IR 05000255/1986007

Insp Rept 50-255/86-07 on 860204-0303.Violation Noted: Failure to Submit LER for Open Fire Doors Found on 860106 & 08 W/O Compensatory Measures Established

ML18052A373
Person / Time
Site:	Palisades
Issue date:	03/28/1986
From:	Hehl C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML18052A371	List: IR 05000255/1986007 ML18052A370 ML18052A372
References
50-255-86-07, 50-255-86-7, NUDOCS 8604040105
Download: ML18052A373 (10)

Text

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-255/86007(DRP)

Docket No. 50-255 Licensee:

Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, MI 49201 Facility Name:

Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant Inspection At:

Palisades Site, Covert, MI Inspection Conducted:

February 4 through March 3, 1986 Inspectors:

E. R. Swanson C. D. Anderson J. K. Heller Approved

~J\\~

By:

~-.--~6'~( *Chief

~"-Reactor Projects Section 2A Inspection Summary License No. DPR-20 3-z,8 ~~

Date Inspection on February 4 through March 3, 1986 (Report No. 50-255/86007(DRP))

Areas Inspected:

Routine, unannounced inspection by resident inspectors of operational safety; maintenance; survei,llance; reportable events; regional request; and the drug allegation meeting of February 5, 198 The inspection involved a total of 107 inspector-hours onsite by three NRC inspectors including 18 inspector-hours on site during off-shift Results:

Of the ar~as inspected one violation with several examples was identified for failure to submit Licensee Event Report One open item related to repeated failure of charging pump closing coils was identified to track licensee resolution of this problem.

• DETAILS Persons Contacted Consumers Power Company (CPCo)

1. F. #J. *J. #*R. w. *R. *H. w. *R. *D. *R. #D. #K. Buckman, Vice President, Nuclear Operations Firlit, General Manager Lewis, Plant Technical Director Orosz, Engineering and Maintenance Manager Beckman, Radiological Services Manager Rice, Plant Operations Manager Esch, Plant Administrative Manager Hodge, Property Protection Supervisor Fenech, Technical Engineer Fitzgibbon, Licensing Engineer McCaleb, Quality Assurance Director Smith, Human Resources Director Berry, Nuclear Licensing Director Nuclear Regulatory Commission

1. J. G. Keppler, Regional Administrator

1. A. B. Davis, Deputy Regional Administrator

1. E. G. Greenman, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects

1. T. N. Tambling, Director, Enforcement and Investigations Coordination Staff

1. W. D. Shafer, Chief, Emergency Preparedness and Radiological Protection Branch

1. C. W. Hehl, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 2A

1. J. R. Creed, Chief, Physical Security Section

1. B. A. Berson, Regional Counsel

1. J. F. Suermann, Project Manager

1. G. M. Christoffer, Security Inspector

1. C. D. Anderson, Resident Inspector, Palisades

• Denotes those present at the Management Intervie #Denotes those attending the February 5, 1986, Allegation meeting in Region II Numerous other members of the Plant Operations, Maintenance, Technical, and Chemistry Health Physics staffs, and several members of the Contract Security Forces, were also contacted briefl.

Operational Safety The inspectors observed control room activities, discussed these activities with plant operators, and reviewed various logs and other operations records throughout the inspectio Control room indicators and alarms, log sheets, turnover sheets, and equipment status boards were routinely checked against operating requirement *

• Pump and valve controls were verified proper for applicable plant condition On several occasions, the inspectors observed shift turnover activities and shift briefing meeting Tours were conducted in the turbine and auxiliary buildings, and central alarm station to observe work activities and testing in progress and to observe plant equipment condition, cleanliness, fire safety, health physics and security measures, and adherence to procedural and regulatory requirement The inspectors made observations concerning radiological safety practices in the radiation controlled areas including:

