IR 05000255/1986010
| ML18052A442 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 05/01/1986 |
| From: | Burgess B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18052A440 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-3.D.3.4, TASK-TM 50-255-86-10, GL-84-13, GL-85-05, GL-85-06, GL-85-07, GL-85-14, GL-85-22, GL-85-5, GL-85-6, GL-85-7, IEB-83-07, IEB-83-7, IEB-85-001, IEB-85-1, IEC-80-03, IEC-80-3, NUDOCS 8605230146 | |
| Download: ML18052A442 (12) | |
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-255/86010(DRP)
Docket No. 50-255 Licensee:
Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, MI 49201 Facility Name:
Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant Inspection At:
Palisades Site, Covert, MI Inspection Conducted:
March 4 through April 15, 1986 Inspectors:
E. R. Swanson C. D. Anderson Approved By: ~~~Chief Reactor Projects Section 2A Inspection Summary License No. DPR-20 Date Inspection on March 4 through April 15, 1986 (Report No. 50-255/86010(DRP))
Areas Inspected:
Routine unannounced inspection by resident inspectors of followup of previous inspection findings; operational safety; maintenance; surveillance; engineered safety features walkdown; reportable events; Bulletins and Circulars; and regional request Also an Enforcement Conference was held on March 13, 1986, concerning containment integrit Results:
Of the areas inspected one violation was identified for failure to have a fire watch present during grinding activities.
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- DETAILS Persons Contacted Consumers Power Company (CPCo)
- J. *J. R. w. c. R. *C. *H. *J. #*R. *D. *G. *R. #T. #*D. #W. Firlit, General Manager Lewis, Plant Technical Director Orosz, Engineering and Maintenance Manager Beckman, Radiological Services Manager Axtell, Health Physics Superintendent Rice, Plant Operations Manager Kozup, Plant Operations Superintendent Esch, Plant Administrative Manager Bradshaw, Property Protection Operations Supervisor Fenech, Technical Engineer Fitzgibbon, Licensing Engineer Sleeper, Plant Safety Engineering McCaleb, Quality Assurance Director Palmisano, Plant Projects Superintendent Malone, Licensing Engineer Kessler, Consultant U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- A. B. Davis, Deputy Regional Administrator
- E. G. Greenman, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects
- W. H. Schultz, Enforcement Coordinator
- C. W. Hehl, Chief, Operations Branch
- E. R. Swanson, Senior Resident Inspector, Palisades Site
- C. D. Anderson, Resident Inspector, Palisades Site
- B. A. Berson, Regional Counsel
- Denotes those present at the March 13, 1986, Enforcement Conference held in the Region III offices, Glen Ellyn, Illinoi *Denotes those present at the Management Intervie Other members of the plant Operations, Maintenance, Technical, and Chemistry/Health Physics staffs, and several members of the contract Security force, were also contacted briefl.
Followup on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Unresolved Item 255/84009-02:
Jumper, link and bypass (JLB)
controls did not include requirements for safety evaluations of changes to the plant made as provided for in 10 CFR 50.5 The controls for JLBs were removed from Administrative Procedure 4.03 and a new Procedure 9.31, JLB, was implemented on October 15, 1985.
- Installation and removal is still under the control of the Operations Shift Superviso If not a part of an approved procedure, a safety evaluation is prepared for each JLB, and if it is Q-listed, it is reviewed by the Plant Review Committe Caution tags are used to indicate the presence of a JL The Operations Superintendent is tasked with annual review and initiating action to make the modifi-cation permanent where it has existed for an entire fuel cycl This unresolved item is close (Closed) Unresolved Item 255/84020-08(DRS):
Testing of Primary Coolant System (PCS) Pressure Isolation Check Valve The inspection reviewed the licensee surveillance procedure, S0-9, 11 PCS Pressure Isolation Check Valves, 11 in conjunction with licensee procedure, GOP-13, 11 Primary System Leakage Calculation.
