IR 05000255/1989004
| ML18054A643 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 03/30/1989 |
| From: | Burgess B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18054A642 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-255-89-04, 50-255-89-4, NUDOCS 8904180207 | |
| Download: ML18054A643 (11) | |
Text
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II I Report No. 50-255/89004(DRP)
Docket No. 50-255 Licensee:
Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, MI 49201 *
Facility Name:
Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant Inspection At:
Palisades Site, Covert, Michigan Inspection Conducted:
February 14 through March 13, 1989 Inspectors:
E. R. Swanson J. K. Heller Approved By: ~ief Reactor Projects Section 2A Inspection Summary License No. DPR-20 3/")LJ/f'J Date Inspection on February 14 through March 13, 1989 (Report No.50-255/89004(DRP)
Areas Inspected:
Routine unannounced inspection by the resident inspectors of:
actions on previously identified items; plant operations; reactor trip; radiological controls; maintenance; surveillance; security; reportable event; enforcement conferences; and, management meeting Results:
Of the eight areas inspected no violations, deviations unresolved items or open items were identifie The inspection disclosed weaknesses in the licensee 1 s post maintenance/*
preoperational containment closeout inspection process and noted strengths in the plant personnel willingness to write work requests for equipment that may need repair.
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- DETAILS Persons Contacted Consumers Power Company
@+*D. P. Hoffman, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
+*G. L. Heins, Senior Vice President, Energy Supply
- @+*G. B. Slade, Plant General Manager
J. G. Lewis, Technical Director
- + R. D. Orosz, Engineering and Maintenance Manager
R. M. Rice, Operations Manager
- @
D. J. VandeWalle, Configuration Control Manager
- @
W. L. Beckman, Radiological Services Manager
R. A. Fenech, Operations Superintendent H. C. Tawney, Mechanical Maintenance Superintendent K. E. Osborne, Projects Superintendent R. M. Brzezinski, I&C Superintendent L. K. Kenaga, Staff HP
+*K. W. Berry, Director, Nuclear Licensing
C. S. Kozup, Licensing Engineer
J. R. Brunet, Licensing Analyst
- D. J. Malone, Licensing Analyst
+ R. J. Frigo, Operations Staff Support Supervisor
+ W. L. Roberts, Plant Projects Supervisor
+ R. W. Smedley, Staff Licensing Engineer
+ K. A. Toner, Plant Projects Supervisor
- R. A. English, Corporate Health Physicist
- L. T. Phillips, Senior Systems Engineer Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
@+*A. B. Davis, Regional Administrator
+*B. A. Berson, Regional Counsel
@+ H. J. Miller, Director, DRS
@ M. P. Phillips, Chief, Operation Programs Section 2
@ W. D. Shafer, Deputy Director, DRS
@ *W. L. Forney, Deputy Director DRP
@ W. L. Axelson, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 2
@ R. L. Greger, Chief, Reactor Programs Branch
@ G. C. Wright, Chief, Operations Branch
@ M. C. Schumaker, Chief, Radiological Controls and Chemistry Section
+*B. L. Burgess, Chief, Projects Section 2A
- W. G. Snell, Chief EP & Effluents Section
+ R. N. Gardner, Chief, Plant Systems Section
- +*E. R. Swanson, Senior Resident Inspector
- @
J. K. Heller, Resident Inspector
@ I. S. Yin, Reactor Inspector
+ B. H. Stapleton, Enforcement Specialist
+
@
- W. H. Schultz, Enforcement Coordinator
+ J. Holmes, Reactor Inspector
+ T. V. Wambach, Project Manager, NRR
- C. F. Gill, Senior Radiation Specialist Indicates those attendinq the Seotember 2, 1988 Enforcemen Conferenc Indicates those attending the March 7, 1989 Enforcement Conferenc Denotes those present at the Management Meeting on February 17, 198 Denotes some of those present at the Management Interview on March 21, 198 Other members of the Plant staff, and seve~al members of the Contract Security Force, were also contacted during the inspection perio.
