the operability determination.
This inspector followup item questioned the operability determination of CV-05228.
ASME Section XI IWV-3417(b) stated
.
that a valve shall be declared inoperable if it failed to exhibit the required change of valve stem or disk position or exceeded the stroke time.
Section XI also required that corrective action shall be completed within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
The licensee's followup evaluation confirmed that CV-05228 performed in a manner such that the turbine driven auxiliary feed pump achieved the required flow and discharge pressure within 90 seconds.
Further, the accident analyses described in the Final Safety Analyses Report stated that proper flow was based on the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump achieving a flow rate of 155 gpm in 177 seconds.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's evaluation and concluded that enforcement action was not warranted.
Additionally, the licensee concluded that the valve should have been declared inoperable when the light did not indicate that the valve fully opened within 200 seconds.
The licensee has since repaired the
- position indicator and added explicit acceptance criteria pertaining to operability and time to indicate open.
c.
(Closed) Inspection Followup Item 255-90031-03: Containment Rebar and Stiffener Reconfiguration This item was identified during part of the containment cutting and removal process during the steam generator replacement project (SGRP).
There were changes made in the configuration of some rebar around the containment opening to facilitate the SGRP.
Also, the stiffeners for a replacement section of containment liner plate were not placed at the same location as stiffeners from the existing liner plate.
The inspector considered these changes to the original plant design that were not reflected in any Facility Change package.
- The licensee incorporated the new stiffener configuration onto engineered drawing C-3011.
Two Facility Change Notices, Nos. 236 and 286, describe the new stiffener configuration.
The as-built configuration of the rebar has been documented in Facility Change Notice No. 237.
No violations, deviations, unresolved or inspection followup items were identified.
3.
Operational Safety Verification (71707, 71710, 42700)
Routine facility steady state operating activities were observed as conducted in the plant and from the main control room.
Performance of reactor operators and senior reactor operators, shift engineers, and auxiliary equipment operators was observed and evaluated.
Included in the review were procedure use and adherence, records and logs, communications, shift/duty turnover, and the degree of professionalism of control room activities.
Evaluation, corrective action, and response for off normal conditions were examined.
This included compliance to any reporting requirements.
Observations of the control room monitors, indicators, and recorders were made to verify the operability of emergency systems, radiation monitoring systems, and nuclear reactor protection systems.
Reviews of surveillance, equipment condition, and tagout lQgs were conducted.
Proper return to service of selected components was verified.
a.
General The plant operated at essentially full power during this reporting period.
'.
b.
Spent Fuel Pool Handling Machine Malfunction due to a Personnel Error At approximately 2:30 a.m. (EST) on March 21, 1993, the spent fuel pool handling machine malfunctioned.
This occurred during preplanned moves of spent fuel to support the upcoming 1993 refueling outage.
The cause was personnel error because an operator inappropriately used an override key in an unsuccessful attempt to seat and ungrapple a fuel assembly that would not go in a storage location.
When the operator attempted to remove the fuel assembly from the storage location, several inches of the main cable unwrapped from the drum on the handling machine and wrapped around the motor shaft. The cable remained attached to the drum but allowed the fuel assembly to drop approximately six inches.
The fuel assembly was then suspended approximately six inches above the bottom of the spent fuel pool.
The operator verified that the fuel assembly was not damaged and that there was no release of radioactivity.
The shift supervisor directed that power to the spent fuel handling machine be shut off.
He also secured all other activities ongoing in the spent fuel pool area. The senior resident inspector responded to the site, attended the licensee's technical briefing, and verified that the fuel assembly was in a safe configuration.
System engineers and a field representative for the refueling machine examined the cable configuration and concluded that the fuel assembly was safe. A course of action was proposed anq evaluated.
The corrective actions were implemented following the close of this inspection period.
Since this event happened on the last day of the iflspection period, the licensee's recovery and the NRC inspection activities were incomplete.