The inspectors noted that should the licensee monitor the pressure indicator-controllers, PIC-0342, PIC-0346, PIC-0347 and PIC-0338 during the leak rate tests for the inboard check valves, the leak rate determination would be vali The licensee has modified their procedure, S0-9 to require that these pressure indicator-controllers be monitored during the leak rate determination for the subject valves, thereby assuring that leak rates for these valves is vali This item is considered to be close (Closed) Open Item 255/85003-13:
JLB control inadequacies. This item is closed by reference to the above discussed Unresolved Item 255/84009-02.
(Closed) Violation 255/86003-02(DRP):
Two fire doors were found open with no compensatory measures establishe The root cause appears to be the lack of awareness of fire door requirements; thus the corrective actions were to place announcements in the Plant Daily and Weekly Bulletins on the subjec Also, fire doors are now addressed in the annual General Employee Training (GET) as verified by the inspector This item is considered close No violations or deviations were identifie.
Operational Safety The inspectors observed control room activities, discussed these
~ctivities with plant operators, and reviewed various logs and other operations records throughout the inspectio Control room indicators and alarms, log sheets, turnover sheets, and equipment status boards were routinely checked against operating requirement Pump and valve controls were verified to be proper for applicable plant condition On several occasions, the inspector observed shift turnover activities and shift briefing meeting Tours were conducted in the turbine and auxiliary buildings, and central alarm station to observe work activities and testing in progress and to observe plant equipment condition, cleanliness, fire safety, health physics and security measures, and adherence to procedural and regulatory requirement *
The inspectors made observations concerning radiological safety practices in the radiation controlled areas including: verification of proper posting; accuracy and currentness of area status sheets; verification of selected Radiation Work Permit (RWP) compliance; and implementation of proper personnel survey (frisking) and contamina-tion control {step-off-pad) practices. Health Physics logs and dose records were routinely reviewe The inspectors observed physical security activities at various access control points, including proper personnel identification and search, and toured security barriers to verify maintenance of integrit Periodic observation of access control activities for vehicles and packages and activities in the Central Alarm Station were also conducte An ongoing review of all licensee corrective action program items at the Event Report level was performe On March 7, 1986, at 11:00 a.m. the licensee commenced a scheduled shutdown to repair two primary coolant pump (PCP) seals which had unseated first stage seals, a loop isolation check valve, and several other leaking valve The plant was off-line at 3:46 a.m. on March 8, 1986, and reached cold shutdown at 1:30 a.m. on March 9, 198 On March 25, 1986, at 12:37 a.m. the unit went critical following this outag Major work accomplished included replacement of 11A 11 and 118
PCP seals, grinding and lapping of loop check Valve 3146 seating surface, replacement of CVCS three-way divert Valve 2056 with the rebuilt one that was removed during the refueling outage and replacement of MV 303 The licensee also cleaned and installed new actuators on CV 3047 and CV 3038 in the safety injection tank syste After restart the 118 11 PCP experienced an increase in vibration from the 6.5 experienced during the last cycle to 7.8 mil It has remained constant since the pump was started on March 23, 198 The turbine was connected to the grid at 2:35 p.m. on March 25, 198 On March 25, 1986, at 8:52 p.m. the generator was disconnected from the grid to correct a leaking moisture separator reheater relief valv The cause was found to be a check valve in the pilot operating line installed backwar A flow arrow was marked on the valve, but the repairman erred when installing the valve by failing to check the flow directio The licensee 1 s corrective actions included revising the valve to the proper orientation and counselling and training of the repairmen and supervisor At 10:00 p.m. the same day the unit was placed back in servic At 12:58 p.m. on March 26, 1986, the reactor tripped from 60% power on a turbine/generator tri Excitation to the generator was lost when the voltage regulator was placed in the test position for planned testin Testing was being conducted at several different power
