IR 05000255/1989029
| ML18054B171 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 11/29/1989 |
| From: | Burgess B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18054B172 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-255-89-29, IEB-87-002, IEB-87-2, NUDOCS 8912140249 | |
| Download: ML18054B171 (12) | |
Text
U.S NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-255/89029(DRP)
Docket No. 50-255 Licensee:
Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue J~ckson, MI 49201 License No. DPR-20 Facility Name:
Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant Inspection At:
Palisades Site, Covert, Michigan Inspection Conducted:
October 6 through November 13, 1989 Inspectors:
E: R. Swanson J. K. Heller Approved By:
E.~~~iriz
~~
Reacto~ Projett~ Secti-0n 2A Inspection Summary Inspection on October 6 through November 13, 1989 (Report No. 50-255/89029(DRP))
Areas Inspected:
Routine unannounced inspection by the resident inspectors of: actions on-previously identified items; plant operations; maintenance; surveillance; fire protection; secur.ity; quality program activities; reportable events; bulletins, 10 CFR 21 reports; and, NRC Region In request No Safety Issues Management System (SIMS) items were reviewe Results: Df the eleven areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie The inspection disclosed weaknesses in:
the licensee 1s excessive use of Engineering Design Changes during modification wofk, fite protection, and containment cleanu The inspection noted strengths in the 1icehsee 1s maintenaoce of general cleanliness during the outage, completion of the 11model room 11 for-evaluation, aggressive implementation of Fitness for Duty Program, and the system engineer program~.
One new Unresolved Item was identified concerning fire protection program implementation and is discussed in Paragraph PDR ADOCK 05000255*
Q PNU
DETAILS Persons Contacted Consumers Power Company
- G. B. Slade, Plant General Manager
- R. M. Rice, Plant Operations Manager J. G. Lewis, Technical Director
- R. D. Orosz, Engineering and Maintenance Manager
- W. L. Beckman, Radiological Services Manager
- J. L. Hanson, Operati~ns Superinte~dent R. B. Kasper, Mechanical Maintenance Superintendent K. E. Osborne, System Engineering Superintendent
- H. M. Esch, Acting I&C Engineering and Maintenance Superintendent L. J. Kenaga, Health Physics Superintendent
- C. S. Kozup, Technical Engineer
- J. R. Brunet, Licensing Analyst D. J. Malone, Senior Licensing Analyst W. L. Roberts, Supervisory Engineer K. A. Toner, Plant Projects Superintendent
- D. W. Joos, SG Replacement Project Manager
- W. Clark, SG Replacement Project Engineer
- G. Brown, Engineer, Bechtel
- M. L.* Lesinski, SG Replacement Project, Radiation Protection
- M. C. Sniegowski, SG Replacement Engineer
- J. C. Kuemin, Licensing Engineer
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
- J. 0. Thoma, Director, Project Directorate III-2
- W. L. Axelson,Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 2
- B. l. Burg~ss, Chief, Projects Section 2A
- E. R. _Swanson, Senior Resident Inspector
- J. K. Heller, Resident Inspector *
- E. R. Si:hweibinz, Project Engineer
- A. W. OeAgazio, Project Manager, NRR
- C. F. Gill, Senior Radiation Specialist
- D. E. Miller, Senior Radiation Specialist
- D. H. Danielson, Chief, Materials and Processes Section
- J. M. Jacobsen, Reactor Inspector
- Indicates ~ome of those attending the Steam Generator Replacement briefing on November 9, 198 *Denotes those present at the Management Interview on November 13, 198 Other members of the Plant-staff, and several members of the Contract Security Force, were also contacted during the inspection period. *
- . ::.-:- Actions on Previously Identified Items (92701, 92702)
(Closed) Inspection*Report 50-255/89018 (no number assigned), on pages 15 and 16, asked the licensee to review two cases that may *not be properly
.described in the FSA The first pertained to the position of safeguards room v*entilation supply/exhaust dampers following a containment high
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pressure/radiation signa The second pertained to flow capability of the containment spray nozzle For each case the reviewer determined that the plant design was correct and the FSAR desc~iption could be enhance The reviewer initiated a FSAR change reques No violations, deviations, unresolved or open items were identifie.
