IR 05000255/1993012

Insp Rept 50-255/93-12 on 930518-0628.Noncited Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operational Safety Verification, Outages,Radiological Controls,Maint,Surveillance,Security & NRC Compliance Bulletin

ML18058B928
Person / Time
Site:	Palisades
Issue date:	07/16/1993
From:	Mccabe B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML18058B927	List: IR 05000255/1993012 ML18058B926
References
50-255-93-12, NUDOCS 9307220014
Download: ML18058B928 (17)

Text

u. s. NUCLEAR REGULATORY *coMMISSION

• . REGION I H*

Report No. 50-255/93012(DRP)

Docket No. 50-255 licensee: Consumers Power Cpmpany 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, MI 49201

Facility Name:.Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant Inspection At:

Palisad~s Site. Covert, MI Inspection Conducted:

May 18 through June 28, 1993

. Inspectors: J. K. Heller D.* G. Passehl Approved Inspe~tion Summary License No. DPR-20 DA~

Inspection frbm May 18 through Jun~ 28, 1993, (Report N ~255/93012CDRP))

• Areas Inspected:. Routine unannounced inspe~tion by the resident inspectors of actions.on previously identified items, operational safety Yerification, outages, radiological controls, maintenaric~. surveillance, security, and an NRC comp*l i ~nee bul 1 et i Results:

One non~cited violation (NCV) was identified pertaining to restoration of a hydrogen recombine~ following maintenance (paragraph 6.b~).

The strengths, weaknesses, and inspection followup items are discussed in paragraph l, "Management Interview~"

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9307220014 930716 PDR ADOCK 05000255 G

PDR

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DETAILS Management Interview (7l707)

The inspectors met with licensee representatives denoted in paragraph 10 on July 2, 1993, to di~cuss the scope and findings of the inspectio In addition, the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection was discusse The licensee did not identify any such documents or processes as proprietar Highlights of the exit interview ar~ discussed below: Strengths noted:

1)

Management of activities pertaining to reduced primary

.. coolant ~ystem water level (para~raph 3.e)

2)

• Recovery of a stuck fuel bundle (paragraph 4.b).

3) *

Management of secondary side water chemistry (paragraph4.d)

b, Weaknesses noted:

1)

2)

The apparent lack of preplarining for a work activity (paragraph 3.b)

Failure to execute a restoration switching and tagging order (paragraphs 2.t and 6.b) The licensee was informed that *the NRC's review of the failu~~ to disengage a control.rod from the rack extension was the subject of a special inspection (paragraph 4.c). *

• The non-cited violation pe~tainfng to the hydfogen recombiners was discussed (paragraph 6.c) Actions on Previously Identified It~ms (92701, 92702) (Closed) Unresolved Item 255/93003-0l(DRP): Spent Fuel Pool Handling Machine Malfunction duecto Personnel Erro The inspection effort and enforcement action was documented in paragraph 8 of Inspection Report No. 255/93008(DRP).

The licensee's response to the enforcement action has not been evaluated and will be the subject of a subsequent inspection.

.2

. (Closed) Inspector Followup Item 255/92027-02(DRP): The Palisades Senicir Resident Inspector made a verbal commitment to the Michigan Department of Public Health pertaining to NRC inspection activities when the first dry fuel storage cask was loade Th~ site inspection staff, with support from inspectors stationed in Reg ion II I, at D. C. *cook, and at NRC Headquarters, observed*

loading and placement into storage of the.first two dry fuel storage cask The inspection effort was docu~ented in paragr~ph 9 of Inspectio~ Report 255/93008(DRP). (Closed) Inspection Followup Item 255/92027-03(DRP): The Michigan Department of Public Health requested notification from the Region III State Liaison Officer when the litensee started loading the first dry fuel storage cas *

The Region III State ~iaison Offic~r ~otified the Michi~an Department of Health during the week of May 3, 199 * (Cl-0sed) Inspection Followup Item 255/92018~0l(DRP): Containment

• .