verification of proper posting; accuracy and currentness of area status sheets; verification of selected Radiation Work Permit (RWP) compliance; and implementation of proper personnel survey (frisking) and contamina-tion control (step-off-pad) practice Health Physics logs and dose records were routinely reviewe The inspectors observed physical security activities at various access control points, including proper personnel identification and search, and toured security barriers to verify maintenance of integrity. Access control activities for vehicles and packages were occasionally observe Activities in the Central Alarm Station were observe An ongoing review of all licensee corrective action program items at the Event Report level was performe While heating up on February 16, 1986 from a refueling outage, excessive leakage was noted on the 11A11 Steam Generator manway which necessitated a cooldown from approximately 400 degrees and 280 psi An Unusual Event was declared at 2347 hours0.0272 days <br />0.652 hours <br />0.00388 weeks <br />8.930335e-4 months <br /> and terminated at 1145 hours0.0133 days <br />0.318 hours <br />0.00189 weeks <br />4.356725e-4 months <br /> on February 17, 1986, when cold shutdown conditions were reache The manway was repaired and tested satisfactorily by noon on February 18, 198 While in cold shutdown on February 18, 1986, a noise spike on a nuclear instrument caused a reactor protection system actuation at 0447 hour0.00517 days <br />0.124 hours <br />7.390873e-4 weeks <br />1.700835e-4 months <br /> The reactor and turbine had been reset for testin A four-hour non-emergency report was made as required by 10 CFR 50.7 After heatup from cold shutdown on February 19, 1986, at 2249 hours0.026 days <br />0.625 hours <br />0.00372 weeks <br />8.557445e-4 months <br /> the licensee calculated an unidentified primary coolant system (PCS)

leakrate of 3.75 gp No significant leakage outside the PCS was identified and at 0449 hours0.0052 days <br />0.125 hours <br />7.423942e-4 weeks <br />1.708445e-4 months <br /> on February 20, 1986, the licensee declared an Unusual Even Initial investigation determined that some leakage was going to the clean radwaste system and some was leaking back into the Safety Injection Tank Syste A leakrate calculation at 0545 hours0.00631 days <br />0.151 hours <br />9.011243e-4 weeks <br />2.073725e-4 months <br /> determined the unidentified leakage to be 2.12 gpm.

l

• Subsequent licensee investigation determined and isolated the leakage source Approximately 1.0 gpm was attributed to the letdown system interleakage to the clean waste tank and another 2.5 gpm leak was terminated by isolating manual valves in a path through two parallel loop check valves, pressure control valves associated with the safety injection tanks and relief valves going to the primary drain tan The Unusual Event was terminated at 1325 hours0.0153 days <br />0.368 hours <br />0.00219 weeks <br />5.041625e-4 months <br /> with PCS leakage determined at 0.014 gp Subsequent investigation of the letdown system leakage resulted in a blown packing on a manual valve which contributed to a 3.8 gpm leakrate determination at 2300 hours0.0266 days <br />0.639 hours <br />0.0038 weeks <br />8.7515e-4 months <br /> on February 20, 198 The leak was isolated and repaired and a subsequent leakrate calculation at 0300 hours0.00347 days <br />0.0833 hours <br />4.960317e-4 weeks <br />1.1415e-4 months <br /> on February 21, 1986, showed 0.21 gpm unidentified PCS leakag The unit remained in hot shutdown while evaluating leak sources, and performing startup testin At 0040 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> on February 21, 1986 with the plant in hot shutdown, the licensee declared an Unusual Event when the fuel oil storage tank dropped below the Technical Specification minimu The same tank supplies site heating boilers which were using the fue Delivery of oil had been delayed due to bad weather and icy road Both emergency diesel generators were otherwise operable and the Technical Specifications allow the condition to exist for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> before the unit is required to be in cold shutdow The licensee terminated the Unusual Event at 0355 hours0.00411 days <br />0.0986 hours <br />5.869709e-4 weeks <br />1.350775e-4 months <br /> on February 21, 1986 after receiving a shipment of fuel oi With the plant in hot shutdown at 1115 hours0.0129 days <br />0.31 hours <br />0.00184 weeks <br />4.242575e-4 months <br /> on February 21, 1986, a reactor trip was caused by noise on nuclear instrument NI-04 which induced high startup rate trip signal. All rods were on the bottom with the reactor and turbine trips reset for testin This was the second trip from the same caus Four-hour non-emergency reports were made to the NR The licensee identified the cause as being due to welding and a radiation monitor relay which induced the signal nois While in hot shutdown on February 25, 1986, at 1515 hours0.0175 days <br />0.421 hours <br />0.0025 weeks <br />5.764575e-4 months <br /> the licensee experienced a spurious reactor and turbine tri A vital AC power supply transfer (Y.30 to No. 3 inverter) caused a nuclear instrument (NI-03) noise spike which brought in a high startup rate trip, reactor trip, turbine trip and emergency diesel generator automatic start. All systems functioned as designe On February 28, 1986, at 0925 hours0.0107 days <br />0.257 hours <br />0.00153 weeks <br />3.519625e-4 months <br /> the licensee began pulling rods to startup from a refueling and maintenance outage that started November 30, 198 The reactor achieved initial criticality at 1308 hours0.0151 days <br />0.363 hours <br />0.00216 weeks <br />4.97694e-4 months <br /> on the same da The unit was synchronized to the grid at 1355 hours0.0157 days <br />0.376 hours <br />0.00224 weeks <br />5.155775e-4 months <br /> on March 3, 198 During low power physics testing on March 1, 1986, at 1600 hours0.0185 days <br />0.444 hours <br />0.00265 weeks <br />6.088e-4 months <br /> the No. 4 shutdown rod was unable to be move Low power physics testing was then stoppe At 2020 hours0.0234 days <br />0.561 hours <br />0.00334 weeks <br />7.6861e-4 months <br /> the shutdown rod was exercised and declared operabl At 2045 hours0.0237 days <br />0.568 hours <br />0.00338 weeks <br />7.781225e-4 months <br /> the No. 4 shutdown rod was again unmovable and declared inoperabl The control rod drive mechanism

