IR 05000255/1989016
| ML18054A898 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 07/31/1989 |
| From: | Patterson J, Ploski T, Snell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18054A897 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-255-89-16, NUDOCS 8908110114 | |
| Download: ML18054A898 (16) | |
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II I Report No. 50-255/89016(DRSS)
Docket No.- 50-255 License No. DRP-20 Licensee:
Consumers Power Company 212 West Madison Avenue Jackson, MI 49201 Facility Name:
Palisades Nuclear Power Plant Inspection At:
Palisades Site, Covert, Michigan Inspection Inspector:
Co~cted: J)JlY 18-20, 1989
~~,. ~ffe~J J
es P. Patterson Team Leader Approved By:
- -/,/) /)'
/
~7!? //i£~
Tom Ploski
'Jl' ~
wWam s~. Chief Radiological Co~trols and Emergency Preparedness Section Inspection Summary Inspection on July 18-20, 1989 (Report No. 50-255/89016(DRSS))
1/~1/t~
Date-y;~)?
Date Areas Inspected:
Routine announced inspection of the annual Palisades Emergency Preparedness exercise involving observations by four NRC representatives of key functions and locations during the exercise (IP 82301).
Results:
The licensee demonstrated a good response to a simulated accident scenario involving loss of the start-up transformer and subsequent losses of diesel generator backup powe A small release of radioactivity was also simulated to be presen All objectives were demonstrated satisfactorily based on the scenari No exercise weaknesses were identifie One Open Item was identified relating to training for the security officer position at the EOF and use of the proper implementing procedure for EOF security officer assignments.
- DETAILS Persons Contacted NRC Observers and Areas Observed J. Patterson, Control Room (CR), Operational Support Center Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
T. Ploski, CR and Technical Support Center (TSC)
G. Martin, TSC and EOF, Health Physics Activities and Dose Assessment
E. Podolak, EDF Consumers Power Company (CPCo) Personnel
- G. Slade, Plant General Manager W. Beckman, Radiological Services Manager P. Loomis, Emergency Planning Administrator (CPCo)
A. Katarsky, Senior Nuclear Emergency Planner (CPCo)
K. Penrod, Emergency Planner (CPCo)
K. Haas, Reactor Engineering Superintendent*
C. Kozup, Technical Engineer M. £enrich, Shift Engineer C. 'Axtell, Senior Staff Health Physicist C. Reavy, Senior Health Physics Technician, Emergency Planning S. Cote, Property Protection Superintendent M. Nock, Property Protection Associate N. Brott, Emergency Plan Coordinator *
M. Savage, Public Affairs Director D. Vande Walle, Confirguration Control Manager R. Doan, Sr., Senior Plant Technical Advisor M. Dawson, Nuclear Instructor, Emergency Planning R. Beeker, Quality Assurance Audit Supervisor K. Kobota, Senior Licensing Specialist
- All names listed above except the one designated by an asterisk attended the exercise exit meeting on July 20, 1989. General An exercise of the Palisades Plant Site Emergency Plan (SEP) and the Emergency Implementing Procedures (EIPs) was conducted on July 19, 198 This exercise tested the licensee's response to a hypothe_tical accident scenario with a small release of radioactivit An attachment to this report includes the scope and objectives and a sequence of events for the exercise scenari This announced exercise was a utility only event with no participation from the State of Michigan or related countie *
3.
General Observations Procedures This exercise was conducted in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E requirements using the Palisades SE Coordination The licensee's response was coordinated, orderly and timel If the events had been real, the actions taken by the licensee would have been sufficient to permit the State and local authorities to take appropriate actions to protect the health and safety of the publi Observers Licensee observers monitored and critiqued this exercise as well as four NRC observer Exercise Critiques The licensee held facility and controller critiques immediately following the exercis The NRC critique was held at the plant site on July 20, 198.
Specific Observations Control Room The first significant event occurred when lightning struck the startup transformer 1-2 with probable loss of the 11 R 11 bu The Shift Supervisor (SS) received a message that there were frequency oscillation problems with the 1-2 diesel generato He promptly contacted an Auxiliary Operator (AO) by radio and told him to inspect the locatio The AO reported by radio that there was oil all over the floor around the 1-2 diese This diesel was then promptly shutdow These actions were well conducted in this emergency mod At 0840 the CR considered declaring an Aler On further review of the EALs, they recognized that the conditions would only justify the Notification of Unusual Event (NUE).