Actions on Previously Identified Items (92701, 92702) The Director of the Reactor Safety Division has documented in a February 8, 1989 ~ernorandurn, that.the Open Item List (current to November 7, 1988) _has been reviewed and the items listed below can be administratively close The decision to close the items is based on the length of time it has been in existence and the recognition of limited safety significanc (1)
(Closed) Open Item 255/86032-02(DRS):
EQ revisions to PCS listings for position switches and motor (2)
(Closed) Open '"Item 255/86032-03(DRS):
EQ revisions of procedures to replace Celrnark penetration connector (3)
(Closed) Open Item 255/86032-04(DRS):
EQ implementation of controlled procedures for replacement of transmitter 110 11 rings and torquing housin (4)
(Closed) Open Item 255/86032-08(DRS):
EQ discrepancies in GE cable files for radiation requirement (5)
(Closed) Unresolved Item 255/87003-0l(DRS):
Stearn generator snubber test procedure requires revisio (6)
(Closed) Unresolved Item 255/87003-02(DRS):
Licensee will provide measures to reduce steam generator snubber oil leakag The following Unresolved Item is closed:
(Closed) Unresolved Item (255/86022-04):
The Intake Structure was the last remaining portion of the open item and was resolved when the licensee installed additional fire protection features which included a fire detection syste This w~s closed in Inspection Report 255/88012, Paragraph No violations, deviations, unresolved or open items were identified.
- Operational Safety Verification (71707, 71710, 42700)
Routine facility operating activities were observed as conducted in the plant and from the main control room Plant startup, steady power operation, plant shutdown, and system(s) lineup ahd operation were observed as applicabl *
The performance of licensed Reactor Operators and Senior Reactor Operators, of Shift Technical Advisors, and of auxiliary equipment operators was observed and evaluated including procedure use and adherence, records and logs, communicatio'ns, shift/duty turnover, and the degree of professionalism of control room activitie Evaluation, corrective action, and response for off normal conditions or events, if any, were examine This included compliance to ~ny reporting requirement Observations of the control room monitors, indicators, and recorders were made to verify the operability of emergency systems, radiation monitoring systems and nuclear reactor protection systems, as applicabl Reviews of surveillance, equipment condition, and tagout logs were conducte Proper return to service of selected components was verifie Genera 1 The unit began the reporting period in a steam generator tube plugging outage that began on January 30 and continued until March 1, at which time the unit was returned to servic Inadvertent Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) Opening On February 15 at 4:16 p.m. while heating the Primary Coolant System (PCS) two of two pressurizer PORVs received full open and close signal The PCS was at 260 psig and 216 degrees The two PORVs physically opened and immediately closed at least once as indicated by their tail pipe temperature and quench tank level indicatio Lift pressure setpoint on both PORVs was.310 psi *
The licensee declared an unusual event (UE) at 4:16 p.m. due to a challenge to the over presstire protection system and made the appropriate notification The operators termihated the plant heatup and determined that one PORV was weepin The operators closed the associated block valve and declared the PORV inoperabl The plant was taken to cold shutdown at 11:00 p.m. after attempts to cycle and close the PORV faile *
The licensee determined that when the running shutdown cool~ng pump was secured, a pressure surge occurred due to ~ir trapped in the piping associated with shutdown coolin Recent changes in operating restrictions has caused a reduction in PORV setpoints which resulted in securing shutdown cooling at a PCS pressure clbser
- to the PORV setpoin The procedure did not require that a bubble established in the pressurize These things likely contributed to the PORVs opening and closin Prior to repressurizing on February 17, 1989, the licensee modified the operating orocedure to minimize the pressure transient wheri securing shutdown cooling and cautioned operators to secure shutdown cooling at a lo~er PCS pressure.* The l~censee determined the likelj location of the air and has demonstrated that the procedure modification has eliminated the transients.. For the long term, the licensee is evaluating establishment of a bubble in the pressurizer before se0uring shutdown cooling to eliminate the solid system*
pressure respons At this time the inspector has no additional questions, however, this item will be reviewed when the Licensee Event Report is issue Unusual Event Due To Leakrate Exceeding 10 gpm The licensee declared an Unusual Event on February 18, 1989 at 9:01 a.m., when it was identified that the primary c.oolant system leakrate exceeded 10 gp The plant was in hot shutdown preparing to return to power operations following a steam generator outage that began on January 30, 198 At approximately 3:05 a.m. on February 18, plant heatup was suspended to perform a leakrate calculation when the pressurizer and volume control tank level were noted to be decreasing indicating a leak of approximately 5 gp Investigation determined that manually operated cold leg drain valves for loop 18 were leaking to the primary system drain tan Attempts to seat the valves by cycling and increasing the closing torque were unsuccessfu The leakrate was determined to exceed the identified leakrate limit of 10 gpm at 7:12 The Unusual Event wa~ terminated on February 19, when the plant achieved cold shutdown ~ondition Upon NRC notification of the Unusual Event, the resident inspector was dispatched to the site and monitored the licensee action on February 18 and 1 Conference calls between NRC and the licensee were held to discuss the licensee action and proposed repai The licensee installed welded pipe caps down stream of all cold leg drains (4 total).