They will be subject to continuing routine inspection. Also, because it appears procedural controls may have been violated, the event will be evaluated for enforcement.
This matter is therefore considered an unresolved item (unresolved item 255-93003-01 (DRP)).
c.
Containment Escape Air Lock Penetration Leak Test Failure Results in 50.72 Telephone Notification On March 5, 1993, during the performance of the containment escape airlock pressurization test per S0-4b, "Escape Air Lock Penetration Leak Test," the containment escape air lock inner door equalizing valve stuck open, causing the air lock test to fail.
The outer door was verified to be air tight, assuring that containment integrity had not been breached.
Personnel entered containment through the personnel airlock, manually closed the valve, and successfully completed the test.
- The next day, while restoring the escape air lock to its normal pre-test condition, personnel observed that the inner door equalizing valve lever arm was.out of its normal position by 1/8 to 1/4 of an inch. This was identified after personnel had opened the escape hatch outer door to remove strong backs from the inner door.
The licensee was unable to determine if the position of the lever arm equated to the equalizing valve being open by the same amount.
If the valve was opened by 1/4 of an inch, then a pathway existed from the containment to the outside when the outer door was open, and containment would have been breached.
The licensee conservatively declared the escape air lock inoperable and made the telephone notification per 10 CFR 50.72.
They planned a written notification per 10 CFR 50.73.
The licensee's initial evaluation determined that the vendor recommended lubricant dries and becomes tacky due to the normal ambient temperature in the containment and from lack of use.
The escape air lock doors are maintained closed, except to facilitate performance of the test.
The licensee has verified that the equalizing valve was shut and has planned outage related work orders to disassemble, clean, and lubricate the valve. Additionally, the licensee is attempting to devise a test to determine if the position of the lever arm equates to the position of the valve.
This subject will be evaluated further when the 10 CFR 50.73 written notification is issued.
d.
Control Rod Testing Error Due to a Personnel Error On March 10, 1993, during the scheduled biweekly testing of the control rod drives, an operator mistakenly tested control rod drives (CRDs) 20 and 31.
The shift supervisor told the operator during the shift turnover meeting that day to test all control rods except CRDs 31 and 20.
These rods were scheduled to be tested the last week of the month.
The CRDs 20 and 31 were the subject of a Technical Specification amendment that relaxed *the biweekly testing for these two CRDs to once during the month of March 1993.
This amendment was applicable for the remainder of the cycle 10 operating cycle.
The biweekly test consisted of moving the CRDs inward and outward a distance of six inches.
Because the primary coolant system boundary seals for CRDs 20 and 31 were degrading, the requirement to test these two CRDs was relaxed.
The licensee had shown that biweekly testing accelerated the seal degradation and the leakage for the two CRDs.
Testing the two CRDs at the beginning of the month or the end of the month likely
would have had the same effect of accelerating the seal deterioration and increasing the leakage.
However, performance of the test at the beginning of the month may have caused a forced outage approximately a month before the scheduled refueling outage.
This was because the CRD leakoff rate may increase and exceed the administrative limit, prior to the start of the refueling outage.
While the operator's actions were in compliance with the Technical Specifications, he was not in compliance with the scheduling requirements of the licensee.
The inspector's review of this event will be included with his evaluation of the licensee's actions to address the apparent rise in the number of personnel errors, as discussed in paragraph 1 above.
No violations, deviations, or inspection followup items were identified.
One unresolved item was identified.
4.
Maintenance (62703, 42700)
Maintenance activities in the plant were routinely inspected, including both corrective maintenance (repairs) and preventive maintenance.
Mechanical, electrical, and instrument and control group maintenance activities were included as available.
The focus of the inspection was to assure the maintenance activities reviewed were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards, and in conformance with Technical Specifications. The following items were considered during this review: the Limiting Conditions for Operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities w~re accomplished using approved procedures; and post maintenance testing was performed as applicable.