The NUE was correctly classified based on the miscellaneous category of EALs requiring an initia~ion of a plant shutdown according to technical specification Soon after, with the recognition of a steam generator tube leak, the SS and his crew correctly reviewed Off-Normal Procedure ON 23.2 to better ensure that all required actions were initiated for this lea The Alert was properly classified by the SS, however, the PA announcement did not include a short statement on the reason for the classificatio This is recommended for any emergency classificatio Notifications for both the NUE and the Alert were rather poorly completed, although they were made within the required time Each
of the two AOs demonstrated some unfamiliarity with the dedicated phones in the C Neither one appeared to be comfortable using the automatic dialer. Their performance indicated a need for more 11 hands-on 11 experien{: One AO erroneously called the EDF after the Unusual Event declaratio More hands-on training in a drill mode is recommended for the AOs assigned this tas The SS coordinated efforts with the incoming TSC chemistry staff to ensure that 11A 11 and 118 11 steam generators would be sampled to determine which (or both) had a primary to secondary lea The SS correctly recognized that a reactor trip would necessitate a Site Area Emergency, as no source of AC power could be available within 15 minutes of a trip. There was an orderly and efficient transfer of command and control from the SS to the Site Emergency Director (SEO) in the TSC shortly before 100 It was recognized that a reactor trip would result in a loss of power to certain radiation monitor As a precaution, the SS directed that a backup Area Radiation Monitor be made ready for the CR/TSC are At approximately 0900, plant personnel were instructed to go to the Radiation Protection, lower level, 11 bomb shelter 11 area due to the sighting of a funnel clou This required a large number of people to go outside during a severe weather condition, potentially exposing them to greater risk than if they took shelter nearer their primary work stations. This should have been considered as part of the decision for personnel to report to the bomb shelter are The second announcement for people to return to their work stations somehow got misinterpreted as it was passed alon The message the assembled people received was to return to their normal assembly are This accounted for several individuals walking into the CR/TS The procedure, which includes instructions for people to congregate if a tornado funnel or other severe weather is present, should be reevaluated and revised for certain groups who are currently instructed to go outside to reach their shelte Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee 1s program was acceptable; however, the following items shotild be considered for improvement:
0 Additional 11 hands on 11 training, preferably in a table-top drill format, should be provided to AOs to better familiarize them with the communications equipment and notification forms required to make emergency notification Procedures to provide guidance for employees or anyone onsite during severe weather conditions should be re~valuated and revised where necessary.
Onsite assembly and accountability was completed within _approximately 30 minutes after the siren actuated following the Alert declaratio Status boards were well maintained including one for sequence of events and a plant parameter status boar The timeliness of the updated data on the plant parameter status board improved as the exercise, progressed.* Du~i~g the time that the SEO was in command and control, he reviewed and revi~ed, as appropriate, the updated messages to State and local officials before transmissio These updates were then copied onto several status board At 0945 stack monitor readings increased indicating a release of radioactive material to the environmen However, notification message forms did not indicate that a release was in progress until approximately noo It appeared that the rationale for not reporting the monitor increase as a release was that the resulting dose was calculated to be insignifican However, any verified release of radioactive material during a declared emergency should be reported as a release regardless of the resulting dos Initial dose assessment results indicated noble gases of lE-3 mR/hr and iodine of lE-6 mR/h These results were based on a stack monitor reading of 1800 counts per minut Projected dose calculations were made at approximately 1045 to determine the effect on doses, if the primary to secondary leak rate were to increase*to 40 gallons per minut Thus, dose assessments were being calculated even though amounts applicable were smal Within 20 minutes of assuming command and control, the SEO had decided to continue reactor shutdown until a 30% power level had been reached and to remain at that power level unless one other source of AC power would be availabl He was well aware of the technical specification time limit to reach hot shutdown and his option to invoke 10 CFR 50.54(x).