Operational Safety Verification (71707, 71710, 42700)
Routine facility operating activities were observed as conducted in the plant and from the main control room Plant startup, steady power operation, plant shutdown, and.system(s) lineup and operation were observed as appl1cabl The performance of licensed Reactor Operators and Senior Reactor Operators, of Shift Technical Advisors, and of auxiliary equipment operators was observed and evaluated including procedure use and adherence, records and logs, communications, shift/duty turnover, and the degree of professionalism of control room activities.
. Evaluation, corrective action, and response for off normal conditions or e~ents, if any, were examine This included compliance to any reporting requirement Observations of the control room monitors, indicators, and recorders were made to verify the operability of emergency systems, radiation monitoring systems and nuclear reactor protection systems, as applicabl Reviews of surveillance, equipment coridition, and tagout logs were conducte Proper return to service of selected components was verifi~ General The unit began the reporting period in a preplanned maintenance and surveillance outage, that began on October 1, 198 During this outage two potential startup issues were identified, that resulted in numerous _conference ca 11 s between the NRC (Region II I and Washington) and Consumers Power Company (Plant and Jackson).
The first issue pertained to the findings* and scope of the Ste.am Generator Eddy Current Testing (ECT).
This issue was resolved on November 3 when the NRC agreed that ECT equipment could be removed from the Steam Generator ECT results will be discussed in Inspecti~n Report No. 50-255/89032(DRS).
- The second issue pertains to NRC review of seismic Cdlculations
_performed by the licensee related to NRC Bulletin 79-1 In addition to the conference calls, this was the subject of a meeting held in Washington D.C. on October 30, 1989 and a site visit on November 7-9, 198 At the close of this report this startup issue had not been resolve The seismic concerns will be discussed in Inspection Report No. 50-255/89024(DRS).
Plant Tours During plant tours, the following were noted and discussed with plant personne (1)
PIC 0201 11Changing Pump Discharge Pressure 11 is a local pressure gauge and was indicating a discharge pressure greater than the pump capabilit This was identified to the Shift Supervisor, who indicated a W.R. had just been writte (2)
Remote fl ow i ndi ca tor FI-3078 11 Loop lA Shutdown Coo 1 i ng Fl ow
was reading approximately 600 to 800 gpm less then control room indicator FI-307 This was identified to the Shift Supervisor, who initiated a (3)
The 11A 11 service water pump appeared to have abnormally high vibratio This was identified to the Shift Superviso The next day the pump was declared inoperable due to a high vibratio (4)
On November 8 the inspector toured the containment, and observed the following on or near the Safety Injection bottle catwal *
A couple of bottles of snoop
A cigarette butt
A note pad
A number of magic markers
A monkey wrench
A torn workman's glove
Work order package 24806369 and a associated container of weld ro A check of the computer shows that this work activity was performed in October of 198 The catwalk is a low traffic area and requires considerable effort to get t As such, some of the items were left from previous outage The inspector* discussed these items at the exit interview, noting that these are additional examples of a weak containment cleanliness standar (5) During a containment tour, the inspector noted that the majority of the-wall graffiti has been remove No vioJations, deviations, unresolved or open items were identifie ** Maintenance (62703, 427aa)
Maintenance activities in the plant were-routinely inspected, including both corrective maintenance (repairs) and preventive maintenanc Mechanical, electrical, and instrument and control group maintenance activities were included as availabl The focus of the inspection was to assure the maintenance activities reviewed were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with Technical Specification The following items were considered during this review: the Limiting Conditions for Operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures; and post maintenance testing was performed as applicabl The following activities were inspected: VOTES testi~g of MOV-2089 (W.O. 2490595 and 24905152). Hydrogen Monitor heat trace calibration (W.O. 24905058). Replacement of Alnor Meter TI-1479 (W.a. 249a1441). Installation of DIG service water flow meters (W.O. 249a4052). Rebuild of Auxiliary Feedwater Pump P-8C ( ~49a3217). Boric Acid Pump flow instrumentation and heat tracing (W.a. 24904634 and 249a4638, FC 847).
It was noted, that over fifty engineering design changes were made in the completion of this minor modification: Installation of PIC-02a2/HIC-2122 instrument upgrade program ( a48al, FC-817)., Removal of P-54C and P-668 motors for rebuild (W.a. 24901667, 249a1671). Installation of power cross-ties for P-55A and B (W.O. 249a3903, RW_P-89a399). Service Water Pump P-7A rebuild (W.a. 24904386)
No violations, deviations, unresolved or open items were identifie.