The following work order (WO) and other activities were inspected:
a.
WO 24300763 Duty Test of the Spent Fuel Building Crane b.
WO 24300717 Smoke Coming from the Spent Fuel Building Crane c.
WO 24300677 Install Thermocouples on the Spent Fuel Building Crane Speed Control Resistor Banks d.
WO 24300753 Spent Fuel Pool Crane Repairs e.
MSM-43
"Scaffolding" The inspector reviewed this permanent maintenance procedure and questioned if the procedure adequately addressed the seismic requirements for scaffolding placed over safety related equipment.
The
- .
inspector did not identify any problems with as-installed scaffolding currently in use, but noted that there may be an administrative problem.
While the procedure appropriately addressed requirements for ventilation, fire protection, and lighting, the reference section and the body of MSM-M-43 did not clearly state or provide reference to an analysis showing that the scaffolding, constructed to MIOSHA safety standards, was able to withstand seismic events.
The inspector's observations were discussed with the maintenance department superintendent.
He acknowledged the observation and agreed to evaluate the procedure and make enhancements as appropriate.
I No violations, deviations, unresolved or inspection followup items were i dent ifi ed.
5.
Surveillance (61726, 42700)
6.
The inspector reviewed Technical Specifications required surveillance testing as described below and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures. Additionally, test instrumentation was calibrated, Limiting Conditions for Operation were met, removal and restoration of the affected components were properly accomplished, and test results conformed with Technical Specifications and procedure requirements.
The results were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test and deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
The following activities were inspected:
a.
M0-7A-2, "Emergency Diesel Generator 1-2 (**K-68)"
b.
MI-4, "Pressurizer Low Pressure SIS Initiate and Pressurizer High Level Alarm" c.
M0-38, "Auxiliary Feedwater System lnservice Test Procedure" D.
S0-48, "Pressurization of the Containment Escape Air Lock" No violations, deviations, unresolved or inspection followup items were identified.
Engineering and Technical Support (37700)
The inspector monitored engineering and technical support activities at the site and, on occasion, as provided to the site from the corporate office. The purpose was to assess the adequacy of these functions in contributing properly to other functions such as operations, maintenance, testing, training, fire protection, and configuration management.
- .
. -.
Air Operated Valve Program The inspector discussed air operated control valves (AOVs) with the valve program system engineer and his supervisor in the Performance and Components section.
The inspector also met with the other system engineers in that group to discuss current and future projects. The licensee recently initiated a program to improve maintenance and testing of AOVs by performing a detailed review of AOV design criteria.
The licensee's program includes performing walkdowns, design reviews, procedure development, and program upkeep.
The inspector was presented a proposed schedule listing milestones and priorities. The licensee stated there was no written guidance to assist in setting up such a program.
They performed a study of other programs and researched many manuals on AOVs to assist in the development of this program.
This appears to be a good initiative in which the licensee has taken an aggressive lead in this area in anticipating future industry developments.
No violations, deviations, unresolved or inspection followup items were identified.
7.
Dry Cask Storage Operations (42700, 86700, 37702, 37703)
An NRR engineer and the site inspectors reviewed and observed selected activities pertaining to the dry cask storage project. This included a review of severa~l dry cask storage procedures, a review of several 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluations, and observations of selected preoperational check outs.
a.
Procedures Reviewed (1)
Procedure T-FC-864-01, "Preoperational Test Procedure for Loading and Placing the Ventilated Storage Cask into Storage," provided the instructions to ensure the proper preparation and organization of the equipment used to support dry cask storage prior to loading of irradiated fuel.
(2)
Procedure FHS-M-33, "Equipment Preparation for Dry Fuel Loading Operations," provided the instructions for the preparation and organization of equipment prior to loading the casks. This procedure will be finalized after the completion of the preoperational checkout.
The inspectors review indicated that NUREG 0612, "Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants," was considered during preparation of the draft procedure.
