IR 05000255/1989031
| ML18054B404 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 01/11/1990 |
| From: | Burgess B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18054B403 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-255-89-31, IEB-88-003, IEB-88-3, IEB-89-003, IEB-89-3, IEIN-89-051, IEIN-89-077, IEIN-89-51, IEIN-89-77, NUDOCS 9001300109 | |
| Download: ML18054B404 (10) | |
Text
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-255/89031(DRP)
Docket No. 50-255 Licensee:
Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, MI 49201 Facility Name:
Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant Inspection At:
Palisades Site, Covert, Michigan Inspecti,on Conducted:
November 14 through December 26, 1989 Inspectors:
E. R. Swanson J. K. Heller Approved By:
J. Holmes uce L. Burgess, ief Reactor Projects Section 2A Inspection Summary License No. DPR-20 Ins ection on November 14 throu h December 26, 1989 (Re o~t No. 50-25~/89031(DRP))
Areas Inspecte :
out1ne unannounce lnspect1on y t e res1 ent inspectors of:. plant operations; maintenance; surveillance; security; reportable events; and, bulletins and information notice No Safety Issues Management System (SIMS) items were reviewed.*
Results:
No violations or deviations were identifie The inspection did not identify any notable weaknesses. A strength identified was the Contractor Fee Performance Program (Paragraph 3.a) which has had goo results. A new open item is discussed in Paragraph 3 ~
PDR ADOCK 05000255 Q
- DETAILS Persons Contacted Consumers Power Company
- G. B. Slade, Plant General Manager
- R. M. Rice, Plant Operations Manager
- J. G. Lewis, Technical Director
- R. D. Orosz, Engineering and Maintenance Manager
- W. L. Beckman, Radiological Services Manager J. L. Hanson, Operations Superintendent R. B. Kasper, Mechanical Maintenance Superintendent D. G. Turner, Electrical Maintenance Superintendent K. E. Osborne, System Engineering Superintendent R. M. Brzezinski, I&C Engineering and Maintenance Superintendent L. J. Kenaga, Health Physics Superintendent
- K. W. Berry, Director, Nuclear Licensing C. S. Kozup, Technical Engineer J. R. Brunet, Licensing Analyst
- D. J. Malone, Senior Licensing Analyst
- R. J. Frigo, Operations Staff Support Supervisor Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
- W. L. Axelson,Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 2
- B. L. Burgess, Chief, Projects Section 2A
- R. N. Gardner, Chief, Plant Systems Section
- E. R. Swanson, Senior Resident Inspector
- J. K. Heller, Resident Inspector J. Holmes, Reactor Inspector
- A. W. DeAgazio, Project Manager, NRR
- Indicates some of those attending the December 6, 1989 Working Level Meetin *Denotes some of those present at the Management Interview on December 15, 198 Other members of the Plant staff, and several members of the Contract Security Force, were also contacted during the inspection perio.
Actions on Previously Identified Items (92701, 92702) (Closed) Unresolved Item 255/89010-01:
Main Feedwater runback system does not appear to be operated as described in the FSA As a result of the licensee's response dated November 17, 1989 and site followup, the inspector ascertained that:
(1) The system does operate as described by the FSAR Section 7.5.1.3 and 10.3.l and that the function is demonstrated on a yearly basis (PPAC FWS-929, last done July 1989); (2) Since the design of the system does not
- control feedwater flow based on primary coolant temperature, manual
. action appears warranted to limit cooldow This weakness of the original design could be better described in the FSA The licensee performed a safety evaluation of the current operating procedures and determined that they are in accordance with the FSAR description for maintaining heat removal success paths requiring feedwate Tripping the feed pumps to control cooldown rate appears appropriate, but does delay the use of main feed if needed due to the lack of remote reset capabilit The licensee's.small break LOCA analysis indicates that ample time (60 minutes) is available for restoring main feedwater if the two safety trains of AFW are unavailabl No violations, deviations, unresolved or open items were identifie.