• problem was attributed to an intermittently open connector located on the reactor hea No maintenance was initiate At 0642 hours0.00743 days <br />0.178 hours <br />0.00106 weeks <br />2.44281e-4 months <br /> on March 2, 1986, after taking torque traces during rod dropping and exercising, the shutdown rod was declared operable when no further problems were note At 1710 hours0.0198 days <br />0.475 hours <br />0.00283 weeks <br />6.50655e-4 months <br /> on March 1, 1986, the licensee declared an Unusual Event per their Emergency Plan for a Technical Specification required shutdow The licensee reported, as required by 10 CFR 50.72, that three of four newly installed, environmentally qualified containment radiation monitors appeared to be inoperabl The licensee took immediate compensatory measures by placing one monitor in a tripped condition in order to satisfy the containment isolation logic requirement Subsequent licensee review determined that the cause of the apparent monitor inoperability was related to the effect of low background radiation in the vicinity of the three monitors during low power physics testin Troubleshooting disclosed that an input from a detector below a certain threshold value (in this case, the low background radiation) would cause the amplifier output to reverse, which in turn caused a 11pegged low 11 indication on the monitor's scale and a concurrent loss of the green 11operating

light, even though the monitor was operabl The Plant Review Committee met and determined that the monitors were, in fact, operable and that this condition should be verified periodically by performing a circuit check which results in an onscale reading and energizing the green ligh The Unusual Event was terminated at 2030 hours0.0235 days <br />0.564 hours <br />0.00336 weeks <br />7.72415e-4 months <br /> that nigh No violations or deviations were identifie.

Maintenance The inspector reviewed and/or observed the following selected work activities and verified appropriate procedures were in effect controlling removal from and return to service, hold points, verification testing, fire prevention/protection, and cleanliness: Troubleshooting of the breaker closure problem for the service water pump, P-528 was observed (FWS-24602008).

This one and several other safety related breakers had either failed to close or closed and then opened during testing. It was found that one control switch had been improperly rebuilt and the other cases apparently were due to the breakers being improperly racked i Subsequent testing found no repeat failures. It is the licensee's policy to test breakers alter they are racked in during operation which would detect any similar problems in the futur Calibration of the feedwater flow controller FT-0701 (FWS 24602076)

was observed. Troubleshooting of the steam pressure control valve (PCV-0521) to the turbine driven auxiliary. feed pump was observe. *

The coolant charging pump P-558 failed to start. It was found to be due to a failed closing coil (CVC-24603221).

This closing coil was replaced about a year ago and so additional action is planned by the license This may include staging a spare breaker for rapid repair, installing counters to determine the use/failure rate of the breakers or installing contactors to start and stop the pump instead of the power breake The breaker vendor was contacted and was not aware of any generic concerns with frequent failure of these breaker Licensee resolution of these repetitive failures will be tracked as an open item (255/86007-02(DRP)). A number of valve problems were experienced during outage testin A common cause between several of them was the instrument air system which still contained some desiccant from a previous filter failure and water contamination due to the air dryers being out of service for several months during the outag The air dryers were repaired and the contaminants were purged from the syste The valves were inspected, the actuators cleaned and rebuilt as necessary, and the valves were reteste About forty-eight G. E. hand switches were rebuilt to correct a potentially generic problem with lack of lubrication on the internal operating cam After testing identified a loose cam, the licensee sampled five mor At the request of the inspector the licensee took a broader sample and identified two more loose cams (half turn on a screw) and two switches which had the wrong cams installe All switches were subsequently verified to be correctly rebuil Setpoint Change 86032 removed the bypass torque limit switches from the 11open 11 circuits on eight auxiliary feedwater valves Limitorque operators in response to a concern expressed by the NR No violations or deviations were identifie.