. ~

Penetration Coolin *

This inspection followup item included three concerns regarding cooling for steam li~e containment penetration The first two cbncerns pertained to the fasteners holding ventilation ductwork in plac Work Orders (242032123 and 24203214) resolved these concern The third concern pertained to. the position of ~he contain~ent pen~trati~n temperatur~ prob~s. The lice~see concluded that the position of the probes was correct because past and recent penetration temperature profiles were well below t~e FSAR

. temperature limitation of 200 degrees Fahrenheit for steam line penetrations.*.Additionally, the FSAR stated that forced air cooling ~as not require *The licensee's *evaluation of this item did not identify a condition that affected operability of the cooling system or the penetrations~ The inspector reviewed the licensee evaluatipn and had no additional concern * (Closed)

Unresolved Item 255/91022~04(DRSS): Definition of~

Restricted Are This item was closed in Inspection Report No. 255/93009(DRSS) but was inadvertently listed as Item Number 255/91022-0 The above refer~nced number is the correct numbe No violations, deviations,.unresolved or inspection followup items were identifie. '>-

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Opeiatio~al Safety Verification (71707, 71710, 42700)

Routine facility operating* activities were observed as conducted in the plant and from the main control room,_

Pl~nt steady power oper;ition,*

shutdown activities, and system lineup for reduced inventory operation

• were observed as applicabl *

The performance of reactor operators and senior reactor operators, shift engineers, and auxiliary equipment operators was observed and e_va 1 uate Included in the review were procedure use and adherence, records and logs, communications, shift/duty turnover, and the degree of

~rofessionalism of control room activitie Observations of the control room monitors, indicators, and recorders were made to verify the operability of emergency systems, radiation monitoring systems, and nuclear reactor protection system Reviews of surveillarice, equipment condition, aod tag out logs were conducte Proper return td service of selected components was verifie General The licerisee began the report period with the plant at essentially full power and ended th~ report period with the plant in a refueling outage which started on June 4, 199 T~e refueling outage is,discussed in paragraph 4 of this repor Contaminati~ri of two levels of the Auxiliary Building During a plant cooldown on April _28, 1993, a primary coolant system crud burst was induced and subsequently created a radiation

"hot spot" at a low point drain of the tube side of the "B" shutdown cooling heat exch~n~e *

• The licensee intentionally induced a primary coolant system crud burst at the start of a forced outage t9 r~place degraded control rod drive seal packages.* fnspectitin activities pertaining to-the forced outage were documented in paragr~ph 3.c and 3.d of Inspection Report No. 255/93008(DRP).

The crud burst suspended a l~rge quaritity of contaminated solids*

in the primary cool ant syste It was induced to reduce dose duting the upcoming 1993 refueling out*g The licensee attempted to remove the suspended solids via the chemical and volume control system (CVeS) filters, but the magnitude of the crud burst was larger than expected. This meant that the cleanup time would exceed the time allotted for the forced outage.* The licetisee choose to continue with the cool down to cold shutdown and remove the suspended solids during the heatu When the primary coolant system was placed in shutdown cooling (and the eves removed from service), a hot spot eventually formed at the 16w point drain (MV-3384) on the tube side of the "B" shutdown ~ooling heat exchange The hot spot was metered at GOR/hr on contac.*....

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On.May 19, 1993, the licehse~ attempted to remove the hot spot by attaching a filter and hose to the low point drain (MV-3384).