- levels because voltage regulator problems had been noted and caused a trip during the last cycl The voltage regulator had been tested once successfully since the recent startu All systems responded as expected during the trip except a turbine bypass valve had to be closed manuall The licensee made several minor repairs, including the turbine bypass valve, and then took the reactor critical at 10:11 a.m. on March 27, 198 Troubleshooting of the turbine generator excitation circuitry which apparently caused the trip was inconclusiv The testing will not be repeated since the desired information was obtaine The turbine generator was placed on line at 8:25 p.m. on the same da The licensee is continuing to investigate this issu At 4:52 a.m. on April 10, 1986, the licensee calculated PCS unidentified leakage to be 1.255 gp Unidentified leakage had been increasing over the last week with.519 gpm unidentified on April 9, 198 A containment entry was made to try to identify the leakage source and found heavy leakage in the area of the pressurizer shed and quench tank but the exact location was not identified. A power reduction was commenced from 98% power at 7:53 a.m. due to the unidentified leakage being in excess of the technical specification allowed 1 gp An Unusual Event was declared at 8:15 a.m. on April 10, 1986, in accordance with their Emergency Pla Hot shutdown was reached at 1:56 Some minor leakage (0.01 gpm) was found near the control rod drive autoclave nut After considerable investigation the licensee determined that a relief valve in the letdown system was leaking to the quench tan Due to valve mislabeling and misposition, the quench tank liquid was being vented to a funnel drain thus preventing the tank level from increasin This precluded the ready detection of the inter-system leakag A PCS leak rate completed at 11:07 p.m. on April 10, 1986, showed 0.25 gpm unidentified leakage with the letdown system isolated and based on this value the Unusual Event was terminate The licensee then replaced the ruptured diaphragm on letdown relief Valve RV-2006, the major contributor to the leak rate, and cycled PRV-1072, a reactor head vent and a smaller contributor to PCS leakag Subsequent to valve cycling it reseated; stopping the level increase in the quench tan At 4:00 a.m. on April 12, 1986, the reactor was taken critical and the unit was placed on-line at 11:09 a.m. on April 13, 198 On April 14, 1986, at 6:29 a.m., the packing on the 11A 11 condensate pump fai1ed requiring a rapid power reduction from 85% to approximately 38%
to facilitate shutting off the pum The licensee attempted to repack the pump several times, unsuccessfully, prior to deciding to replace the pum At the end of the inspection period the unit was operating at approximately 52% power using the 118 11 condensate pum It was subsequently determined that the vendor who had recently rebuilt the pump had made some errors in reassembly which went undetected and resulted in shaft misalignment and packing failur No violations or deviations were identifie * Maintenance The inspectors reviewed and/or observed the following selected work activities and verified appropriate procedures were in effect controlling removal from and return to service, hold points, verification testing, fire prevention/protection, and cleanliness: Maintenance was observed and reviewed on the steam pressure controller for the 118 11 auxiliary feedwater pump turbine steam supply valve, PCV-0521 (FWS 24604698).
The controller had been causing steam pressure fluctuations which, although they did not adversely affect pump operations, were being investigate In the turbine building on April 1, 1986, at approximately 8:00 a.m.,
a mechanical maintenance worker was observed by the inspector to be grinding without a fire watch on the discharge piping for the spare hydrazine chemical injection pump, P-150, to replace a leaking elbow (Work Order No. 2460477).
The fire watch appeared shortly after the inspector arrived and indicated that he had been gone for a few minutes to obtain a too Apparently the grinder saw someone appear behind him, incorrectly assumed it to be his fire watch, and began grindin When the inspector asked about the hot work permit, the grinder went to the shop and retrieved it and the work packag These should have been kept at the work sit This incident is very similar to Violation 255/85018-03 in which grinding was occurring with no fire watch presen Fire Protection Implementing Procedure (FPIP) No. 7, Section 9.2 sets forth requirements for training of fire watches and their duties and responsibilities which include being present during hot wor The performance of hot work without having a fire watch in accordance with FPIP No. 7 constitutes a violation of Technical Specification 6.8. as set forth in the Notice of Violation (255/86010-0l(DRP)).