Surveillance The inspectors reviewed surveillance activities to ascertain compliance with scheduling requirements and to verify compliance with requirements relating to procedures, removal from and return to service, personnel qualifications, and documentatio The following test activities were inspected: T-190 Service Water Supply to Auxiliary Feedwater Pump P-8C T-196 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump P-8C 48 Hour Endurance Run M0~38 Auxiliary Feedwater Systems Inservice Test Procedure on Pump P-88 R0-8 Engineered Safeguard System (Blackout Test)

No violations or deviations were identifie.

Licensee Event Reports

• Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following reportable events were examined to determine that reportability requirements were met, immediate corrective action was accomplished as appropriate, and corrective action to prevent recurrence has been accomplished per Technical Specificatio (Closed) LER 255/82019 Revision 2:

The LER was updated to reflect a change in corrective action for the containment airlock interlock which had faile A 11 hard spot 11 on the inner door closure mechanism was repaired which had given a false feeling of being close The interlocks required adjustment and were further modified to provide a more positive lock during door operatio (Closed) LER 255/84025 Revision 1:

Primary coolant system unidentified leakage was measured to be in excess of Technical Specification limit The event report was revised to indicate that it was voluntary and not a required repor (Closed) LER 255/85006 Revision 1:

Two control rods were inoperable at the same time due to lack of testing on one and mechanical binding of the othe The licensee took action to test the first rod and thereby comply with the limiting condition for operatio The purpose of the update was to change the reporting requirement to indicate a voluntary repor (Closed) LER 255/85017 Revision 1:

Environmental qualification of the engf neered safeguards room temperature control switches was not tracked and not completed as committe This supplement added a statement that 11 immediate action was provided to ensure adequate Engineered Safeguards Room Cooling 11 *

Although the report does not so state, the actions were to bypass the switches by operating the fans in manual, and caution tagging the control switche (Closed) LER 255/86001:

A radioactive waste shipment to Richland, Washington was not acknowledged as required by 10 CFR 20.311(h).

It was subsequently determined by the licensee that the shipment made on December 17, 1985, was buried on December 30, 198 Written acknowledg-ment was received on January 13, 198 This report, made under the requirements of 10 CFR 20.311(h)(2), is considered close (Closed) LER 255/86002:

The missile shield lifting device was found to be outside its safe working load requirement due to the incorrect weight values assigned to the shield While conducting a review of the weights to be used for a load test of the Polar Crane on January 2, 1986, it was determined that the missile shields weigh 64 tons rather than 35 ton All components of the lifting device had sufficient margin to meet the new safe working load requirements except for the master rin This master ring has a safe working load of 52 ton After measurement and evaluation it was determined that since no elongation of the ring was evident after eight lifts that it would be acceptable for use until a new device could be purchase The licensee does not know how this error occurred but it apparently has existed since plant constructio No review of the weight values appeared to have been done under the NUREG-0612 heavy loads issu The licensee plans to replace the lift rig before the next refuelin. '

(Closed) LER 255/86003:

Valve motor operators were determined not to be environmentally qualified under a generic issue identified at other plant Thirteen pre-1970 vintage qualified Limitorque operators were found to contain undocumented, vendor supplied wirin All the subject wiring in these valves was replaced with IEEE 323-1974 environmentally qualified wir The licensee's evaluation concluded that the undocumented wire would likely have withstood the effects of a LOC This event report is close (Open) LER 255/86004:

Fourteen of twenty-four main steam relief valves were found to exceed the plus/minus 1% of setpoint acceptance criteri All valves except one were found to be within 2% of their setpoint with the one being 2.8%

The licensee believes the errors to be due to the 11as left 11 settings after the last outage and corrosion deposit buildup during operatio The valves were overhauled and reset with the assistance of a valve manufacturer representativ The licensee plans to supplement the LER when an evaluation of safety significance and further evaluation of the acceptance criteria are complete Due to the additional review and evaluation required of this event by the licensee and NRC it remains ope The licensee was cited in Inspection Report No. 255/86003 for having two fire doors open without compensatory measures established which is in violation of Technical Specification (TS) 3.2 The east safeguards room fire door was found open by an NRC inspector on January 6, 1986, and the auxiliary feed pump water-tight fire door was found open by NRC inspectors on January 8, 198 The licensee failed to submit Licensee Event Reports (LERs) on these two occurrence CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)

requires that any operation or condition prohibited by the plant's TS be reported via a LE Failure to do so in considered an example of the violation as set forth in the Appendix (255/86007-0la(DRP)).