The hose was directed to a nearby floor drain which communicated to the sump located in the safeguards pump roo MV-3384 was opened and a gravity flow path established from the safety and refueling water (SIRW)

stor~~e tank, to the room drain, and to the room sum The flow rate exceeded the capabilitj of the drain and started to flow onto the floo The operator attempted to reduce the flow rate by closing MV-3383. * MV-3383 stuck partially open and required as~istance from the valve maintenance team to close MV-3383 and cap the drai **

While the valve maintenance team was closing MV-3383,

. approximately tiOOO gallons of water, 92 to 90 percent of t~e SIRW.

tank volume, drained to t~e floor drai The room sump pumps attempted to trari~fer the water to the dirty equipment drain t~nk, but a temporary flow blockage hampered this transfer. This caused the water to back up and flo~ out the floor drains located on the next floor elevatio The flow blockage was subsequently resolve During recovery operations, five personnel and two floors of the auxiliary building were contaminated.* The persorinel were

..

decoritaminated, and the affected levels of the auxiliary b~ilding were cleaned by the next da *

The inspector interviewed the shift supervisor, the operation

• support personnel, and the radiation protection personnel directly involved with the activity. The inspector determined the following:

1)

2)

3)

4)

The shift supervisor had not established a limit for the amount of water that could be drained from the SIRW.tan The SIR~ tank has. a Technical. Specification operability limit based on water level which equated to.85 percen When valve MV-3385 ~as opened, there wa$ no indication of bindin *

The shift super.visor stated that the operations support person was in charge.. The operations support person stated that the radiation protection technician was in charg The radiatioh protection technician refer~nced a.radiation*

protection work permi In addition, the inspector asked the radiation protection supervisor who.stated that operations personnel were in charg The licen~ee, on several previous occasions, had.

successfully removed hot spots in this manner without *

incident;

....-:.\\(.*

. -.-~..

The inspector concluded that:

The draining event h~d no effect on the plant safety and. did not create a personnel safety proble.

5)

6)

• The preplanning for this activity did not identify how much water could be removed from the SIRW tan )

The chain-of-command {who was in charge) was not clearly identifie *

ihe weaknesses identified during the inspector's re~iew w~re discussed.with the plant managers during the inspection ~ctivities and ~t the exit intervie The licensee acknowledged the

_

inspector's comments and was evaluating the need for corrective action * Plant Mode Change With A Hydrogen Recombiner Tagged Out-of-Service 1)

2)

General On May 15, 1993, during a plant startup, the unit entered the "Hot Standby" reactor operating condition. with th~ power supply breaker for one-of-two Hydrogen Recombiners administratively out~of-service.

The as found position-of the power supply breaker was "red tagged" open 1 * The normal position of the power supply breaker was open without a "red tag" in plac A "red tag" was placed on the breaker for personnel protection.to prevent tnadvertent operatio The "~ed tag~ remained in *

. place following maintenance performed during: the recently completed 1993 forced maintenance outag The licensee..

discovered the error on May 17, 1993, *and promptly returned the hydrogen recombiner to servic The reactor power *1evel at the time of discovery was less than 2percent powe Licensee's evaluation The licensee's evaluation concluded that there was no Technical Specification violation since the hydrogen recombiner was never inoperabl The basis for that conclusion follow The hydrogen recombiner is called upon to operate during two procedures, Emergency Operating Procedure EDP 4.0 "Loss of Coolant. Accident. Recovery" and EOP-9.0 "Functional Recovery.

Procedure."

.*In both of these procedures the action to start the recombiners was not an immediate or automatic actio The recombiners would be started early in the a~cident scenari.. r

...

A delay of as long as one hour (best estimate to cle*a.r the red tag) to energize the recombiners wotild ncit effect the outcome of the acciden Administrative Procedure 4.10, "Perso~nel Proteciive Tagging," provided fpr three methods to remove p~otective -

taggin These were sections 7.5 "To Restore to Service";

7.6.8, "Plant Mariager Rele~se of Working Clearance"; and 4.6, "Emergency Operations.". The inspector has.reviewed these sections and concluded that they are adequate to ass~re that a red tag can be re~oved in a short period of tim *

The licensee co,ncluded that no Technical Specification violation occurred because:

a)*

The hydrogen recombiner was in its normal lineup ana available for us b)

There would have been adequate time for an operator to restore the breaker to an operable status using ~ne of the metho.ds outlined in the previous. paragraph..

