IR 05000255/1989034
| ML18054B457 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 02/14/1990 |
| From: | Burgess B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18054B456 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-255-89-34, IEB-88-004, IEB-88-4, NUDOCS 9002270355 | |
| Download: ML18054B457 (11) | |
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-255/89034( DRP).
Docket No. 50-255 Licensee:
Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, MI 49201 Facility Name:
Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant Inspection At:
Palisades S.ite, Covert, Michigan License No. DPR-20 Inspection Conducted:
December 15, 1989 *through January 26, 1990 Inspectors:
E. R. Swanson J. K. Heller J. A. Holmes c~~
Approved By:. B. L. Burge:ef s, Chief Reactor P~ojects Section 2A Inspection Summary Inspection on December 15, 1989 through January 26, 1990 (Report N so~2SS/89034(DRP))
'
Areas Inspected:
Routine unannoun*ced inspection by the resident inspectors of:
actions on previously identified items; plant operations;*reactor trips; engineered safety features walkdown; radi.ological c6ritrols; maintenance;
.surveillance; reportable eventi; bulletins, and, NRC Region III requ~st No Safety Issues*Management System (SIMS) itemi were reviewed.*
Results:
Of the areas inspected, no violations or deviations wera identifie An unresolved item was identified in Paragraph 10 regarding a containment spray pump test, and an open item.was identified concerning a piping component on the Diesel Generator Service Water Syste lhe inspection disclosed weaknesses in the 1icensee's threshold for initiation of corrective action documents as ~iscussed in Paragraph 8, and the thoioughness of corrective actions taken to prevent recurrence as discussed in Paragraph A strength was identified in the individual responsibility being taken to*
maintain exposure to radiation ALAR * -- " ____ _;_ _____ *-- *--- -- - ---- -~
9002270355 900214
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PDR ADOCK 05000255 Q
- PDC
- DETAILS Persons Contacted Consumers Power Company (
- G. B. Slade, Plant General Manager
- R. M. Rice, Plant Operations Manager
.+* J~ VandeWalle, Technical Director R. D. Orosz, Engineering and Maintenance Manager W. L. Beckman, Radiological Services Manager
- T. J. Palmisa~o, Administrative and Planning Manager J. L. Hanson, Operations Superintendent R. B. Kasper, Mechanical Maintenance Superintendent K. E.. Osborne, System Engineering Superintendent
- R. M. Brzezinski, I&C Engineering and Mai.ntenance Superintendent L. J. Kenaga, Health Physics Superintendent
- C. S. Kozup, Technical Engineer
- J. R. Brunet, Licensing Analyst
- D. J. Malone, Senior Licensing Analyst*
R. J. Frigo, Operations Staff Support Supervisor
- R. E. McCaleb, Quality Assurance Directpr
- J. R. Schepers, Quality Assurance Engineer
+D. t. Toka~h~ Project Manager, Configuration Con~rol Project
+B. L. Harshe, Proj~ci Manager, Configuration Control Project
- +J. A.. Blewett, Project Manager, Configuration Control Project Nuclear Regulatory Cammi ssi on (NRC)
- +M. P. Phillips, Chief~ Operation Programs ~ection 2
+W. L. Axelson, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 2
+R. W. Cooper, Chief, Engineering Branch, DRS
+*E. Swan~on, Senior Re~ident Insp~ctor J. K. Heller, Resident Ifispector J. A. Holmes, Reactor Inspector
+Denotes those present at the Configuration Control Project b~iefing on January 11, 199 *Denotes some of those present at the Management Interview on January 26, 199 Other members of the Plant staff, and several members of the Contract Security Force, were.a 1 so contacted during the inspection perio.
Actions. on Previously Identified Items (92701, 92702) (Closed) Violation 255/88008-02(DRP):
Technical Specification 6.8.1.c by not auxiliary feedwater logic.channel trip inadequate surveillance performance.
Licensee failed to implement obtaining the required 1ndications due to an
- The licensee responses dated April 22 and September 1, 1988 were reviewe The inspector verified that:
MI-39, "Auxiliary-Feedwater Actuation Logic Surveillance Test Procedure" had been revised; the auxjliary feedwater actuation panel was relabeled; continuity existed between the procedure and the relabeled panel; MI-39 _
surveillance procedure was added to the On-the-Job-Training Program;
- a full time. I&C coordinator was assigned; and, a three *day simulator orientation class was added to the'I&C department advanced systems traini~g matri The inspector has no addition~l question (Closed)* Open Item 255/88016-02(0RP): _Possible single failure susceptibility of the design for the preferred AC buses (Y-10, 20, 30 and 40).