Radiological Controls (71707)
During routine tours of radiologically controlled plant facilities or areas, the inspector observed occupational radiation safety practices by the radiation protection staff and other workers.
- Effluent releases were.routinely ~hecked, ~ncluding examination of on-line recorder traces and proper operatiun of automatic monitoring equi~ment. *
Independent surveys were performed in various radiologically controlled area A hand help frisker, located in a hallway of the *590 level of the Auxiliary Building, appeared to have failed lo This was identified to the Duty H.P. Technicia During subsequent tours, the inspector noted that the frisker had been replace b. * During the process of touring the containment sump, the inspector participated in the pre-job ALARA briefing which was fairly
comprehensive.- While dressing for the entry the inspector tried*to obtain the plastic booties specified on the RWP, but was told by the RP Technician providing coverage that they were not needed as t_he poly suit (fish skins) had attached boot This was the case, but the inspector was concerned after entering the sump and finding that the water was deeper than the rubber shoe cover A second layer.of waterproof protection was recommended t6 RP management for future e~trie None of the personnel entering the sump were contaminated, and exposure wa~ very lo ** Surveillance (61726, 42700)
The inspector reviewed Technical Specifications required surveillance testing as described below and verified that testing was pe~formed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that Limiting Conditions for Operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were properly accomplished~
that test results conformed with Technical-Specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed. by personne 1. other than the i ndi vi dua 1 directing the test, and th~t deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personne The following activities were inspected: RO 32-'56 Local Leak Rate Test - containment.sump level instrument (LT-0383) Q0-88 ESS Check Valve Operability Test (Cold Shutdown) DW0-1 SH0-1 Daily Control Room Surveillanc Operators Shift Surveillanc No violations; deviations, unresolved or open items were identifie,
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','.. Fire Protection (71707, 64704)
Fire protection program activities, in~luding fire prevention and other -
activities associated with maintaining capability for early detection and suppression of postulated fires, were examine Plant cleanliness; with a focus on control of combustibles and-on maintaining continuous ready
-- access to fire fighting equipment and materials, was included in_ the-items evaluate During_ this outage, the inspectors observed a number of maintenance activities involving hot work activitie The inspector verified that with the exception listed below: that hot work permits were approved and
~posted; that fire fighting equipment, in addition to the equipment permanently stationed in the area, was available; that a firewatch was assigned; and, that the hot work activity was controlled in accordance with plant administrative procedure An LP gas bottle (approximately 80 pounds) was being stored in a tool chest, located at the south end of the 590 level of the turbine dec The fire protection coordinator was informed and-had the bottle remove *
- The doorway, from the 590 level of the Auxiliary Building to the Turbine Building, was blocked with circuit breakers on the Turbine Building sid Both sides of the door were marked 11 Fire Door 11 *
The Auxiliary building side was labeled 11emergency exit 11 *
This was
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identified to the Shift Outage Mana~er, who had the area cleaned u On November 9, the inspector observed hot work activities, per W.O. 24903693, in the component cooling water roo The inspector identified to the crew that a fire extinguisher was not present -
during the grinding activit The work supervisor stopped the activity until a fire extinguisher was obtaine Although most findincis were favorable, the above items raise conc~rns about the licensee 1s implementation of the Fire Protection Program and-therefore the corrective actions to the above will be tracked as an Unresolved Item (No. 255/89029-01 (DRP)).
One unresolved item and no violations, deviations, or open items were identifie.
Security (71707)
Routine facility security measures, including control of access for vehicles, packages and personnel, were observe Performance of dedicated physical security equipment was verified during inspections in various plant area The activities of the professional security force in maintaining facility security protection were occasionally examined or reviewed, and interviews were.occasionally conducted with security force member,
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The inspector observed two maintenance activities that involved a
~odification of the vital barrier.. The inspector verified that compensatory measures were implemented while the barrier was modified, and was restored following the activit The licensee's Fitness for Duty Program was observed to be functioning properly during the outag Three contractor individuals were tested for cause and found to have alcohol levels in the action range. *Two of these were identified by Security Officers prior to the individuals entering the protected are No violations, deviations, unresolved or open items were identifie..