This removed the cold leg drains from service, a situation that will not impact operations since other methods are available to drain the PC At this time the inspector has no additional questions, however, this item will be reviewed again when the Licensee Event Report is issue In addition, the inspector has requested that this repair be reviewed by a engineering team inspection scheduled for April.
- Welding Deficiencies After weld repair of leaking loop drain lines and a hydrostatic test, a visual inspection identified that weld buildup was less
'than require Evaluation of stress calculations determined the welds to be acceptable, but due to a minor body to bonnet leak on*
a loop drain isolation valve and a valve p~cktng leak, the licensee elected to cool down starting at 1:13 p.m. on February 25, 198 Following heatup, the reactor was taken critical at 6:57 a.m. and the generator tied to the grid at 11:30 p.m. on March 1, 198 Steam Generator Tube Leakage On March 8, 1989, the condenser off-gas monitor (RIA-0631) indicated an increase in steam generator radioactivity from background level On March 10, 1989, the leakrate was calculated to be about 0.014 gpm (compared to the Technical Specification limit of 0.3 gpm and the plant 1s administrative limit of 0.1 gpm).
Based on prior leak history, the plant had been operating at~ reduced power of 90 percent with T-hot at about 579 degrees In order to maintain an acceptably low leak rate, the licensee reduced power to approximately 60 percen The off-gas monitor counts appears to have stabilized at a new level that is 6 to 7 times above the normal operating levels. _The licensee intertds to extend operation until late April, when engineering and planning for a steam generator outage would support removal of a tube and.support plate sample and possibly rim and lug cutting inside the generator Inadequate Diesel Generator Fuel Supply During research to develop a diesel generator performance design basis document, the licensee identified that the current Technical Specification required minimum fuel oil storage capacity for the emergency diesels would not supply current design loads for the required seven day perio Fuel requirement calculations were originally performed in 1968, but the addition of loads and revised loading studies did not instigate revision of the fuel consumption estimate Contrary to the original calculations, the revised calculation for the limiting scenario for fuel consumption, the plateau small break LOCA, resulted in a 45 percent increase in the required amount of fue A four hour 10 CFR 50.72 notification was made on March 3, 1989, regarding this discover The licensee has taken action to maintain the required amount of stored fuel by maintaining a fuel o,il truck onsite until a long term fix is mad At this time the inspector has no additional questions, however, this item will be reviewed again when the Licensee Event Report is issued.
- Reactor High Rate Trip A reactor high rate trip caused by an operator error occurred on February 2 At the time of the trip, the reactor was subcritical with the regulating rods withdrawn four inches and the shutdown rods fully withdraw An operator was performing a control rod interlock test and had just placed the high rate trip for the 118 11 channel of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) in bypas The procedure then required that a high rate trip be dialed in by use of an adjustment 11 pot 11 on one of the wide range channe 1 Each wide range provides input for two RPS channel The wide range channel selected did not provide an input for the RPS channel that had previously been bypassed.* When the high rate trip was di a 1 ed in, the resultant 2 of 4 logic ca~sed a reactor tri Interviews with oper~tions personnel indicated that training on this system had been recently provided during the latest simulator trainin The operators were cautioned, the test resumed and completed satisfactor All systems responded as desigrie The inspector has no additional questions, however, this item will be reviewed again when the Licensee Event Report is issue Containment Tours Two containment tours were conducted (February 14 and February 24).