The licensee informed the inspector that modifications will be performed to correct the design of the preferred and instrument AC power supplie The work w*ill be performed under Facility Change Notice FC-854 and is scheduled to start in July and end in, November 199 In addition, the licensee provided the inspector with a letter dated August 24, 1988 in which the license-e specifically addresses ~hs conditions under which the preferred AC buses may be powered via the by-pass regulato}".
The licensee also committed in this letter to include these conditions in the rest~uctured Technical Specification In the interim, the licensee has implemented Standing Order 54 which incorporates appropriate controls during the times when preferred AC buses are powered via the bypass regulato Based on the lic~nsee's.corrective actions this item is considered closed.
(Closed) Open Item 255/88025-04(0RP):
Control R~d Drive seal housing with a through wall crac By reference to Report No. 255/89032, Paragraph 2.b, this item is close Future actions planned by the licensee include continued efforts to identify the stimulus to the transgranular stress corrosion cracking, replacement of the CROM seal housings, and evaluations/inspection of'othe~ CROM pressure boundarie No vi6lations, deviations, unresol~ed or dpen items were identifie.
Operational Safety Verification (71707, 71710_, 42700)
- Routine facility operating activities were observed as conducted in the plant and from the main control room Plant startup, steady power operation, plant shutdown, and system lineups and operation were observed as applicabl The performance of.licensed Reactor Operators and Senior Reactor Operators, of ShHt Technical Advisors, and of auxiliary equipment operators was observed and evaluated including procedure use and adherence, records and logs, communications, shift/duty turnover, and the degree of professional-ism of control room activitie Evaluation, corrective action, and response for off normal conditions or events, if any, were examine This included compliance to any reporting requirement \\
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Observations of the contro.l room monitors, *indicators, and recorders. were made to verify the operability of emergency systems, radiation monitoring systems and nuclear reactor protection systems, as applicabl Reviews of $Urveillance, equipment conditi~n, and tagout logs were conducte Proper return to service of selected components was verifie Periodic verification. of Engineerec;t Safety Features status was conducted by the resident inspecto Equipment alignment was verified against*
plant procedures and drawings and detailed walkdowns selectively verified: *equipment labeling, the absence of leaks, housekeeping, freeze protection, ca*libration dates, operability of support systems, breaker and switch alignment as appropriate. Walkdowns during this inspection period focused on the containmen~ boundary, penetrations and isolation valve * General The plant began the reporting period in a forced outage that ended on December 20, 1989 (see Paragraph 3b below).* For the remainder of the reporting period the plant was in power operations except for
- a plant trip (see Paragraph 4 "Reactor Trip" below). Plant Startup
' The reactor was made critical on December 20, 1989, at 6:30 p.m.,
completing a preplanned maintenance and surveillance outage that began on October 1, 1989~ The scope. included:
steam generator eddy current testing; steam generator replacement engineering activities; Technical Specifi~ation surveillance testing; and, preventive/
corrective maintenance activitie The outage was scheduled to
.end on November 15, however, during post maintenance testing of the pre~surizer power operated relief valve and block valve
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modifications, problems were encountered that required tne plant be returned to cold shutdo~n for additional evaluatio The problem (unintentional opening of a relief valve and failure of a block valve to close when required) was the subject of Augmented
.Inspection Team, which is documented in Inspection Report No. 255/8903 During the heatup, the inspector routinely verified that activities were performed in accordance with the gove~ning system and general operating procedure PORV Block Valve Operation After Completion of the post maintenance outage primary coolant system leak test, the inspector observed the opening of the Pressurizer Power Operated Relief block valves per the revised Attachment 8 to SOP-1 "Primary Coolant System".