The SEO ensured that his staff expedited OSC efforts to investigate and repair the 1-1 and the 1-2 diesel generators and the 1-2 startup transformer The staff was told to keep him informed of estimated repair times and any new damage reports that would affect these time estimate By 1045 the SEO and his group leaders had thoroughly discussed the likely increase in the primary to secondary leak rate and their-inability to quantify the radioactive release rate using either a stack monitor or field teams if reactor power were los The fielq teams would have been ineffective because the plume would be over the lak The Chemistry Support Team Leader kept the SEO well informed of efforts to determine which steam generator had the primary to secondary leak. - They correctly concluded by about 1115 that the leak was in the 11A 11 steam generato Further analysis of
samples confirmed this by 114 The SED kept his EOF counterpart well informed of the damage assessments on both diesels, the startup transformer, the 11 R 11 bus and the determination that the 11A 11 steam generator had the primary to secondary lea The Assistant SED and several group leaders did a very good job of convincing the SED to recommend the Site Area Emergency (SAE) declaration because.there was no alternative but to invoke 10 CFR -50.54(x) by stopping the reactor shutdown at 30% power near 120 An SAE could have been declared by 1130, since the SED had adequate information that he had no other viable alternative than to stop the reactor shutdown at about 120 However, the SED did not recommend a SAE to the EOF Director until another 15 minutes had passe Some of the delay was due to the orderly transfer of co~mand and control to the EOF at 1137, while the SED and his support team leaders debated when the SAE should be declare The EOF Director correctly declared the SAE at 115 The TSC staff were promptly informed of this declaration and its basi A simulated evacuation of nonessential personnel was carried out at approximately 1204, with the SED first allowing for time to dispatch the Health Physics Technicians for deployment as radiation monitors and observers of the evacuee The EOF informed the SED in the TSC that a 5 megawatt diesel generator would be onsite about 1700 to help relieve the power outag Meanwhile the TSC correctly continued to give high priority to repairing the 1-1 diesel generator and the 1-2 transformer while considering how the portable genera~or should be utilize Based on the above findings this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable; however, the following item should be considered for improvement:
During an emergency response situation, greater conservatism should be used in informing offsite officials of changes to the routine radiation release rate Opera ti ona 1 Support Center (OSC),
The OSC was staffed and activated in a timely manne The first of several plant status briefings was held at 100 Throughout the exercise a good, coordinated effort was demonstrated by the OSC supervisors and staff, including the OSC Director, Health Physics-Supervisor, Communicator and the Dosimetry Cler Status boards were well maintained and kept current including the main event boar While still testing equipment during OSC activation, it was observed that the power supply for the radios had blown a fus New fuses were quickly obtaine A$ a backup source of power, a hookup was made with a 12 volt battery. This unplanned problem was efficiently handled to maintain operability with the two way radio *
A maintenance team was sent to evaluate diesel generator 1-2 and recommend possible repair and/or maintenanc The team demonstrated good reso~rcefulness including substituting a rubber hose for the ruptured oil lin Also, they planned to examine another segment called the 11boot 11 while trying to get access to the rotor which they could then spi These plans were not allowed to be carried out due to a message from the Control let which told them the bearings were froze The team then concluded that it would take several days to repair the turbocharge The actions of this maintenance team were good examples of troubleshooting including an innovative method to attempt to restart the diesel generato From a radiation protection standpoint there was minimal activity throughout the exercise due to the scenari Two teams were activated early into the event, i.e., before 100 One team was sent along the lakeside. to detect any radiatio The wind direction and projected plume were out over the lake and were based on real time meteorology which was used since before 100 The second team was in standby in the plant parking lot waiting to be dispatched if th~re was a wind chang This team was later told to perform some precautionary monitoring measurement At 1155 the DSC Director chose to relieve the HP Supervisor with another person trained in that positio This change was made due to the lack of activity in that area and also to permit the original HP Supervisor to go home and get some res This would permit him to be available again on the late shift if he were neede This was a good management decisfon and gave two individuals an opportunity to fill this positio Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee 1s program was accep~abl Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
The EOF Administrator gave his first briefing to the EOF staff at 103 Support group personnel including the Plant Support Engineering (PSE) Reactor Physics, Health Physics and dedicated Communicators were represente At 1056 with the EOF still not operational, the PSE was already contacting the TSC and making them aware of the 11backfeed 11 procedure should the plant tri The PSE group appeared well coordinated and were already taking steps to receive the portable generator to help with the power failur At 1100 the General Office Response Team arrived from the corporate headquarters in Jackson, Michiga One dedicated telephone line from the TSC Coordinator to the EOF was out of order for over one hou Other phone lines were quickly substituted without a serious delay in respondin After briefing the team leaders and getting briefed by them, the EOF Director discussed criteria needed for escalating the event to a Site Area
Emergenc The Health Physics group was setting up their dose assessment and other equipment an*d standing by for developments, which was all that c*ould be done with the scenario condition At 1137 the Emergency Director officially took over command and control from the TS After concurrence and discussion with the TSC, the EDF Director officially declared the Site Area Emergency (SAE) at 115.