On December 14, 1985, at 1210 hours0.014 days <br />0.336 hours <br />0.002 weeks <br />4.60405e-4 months <br /> an inadvertent right channel containment isolation occurred due to a high radiation trip of a containment radiation monito The trip was caused by a contaminated light being moved past the monito On December 15, 1985, at 2258 hours0.0261 days <br />0.627 hours <br />0.00373 weeks <br />8.59169e-4 months <br /> and 2312 hours0.0268 days <br />0.642 hours <br />0.00382 weeks <br />8.79716e-4 months <br /> respectively, left and right channel containment isolations occurred due to increasing background radiation levels during removal of the incores during refueling operation None of these isolations were preplanned evolutions, thus LERs are required per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)

which states any event or condition that results in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature that is not part of a preplanned sequence must be reporte These ESF actuations were properly reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72, four hour reporting No LERs were submitted, therefore, these are considered to be examples of the violation set forth in the Appendix (255/86007-0lb(DRP)).

One violation with several examples and no deviations were identified in this area.

. ' Regional Request Upon receipt of the NRC 1 s Vendor Program Branch Inspection Report No. 99901033/85-01 of Power Inspection Incorporated (PII) it was identified that Palisades Eddy Current Testing (ECT) equipment may have been improperly calibrated by PI Palisades has used PII since 1982 in some phases of the steam generator and main condenser inspection The licensee reviewed the report provided and concluded that none of the suspect equipment was utilized for steam generator EC Due to the identified irregularities in documentation of personnel training and certification, procurement and equipment calibration, the licensee decided that PII will not be used until a satisfactory onsite audit is conducted by their own auditor.

Drug Allegation Meeting in Region III On January 31, 1986, the Regional Administrator asked the licensee to prepare a presentation on their actions regarding a drug allegation received by the licensee in December of 1985 and why they believe the plant is safe to start up following the refueling outage regarding any work the alleged drug users may have performe The allegation concerned usage of drugs by members of the licensee 1 s electrical maintenance sho On February 5, 1986, the licensee met with the NRC representatives denoted in Paragraph 1 in the Region III office in Glen Ellyn, Illinoi The licensee presented the chronology of events concerning the allegation including the second allegation received on February 3, 198 The licensee concluded that the allegations were false due to all urinalysis results being negativ The licensee proposed a sample reverification of electrical work done by those electricians accused of using drug Eight of twenty-one work orders performed two weeks prior to and two weeks after the alleged drug use were selected for reverification by individuals other than those involve If abnormalities were noted, further evaluation would be performe The NRC agreed that the sample program was adequat The licensee also briefly discussed the fitness for duty policy that will be implemented at Palisade Subsequent to the meeting, the reverification inspections noted no abnormalitie The Fitness for Duty program was presented to the plant employees during the week of February 10, 1986, to be fully implemented on March 15, 198.

Management Interview A management interview (attended as indicated in Paragraph 1) was conducted on February 28, 1986, following the inspectio The scope and findings of the inspection were discusse Also discussed were the licensee 1 s plans to startup with a number of known equipment deficiencie Two of four primary coolant pumps have failed seals on the first of four stage A loop check valve is known to have a 2.25 gpm leak rate which can be reduced by closure

of other valves to 0.4 gp Intermittent leakage from the Chemical and Volume Control System to the Clean Radwaste System causes high PCS leak rates to be measure The licensee committed to repairing these and other valve problems in the event that the plant is taken to a cold shutdown condition, and acknowledges that they are not content with the situatio The licensee planned to continue with plant restart and operation in order that they may identify any other problems which may require a cold shutdown to repai The licensee was appraised of the NRC view that their course of action was considered less than prudent and would be a factor in the next SALP revie The inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspect9r during the inspectio The licensee did not identify any such documents/processes as proprietar