The 11j9g open" feature was used to bpen the block valve and pressurize the spool piece between the block valve.and relief valve without opening the relief valv Both block valves were successfully operated, demonst_rating the viability of the new procedur The relief valves remained essentially shut, however, both relief valves chattered on their closed seats as indicated by a.blinking of the closed
- indication ligh One relief valve passed enough fluid to raise the tailpiece temperature indicator, the other did not. The inspector considered the demonstration of the procedure to be adequat Tours
- ouring a tour of the diesel generator rooms the inspector observed the following:
(1) A caution tag affixed to DPI-1486 "Fuel Oil Differential Pressure". The tag was_written to identify an oil leak on DPI-148 DPI-_1487 performs the same function but is located on the other 0/G. * This was id~ntified to the shift supervisor who resolved the wording error. It was found that the valve labels were different from the plant drawings. Deviation Report No. QP-89-018 documented further corrective action regarding lock-wiring of the valv (2) *A Garlock 204 expansion joint located in the 1-1 Diesel Generator service water line does not appear to have the classical expansion joint bulg The joint is installed vertically and ap~ears to be stretched. The expansion.joint for diesel generator 1-2 is install~d horizontally and appears to have the classical expansion joint bulg The Garlock Vendor Manual specifies ari axial elongation of 1/4 to 1/2 inc The inspector was unable to confirm, by measurement or record review, if the expansion joint for the 1-1 Diese Generator service water line was installed properl The inspector discussed this item with the system engineer and asked if the expansion joint is the correct size ana configuration for the application. This is an open item pending review by the system engin~er (255/89034-0l)(DRP)).
No violations, deviations, unresolved or open items were identifie.
Reactor Trips (93702)
The reactor was manually tripped from 35 percent power at 5:12 a.m. on January _9, 1990, when the operating main feed pump automatically tripped for unknown reason The plant was at 35 percent power to repair main condenser tube leakage; a maintenance activity that only permitted one main feed pump in operation. -
After extensive trouble shooting and testing, no cause could be identified which caused the feedpump turbine trip. The reactor was restarted on January 10 and the turbine placed in service the next da One open item and no violations, deviations, or unresolved items were identified.
- Radiological Controls (71707)
During routine tours of radiologically controlled plant facilities o areas, the inspect_or observed occupational radiation safety practices by the radiation protection staff and other worker *
Effluent r~l~ases were routinely checkedi including examination of 6n-line recorde~ traces and proper operation of automatic monitoring equipmen Independent surveys were performed in various radiologica_lly controlled area Persrinnel contaminations continue to occur at a higher than expected rat Licensee management continues to closely monit.or the situation and addresses root.cause and for corrective action for.each contamination event. Similarly, noble gas problems in the Auxiliary Building continue despite actions to eliminate ~he_leakag~ sou~ces. Engineering for removal of a hot spot in abandoned piping did not r.eceive a critical ALARA review. *The work plan called for reuse of a section of the removed piping instead of doing new piping fitup-and welding in the sho Th worker had the job plan altered to reduce hts exposure.. Individuals taking responsibility for their exposure and making recommendations to maintain ALARA is considered by the inspector to be a $trengt N6 violation~, deviatians, unresolved or open ite~s were identifie. * Maintenance (62703, 42700)
Maintenance activities in the-plant were routinely inspected, including both corrective maintenance (repairs) and preventive maintenanc M~chanical, electrical, and iristrument and.control group maintenance activities were included as availabl The focus of the inspection was to assure the maintenance activities reviewed were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with Technical Specification The followin_g items were considered during this review:
the Limiting Conditions for Operation were met while.
component~ or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained p~ior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished usirig approved p~ocedures; and post maintenance testin~ was performed as applicabl The 1ollowing activities were inspected: Service Water Booster pump (P-25A) rebuild (W.O. 24906694). Temporary Modification No. 89-80 removed power to radiation door alarms to clear ~ ground (W.O. 24905928) Removal, repair and test relief valve RV-FW0525 (W.O. 24000282)
- Replace valve MV-FW521 (Main Feedwater pump turbine P-lA) *
(W.O. 24902123) Removal of T-80 hot spot piping per SC-89-168 (W.O. 24902384) Preventive maintenance on acid feed pump P-907 (W.O. 24905668) SPI trouble shoot and repair (W.O. 24906582)
No violations, deviations, unresolved or open items were identifie.
Surveillance (61726, 42700)
The inspector reviewed Technical Specifications required surveillance testing as described below and verified that testing was performed in
.accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was
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calibrated, that Limiting Conditions for Operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were properly accomplished, that test results conformed with Technical,Specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personne The following activities were inspected: M07A-2 Emergency Diesel Generator 1-2 Surveillance T-195 Primary Coolant System Mass Flow Calculation M0-25 Iodine Removal System DW0-13 Local Leak Rate Test of the personnel lock -
e *.
DW0-1 Daily Control Room Surveillance SH0-1 Operators Shift Surveillance No violations, deviations, unresolved or open items were identifie.