Safety Assessment/Quality Verification (35502, 40500)
The effectiveness of management controls, verifi~ation and oversight activities, in the condµct of jobs observed during this inspection, was evaluate The inspector frequently attended management and supervisory meetings involving plant status and plans and focusing on proper coordination among Department,
The results of licensee auditing and corrective acti~n programs were routinely monitored by attendance at Corrective Action Review Board (CARB) meetings and by review of Deviation Reports, Event Reports,.
Radiological Incident Reports, and security incident report As app 1 i cable, corrective act ion program documents were *forwarded to NRC
- Region III technical specialists for information and possible followup evaluatio *
After a Corrective Actiori Review Board (CARB), the inspector attended an informal discussion pertaining to the threshold for issuing a Deviation Re~ort (DR), an internal corrective action docu~en Some problems were discussed, for which a DR had been prepared but not entered into the corrective action syste The supervisor questioned the need for the DR, since corrective action was implemented at the time of discovery and there did not appear to be generic concerns or long range corrective action After that meeting, the inspector interviewed some other engineers, operators and technicians and found that similar opinions were expresse Some indicated that they have been encouraged to use their judgement and not write sq man The inspector reviewed administrative.
documents pertaining to DRs and found that the instructions were open to interpretati~n pertaining to when a DR was actually require At the exit interview, the inspector expressed concern that allowing management decisions to be made by their employees could lead toward ineffective repairs and repetitive events. *The DR assures that management is involved *in the decision making process to resolve the conditions and ensure that the event is put in the perspective of re~urring or generic problems, th?t reporting requirements are reviewed, and that effective and lasting corrective actions are take Isolated occurrences 11 that are not documented on a DR may be precursors to serious equipment*
failures or personnel error The inspector noted that the licensee
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trends the number of open DRs and recommended that if the review-load is too great that a means be devised to deal with a larger number effectivel It was also recommended that the licensee make better use-of thetr D~ database by developing a meahs to conduct "key word 11 -searches and trendin No violations, deviations, unresolved or open items were identifie.
Reportable Events (92700, 92720)
The inspector reviewed the fo 11 owing Licensee Event Reports (LE Rs) by means of direct observation, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of record The review addressed compliance to reporting re~uirements and, as applicable, that immediate cortective action and appropriate actioh to prevent recurrence -had been accomplishe (Closed) LER 255/85028 Revision 1:
Safety Injection System Actuation: The licensee reissued the report to document probable causes of the right channel actuating, but c*ould identify no definitive cause, and therefore, specified no additional corrective measure (Closed) LER 255/86031 Revision 1:
Inoperable Containment Air Cooler (Closed) LER 255/88015 and Revision 1:
FueJ bundle removed from core durin~ upper guide structure lift. Corrective actions taken, to prevent recurrence, are appropriate and extensiv Nearly all avehues, which were being evaluated, are planned for implementation before the next refueling outag * (Closed) LER 255/88018:
Inadvertent containment isolation signal during plant modification Review.of the three previous LERs involving containment isolation (88014, 88016, and 88017) and the
. one subsequent LER (88019) indicate no common cause License-e corrective action appears appropriate and no other reportable containment isolations have occurred since October 1, 198 (Closed) LER *255/88019:
Inadvertent containment isolation actuation
. during post-modification testin Review indicates that the root cause could nnt be absolutely identified nor could it be repeate The licensee has not had any subsequent reportable containment isolations sine~ this even No violations, deviations, unresolved or open 1tems were identifie.
NRC Compliance Bulletin (92703)
The inspector reviewed the NRC communication listed below and verified that: the licensee has received the correspondence; the correspondence was reviewed by appropriate management representatives; a written response was submitted if required; and, plant-specific actions were taken as described in the licensee 1s respons ;_ *"
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NRC Compliance Bulletin 87-02 "Fast~ner Testing to Determine Confor~ance with Applicable Material Specifications". As requested by Temporary Instruction TI-2500/27, the inspector reviewed the adequacy of the root cause analysis and corrective action taken by the licensee in regard to sample PAL-1 The 1/2" by 2 1/4 11 stud had a Rockwell hardness of 41 HRC as compared to the acceptance range of 24 to 37 HR The stud was evaluated as acceptable for use and no further action was take Nonconforming Material Report NMR-QP-88-024 was written to document the acceptability of the studs obtained on the same purchase orde No violations, deviations, unresolved or open items were identifie.