At 1158 the Emergency Director contacted the State about the SA At approximately 1200 the 1145 message was amended to indicate that an SAE was declared, and also that the time of release was changed to 093 The Emergency Director provided good leadership, utilized his support groups ~ell and gave meaningful briefings to his staf The PSE was well involved throughout the exercise and continually provided guidance and support to the rsc.*
The security officer on duty inside the entrance to the EDF had an*
uncontrolled, unapproved, undated document in the security officer 1 s kit titled 11Security Officer Instructions.
These instructions implied that there was only one security officer assigned to the ED Procedure EDF-10, Revision 4, titled 11 Property Protection Team, 11 O!l page 6.of 7 has statements with instructions for three security officers, rather than on However, at the bottom of this page is a statement under Note:
11The number of officers needed will be determined at the time of EDF activation.
Since the security officer arrived at 1024, the EOF*staff had no opportunity to determine whether this was sufficient security coverag Even if it was deci.ded that three security officers were too many, some other *
security representative should have been present to relieve the one on duty and serve as liaison with the EDF staf Following the exercise, discussion with the assigned guard indicated that this person had not received any prior training on EDF-10 or any special considerations for providing EDF security during an emergenc A current copy of EOF-10, Revision 4, should be included in the officer 1 s ki Specific traiQing should be provided to any security officer given this assignmen In retrospect, the security officer at the EOF was diligent and did a good job performing the security-related task This is an Open Item No. 50-255/89016-01, until these security/emergency related items are addresse The EDF staff was instructed by the Emergency Director to consider recovery/reentry concerns and report back by group functio The exercise was then terminated at 131 Following a time jump of nine hours recovery/reentry plans were discussed and recorded in coordination with two representatives from the TS The recovery plans were adequate considering the scope of the scenario, a minimum release and no reactor equipment damage Offsite sampling of water and milk was recommended as a precautionary measur The SED from the TSC was assigned as the Recovery Manage Other key support positions were also designated including licensing, which would deal also with the NRC for authorization to restart the plan Based on the above findings, with the exception of the one Open Item, this portion of the licensee 1s program was acceptabl.
Scenario The exercise scope and objectives and the complete scenario package were submitted in accordance with the established schedul The licensee was responsive to the few technical questions raised by the NRC on the scenario dat Certain of the objectives relating to radiological controls, dose assessment and protective action recommendations were demonstrated but only to a limited extent due to the small release of radioactivit There was no time at which the Technical Specification for this stack release was exceede One criticism was that the radiation protection inplant teams and offsite teams were not challenged sufficiently to provide a good test of their skills, but the scena~io did provide other challenge Meteorological data was provided as real time data after about 094 This included current and forecast data provided in 15 minute average This provided a more realistic challenge to the protective measures staff, ev~n though the scenario did not include a simulated major release or a real need for protective action For the first time in an exercise, this licensee provided a roleplayer who represented the NRC in a response cell capacity. *He portrayed an NRC Region III Section Chief and Branch Chief of the Division of Reactor Project The scenario developers felt these management levels would be contacted in addition to the Headquarters (HQ) Duty Officer as the scenario progresse The NRC role playing was creative and challengin However, in a real event the NRC Region III Incident.Response Center would have beeQ activated following the Alert declaratio Once the NRC had learned of the potential to involve 10 CFR 50.54(x), the level of NRC interest and attention would probably have included regional and HQ senior management, well above the Branch Chief leve Scenario developers should better anticipate the level of NRC response to scenario events if roleplayers are to be utilized to realistically portray NRC official Participants were confronted with the scenario challenge of deciding whether to shut down the reactor in accordance with Technical Specifications or to continue operating the reactor at reduced power level by invoking the provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(x) due to the existence of postulated plant conditions that are beyond those circumstances covered by Technical Specification However, as the scenario progressed, th~ challenge confronting the participants was when they should officially decide that 10 CFR 50.54(x) became applicable and not whether it would be applicable to their emergency response effort In summary, the scenario did provide challenges and events which tested the technical skills of plant management and staff~ The basic emergency conditions had a great deal of realism to them including the diesel generator problems and the continuing primary to secondary leak in one of
- ,
the steam generator These aspects, among others, kept the staff busy determining the best corrective actions availabl However, as already described in this scenario, there was little involvement for the radiological assessment groups and the inplant and offsite team.
