IR 05000255/1986027
| ML18052A784 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 11/03/1986 |
| From: | Burgess B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18052A783 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-255-86-27, NUDOCS 8611250565 | |
| Download: ML18052A784 (8) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-255/86027(DRP)
Docket No. 50-255 License No. DPR-20 Licensee:
Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, MI 49201 Facility Name:
Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant Inspection At:
Palisades Site, Covert, MI Inspection Conducted:
September 9 through October 20, 1986 Inspectors:
Inspection Summary Inspection on September 9 through October 20, 1986 (Report No. 50-255/86027(DRP))
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Date Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by resident inspectors of followup of previous inspection findings; operational safety; maintenance; surveillance; and reportable event Also, a Management Meeting was held September 29, 1986 to discuss Containment Air Cooler Fans, Service Water, Component Cooling Water, and Low Pressure Safety Injection systems, as well as numerous inadvertent Diesel Generator start Results:
Of the areas inspected no violations or deviations were identifie One unresolved item was identified which requires further review for potential escalated enforcement concerning Service Water System inoperabilit One open item was identified to track actions concerning licensed operator procedure usage.
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DETAILS Persons Contacted Consumers Power Company (CPCo)
- F. W. Buckman, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
- \\~. Berry, Director, Nuclear Licensing
- J. F. Firlit, General Manager
- J. G. Lewis, Plant Technical Director
- R. D. Orosz, Engineering and Maintenance Manager W. L. Beckman, Radiological Services Manager C. E. Axtell, Health Physics Superintendent
- R. M. Rice, Plant Operations Manager R. A. Fenech, Plant Operations Superintendent
- H. M. Esch, Plant Administrative Manager
- S. C. Cote, Plant Property Protection Supervisor
- K. E. Osborne, Technical Engineer
- D. G Malone, Licensing Engineer
- G. W. Ford, Plant Safety Engineering
- R. P. Margol, Quality Assurance Administrator
- T. J. Palmisano, Plant Projects Superintendent
- J. D. Alderink, Mechanical Engineering Superintendent
- E. A. Dziedzic, Plant Facility and Material Services Superintendent NRC Personnel
- A. B. Davis, Deputy Regional Administrator RIII
- C. E. Norelius, Director, Division of Reactor Projects
- C. W. Hehl, Chief, Operations Branch 2
- B. L. Burgess, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 2A
- E. R. Swanson, Senior Resident Inspector
- Denotes those present at the Management Interview
- Denotes those present at the Management Meeting on September 29, 198 Other members of the Plant Operations, Maintenance, Technical, and Chemistry Health Physics staffs, and several members of the Contract Security Force, were also contacted briefl Management Meeting On September 29, 1986, representatives of Consumers Power Company (denoted in Paragraph 1) met with the NRC Staff (as indicated) to discuss recent findings and the progress of their maintenance outag The licensee's presentation included discussions of the Containment Air Cooler Fan, Service Water, Component Cooling Water, and Low Pressure Safety Injection Systems, as well as the numerous recent unplanned Diesel Generator starts. Scenarios of problem discovery, cause, safety significance and resolution were discussed for each item to
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- the extent of the information availabl Additional details will be provided to the NRC informally as they become available and in the Licensee Event Report No conclusions were made with respect to satisfaction of the May 22, 1986, Confirmatory Action Lette Followup on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) IE Bulletin 80-04:
Under the Syst*ematic Evaluation Program Topic XV-2 11Spectrum of Steam Piping Failures Inside and Outside Containment 11 and Bulletin 80-04 11Main Steam Line Break With Continued Feedwater Addition 11 the licensee had made several commitments to modify system The licensee concluded in their June 21, 1985, letter to the Director of NRR that the only remaining action planned was to modify the emergency operating procedures by December of 1986 to include alignment of the condensate system as a backup to the Auxiliary Feedwater Syste Based on the results of the NRC review of the licensee's May 23, 1985, submittal, thi~ Bulletin is considered close The only outstanding corrective actions involve Emergency Operating Procedures revisions which are being tracked under TM! Item I..
Operational Safety The inspectors observed control room activities, discussed these activities with plant operators, and reviewed various logs and other operations records throughout the inspectio Control room indicators and alarms, log sheets, turnover sheets, and equipment status boards were routinely checked against operating requirement Pump and valve controls were verified to be proper for applicable plant condition On several occasions, the inspector observed shift turnover activities and shift briefing meeting Tours were conducted in the turbine, auxiliary and containment buildings, and central alarm statio~ to observe work activities and testing in progress and to observe plant equipment conditi6n, cleanliness, fire safety, health physics and security measures, and adherence to procedural and regulatory requirement The inspectors made observations concerning radiological safety practices in the radiation controlled areas including:
verification of proper posting; accuracy and currentness of area status sheets; verification of selected Radiation Work Permit (RWP) compliance; and implementation of proper personnel survey (frisking) and contamination control (step-off-pad) practice Health Physics logs and dose records were routinely reviewe The inspectors observed physical security activities at various access control points, includi~g proper personnel identification and search, and toured security barriers to verify maintenance of integrit Periodic observation of access control activities for vehicles and packages and activities in the Central Alarm Station were also conducte *
An ongoing'review of all licensee corrective action program items at the Event Report level was performe During performance testing of the Service Water (SW) pumps on September 25 and 30, 1986, the licensee determined that the flow of each pump was less than that specified in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).