Corrective actions for this personnel error include: the mechanical supervisor in charge of the activity counseling both individuals on fire watch responsibilities shortly after the incident, the senior plant mechanical supervisor giving the grinder a verbal warning concerning his conduct of grinding without verifying his fire watch was present and not having the work package and hot work permit at the job site, and a review of this incident at the newly established Management Review Board (held for personnel errors).
One violation and no deviations were identifie.
Surveillance The inspectors reviewed surveillance activities to ascertain compliance with scheduling requirements and to verify compliance with requirements relating to procedures, removal from and return to service, personnel qualifications, and documentatio The following test activities were inspected:
J Q0-8C Q0-12 ESS Check Valve Operability Test and High Pressure Safety Injection Flow Indicator Verification (Hot Shutdown)
Hot Leg Injection Flow Path Test No violations or deviations were identifie.
Engineered Safety Features Walkdown The inspectors performed a walkdown of the 11A 11 and 118 11 AFW pump subsystems and verified:
That each accessible valve in the flowpath was in its required position and operable, that power was aligned for components that activate on an initiation signal, that essential instrumentation was operable, and that no conditions existed which would adversely affect system operatio A few minor discrepancies such as missing or unattached valve identification tags, a missing cap and a checklist correction that needed to be made were pointed out to the shift supervisor who noted them for resolutio No violations or deviations were identifie.
Licensee Event Reports Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following reportable events were examined to determine whether reportability requirements were met, immediate corrective action was accomplished as appropriate, and corrective action to prevent recurrence has been accomplished per technical specification (Closed) LER 255/86006:
During plant shutdown, power was lost to the 2400 volt vital lC bus when a manual transfer between station power breakers was attempted and faile The breaker to which the transfer was being made was racked out in the test positio The loss of power to the lC bus auto started both diesel generators (DG) and the 1-1 DG picked up the lC bus load The causes were that the control room and electrical personnel failed to ensure proper initial conditions prior to the transfer and inadequate control of breakers since the breaker should not have been left in the test positio Operator training was verified to be in progress to inform personnel that breakers are not to be left in the test position unless testing is occurring and that they are to ensure that all equipment required for the test is in fact ready to be teste During normal operating conditions it is a practice to remotely test operate all breakers before they are considered operabl This event is considered close (Closed) LER 255/86007:
During the refueling outage, two inadvertent safety injection signals (SISs) were caused by an Instrument and Control (I&C) technician disconnecting the wrong pressure indicator while another was already de-energized due to outage activitie The disconnected pressure indicator, PIA-0102DLL, was next to the one that was to be disconnected, PIA-0102 After the first SIS, the I&C technician restored the pressure indicator to normal, without realizing he had caused the SIS,
to get out of the way of the control room operators who were reacting to the SI The SIS tripped the incoming feeder breaker to bus lE which caused the loss of numerous motor control centers (MCCs) which were cross-tied due to outage wor The loss of MCC 5 brought in the main transformer trouble alar Although no switchyard problems were noted, the operators decided to start and load the DGs with vital loads until the main transformer and switchyard were proven to be operating correctl At that time the control room personnel decided that the most likely cause of the event was a load shed signal of unknown origin that the Electrical Supervisor was to investigat No standing load shed signals were foun The I&C technician resumed his activity and caused the second SI This time the cause was discovere I&C technicians and supervisors were instructed to increase their awareness of ongoing control room activities and the importance of assuring they are working on the proper component Also this event and lessons learned will be reviewed with the operations staff during trainin This LER is considered close (Closed) LER 255/86008:
Inadvertent reactor trip, containment isolation and DG automatic starts occurred during testing while the unit was shutdow During a post maintenance check, an electrician inadvertently jarred the output breaker operating handle while releasing the door interlock to the preferred AC bus Y30 inverter causing the breaker to open and de-energized Y3 Since another preferred AC bus, YlO, was already de-energized for service work, the loss of Y30 satisfied the 2 of 4 channel logic causing reactor trip and containment isolation. A turbine trip signal was also initiated causing both DGs to automatically star The event was reviewed with the electrician and others on the Field Maintenance services crew so that the sensitive nature of these breakers is understoo (Closed) LER 255/86009:
Two fire doors were found open by NRC inspectors without appropriate compensatory measures established as required by technical specification The licensee was cited for the events (86003-02(DRP)) and for failing to report these events in LERs (86007-0la(DRP)).