- .
(3)
A draft of FHS-M-32, "Loading and Placing the Ventilated Storage Cask into Storage," was also reviewed.
This procedure provided the permanent instructions for dry cask storage.
The instructions were comprehensive and range from movement of the Multi-assembly Sealed Basket (MSB) and the MSB Transfer Cask (MTC) into the spent fuel pool, to placing the Ventilated Storage Cask (VSC) on the storage pad.
Sufficient detail was provided in this procedure to meet the NUREG 0612 guidance on specific sequencing.
(4)
Procedure FHS-M-23, "Movement of Heavy Loads in the Spent Fuel Pool Area," was revised to include dry cask storage heavy loads to the routine heavy loads list and a new load path to allow movement from the cask wash down pit to the cask loading area. Also, lifting constraints and procedural steps were added which addressed movement of the MSB/MTC from the cask wash down pit to the spent fuel pool.
Attachment 4 contained a diagram of the interlock limit switch area.
The diagram did not accurately define the area in which the interlocks are in effect. It defined the critical area over the spent fuel pool, but the interlocks are in effect for an area greater than the pool boundaries.
The licensee agreed to revise Attachment 4 to reflect the area covered by the interlocks.
b.
Fuel Pool Crane Load Test Attachment 14, "Fuel Pool Crane Load Test" to T-FC-864-01, described the before and after visual inspection requirements of the L-3 crane, its supporting structur~s, and the track alley.
Documentation of the licensee's inspection included*photos and sketches.
The results of the post load test inspection identified some minor surface cracking that did not effect structural integrity. The NRC inspector performed a walkthrough of the area and did not identify any other indications or structural problems.
c.
50.59 Safety Evaluations The inspector reviewed the 10 CFR 50.59 documentation for T-FC-864-01 and Facility change 864.
The safety reviews clearly addressed the requirements of 50.59(a)(l) and the unreviewed safety question (USQ) evaluations satisfied 50.59(a)(2).
The safety analysis included an overall description of the area of review and the justification for the answers to the USQ evaluations as required by 50.59(b)(l).
The T-FC-864-01 package covered the work performed by procedure T-FC-864-01.
The evaluation did not identify any USQs.
The FC-864 package included the 50.59 review for the entire spent fuel dry storage process. This package contained two USQ
- determinations with "yes" responses: (1) "Will the possibility of an accident of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR be created?"; and (2) "Will the possibility of a malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR be created?" This will be evaluated by the NRC Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards in a Safety Evaluation Report.
A Certificate of Compliance per 10 CFR 72.212(a)(3) will constitute NRC approval and per 10 CFR 72.212(b)(l) the NRC must be notified 90 days prior to the first storage of spent fuel.
The licensee informed the inspector that this notification had been made.
d.
Observation of the Preoperational Checkout (1)
Preshift Briefing The movement of the MSB and MTC into the spent fuel pool was designated as an infrequently performed evolution.
Infrequently performed evolutions are performed in accordance with Administrative Procedure No. 4.07,
"Operations Organization, Responsibility, and Conduct."
A preshift briefing was conducted for this evolution.
Information provided during the briefing included precautions; a review of the procedural steps expected to be performed; identification of key management, technical and operations personnel and their associated responsibilities.
Management reviewed the objectives and safety concerns, specifically emphasizing limited tolerances between the MTC and the spent fuel. Checklists were completed as required.
The briefing was effective and met the objectives of the Administrative Procedure.
(2)
Multi-assembly Sealed Basket (MSB) and the MSB Transfer Cask (MTC) Lift The MSB/MTC was moved from the cask wash down pit on February 14, 1993, per step 6.15.15 of procedure T-FC-864-01.
Prior to movement of the MSB/MTC, the daily crane inspection sheet was completed, the crane operator and signal person reviewed signals, and environmental conditions were verified to be in accordance with the procedure requirements.