Safety Assessment/Quality Verification (35502, 40500)
The effectiveness of management controls, verification and oversight activities. in the conduct of jobs observed during this inspection was evaluate The inspector frequently attended management and supervisory meetings involving plant status and plans, focusing on proper coordination among Departments *
- The results of licensee auditing and corrective action programs were routinely monitored by att.endance at Corrective Action Review Board (CARB) meetings and by rev;.ew of Deviation Reports~ Event Reports~
Radiological Incident Reports, and security incident report As-applicable, corrective action program documents were forwarded to NRC Region III techn,cal specialists for information and possible followup *
evaluatio *
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The inspector attended a Corrective Action Re~iew.Board (CARB) on January 18, 199 One item discussed pertains to installation of a jumper in the Rad Waste system without use of a Temporary Modification*
(TM).
The jumper was i nsta 11 ed for approximately a year before the system engineer determined that a TM was require The system engineer processed the TM, however, did not identify the missed TM via the internal corrective action system Deviation Report (DR)).
The DR was written by the Plant Safety* and Licensing group when the TM safety evaluaiion was being processed~ During the CARB; so~e personnel indicated that the DR was needed to document the difference between the date of TM and installation of the jumper, not to addre.ss the issue of an administrative procedure being violated. Also it was not discussed, until after the inspector raised the q*uestion, why the system engineer did not initiate a DR in parallel with the T This appears to be another example of pl ant personnel not appreciating or under-standing the use of the DR system. _The inspector noted that the existing DR administrative* re~uirements are vague and open to interpretatio This was discussed at the exit intervie No violations, deviations, ~nresolved or open items were identifie.
Reportable Events (92700, 92720)
The inspector reviewed the following Licensee Event Reports (LERs)
by means 'of direct observation, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of re,cord The review addressed comp.liance to reporting requjrements and, as applicable, that immediate corrective actign and ~ppropriate action to prevent recur~ence had been accomplishe (Closed) LER iSS/89005:
During the Licensee's review of the design basis for the emergency diesel generators, it was discovered that the Diesel Generator fuel 'oil supply Technical Specification with regard to minimum fuel oil capacity did not meet plant requirement T~ address this item, the Licensee committed to provide an interim limit on minimum required-fuel oil capacity (to meet the intent of the bases for the Technical Specification). In addition, detailed calculations are being performed by the* licensee to identify diesel fuel oil storage capacity in support of a Technical Specifications change request to correct the existing valu The licensee has administratively implemented the new m1n1mum required fuel oil tapacity and completed calculations on fuel oil storage capacity requirements, which support the preliminary
- calculations. A Technical Specification change request to correct the existing mini~um value will be incorporated in the Restructured Technical Speci_fication b. ** (Closed) LER 255/89014:
Failure to maintain necessary fuel oil capacity. This *eve.nt resulted from ineffective communications of the revised minimum required fuel oil reserves to the operatcirs, in conjunction with high consumption during extended testing of the dies~ls. The licensee informed the inspector that the fuel oil system upgrade (FC-889) is scheduled to be completed by the end of 199 This will add a transfer capability for onsite make up to the diesel fuel oil storage tank (T-10).
The inspector also verified that the diesel generator surveillance procedure included information on fuel oil consumption at no load, 50 percent load.~nd *
full load conditions and a check that sufficient fuel is.available prior to starting the surveillance tes~ (Closed) LER 255/89017:
An inadequate procedure resulted in testing of Containmen~ Air Coolers during prohibited conditiorts. * The LER indicated that this is an isolated incident due to the unusual configuration of equipment the test require The LER also indicated that review of Q0-1 Technical Surveillance (TS) test procedures for compliance was done previously in response to the March 4* 1988 incident (LER 88-005-01)~
An evaluation was made of the corrective actions taken in response to the earlier event to determine whether the.~rior corrective action taken to prevent recurrence was adequat It was determined that one SRO-licensed engineer reviewed approximately 80 surveillances to identify any situations where tested or interfacing systems or components were rendered inoperable.unintentionally. This review id~ntified approximately 50 improvement item The review was considered generally adequate, givert the scope and resources commit te_ ).
The more recent.event (Subject of LER 89017) was identified by a*
similarly qualified individual (Shift Supervisor) during pretest implementation review It would appear that a m~lti-disciplined review would have improved the effectiveness of the corrective action. A second part of the original corrective* action was that the Shift Supervisor would review the test prior to implementatio As' such, the identification of the problem was a result of the original corrective actio A Notice of Violation will. not be issued because the event was licensee identified, was reported and corrected, was not willful, and was not the result of previous corrective action (255/89034-02(NV6/DRP)).