FSAR Chapter 9 states that 8000 gpm at a head of 140 feet is require Pump performance ranged from 7323 gpm at feet of head to 7503 gpm at 136 feet of hea The pumps were declared inoperable at 2:30 a.m. on September 30, 1986, and a 10 CFR 50.72 non-emergency report was made at 3:02 a.m. on the same dat Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP) Topic IX-3 evaluated 11Station Service and Cooling Water Systems** and concluded that as it existed with three pumps, two with the same power supply and two required to meet analyzed cooling loads, the system was unacceptabl The licensee evaluation also concluded that a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) with loss of offsite power would result in loss of instrument air, failure of the component cooling water heat exchanger (CCWHX)
outlet valves full open and the subsequent starving of service water to the diesel generators (DGs) resulting in their failur The corrective action was to install hard stops on the CCWHX outlet valves and revise procedur~s to require alignment of the fire water system to the service water header if the DG supplying the two service water pumps fail There is no evidence that an objective evaluation of the system flow requirement was made or that pump performance was measured since the preoperational test in 197 Also, during Service Water System (SWS) testing and discussion between the system engineer and operators, it was identified that the service water inlet temperature had exceeded the design inlet temperature identified in the FSAR and Technical Specification Basis sectio During portions of the summer months, the temperatures were found to be as high as 84 degrees Although operators recorded the temperatures each shift, no limits were indicated on the log Combustion Engineering was in the process of reanalyzing containment response to a LOCA and will also evaluate the effect of SWS temperature A 10 CFR 50.72 4-hour non-emergency report was made on October 13, 1986 at approximately 11:00 The above noted SWS problems will be tracked as Unresolved Item 255/86027-02(DRP) and will be further evaluated and discussed in Inspection Report 255/86030(DRP).
As part of an established Fitness for Duty Program, Palisades recently tested all site employees for drug residue Two individuals tested positiv One individual is enrolled in a rehabilitation program and will return to work under certain provision The second individual failed to enroll in the rehabilitation program and was terminate Neither individual had records of poor job performanc The licensee reviewed the
job assignment of these individuals and, based on either the non-critical nature of the assignments or previous reviews, determined that further followup was not warrante No violations or deviations were identifie.
Maintenance The inspector reviewed and/or observed the following selected work activities and verified whether appropriate procedures were in effect controlling removal from and return to service, hold points, verification testing, fire prevention/protection, and cleanliness: Atmospheric Dump Valve VOP-0779 Air Supply Lines Repair (Work Order MSS 24606811).
During observation of this activity, the inspector noted that the fire extinguisher at the work site had not had its last monthly inspectio The hot work (welding) had not yet commence When informed by the inspector, the worker removed the extinguisher to replace it with a current on Other examples have been noted by the inspectors where fire extinguisher inspection tags had not been initialed and dated by the person doing the inspection even though the checklist indicated that the inspections had been complete This issue was discussed at the Management Intervie Replacement of Link Block 11TV3 (Work Order MSE 24607218, SC-83-053). Replacement of Inlet Damper Actuator for V-79 (Work Order 24505032). Replacement of PS-1484 on Diesel Generator 1-1 Air Start System (Work Order EPS 24600942, SC-86-049-01).
No violations or deviations were identifie.
Surveillance The inspectors reviewed surveillance activities to ascertain compliance with scheduling requirements and to verify compliance with requirements relating to procedures, removal from and return to service, personnel qualifications, and documentatio The following test activities were inspected: D/W0-1 M0-27 SI-7 Daily Control Room Surveillanc Functional Check of PCS Overpressure Protection Syste Functional Test of the Fire Detection System Outside of Containment (partial).
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d. RI-86A Area Monitor Calibration for Radwaste Demineralizer Roof Monitor (Post Maintenance - Work Order RIA 24605575).
In review of the above, the inspector noted that the procedure being used was past its expiration dat Due in part to an additional problem encountered at this time, the test was suspende The inspector was later informed that the procedure revision that was used was current and a new expiration date had been establishe M0-7A Monthly Test of Diesel Generator 1-No violations or deviations were identifie.