3)

NRC's evaluation

• The inspector agreed there was no-Technical Specification violation. However, the inspector found that the. operators missed several opportunities to prevent this event: This indicated a weakness in the quality of reviews performed* by the operators. These included:

a)

Operators are required by Section 8.1 of Administrative Procedure 4.10 to perform weekly

• reviews of the switching and t~gging order index to ensure that, the condition of equipment is accurately c)

~eflected. The inspector attempted to revi~w the index to verify if the hydrogen recombiner was checked, but fou~d that this page in the index was discarded.

. The shift engineer stated that the pages of the index were discarded after they were completed, as there is no requirement to keep the page Th~ inspector saw

.that the weekly reviews were being performed on equipment control bya clearance.. The inspector concluded that the required reviews were performed but that the reviews overlooked the hydrdgen recombine The hydrogen recombiner was originally tagged out for a mainteriance activit Following satisfactory completion, the shift supervisor signed_off that the, test was complet However, the shift supervisor did

not verify that the red tag was remove This was a work control issue and is discussed in paragraph 6 of this repor The licensee's proposed corrective and preventive actions were satisfactory. *They included changing the operations procedures to check operability of the hydrogen recombiners prior to pulling rods and again prior to ~fiticalit Plant Maneuvering e.

The inspector reviewed plant activities as they applied to the following activitie )

Power reduction, plant shutdown, and plant cooldown per General Operating Procedure~ (GOP) 8 and )

Shutdown cooling operations.,per GOP 14 and SOP )

Draining the Primary Coolatit System (PCS) per steps 7. and 7.. 1.6 of System Op~rating Procedure (SOP).

.

Reduced Inventory Operations The inspector reviewed the licensee activities pertaining to draining of the Primary Coolant System (PCS).

The following items*

were. noted.*

1)

2)*

3)

4)

5)

6)*

The licensee removed the pressurizer manway cover tci establish a vent pat At least two independent level indicators were operable with the readings in agreemen The tygon~tube level indicator was functional, with an operator stationed ~t the inditator and in telephon~ communication with the control ro6m~

The level increase of the cle~n waste receiver tank matched the d.ra in rate from the PC The equipment hatch was shut and refueling containment integrity establishe The drain rate was contro 11 ed by gravity and not acce 1 erated.

. by use of a cover. ga The activity was classified as an infrequently performed evolution. This meant that a senior site manager was present during the pre-activity briefing that was conducted for each shift that participated in the drain dow *

• )*

Activities that could effective shutdown cooling'were not

• scheduled during thii tim )*

9)*

10)

The general topic ~f shutdown cooling and the potential consequences if shutdown cooling was lost was a regular topic.during the daily meeting The inspector verifie~ that both shutdown cooling train~)

including mechanical and electrical support systems were operabl While the licensee drained the refueling cavity, the

,inspector interviewed the operator stationed at the cantainment water level indicator The inspectot noted that bot~ level indicatbrs were in agreem~nt, ~owever, one tygon.hose* had a slight crimp at a bend.. This wa identified to the operator who verified that the crimp did not effect the level ~eading. The.operator retaped the hose to remove the crimp and obtained a curved ben This observation was discussed with the shift superviso The items marked with a "*" were also ve~ified during the draining of the refueling cavity activities after refueling activities were completed.

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The inspector concluded that evoluttons involving PCS inventory reduction were conducted in a deliberate and meticulous fashio In addition, the licensee was e~tremely sensitive to issues invol¥ing reduced inventory operation Safety System. Walkdown The 1nspector verified the operability of the shutdown cool1ng system by verifying system alignment using Attachment 5 of GOP 1 and SOP This walkdown included a verification that major.flow path valves were in the correct positio No other items were found that degrad~d the syste No violations, deviations, unresolved, or open items were identified at *

. this tim.