Announcements were placed in the Plant Daily and Weekly Bulletins to remind personnel of fire door requirement Fire door requirements are now part of the annual GE This LER is considered close (Closed) LER 255/86010:
A pipe support was found missing from an Integrated Leak Rate Test (IRLT) one inch diameter instrument lin The instrument line is a containment boundary and is expected to meet seismic consideration The hanger is presumed to have been disconnected during removal of an ILRT instrumentation panel in late 198 The hanger has been replace In the original design, the pipe supports were provided at specific intervals that were considered adequate to eliminate the need for an analysi An analysis was to be completed to determine if the missing hanger would invalidate the seismic desig On April 17, 1986 the licensee requested withdrawal of the LER based on the favorable results of the seismic analysi *
(Closed) LER 255/86012:
Delivery error resulted in a low-level in the fuel oil storage tank that supplies the emergency DG day tank Due to adverse road conditions caused by the weather, the truck driver departed the site without delivering the fuel oi He informed security which in turn did not get the information to the Shift Supervisor who could have made alternate arrangement An Unusual Event lasted approximately three hours while the tank was below the technical specification minimum of 16,000 gallon Security personnel were informed of this occurrence and directed to notify the Shift Supervisor in the event of a similar occurrenc This LER is considered close No violations or deviations were identifie.
Followup of IE Bulletins and Circulars (Closed) Bulletin 85-01:
Steam Binding of AFW Pump The licensee took corrective action to enable detection of steam binding and restoration of the AFW pump to operable conditions following the initial NRC inspection of this issue in June 198 As outlined in the licensee's February 26, 1986, response, Auxiliary Operators check each shift AFW discharge pipe temperature by touch and the procedure for operation of the pumps was modified to address corrective actions if back leakage from the steam generators occur No back leakage problems have been identified in Palisades history and no modifications are planne This Bulletin is close (Closed) Bulletin 83-07:
Apparently Fraudulent Products Sold by Ray Miller, In The licensee's initial response dated March 1, 1984, to the bulletin indicated that no Ray Miller products were purchased for use onsite at Palisade Subsequent information indicated that RECD Industries, Inc. supplied several items to Palisades through Illinois Water Treatment and Bechtel Power Corporatio This information was provided to the licensee by letter from the NRC dated March 30, 198 The licensee was also informed that because of this new information, their response was incomplet After followup by the inspectors the licensee submitted their findings with regard to the RECD Industries supplied product The licensee's letter dated April 9, 1986, stated that the subject products (three radwaste demineralized tanks) were supplied for non safety-related purpose The tanks were sold as Type 304 stainless steel and are not likely to be of a lower grade steel without obvious evidence of corrosio The licensee plans to leave the tanks in plac This Bulletin is close (Closed) Circular 80-03:
Protection from Toxic Gas Hazard This circular was superseded by the Palisades Systematic Evaluation Program Topic II-and received additional review under NUREG-0737 (TMI) Item III.D.3.4, Control Room Habitabilit This TMI item was closed in IE Inspection Report 255/84010(DRP).