Per conversation with a supervisor of the crane operating crew, the team had discussed and determined that the best way to move the MSB/MTC would be in small increments as opposed to one long movement.
At the beginning of the move, key 20 was operated. This limited north/south movement of the crane over to an area which included the majority of the spent fuel pool.
The MSB/MTC was lifted vertically and then moved west to clear
ductwork and then north over the cask wash down pit.
The MTC/MSB was then moved west.
The crane stopped unexpectedly during east-west movement, approximately one foot west of the cask wash down pit.
The stop was apparently caused by the mechanical design of the interlocks. Management approval was obtained to insert override key 21 to determine if the problem was due to the interlock. After the key was inserted, the crane would still not move.
The key was removed, the crane was moved east, and then crane movement to the west was restored.
A positive determination could not be made why the crane had stopped.
Maintenance personnel observed the location of the crane where movement stopped prior to the MTC/MSB being set back into the wash down pit.
A team of maintenance, operations, and engineering personnel was established to determine the cause of the crane stopping.
The team concluded that due to the mechanical design of the interlock, the hook must travel 3" to 4" past an interlock to reset.
The decision to secure work until the cause was determined for the crane stopping was appropriate.
(3)
Spent Fuel Pool Crane Malfunction On March 1, 1993, the licensee attempted to remove the MTC from the spent fuel pool per step 6.15.34 of T-FC-864-01 when electrical control cabling overheated. A crane operator observed a resistor bank in the electrical circuitry for the crane glowing red.
He also observed smoke emanating from one of the electrical cables connected to the resister bank.
The operator immediately ceased movement and deenergized the crane.
The MSB/MTC had been lifted about 20 feet above the bottom of the spent fuel pool when the incident occurred.
No fuel had been loaded into the MSB since this was a dry run.
At no time was the load suspended or planned to be moved over spent fuel stored in the pool.
Had it dropped it would not have impacted the fuel.
The crane brakes are independent of electrical cabling and remained functional.
Electricians inspected the cabling and found that the cloth jacket surrounding insulation on one of the cables was damaged.
The licensee subsequently determined that frequent starts and stops in combination with operating the crane at a very low speed for extended periods of time contributed to the overheating condition.
The licensee's followup evaluation determined that the insulation beneath the cloth jacket was satisfactory to enable the activity to continue.
During the Corrective Action Review Board that was conducted before authorization to continue was granted, the licensee considered the options of seating the MTC/MSB in the spent fuel pool or continuing with the lift. The inspector pointed out that continuation of the lift could invalidate this portion of the preoperational checkout.
The inspector watched the licensee lower the MTC/MSB back into the pool. This was done at 9 p.m. EST.
The lifting
- rig was removed, and the crane parked away from the spent fuel pool to permit evaluation.
The licensee delayed removal of the MTC/MSB until the crane problems were understood, resolved, and discussed with NRC Region III.
The inspector watched the licensee confirm, by lifting the ventilated concrete cask per work order and work instruction 24300763, that operation of the crane in slow speed will cause the resistor bank to glow red.
The crane has five speeds and has minimal heat load to the resisters in the middle to higher speeds.
The inspector observed the licensee remove the MTC/MSB from the spent fuel pool per step 6.15.34 of T-FC-864-01.
The activity was accomplished with personnel watching the crane speed control and the resistance banks.
The removal was accomplished without incident.
e.
Conclusion The inspectors observed several portions of the preoperational check out and concluded that the portions observed were performed in accordance with the preoperational checkout procedure and controlled by the plant administrative procedures.
The preoperational checkout cataloged several problems that were clearly identified to site management and resolved before proceeding to the next phase of the checkout.
No violations, deviations, unresolved or inspection followup items were identified.
8.
Quality Program Activities (37701, 38702, 407404, 92720)
The effectiveness of management controls, verification and oversight activities, in the conduct of jobs observed during this inspection, was evaluated.