Outages (37700, 42700, 60705, 60710, 61701, 61715, 86700) General The licensee began a scheduled 50 day-refueling outage on June 4,

. 199 The plant was exp~cted to be back on line and begin power ascen~ion on July 24, 199 The following outage milestones hav been achieved:

• 'l...:_~"".

• .*g~{~::

Major Outage Mil es tones *

Open Generator B_reakers PCS in Hot Shutdown *

PCS in Cold Shutdown S/G Nozzle Dams Installed

.

Commenced S/G Eddy Current Testing R~actor Pressure Vessel Head Removed Upper Guide Structure Removed Commenced Fuel Shuffle Completed Fuel Shuffle Installed Upper Guide Structure Installed Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Stuck Fuel Bundle Date Completed 06/04/93 06/05/93-06/06/93 06/13/93 06/17/93 06/16/93 06/20/93 06/22/93 06/26/93 06/27/93 06/29/93 The first fuel bundle (L-052) was scheduled for rem6val from tore location N-During the initial iemoval attempt, performed on June 22, fuel bundle L-052 could not be removed using the normal lifting force specified in SOP 28, "Refue1 ing Procedure". *

The licensee revised the unloading pattern specified in FHSO 2, *

11 Core alternations, 11 to remove the* a_dj a cent fuel bundles.and then *

remov~ L-052. In addition, the licensee incr~as~d the maximum lifting force specified in SOP 28. * The safety eval~ation for the change to SOP 28 verified that the new lifting force would not damage th~ fasteners or tie rods of the fuel bundle and that the*

new lifting force did not-compromise the load rating of the

, refueling bridg.

In this core configuration, four fuel bundle~ form a square with four control rods located at each corner of the squar When the adjacent fuel assemblies were removed, the top of fuel bundle L-052 moved approximately 8 inches and leaned against an adjacent control ro The o~erator verified that the refueling machine cou~d grapple and*

ungrapple fuel bundle L-052 in this configuratio The operator grappled fuel bundle L-052 and removed it. This evolution required the use of the additional lifting force specified in SOP 2 This activity was performed on June 22t 199 Fuel bundle L-052 was not scheduled to be reused. A visual inspection

~etermined that fuel bundle L-052 was not damaged during the*

removal and was not bowe *

The. bottom core support plate has four *align~ent holes at the corners for each core locatio Each fuel buridle has two alignment pins (approximately one and one half inches in length)

located at*the adjacent corners of each fuel assembl The

.

licensee determined, from review of logs for previous refueling..

outages, that whenever a fuel bundle was placed in the NE/SW orientation of core location N-5 it was difficult to remove or

• i

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• install. A visual inspection of the NE hole of core location N-5 indicated that the hole has a slight elongatio The licensee also determined the a bundle placed in the NW/SE orientation of core loc,tion N-5 was not difficult to install or remov The fuel bundle for the next fuel cycle was p]aced in the NW/SE orientatio *

The licensee has not determined if corrective actiori will be required to resolve the NE/SW orientatiori since the NW/SE orientation has never caused an installation or removal proble In addition, the licensee has indicated that NW/SE orientation can be used for future core loadings without causing operational problem *

During the removal of fuel bundle L-052, the. inspectors observed activttie~ from containment and the control roo The ins~ectors:

noted that:

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I)

2)

Instructions from the control room to the contain~ent were clearly communicate Procedure limitations imposed by the procedure change were understood..

3).

Management's expectations of the control room and refueling crew were clearly stated and understoo.

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4)

A supervisor from the reactor erigineering group was on the refueling bridge during the fuel removal activity~

5)

A senior member of plarit management was monitorin this activity from the control roo Control Rod Remained Connected To The Rack Extension D~ring Reactor Vessel Head Removal Reactor head lift activities were halted when pl*nt persorinel observed that cont~ol rod nu~be~ 39 was also being lifted from the cor The control rod, which was located in the northeast*sector of the reactor, should have been previously uncouple The licensee's recovery activities and the NRC's inspection/enforcement activities were documented in special Inspection Report No. 255/93016(DRP). Ste~m Generator SlOdge Removal.