Neither tour identified major problems but each tour identified some items that required resolutio For example, the first tour conducted with the licensee while the plant was in cold shutdown identified that the equipment (Flasks and thermometers) used to measure control rod leakoff was staged next to a drain line to the sum The grate for the drain line had been removed to facilitate CROM leakoff measurements and not replace The second tour was conducted while the plant was ho The inspector found a number of ste~m and packing leaks, a non-setured ladder, loose parts on a permanently installed welding machine and a number of small items such as tape, loose tie wraps, wire and nails which were remove For both tours a list was provided to the licensee for resol~tion..
The inspector concludes that these items would not have caused major problems but discussed these items with plant management and placed an emphasis on higher standards for licensees' preoperational containment closeout inspection No violations, deviations, unresolved or open items were identifie.
Radiological Controls (71707)
During routine tours of radiologically controlled plant facilities or areas, the inspector observed occupational radiation safety practices by the radiation protection staff and other workers.
Effluent releases were routinely checked, including examination of on-line recorder traces and proper operation of automatic monitoring equipmen Independent surveys were performed in various radiologically controlled area Prior to a containment tour on February 14, the inspector found that the access control computer was out-of-service so each entry into the auxiliary building was documented on a sign in shee The inspector found that the previous worker to enter had documented a pocket dosimeter reading of 70 M The inspector asked the RP. technician station in the area if the workers pocket dosimeter should have been rezeroed prior to entr The RP technician had the workers' self reader pocket dosimeter rezeroed but did not know that the administrative limit to rezero a pocket dosimeter prior to entry was 50 M During the discussion, the RP technician also found that the worker had signed in on a RWP to do work in the containment but his work assignment.was in the spent fuel poo These items were discussed with station managemen No violations, deviations, unresolved or open items were identifie.
Maintenance (62703, 42700)
Maintenance activities in the plant were routinely inspected, including both corrective mainienance (repairs) and preventive maintenanc Mechanical, electrical, and instrument and control group maintenance activities were included as availabl The focus of the inspection was to assure the maintenance activities reviewed were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with Technical Specification The following items were considered during this review:
the Limiting Conditions for Operation were met while components.or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures; and post maintenance testing was performed as applicabl The inspector found a number of work request tags, initiated by the maintenance department, which indicated that maintenance was doing tours of equ~pment and writing work requests when they found equipment problem This is viewed as a good practice and indicates a new sense of plant ownership by maintenance personnel, The following activities were inspected: M0-2087 Valve not going full stroke (WO 24900990) TIC-OlllH Sigma repairs (WO 24901095) Repair of cold leg loop drain valves (WO 24900838)
- The inspector reviewed the Work Order package and confirmed that:
a Specification Change (SC-89-72) was issued to document the configuration change; non destructive examinations were completed satisfactorily; hydrostatic test was performed, at a pressure greater than 1.02 times the normal operating pressure; and, the engineer~' analysis (EA-SC-89-72) accounted for the additional weight that the repair added to the syste No problems were identified but as stated in Paragraph 3.c an engineering team inspection scheduled for April has been asked to review this ite No violations, deviations, unresolved or open.items were identifie.
Surveillance (61726, 42700)
The inspector reviewed Technical Specifications required surveillance testing as described below and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate pr6cedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that Limiting Conditions for Operation were met, that removal and restdration of the affected components were pr6perly acco~plished, that test results conformed with Technical Specifications and procedure requi~ements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personne The following activities were inspected:
a.