The inspector frequently attended management and supervisory meetings involving plant status and plans and focusing on proper coordination among departments.
The results of licensee auditing and corrective action programs were routinely monitored by attendance at Corrective Action Review Board (CARB} meetings and by review of Deviation Reports and Event Reports.
As applicable, corrective action program documents were forwarded to the NRC Region III technical specialists for information and possible followup evaluation.
On March 15, 1993, the Manager of Safety and Licensing at Palisades Nuclear Plant was named Plant Manager of Consumers Power Company's Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant.
The licensee was still in the process of selecting a replacement Safety and Licensing Manager at the close of inspection period.
No violations, deviations, unresolved or inspection followup items were identified.
9.
Public Meeting (94600, 94703}
On March 15, 1993, the Senior Resident Inspector was the guest speaker at a biweekly meeting of the local chapter of Beta Sigma Phi.
Beta Sigma Phi is a women's service organization with a membership that includes teachers, a principal, self-employed business women, and members of the local medical community.
The meeting was hosted by the Chapter President, held at a private residence, and was attended by approximately twenty members of Beta Sigma Phi.
The purpose was to discuss Dry Cask Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel at the Palisades Nuclear Power Plant.
To accomplish the purpose the inspector showed videos, provided general information, and responded to several questions.
The videos provided general information about the spent fuel storage system and why dry cask storage was required.
Several questions were asked pertaining to:
(1) radiation dose to the workers and general public; (2) the difference between dry cask storage and spent fuel pool storage; (3) the final option for storage of spent fuel; (4) when the final option will be approved; (5) renewal of the cask license for an additional twenty years; and, (6) whether the VCC-24 is an untested design.
The presentation lasted 45 minutes.
Informal feedback from several of those in attendance indicated that the presentation accomplished the purpose.
10.
Region III Requests (92705)
a.
Emergency Diesel Generator Cooling Water Chemistry The inspector reviewed the applicability at Palisades of a Technical Issue Summary entitled 11Derating Capacity of General Motors EMD Diesel Generators When Using a Glycol-Water Cooling Mixture.
A licensee at another nuclear facility discovered that
when a glycol-water mixture is used for cooling the engine the rating of the EDGs should be reduced by 5 percent.
The inspector reviewed COP-22, "Diesel Generator Cooling Water Chemistry," and interviewed the system engineer and chemistry department personnel. This issue does not apply at Palisades as no glycol is added to the engine coolant.
The engine is cooled using a treated water solution of sodium nitrite, which is consistent with the vendor recommended practice.
b.
Land Vehicle Bomb Threat and Response Procedures The inspector reviewed the licensee's contingency plans regarding a land vehicle bomb threat and response.
The inspection included a review of the licensee procedures; discussions with security management; and a tour of the licensee's owner controlled area.
The information was forwarded to NRC regional and headquarters offices as requested.
No violations, deviations, unresolved or inspection rollowup items were identified.
11.
Unresolved Items Unresolved Items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations, or deviations.
An Unresolved Item disclosed during.the inspection is discussed in paragraph 3.b.
12.
Persons Contacted Consumers Power Company G. B. Slade, Plant General Manager
- T. J. Palmisano, Plant Operations Manager
- D. J. VandeWalle, Mech/Civil/Structural Engr. Manager R. 0. Orosz~ Nuclear Engineering & Construction Manager K. M. Haas, Radiological Services Manager
- J. L. Hanson, Operations Superintendent
- R. B. Kasper, Maintenance Manager K. E. Osborne, System Engineering Manager Nuclear Regulatory Commission CNRCl W. 0. Shafer, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 2
- B. L. Jorgensen, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 2A J. K. Heller, Senior Resident Inspector
- 0. Passehl, Resident Inspector
- Denotes some of those present at the management interview on March 30, 1993.
- Other members of the plant staff, and several members of the contract security force, were also contacted during the inspection period.
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