Operational Safety Verification (71]07, 71710, 42700)
Routine' facility operating activities were observed as conducted in the plant and from the main control room Plant startup, steady power operation, plant shutdown, and system(s) lineup and operation were observed as applicabl The performance of licensed Reactor Operators and Senior Reactor Operators, of Shift Technical Advisors, and of auxiliary equipment operators was observed and evaluated including procedure use and adherence, records and logs, communications, shift/duty turnover, and the degree of professionalism of control room activitie Evaluation, corrective action, and response for off normal conditions or events, if any, were examine This included compliance to any reporting requirement Observations of the control room monitors, indicators, and recorders were made to verify the operability of emergency systems, radiation monitoring systems and nuclear reactor protection systems, as applicabl Reviews of surveillance, equipment condition, and tagout logs were conducte Proper return to service of selected components was verifie General The unit began the reporting period in a preplanned maintenance and surveillance outage that began on October The scope of the outage was completed with the licensee performing post maintenance and preoperational testing during the week of November 1 In order to be proactive concerning operability issues, the license is developing a procedure to outline actions to be taken when equipment is discovered to be potentially non-confprmin The licensee has been communicating with the NRC concerning this topic and expects to have fully conforming guidance by the end of the yea *
As another initiative, The Consumers Power Company Engineering Support Services (ESS) group has developed a detailed Contractor Performance Fee Progra Performance in seven areas is eva 1 uated by objective criteria, which are used to formulate a percentage of the performance fe These areas are quality/procedure compliance, schedule, budget, safety radiation protection, housekeeping, and securit The program is modified as experience' is gained, and current statistics have shown excellent result For instance, personnel contamination events per 1,000 entries was tracke Contractors under ESS control had less than 3.00, where the plant staff has averaged about Violations of plant administrative procedures may end up costing the contractor money and provide a real incentive to careful compliance and attention to detai PORV Opening While at hydrostatic pressure (2150 psi), on November 21, 1989, a pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) block valve was opened at 2:27 a.m., to perform post-modification testin The PORV also opened unexpectedly which dropped primary pressure to about 1680 psi causing a reactor trip from Thermal Margin/Low Pressur Initial operator attempts to close the block valve were n6t successful, and the PORV opened a second time causing a Safety Injection activation at 1605 pound No injection occurred because minimum pressure stayed above the HPSI injection hea Region III dispatched an Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) to the Palisades site to review the event associated with the Palisades PORV and PORV block valves irregularities which caused the reactor trip and safety injectio The Team Charter, dated November 22, 1989, consisted of: validatio of events sequence; determination of apparent equipment irregularities; assessment of recent valve design changes-and testing; and, review of operator training and performanc The results of the AIT will be discussed in Inspection Report No. 50-255/8903 At the conclusion of this report period, the unit was in cold shutdow Installation of Electrical Canisters The inspector reviewed the installation of electrical canisters in containment pen~trations by comparisons of FSAR Figure No. 5.8-3 11 Containment Structure Typical Electrical Penetrations 11 and Vendor File E-20 11 Cable Penetrations 11 *
Figure 5.8-3 indicated that a typical electrical penetration consists of a shop fabr1cated and tested canister that contains the wiring and connectors for the 440V, 2.4KV or 4.6KV electrical servic The canister is welded on the ihside of the ~ontainment to a pipe.sleeve that penetrates the containmen The sleeve is welded to the containment line On the outside of the containment, the canister is supported by a wedge shaped ring that is in contact with the canister and pipe sleev The inspectors noted some inconsistencies that were identified to the System Engineer and are discussed belo *
(1) A number of the 480V power electrical penetration canisters are either installed without the ring in contract with the penetration pipe sleeve or without the rin Vendor File E-20 contains a number of "master" penetration drawings and a number of penetration specific drawing All show the ring in contact with the pipe sleeve and identified the ring as a carbon steel
"support ring*i or, 11canister support ring 11 *
Since the drawing did not state the purpose of the support ring, it is unclear if the ring was intended to facilitate installation or was intended as a canister support to prevent a free standing canister from inducing stresses to the pipe sleeve weld (2)
Four 12 inth canisters are installed in a 16 inch pipe sleev Three of the canisters have supports welded to the pipe sleev The remaining canister appears to be free standin The master drawings, of File E-20, show the canister in a comparably sized sleeve, with a support ring installe The System Engineer was asked to review these incrinsistencies and determine if deficiencies exis This is an Open Item pending review by the licensee (Open Item 255/89031-0l(DRP)).
d. _ Containment Tour The inspector toured the containment, finding cleanliness acceptable given the work in progress, and the containment sump, which was found clear of debris with all screens intac Working Level Meeting A meeting, attended as indicated in Paragraph 1, was held on December 6, 1989 in the NRC R-III offices, to discuss concerns the NRC had expressed relating to design and safety margin of various system No conclusions or decisions were mad Unofficial Information Tag The inspector found an unofficial tnformation tag taped next to the containment tendon, in the component cooling water roo The tag was dated April 20, 1989, and written on the back of a blue routing memo and stated:
"Leaking Bulkhead on post tensioning tendon To be repaired on WBS 50910 as part of 5 Year Pla Please remove this tag when work completed.
The inspector discussed this at the exit interview and asked the licensee if this was the appropriate mechanism to communicate this informatio *
g.