- As discussed in the exit meeting, corrective actions taken in *
followup of LERs 89005 and 89017 reveal weakn.esses in the licensee's corrective actions taken to prevent rec~~rence of similar or related event No violations, deviatitiris, unresolved or open items ~ere identifie.
NRC Compliance Bulletin (92703)
The inspector reviewed the NRC communications listed below and verified that: the licensee.has received the correspondence; the correspondence was reviewed by appropriate management representatives; a written response was submitted if required; and, plant-specific actions were taken as described in the.licensee's respons (Closed) NRC Bulletin 88-04:
"Potential For Safety..:Relat.ed *Pump Loss".
The licensee's July 7, 1988, 60 day response was reviewed for significant issue No immediate concerns were identified. Auxiliary Feedwater pump P-8C recirculation flow was evaluated and 'the licensee concluded that the
.flow rate was adequate for short periods of pump operation, but that a modification is required to provide additional flow during longer periods of operatio A modification to add a bypass orifice and manual isolation valve.is planned to be completed during th~ 1990 refueling outag With tespect to providing higher containment spray flow during testing, the review of a safety* evaluation of a special spray pump test resulted in identificatio-nof ari apparent unreviewed safety question, which was forwarded to the NRC on December 28, 1989 for revie Thjs result~d in the li~ensee.undoing the procedure change which had provided a.greater tecirculation flow pat The. licensee has stated that they may withdraw their December 28, 1989 letter, which was submitted prematurely. A dose
- consequence analysis is planned to be completed in the near future, which is expected to show that the recirculation path would not have resulted in exceeding 10 CFR 100 limits during an acciden The inspector is siill concerned that the modifi~d test lineup (no longer in use) created a potential unmonitored release path (~ump r~circul.ation back to the SIRW Tank during testing) while the procedure contained no precautions concerning manually restoring the val~e lineup if an ESF actuation of the Containment Spray System occurre No report has
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been made to the NRC regarding this issu The resolution of this 10 CFR 50. 59 and reportabil i ty concerns wi 11 be tracked as an Un re so 1 ved Item (255/89034-03(DRP)).
One unresolved, no violations, de~iations or open items were identified~
1 Inspection of Regional and Headquarters Requests (255104)
(Closed).Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/104 - Fitness for Duty:
Inspection of Initial Training Program The inspector attended two FFO training sessions on December 20, 198 One session covered general
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. employe~ training and escort.responsibilities, the s~cond was for supervisory personne Both sessions covered the requfred topics adequatel Since Consumers Power haq previously implemented a FFD Policy, the training was somewhat focused on highlighting the changes in the new policy, and.was geared toward the corporate office staff in attendance~ The program and training appeared to have good management *
suppor Each training session had the management individua*l s. charged with implementing the program in attendance. Site management showed good initiative in verifying their compliance with the January 3, 1990 effective date of the rul *
1 Configuration Control Project Meeting
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..
A"working level informational meeting was held on January 11, 1990, in the Region III offices, to review the inception, scop~, experience history, current scope and projected completion dates for the Configuration Control Project (CCP).
The responsible Consumers Power Project Engineers preserited the scope and status of each area:
D~iign Basis Document (generation),. Safety System Design Con"firmation, Design Document Verification and Correction, and Q-List and Engineering Data Bas~ Upgrad~ and Verificatio The licensee briefly reviewed changes made to the project scope as a result of experienc The licensee also plans to add another project engineer to manage actions related to piping and hanger system An acknowledgement was made concerning the *
underestimation of the resource requirements to identify and resolve d~str~pancie *
No concerns were identified by the NR.
Open Item Open Items are matters which have been discussed ~ith the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or bot An Open Item. disc1osed during the inspection is discussed in Par~graph 3.d.(2).
1 Unresolved Item An unresolved item is a*matt.er about which more information is required in order to ascertain where it is an acceptable item, an open item, a deviation, or a violatio One unresolved item, ~isclosed during this
- inspection is discussed in Paragraph 1.
Management Interview (30703)
The inspectors met with licensee representatives (den6ted in Paragraph 1)
on January 26, 1990 to discuss the scope and findings of the inspectio *In addition, the inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes revi~wed by the inspector during the inspectio The licensee did not identify any such documents/processes as proprietary.
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