R0-32-51 Local Leakrate Penetration Test SOP-8 CL 2.2 "Concentrated Boric Acid Flowpath Test 11 DW0-13 Between the Seal Test of the Containment Personnel Lock SOP-4b Air Lock Test of the Containment Escape Lock DW0-1 Daily Control Room Surveillance SH0-1 Operators Shift Surveillance No violations, deviations, unresolved or*open items were identifie.
Security (71707)
Routine facility security measures, including control of access for vehicles, packages and personnel, were observe Performance of dedicated physical security equipment was verified during inspections in various plant area The activities of the professional security force in maintaining facility security protection were occasionally examined or reviewed, and interviews were occasionally conducted with security force member No ~iolations, deviations, unresolved or open items were identifie l Reportable Events (92700, 92720)
The inspector reviewed the following Licensee Event Report (LER) by means of direct observation, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of record The review addressed complianc~ to reporting r~quiremehts and, as applicable, that immediate corrective action and appropriate action to prevent recurrence had been accomplishe (Closed) LER 255/88012 Revision 1:
Steam Gerierator tube leakag No violations, deviations, unresolved or open items were identifie.
- Enforcement Conferences Appendix R An enforcement conference was held in the Region III office on September 2, 1988, with the personnel identified in Paragraph 1 to:
discuss the apparent violations of Inspection Report 50-255/88012; determine any exacerbating or mitigating circumstances; discuss specific areas of concern which were expressed during the
.inspection; and, discuss proposed changes in the management of Appendix R activitie The Regional Administrator opened the meeting by describing the purpose and scope of the meeting as well as the NRC enforcement policy while other NRC staff described the concerns identified during the inspection In addr~ssing the violations, the licensee acknowledged the facts as presented by the Region III staff and discussed corrective actions to prevent recurrenc The licensee also stated that no instances had been identified that indicated a loss of safe shutdown capability would have occurred with regard to the breaker coordination issu Further, the licensee indicated that Emergency Operating Procedures provided sufficient guidance for operators to isolate the DC power and could have been used effectively to isolate the letdown high/low pressure interface, if necessar However, with regard to the licensee 1 s repetitive failure to adequately protect the VCT outlet valve (M0-2087), no addi"tional inform*ation was presented by the licensee at the Enforcement Conferenc These issues were identified as three examples of one violation in Inspection Report No. 50-255/88012-0 Based on the actions the licensee took and subsequent discussions it was determined that the licensee has now taken appropriate actions to correct the identified examples of the violatio Therefore, these issues are considered close Previously, emergency lighting corrective action deficiencies (refer to Inspection Report No. 50-255/88012 discussions covering Inspection
Report Issue No. 50-255/86022-09) were discovered by the NRC to
. still exis Specifically, the licensee had incorrectly taken credit during the 1986 re-assessment for having the plant's lighting system in place for Appendix R emergency lighting purpose As described in the licensee's January 20, 1989 inspection report response, full compliance with this issue was achieve Therefore, this issue is considered close Control Room HVAC An enforcement conference was held in the Region III office on March 7, 1989, with the personnel indicated in Paragraph 1 to:
discuss the circumstances leading up to an apparent violation (identified in inspection report 50-255/89002) of 10 CFR 50.59 requirements which led to the failure of the Control Room HVAC system surveillance test on August 21, 1988; determine the significance of the test failure and the 10 CFR 50.59 review inadequacy; and, discuss corrective actions taken by the licensee relative to this even *The Regional Administrator opened the meeting with a few remarks and the NRC staff then outlined the concerns and expected scope of the intended discussion The licensee presented background information relevant to the apparent violations and discussed their corrective actions pertaining to the even No conclusions were reached as an immediate result of the meetin.
Quarterly Management Meeting A Quarterly Management meeting was held at the Palisades site on February 17, with the personnel indicated in Paragraph 1 in attendanc The discussion included contamination control, configuration control project, PRA status update, plant performance trends and a summary of the latest significant i~sue.
Management Interview (30703)
The inspectors met with the personnel indicated in Paragraph 1 on March 21, to discuss the scope and findings of the inspectio In addition, the inspector also.discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspectio The licensee did not identify any such documents/processes as proprietary..
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