Operator Training The inspector attended operator training for the pressurizer power operated relief and block valve modifications (Lesson Plan 6013,03)
conducted on December 1 The instructor:
described the events of November 21; provided details of valve operation; discussed the testing conducted at Wyle laboratories; described the modification made to the block valve 11 seal-in 11 circuit; discussed Normal, General and Emergency Operating Procedure changes; discussed Emergency Plan changes; and, discussed block valve and PORV operations response under various modes of operation The class format permitted open discussion between instructor and studen The lesson plan_
objectives were me No violations, deviations, unresolVed or open items were identifie.
Reactor Trip(s) or ESF Actuations (93702) The reactor trip and safety injection actuation of November 21, is discussed in Inspection Report N ~5/89033(DRP).
No violations, deviations, unresolved or open items were identifie Radiological Controls (71707)
During routine tours of radiologically controlled plant facilities or areas, the inspector observed occupational radiation safety practices by the radiation protection staff and other workers.
Effluent releases were routinely checked, including examination of on-line recorder traces and proper operation of automatic monitoring equipmen *
Independent surveys were performed in various radiologically controlled area No violations, deviations, unresolved or open items were identifie.
Maintenance (62703, 42700)
Maintenance activities in the plant were routinely {nspected, including both corrective maintenance (repairs) and preventive maintenanc Mechanical, electrical, and instrument and control group maintenance activities were included as availabl The focus of the inspection was to assure the maintenance activities reviewed were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with Technical Specification The following items were considered during this review:
the Limiting Conditions for Operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures; and post maintenance testing was performed as applicabl.
The following activities were inspected: P-7C Service Water Pump Differential Pressure Switch Alarms Intermittently (W.O. 2490359l).
The Work Order (WO) contains a log of the work activity. A log entry dated June 29L 1989, indicates that an incorrect di ff_erent i a 1 pressure switch was i nsta 11 ed during a previous WO (WO 24802861).
The inspector reviewed the Deviation Report (DR) Log for June & July, and did not find a DR that described the incorrect part replacement per WO 2480286 The inspector discussed this with the Technical Enginee The inspector asked if the log entry was correct and if it was, then is a DR require This was discussed at the exit meetin Calibratiorr of Diesel 1-2 fuel oil pressure gauge (PI-1485)
(W.O. 24906434). Hydrogen Monitor heat trace calibration (W.O. 24905058). Rebuild of mechanical seal on containment spray pump (P-54C).
Inadequate work instructions resulted in two rework efforts on this pump and motor (W.O. 24806875 and 24905876).
No violations, deviations, unresolved or open items were identifie Surveillance (61726, 42700)
The inspector reviewed Technical Specifications required surveillance testing as described below and verified that testing was performed in
- accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that Limiting Conditions for Operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were properly accomplished, that test results conformed with Technical Specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personne The following activities were inspected: M0-38 Q0-15 DW0-1 SH0-1 Auxiliary Feedwater System Pumps, Inservice Test Procedur Component Cooling Water Pumps, Inservice Test Procedur The inspector noted that the procedure specifies the location, by yellow dot and drawing, of the vibration readings, but does not specify the location for the bearing temperature Daily Control Room Surve1llanc Operators Shift Surveillanc No violations, deviations, unresolved or open items were identified.
8.
Security (71707)
Routine facility security*measures, including control of access for vehicles, packages and personnel, were observe Performance of dedicated physical security equipment was verified during inspections in various plant area The activities of the professional security force in maintaining facility *security protection were occasionally e_xamined or reviewed, and interviews were occasionally conducted with security force member On December 5, the inspectors observed that the closing mechanism of Door 35 (screen house room) could not close the doo A sign on the door indicated that air pressure prevented closure and that persons using the door would need to manually close the doo That may have been true at one time, however, close examination revealed that door contact with the frame p~evented cl~sure. This was identified to the licensee and corrected promptl In addition, the inspector observed that a latch guard was not installe The licensee acknowledged the inspector observation and stated that door integrity is maintained without the guar However, latch guard installation would be reviewe No violations, deviations, unresolved or open items were identifie.
NRC Information Notices (92701, 92702)
The inspector reviewed the NRC communications listed below and verified that:
the licensee has received the correspondence; the correspondence was reviewed by appropriate management representatives; a written response was submitted if required; and, p]ant-specific actio~s were taken as described in the licensee's respons (Closed) IN 89-51:
Potential Loss of Required Shutdown Margin During Refueling Operation This issue focuses on the unanalyzed condition of fuel paced in intermediate core locations during refuelin Procedures used during prior refuelings at Palisades did not address these intermediate, on the spot decisions about where to place a fuel assembly which could not be immediately placed in the analyzed core reload patter The licensee's evaluation of this issue was conducted in response to Combustion Engineering Information Bulletin 89-01 "Shutdown Margin During Refueling"; which was sent on March 16, 198 The licensee intends to revise fuel handling procedures EM-04-20 and FHS0-2 to require that new fuel assemblies be placed directly in their final core location Previously, burned fuel assemblies are not subject to this requiremen Any deviation would require a special analyse It does not appear that there is an existing analysis which supports the lack of control over burned fuel locations, a~though, the final configuration is analyzed by the fuel vendor and. reviewed by the license *
- (Closed) IN 89-77:
Debris in Containment Emergency Sumps and Incorrect Screen Configuration The inspector performed an inspection of the sump and found the sump adequately clean with the screens intac No violations, deviations, unresolved or open items were identifie.