Based on these reviews this Circular is close No violations or deviations were identifie * Regional Request The inspectors were requested to gather information on the licensee's seismic monitorin Palisades has four triaxial peak-recording accelerometers (Teledyne Geotech Model PRA-103) inside of containment at different elevations and one triaxial strong motion accelerograph (Teledyne Geotech Model RFT-250) in the switchyar The four PRA-103 accelerometers detect and record peak amplitudes of low-frequency accelerations on a small 1/4 inch magnetic tap They record by erasure of prerecorded lines on the magnetic tape by means of a permanent magnet stylus on a torsional accelerometer of known sensitivit The RFT-250 accelerograph provides a record on 70-mm photographic film and remains in standby until actuated by strong ground motion or manuall The instr~ment is triggered by a pendulum and continues recording for approximately seven seconds after the last pendulum contac This instrument gives a motion versus time record but does not indicate a start tim The assembly consists of three torsion seismometers, a transistorized timing trace generator, a starting pendulum, a film transporting assembly, a transistorized program control unit and a battery pac An action (event) indicator window on the assembly shows red following an actuatio None of the seismic monitors have remote indication or alarm function Thus, following a seismic event, an individual would have to go to the switchyard to determine if RFT-250 had actuated and into containment to retrieve the PRA-103 tapes which would then have to be developed and read to determine if they had any indication The seismic monitors are not included in the preventive maintenance progra Parts are no longer available for the RFT-25 Every refueling outage the PRA-103 plates are changed and the RFT-250 is trip teste A review of the following selected Generic Letters was requested to verify that licensee management has forwarded copies of the letters and any response, if required, to appropriate onsite management representatives, and that any statements or commitments made were understood by the onsite management representatives:
85-05:
"Inadvertent Boron Dilution Events."
This letter was for information only and was routed onsit The inspectors could not ascertain from the licensee's routing system whether the information had been factored into the licensee's requalification training or no This was discussed at the exit and the licensee was encouraged to establish a controlled method for incorporating information into the training progra This item is close :
"Qua 1 i ty Assurance Gui dance for ATWS Equipment That is Not Safety-Related." This guidance started the clock for the response required by the Anticipated Transient With Scram rule, 10 CFR 50.62(d).
The licensee failed to input the due date into their tracking system which resulted in a late respons Corrective actions were outlined in their letter and verified completed by the inspector Therefore, no violation will be issue The licensee has subsequently met with the NRC on the ATWS issue and will be updating their plans and schedules in the near futur This item is close :
11 Implementing of Integrated Schedules.
The licensee's response, dated June 21, 1985, conveyed interest in continuing the Integrated Living Schedule (ILS) for the Big Rock Point plant, but plans only to implement an informal ILS for Palisade This Generic Letter was not routed onsite as it was considered only to involve the corporate office licensing staf This Generic Letter is close :
11Tran smi tta 1 of NUREG-1154 Regarding the Davi s--Besse Loss of Main and AFW Event.
The letter and enclosures were given wide distribution onsite and was reviewed by the Plant Safety Engineering group under the Operational Experience Review Progra Licensed Operator Requalification training also picked this up as a topi No changes to procedures or equipment were made as a result of these review This item is considered close :
11 Commercial Storage at Power Reactor Sites of Low-Level Radioactive Waste Not Generated by the Utility.
No response was required by this Generic Lette The letter was routed to applicable plant management staf The licensee does not anticipate storing any such wast This letter is close Potential for Loss of Post-LOCA Recirculation Capability Due to Insulation Debris Blockage.
This letter required no response and received appropriate routin An internal tracking item was opened by the licensee to have an engineering review to evaluate the plant against the new revision to Regulatory Guide 1.82 and include the guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.82, Revision 1, for conduct of 10 CFR 50.59 reviews dealing with the changeout or modification of thermal insulation inside containmen This Generic Letter is close No violations or deviations were identifie.
Enforcement Conference An Enforcement Conference, attended as indicated in Paragraph 1, was held on March 13, 1986, to discuss the apparent violation of containment integrity from May through November 30, 198 Two inadequate containment isolation valve leakage determinations through Penetration No. 40 were made and the licensee's corrective action should have led the licensee to discover the failed isolation valves (Reference Inspection Report 255/86008(DRP)).
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1 Management Interview A management interview (attended as indicated in Paragraph 1) was conducted on April 18, 1986, following the inspectio The scope and findings of the inspection were discusse The inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the inspectio The licensee did not identify any such documents/processes as proprietar