Licensee Event Reports Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the inspector examined the following reportable events to determine whether: reportability requirements were met; immediate corrective action was accomplished as appropriate; and corrective action to prevent recurrence has been accomplished per Technical Specification (Closed) LER 86020 Revision 1:
The corrective actions of the revision now address the root cause of the Diesel Generator (DG) automatic start due to turbine oil system flushing as an isolated personnel erro The licensee has developed a procedure to bypass the Diesel Generator automatic start function from the turbine protection circuitry while the plant is shutdown to prevent similar actuation (Closed) LER 255/86025:
While in cold shutdown, an administratively inoperable boric acid flowpath was relied upon to-meet Technical Specification (TS) 3. The Shift Supervisor (SS) incorrectly interpreted that since the word 11 inoperable 11 did not appear in the Technical Specification, an available, functioning charging pump met the Technical Specificatio The pump had not been declared operable due to three open work orders which required testin The testing specified required that the plant be in a different conditio Following discovery of the inoperable charging pump, the pump was declared operable for the existing plant conditions based upon alternate criteria as allowed by procedur The original test will be rescheduled for the proper plant condition The administratively inoperable flowpath existed for approximately eighteen hours; therefore at least two shift turnovers failed to uncover the erro A similar event (LER 255/85014) occurred in August 1985 in which an administratively inoperable, though functioning, charging pump was relied upo The root cause in 1985 appeared to be an administrative error on the part of the shift supervisor during a Primary Coolant System tagout and not an error in interpretation of Technical Specifications as occurred in 198 It is not evident that the 1985 event could reasonably have been expected to have prevented the 1986 event; therefore, no violation will be issued for this even The corrective actions taken include a memorandum issued to all Senior Reactor Operators and Shift
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Technical Advisors and a Standing Order issued discussing the event and the.correct interpretation that equipment must be declared operable to satisfy Technical Specifications. These actions should prevent recurrenc (Closed) LER 255/86026:
During vital bus lD restoration, an inadvertent emergency diesel generator actuation occurred due to a link being left open following maintenanc This event is discussed in Inspection Report 255/86023(DRP), Paragraph This event along with two others discussed below (LERs 255/86027 and 255/86029) resulted in violation 255/86023-0la for inadequately preplanned maintenance activities. The corrective actions for this event and the two others will be further reviewed during the review of the violation respons (Closed) LER 255/86027:
During preparation for maintenance on the lC vital bus, an inadvertent diesel generator actuation occurred because the written work instructions failed to direct the operator to cut out all bus undervoltage relay This event is discussed in Inspection Report 255/86023(DRP), Paragraph See also LER 255/86026 abov (Closed) LER 255/86028:
An automatic diesel generator actuation occurred when a lightning strike caused potential transformer fuses associated with the lD vital bus to open resulting in deenergization of the lD bus undervoltage relay This event is discussed in Inspection Report 255/86023(DRP), Paragraph (Closed) LER 255/86029:
While attempting to disable the Diesel Generator (DG) automatic start from the turbine protection circuitry, both DGs started due to an error by Instrument and Control (I&C) personne The correct link was opened but quickly reclosed causin~ the actuation when the I&C supervisor began to lose confidence that it was the correct lin The event is discussed in Inspection Report 255/86023(DRP), Paragraph See also LER 255/86026 abov (Closed) LER 255/86030:
An inadvertent'right channel safety injection actuation occurred during performance of a post-modification test procedure (reference Inspection Report No. 255/86023(DRP), Paragraph 3.i).
Planned corrective actions include administrative procedure revisions and written counselling of those who prepare, review, approve or authorize the performance of activities that could result in undesired Engineered Safety Feature actuation (Closed) LER 255/86034:
An evaluation of the 125 Volt DC buses concluded that a postulated single failure of one DC bus could result in no Engineered Safeguards System (ESS) pumps delivering water until manual operator action is take This design deficiency was discussed in Inspection Report 255/86023(DRP), Paragraph 3. The design error will be corrected prior to startup from the current outage by modifying the recirculation actuation system logic from two-out-of-four to one-out-of-two taken twice to prevent the operating ESS pumps' suction from realigning to a dry containment sum The completion of this modification is being tracked by Open Item 255/86023(DRP).
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(Closed) LER 255/B6035:
Two containment purge supply isolation valves, CV-1813 and CV-1814, were not truly in an electrically locked closed condition as required by Technical Specification 3.6. Control room operators confirmed an engineer's hypothesis that the starting of the purge air supply fan overides the electrically locked closed feature of the valves (reference Inspection Report No. 255/86023(DRP), Paragraph 3.n).
The operators inappropriately tested the fan start logic without the use of an approved test procedure or work order. *The licensee's corrective action for the operators use of procedures will be tracked by Open Item 255/86027-0l(DRP).
This was discussed at the Management Intervie Completion of the modification to ensure the valves will be locked closed is being tracked by Open Item 255/86023-07(DRP).
No violations or deviations were identifie.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations or deviation An Unresolved Item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in Paragraph.
Open Items Open Items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or bot An Open Item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in Paragraph.
Management Interview A management interview (attended as indicated in Paragraph 1) was conducted on October 21, 1986, following the inspectio The scope and findings of the inspection were discusse The inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspectio The licensee did not identify any such documents/processes as proprietary.
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