NRC Compliance Bulletin (92703)
1 The inspector reviewed the NRC communications listed below and verified that:
the licensee has received the correspondence; the correspondence was reviewed by appropriate management representatives; a written response was submitted if required; and, plant-specific actions were taken as described in the licensee's respons (Closed) NRC Bulletin 88-03:
Inadequate Latch Engagement In HFA Type Latching Relays Manufactured by General Electric Compan The licensee's response dated December 20, 1988, documented their inspection of the thirteen installed subject relay None required corrective measure The inspector had reviewed the licensee's actions during late 1988, and based on that review and NRR's memorandum dated August 7, 1989, this NRC Bulletin is close (Open) NRC Bulletin 89-03:
Potential Loss of Required Shutdown Margin During Refueling Operation The bulletin was received and will be responded to in January 1990 as require No violations, deviations, unresolved or open items were identifie Licensee Event Report Followup (Closed) Licensee Event Report (255/89-013-LL)):
This licensee event report (LER) identified the results of a review conducted by Palisades to confirm the plant's compliance with respect to fire protection cir~uit separation requirements contained in 10 CFR 50, Appendix During this review, the licensee discovered that right channel control circuitry for charging pumps P-SSA and B and service water pump P-7A passed through the lC Switchgear Room, which is normally associated only with left channel equipmen There1ore, the lC Switchgear Room contained both right and left channel circuitry for the charging pumps and the service water pump With this configuration, a fire in the lC Switchgear Room could damage circuitry to all three service water pumps (licensee assumed the loss of service water pump P-7C since power cabling is also routed through the lC Switchgear Room) and to all three charging pumps, rendering these pumps inoperabl At least one charging pump is required after a reactor trip to maintain primary coolant system subcooling and inventory, and at least one service water pump is needed to provide cooling to the 1-2 diesel generator, which feeds the lD-Switchgea While the power cable for the A service water pump was wrapped with a fire rated material and the power cable for the B charging pump was rerouted so that a lC Switchgear Room fire would not affect either of these cables, the control cables associated with these pumps were not wrapped or reroute The licensee attrib~ted this to a personnel-error.-
-
r
With regard to the above events, the inspectors reviewed the FSAR, applicable drawings and determined that the licensee had an~lyzed loss of the condensate storage tank as a part their Appendix R analysi In addition, the EOPs direct the o~erators to open valves in the fire water system in the event that the suction supply to the AFW system is los The large capacity of the three fire pumps (1,500 gpm each) and the relatively sma 1l flow from the Turbine Drive Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (450 gpm) led the inspectors to conclude that there is sufficient capacity from_the fire water system to both supply water to fight a fire in the lC Switchgear Room and supply service water to the diesel generatot, in addition to providing enough water to feed the TDAFW pum Given an adequate so~rce of water to AFW, the licensee could use AFW to cool the primary coolant system to hot shutdow Additionally, the PORV and vent system could be used to depressurize the primary coolant system {PCS) to within the injection pressure of the high pressure injection ~ystem to maintain PCS inventory. Therefore, the postulated fire which could potentially render all charging and all service water pumps inoperable does not represent a significant safety concer_n based on the conclusions reached abov Since this deficiency was identified, the licensee has initiated hourly fire ~~tch patrols of the IC Switchgear Room and have revised bperating *
procedures to specify methods of restoring a service water pump and a charging pump until the subject control cables can be wrapped or-rerouted. This work activity is currently scheduled to occur during the 1990 Maintenance Outag An inspector verified these corrective actions on December 3~ 1989. This violation meets the tests of 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix_ C,Section V.G.; consequent1y, no Notice of Violation will be issued, and this matter is considered close One licensee identified violation was identifie.
Ope!! Items Open Items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some action_
on the part of the NRC or licensee or bot An Open Item disclosed during the inspection is discus$ed in Paragraph.
Management Interview (30703)
- The insp~ctors met with licensee representatives (denoted ir Paragraph 1)
on December 15, 1989 to discuss the scope and findings of the inspectio In addition, the inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspectio The licensee did not identify any such documents/processes as proprietar