The inspector interviewed the contractor performing the *steam generator secondary side sludge removal,.the system erigineer for the steam generators, and the acting chemistry superviso "

. -1-* *.

-.1..;* **~*

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The inspector was informed that l~ss than 20 pounds of siudge had been removed from each steam generato Th~ inspector reviewed *

the as-found video inspection of the secondary side tube sheet and confirmed th~t there was not a large quantity of visible sludg The inspector interviewed the system engineer and chemistry

• supervisor and was informed that strict compliance with the chemistry program and removal of secondary side copper resulted in the reduced quantity of sludg The inspector was also informed that small wireswere found and remove The i~spector interviewed the system engineer and ob$erved several of the wire One appeared to be a lock wire and the others appeared to be the thickness of fine hai The system engineer concluded that the size and amount of wire would not cause an operability problem, and appeared to be a carry over from th~ steam generator replacement outage.. The ~ystem engineer also stated that his ev~luation will be captured on an ihternal corrective action documen * Flange Fillet Weld Pinhole Leak - Service Water Return Header The inspector met with the licensee tb discuss their response to two unisolable pinhole service water leaks in the service 'water return he~der from E-54B, "B - {omponent Cooling Water (CCW) Heat Exchanger."

Th~ licensee has p~6posed a non-Code repair of this system which. is classified as code class "3." The licensee proposed to implement the non-code repair requirement of Generi Lette~ 90-05, "Guidance for Performing Temporary Non-Code Repair of ASME Code Cl ass 1, 2, and 3 Piping." Cogn,i zant members of the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation parti~ipated in discussions with the license *

On May 26, 1993, water leaking from insulation on the service water line from E-54B inditated a possible gasket leak at CV-0826,

"Service Water Return Isolation Valve at E-54B."

There was also indication of a similar leak on MV-SW-136, the bypass to CV-082 Upon removal of the irtsulation and several close* inspections, the*

licensee found an approximate 1/64 inch diameter pinhole leak in the weld immediately downstream of CV-082 A l~ak of approximately 1 drop per second was found on MV-SW-13 The licensee performed a* stopg_ap repair (epoxy patch and clamp) in accordarice with the generic lette An engineering analysis showed that the service water line had little.likelihotid of failin The root cause was determin~d to be flow induced erosion/corrosion caused during throttling of CV-0.82 The licensee determined that their abil itY to complete a code repair was limited by the service water and CCW operability requirement Both systems are required to be in service to

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support operating and shutdown plant condition The licensee concluded that a repair during the 1994 refueling outage was preferabl The licens~e has requested relief from performing a Code repair until the 1994 refuel in~ outag The relief was submitted on July 1, 199 No violations, deviations, unresolved; or inspection followup items were i dent ifi e.

Radiological Controls (71707)

During routine to~rs of radiologically contrdlled plant facilities or areas, the inspector observed occupational radiation safety practices by the radiation protection staff and other worker On June 3, 1993; the licensee reported th~t the condenser offgas concentration of Xenon 135 elevated to a minimum* detectable leve The presence of Xenon in the condenser offgas is tndicative of a ptimary to secondary lea The licensee's analysis showed the magnitude of the leak to be about 2E-5 gp The licensee began to sample the secondar systems at various locations to identify the sourc The amount of secondary in 1 eakage was based on the presence of Xenon *

133, not* Xenon 135, in the condenser offga Based on this, the licensee initially thought the l~akage was from the radioactive waste evap6rator After failing to locate the leak in the e~a~or~t6rs, the licensee analyzed steam generator samples and confirmed the presence of a very small primary leak into the steam generator The leak was barely detectable and well' below the Technical Specification :leakage limi * *