Exit Interview The inspection team met on Juiy 20, 1989, with the licen~ee representatives denoted in Section 1 of this repor The team leader discussed the scope and evaluation of the exercise including preliminary inspection fin.ding There was initially a difference of opinion with the licensee on whether a release of radioactivity should have been acknowledged on the notification form early in the exercis The licensee contended that this was a small stack release within Technical Sp.ecification Later in the exercise the EOF Director amended the notification form at the Site Area Emergency level to record the time of release as 0930 rather than a later tim The licensee informally agreed with the NRC team 1s contention that when ~
plant is in any declared emergency status any amount or level of released radioactivity should be identified as a release for the benefit of offsite support agencies and the NR Another item discussed was the EOF 1 s security officer 1s statement that
- training for this security position at the EOF was never receive Also, an unauthorized document for security officer instructions was *found in the officer 1s duty ki The procedure to be followed was from the General Office Resp9nse Team 1s Procedures for the EOF, specifically EOF-10, Revision The Property Protection Superintendent agreed to take action to correct the situatio This security related finding was later identified, following this inspection, as an Open Ite The licensee indicated that none of the items discussed were proprietar Attachments: Exercise Scope and Objectives Sequence of Events 10 SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES SCOPE PALEX 89 is designed to meet exercise requirements specified in.*10 CFR SO, Appendix E,Section I It will postulate events which would require activation of major portions of the site emergency pla This is a utility-only, exercis The Joint Public Information Center will not be activate.2 OBJECTIVES The exercise will demonstrate the following items as dictated by the scenario:
1. Assessment and Classification Recognition of emergency conditions Timely classification of emergency conditions in accordance with emergency action levels Conrnunication Initial notification within specified time constraints (state and local -
15 minutes, NRC -
1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />)_ Subsequent notification in accordance with procedure Notification and coordination with other organizations, as required (other utilities, contractors, fire or medical services) Provision of accurate and timely information to support news release activity Radiological Assessment and Control Calculation of dose projection based on sample.results or monitor readings Performance of in-plant and offsite field surveys Trending of radiological data Formulation of appropriate protective action recommendations Contamination and exposure control Emergency Response Facilities Activation, staffing and operation at appropriate classifications and within specified time constraints MIOS89-0l38A-TP20 * Adequacy of emergency equipment and supplies Adequacy of emergency conrnunication systems Access control Emergency Management ColIIIland and control with transfer of responsibilities from Control Room to Technical Support Center to Emergency Operations Facility Assembly and accountability within approximately 30 minutes Coordination with State of Michigan emergency response organization Mitigation of operational and radiological conditions Mobilization of emergency teams Reentry and Recovery Assessment of damage and formulation of draft* recovery plan outline Identification of constraints, requirements and organization to implement the plan Exercise Control Provisiqn for adequate free play Accurate assessment of player performance MI0589-0138A-TP20 Scenario Time
- 0030 NU0589-0187A-TP12 PALEX-89 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS Event Initial Conditions -
Normal Full Power Equipment Out of Service:
1-1 Diesel Generator Alarms:
K-05 Ann 49, Diesel Gen Bkr 152-107 Trip K-05 Ann 51, Diesel Gen No 1-1 Trouble K-05 Ann 52, Diesel Gen No 1-1 Start Signal Blocked PCS Leak Rate (Most Recent Results):
0.08 gpm identified, 0.054 unidentified, 0.134 gpm tota Estimated Primary to Secondary Leak Rate:
0.02 gp *
Scenario Time 0000 0010 0015 0020 0030 0040 0045 0050 0100 0110 PALEX-89 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS Event A severe thunderstorm warning and tornado watch is received from Murray and Trette Lightning strikes Star~-Up Transformer 1- "R" Bus de-energizes, 1-2 Diesel Generator start Plant shutdown at 12% per hour should be co!llilenced due to failure to meet the requirements of Technical Specification Sections 3.7.2.b and 3.7.2.i, and an Unusual Event must be declare Control room and switchyard relays indicate that Start-Up Transformer 1-2 tripped on ground overcurrent and differentia Weather conditions continue to deteriorat Security reports that a funnel cloud has been sighted to the southwes Diesel Generator ~hould be restarted if previously stopped, but not loaded, at this point (declaration of Alert is appropr~ate-but is not required).