CFR 21 Report
- .j (Closed) Part 21 No. 255/88014-06:
Ashcroft pressure gauges failed at
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pressures within their operating range. -The original 10 CFR 21 Report was submitted on May 25, 1988. After further testing and evaluation, the licensee has concluded that the gauges were fatling as a result of high frequence pressure pulses~ which caused fatigue failure of the bourdon tube in the gaug The licensee is planning to replace the 0-100 psi range
. gauges with 0-200 psi range devices, which have a throttling screw t dampen the pulsation. This is in accordance with the vendor's (Dresser Industries) recommendatio Although some of the gauges appeared to be defective, the root cause was misapplication of the gauge (Closed) Part 21 No. 255/88025-02:
Unauthorized supplie~ sold parts represented as genuine Masoneilan parts. *Details of the suspect parts issue was documented by licensee correspondence on October 21, 1988 and updated on December 22, 1988 *.It was determined that parts made by the former subsidiary, as we 11 as a small percentage of Masoneilan parts, were nonconforming in some aspect (Closed) Part 21 No. 255/89029-02:
On November 7, 1989, the licensee
- reported a mis-wiring of a 2400 volt breaker by Siemans Energy and*
Automation of Milwaukee, Wisconsin. The breaker was found to be.mis-wired when it was tested by the licensee prior to use, and blew a fuse in the *
control power circuit. The licensee determined that it had not been rewired according to the drawing The vendor was again provided the correct drawings and rebuilt the breaker properl The condition was concluded to be ~n isolated case of personnel error. The vendor has stated that they do _not service any other nuclear power plants. This issue is closed (No. 255/89029-02 (DRP))
No violatio*ns, deviations, unresolved or open items were identifie * 1 Region III Requests (92705)
a*-
NUREG/CR-5078*
Mr. E. G. Greenm~n memorandum of April 16, 1989, requested verification by the resident inspector that the licensee was aware of NUREG/CR-5078, Volume 2, "A Reliability Program for Emergency
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Dies~l Generators at Nuclear Power Plants." On October 6, 1989~ the inspector verified, by discussion with the system engineer, that the-
- 1icensee had received, reviewed and evaluated the recommendations of NUREG/CR-507 '
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. Steain Generator Blowdown Isolation Mr. W. L. Axelson memorandum of October 10, 1989, identified that a discrepancy between the design basis and plant configuration was identified at some four loop PWR It was found that the Byron and
.Braidwood FSAR stated.that Steam Generator blowdown will isolate on initiation of Auxiliary Feedwater, when in fact it doesn' M Axelson's memorandum requested that the resident inspector review the auxiliary feedwater and steam generator blowdown logics, and confirm that plant design and the FSAR description are in agreemen The insp~ctors review~d the FSAR~ plant prints and interviewed members of the operations staff; no problems were identifie c~
Main Steam Relief Valve Testing During a conference call on October 5, 1989, ~r. W. L. Axelson requested information pertaining to testing of Main Steam Relief valve It appears that some sites do the testing at power, which may create an unreviewed safety questio The licensee performs Ma,in Sfeam Relief Valve testing while in cold shutdown, by removing the valves and sending them to a fossil plant that has testing capabilities. This information was provided to Region II d~
Inconel Pressurizer Heater Sleeve As a result *of cracking found in the INCONEL-600 pressurizer heater sleeves, at the Calvert Cliffs Unit 2 Plant, Consumers. Power Company conducted an inspection during the current outag No cracking was identified. The pressurizer's manufacturer, Combustion Engineering, has determined that the c~acking was likely a result of the particular process used in the assembly or of the material yield strength used in certain pressurizers. The Palisades pressurizer fell into all low risk c*ategories.* System Engineering Program As a result of NRC management interest, a description of the Palisades System Engineer program was provide Highlights'include:
the ten year average experience among the thirty plus engineers, several of which held SRO licenses on the plant; daily hands on system involvement in maintenance, surveillance and modification oversight; system and equipment performance trending; and responsibility for corrective action relative to system deficiencies. The program and its implementation is a major strength in the licensees engineering and maintenance are *
No violations, deviations, unresolved or open items were identifie.*
1 Unresolved Items Unr~solv~d Items ar~ matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations, or deviation An Unresolved Item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in Paragraph.
Management Interview (30703)
The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denot~d in Paragraph 1)
on November 13, to discuss the scope and findings of the inspectio In addition; the inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspectio The licensee did not identify any such documents/processes as proprietar