In addition the licensee concluded the following: The leak appears to.be stable, since no increase in the secondary.*

side activity was observed.prior *to the beginning of the current refuel in~ outage~ The leak was barely detectable and did not increase when the licensee purp6sely accelerated the down.power for the 1993 for~ed outage in an attempt to increase the leakrat c~

The licensee performed eddy current tests on both steam generators during the current refueling outag The ~esults of the eddy current tests will be discussed in a subsequent inspection repor The inspector found the licensee's timely communication of this issue to be a strength. Changes in the magnitude of, the primary to secondary leakrate should be identified by continuous condenser of_fgas monitoring and daily sampling and analysis as required by COP-11, "Secondary System Chemistry."

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• No violations, deviations, unresolved, or inspection followup items were identifie * Maintenance (62~03, 42700)

Maintenance activities in the pl.ant were 'routinely inspected, including both corrective maintenance (repairs) and p.revent i ve maintenanc Mechanical, electrical, and in~trument and control group maintenance activities were included as availabl The focus of the inspection was to assure the maintenance activities reviewed were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards, and in conformance with Technical Specifications. The following items wer~ considered

.

during this re~iew: the Limiting Conditions for Operation were met while c~mponents or systems were rem6ved from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures; and post maintenance testing was performed as applicabl *

• The following work order (WO) activities were inspected: WO 24102969, "Readings Obtained in S0-3 Test Did Not Meet Spec." WO 24102965, "M-69A Failed Accepta~c~ Criteria Per ~0-3."

The work orders above were written after operations and maintenance department perso~nel performed S0-3, "Heatup Test For Hydrog*en Recombiners," and found that continuity and resistance measurements did not meet the acceptance criteri One hydrogen recombiner, M-69A, was tagged out so workers could operi the panels and inspect the recombiner inside containmen Following the inspection the tag ~as mistakenly left on the power supply breaker~ The licensee later brought the unit to hot standby with the breaker still tagged ou The inspector re~iewed the operability implications in paragraph 3 The inspector's asse~sment ~f the work control practice is discussed below. *

The licensee found a wire bundle squeezed between a cover plate and a terminal block that caused a short circuit-to-ground. Also, a heater bank termination cover was installed ~pside dow The el~ctricians corrected both deficiencies and tested the hydrogen recombi ner with satisfactory result The licensee attributed the problems to improper re-installation of the terminal block covers on the hydrogen recombiners followi~g the steam generator replacement projec The hydrogen recombiners were removed from containment during that tim The inspector interviewed the electrical supervisor and the maintenance superintendent to confirm that this problem had not been

• • previously identified-or misse The inspector confirmed that*

test results had not (nor should they have) identified this-problem prior to performance of the May 11, 1993, tes Following satisfac~ory completion of the repair,. the hydrogen recombiner was returned to service. lhe work and test documentation was properly closed out except for the lifting of the clearance on the breaker..

The reason that the electrical supervisor t~ansferred the responsibility for lifting the clearance ~o the next shift was*

because of personnel safety concern However, the oncoming electrical supervi~or forgot to have the clearance lifted on the hydrogen recombiner when the worker vacated the containmen The first electrical supervisor reported to the shift supervisor that work on the hydrogen recombiner was complet The shift supervisor then signed that te~ting was completed and logged that M-69A and M-698 were operable per S0-3 at 11:00 a.m~ _on May 12,

199 Step 5.5.9 of S0-3 (performed on May 12, 1993) required that the maintenance supervisor "Release clearance on red tags for M-69A."

The failure to release the clearance on M-69A was considered a violatioh of procedure sb-3 and thus a vi6lation of Technital Specificatioh 6.8.1.c, which requires written proced~res be implemented for surveillance and test activities of safety related

• equipmen However, the licensee identified this violation ~nd the hydrogeri recombiner wa$ never inoperable (see paragraph 3).