1-2 Diesel Generator speed is noted to be errati Security reports that the funnel cloud has dissipate Auxiliary Operator reports a severe oil leak on the 1-2 Diesel Generator Turbocharger bearing oil supply flex hos Turbocharger is screeching; engine speed will not respond to contro Diesel Generator s~ould be stopped to stop the oil lea Diesel Generator is inoperabl Power reduction rate should be increased to 24% per hour, as Technical Specification 3.0.3 now applies (again, declaration of Alert is appropriate but is not required).
Reports indicate no plant damage due to stor No fire or damage evident to Start-Up Transformer 1-Control Room and switchyard relays can be rese (If power was restored to the "R" bus, it would ililtlediately be lost due to high dif-ferential; subsequent investigation will reveal a faulted primary winding on Start-Up Transformer 1-2.)
An Alert should have been declared by this tim RIA-0631 in alarm.at 30~000 cp Stack activity increases slightly (2,000 cpm on RIA-2326).
0150 Primary to secondary leak rate estimated at 0.15 gpm based on off gas sampl Repairs to 1-1 Diesel Generator are estimated to require 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />; operability testing will then require an additional NU0589-0187A-TP12
Scenario Time 0230 0300 0330 0400 0430 0445 NU0589-0187A-TP12 PALEX-89 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS Event 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, with 1-1 Diesel Generator capable of assuming Bus lC loads approximately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> into the tes Diesel Generator Turbocharger is diagnosed as having failed bearing(s) due -to loss of oil; repairs are estimated to require 2 day No time estimate is available for 1-2 Start-Up Transforme RIA-0631 count rate stable at 30,000 cp Gross gamma activities:
'A' S/G -
7.1 E-6
'B' S/G ~ < 5.6E-6 Plant shutdown continues at 24% per hou It should be evident at this point that continued compliance with Technical Specification 3.0.3 will result in complete lo.ss of offsite and onsite AC powe The SEO should choose one of two options: Reduce power to the lowest practicable level consistent with stable feedwater operation and ~aintain station power until repairs are complete to 1-1 Diesel Generato This action will result in violation of Technical Specific~tion 3.0.3, but is permissible under 10 CFR 50.54(x).
(No increase in steam generator tube leak.age will result from this option.) Trip the plant and line up to backfeed via the Main Transforme This action will result in complete loss of offsite and onsite AC power for approximately 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> (Selection of this option will result in a primary to secondary leak rate of 5 gpm and an unmonitored release of unknown magnitude.)
Selection of either option is acceptable but must result in declaration of a Site Area Emergenc Course of action (Option A or B above) selecte Reactor stable at approximately 30% or tripped, depending on option selecte Initial offsite monitoring complet Jump ahead to new plant condition Plant in Hot Shutdown with 1-1 Diesel Generator carrying basic loads, OR offsite power available via Main Transformer backfeed, depending on option selecte 'A' steam generator is isolate Enter recovery phas Scenario PALEX-89
_SEQUENCE OF EVENTS Time Event 0500 Commence plant cooldow Secure from the dril NUOS89-0187A-TP12 4