Therefore, this violation will not be cited because the criteria specified in Section VII.8.2 of the General Statement of Policy

. and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions (Enforcement Policy, 10 CFR Part 2~ Appendix C (1992)), were satisfied~

• WO 24204218, Perform RM-6j-2, ~Diesel Generator Inspection (K-68)" WO 24205212, Preventative Maintenance of Diesel Generator-Engi~e 1-2" One non-cited violation was identifie No deviations, unresolved, or inspection fo 11 owlip items were i dent i fi e Surveillance (61726, 42700)

The inspector reviewed surveillance testing required by Technical Specifications as described below, and verified that testing was performed in accordarice with adequate procedures. Additionally, the

• inspector vefified that test instrumentation was calibrated,*Limiting Conditions for Operation were met, removal and restoration of the affected components were properly accomplished, and test results conformed with Technical Specifications and procedure requirement The

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J* *-::.

,,<~,

..:. _;::'j

results were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directin *the test, and deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed ~nd resolved by appropriate management pers~nne The following.activities were inspected: S0-3 T-326

"Heatup Test for Hydrogen Recombiners."

"Performance.Test*_ Battery Charger No 1 (ED-15)."

No violations, deviations, unresolved, or inspection followup items were identifie.

Security (71707)

Routine facilfty security measures, including control of access f6r vehicles, packages and personnel, were observe Performance of dedicated physital security equip~ent was ~erified ~uring inspections in various plant area The activities of the professional security force in maintaining facility security were occasionally examined or reviewed, and interviews were occas1onally conducted with security force member On June 11, 1993, the licensee ~eported, ~ia the 10 CFR 50.72 telephone, that random fitness for duty testing of a plant supervisor identified a positive test for cocain The inspector verified that the individual's protected area access was revoked and that the individual entered the

• .licensee's employee assistance progra *

This inf6rmation was provided to Region III security special{st *Additional NRC questions will be addressed in separate correspondenc No violations, deviations. unresolved, or inspectiori followup items were

. identifie.

NRC Compliance Bulletins (92703)

The in~pector reviewed the NRC comm~nicatiori~ listed below and verified that: the.licensee has received the correspondence; the correspondente was reviewed by appropriate management representatives; a written*

response was submitted if required; and plant-specific actions were taken as described in the licensee's respons (Open)

NRC Bulletin 93-02:

Debris Plugging of Emergency tore Cooling Su~tion Strainer Bulletin 93~02 was issued on May 11, 1993, and identified a potential for blbcking of the sump suction strainers during the recirculation phase of a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA).

This Bulletin requested *

that utilities, with units in a shutdown, evaluate the Bulletin and remove any material that could cause a plugging problem ~uring the recirculation phase of a LOC The licensee received a facsimile of the Bulletin on May 11 and evaluated the Bulletin.. They confirmed that the

-,,

-*

po~t outage containment close out inspection did look for and required removal ~f loose debris that could plug the suction straine The Bulletin remains open pending the licensee written response and any additional NRC reviews mandated by the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulatio No violations, deviations, unresolved, or inspection followup items were identifie.

Persons Contacted Consumers Power Company D. P. Hoffman, Vice President, Nucleir Operations

• G. B. Slade, Pl ant General Manager

.

• T. J. Palmisano, Plant Operations Manager*

R. Oro~z. Nuclear Engineering & Construction Manag~r

• K. M. Haas, Radiological Services Manager

• J. L. Hanson, Operations Superintendent R. Kasper~ Maintenance Ma~ager Nuclear Regulatory Commission CNRC)

..

w: D. Shafer, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 2

• J. K. Heller, Senior Resident Inspector

• D. Passehl, Resident Inspector

• Denotes some of those present at the management interview on July 2,*

. 199 Other members of the plant staff, and several members of the contract security force, were also contacted during the inspection period.*

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