IR 05000237/1986024
| ML17199F963 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 12/15/1986 |
| From: | Jackiw I NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17199F962 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-237-86-24, 50-249-86-29, IEB-86-001, IEB-86-003, IEB-86-1, IEB-86-3, IEIN-86-067, IEIN-86-084, IEIN-86-085, IEIN-86-086, IEIN-86-092, IEIN-86-67, IEIN-86-84, IEIN-86-85, IEIN-86-86, IEIN-86-92, NUDOCS 8612290227 | |
| Download: ML17199F963 (14) | |
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I II Reports No. 50-237/86024(DRP); 50-249/86029(DRP)
Docket Nos. 50-237; 50-249 Licenses No. DPR-19; DPR-25 Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company P. 0. Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name:
Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3 Inspection At:
Dresden Site, Morris, Illinois Inspection Conducted:
September 30 thru December 2, 1986 Inspectors:
L. G. McGregor E. A. Hare P. D. Kaufman Approved By: ~k~~
P~ects ~ction 2D Inspection Summary
/,;i- /J---~ ?.(
Date Inspection during the period of September 30 thru December 2, 1986 (Reports No. 50-237/86024(DRP); No. 50-249/86029(DRP))
Areas Inspected:
Routine unannounced resident inspection of operational safety, followup of events, maintenance, surveillances, licensee event reports and I.E. Bulletin Results:
Of the six areas inspected, no violations or deviations of NRC requirements were identifie * * *
DETAILS Persons Contacted Commonwealth Edison Company
- N. Kalivianakis, Division Vice President
- E. Eenigenburg, Station Manager
.
- J. Wujciga, Production Superintendent
- R. Flessner, Services Superintendent T. Ciesla, Assistant Superintendent, Planning R. Zentner, Assistant Superintendent, Maintenance J. Brunner, Assistant Superintendent, Technical Services R. Christensen, Unit 1 Operating Engineer J. Almer, Unit 2 Operating Engineer
- J. Kotowski, Assistant Superintendent, Operations W. Pietryga, Unit 3 Operating Engineer J. Achterberg, Technical Staff Supervisor
- D. Adam, Compliance Administrator J. Doyle, Q.C. Supervisor D. Sharper, Waste Systems Engineer E. 0 1Connor, Radiation Chemistry Supervisor J. Mayer, Station Security Administrator W. Johnson, Chemistry Supervisor D. Saccomando, Radiation Protection Supervisor M. Jeisy, Q.A. Supervisor
- R. Stols, Q.A. Inspector H. Cobbs, Q.A. Inspector The inspectors also talked with and interviewed several other licensee employees, including members of the technical and engineering staffs, reactor and auxiliary operators, shift engineers and foremen, electrical, mechanical and instrument personnel, and contract security personne *Denotes those attending the final exit interview conducted on December 2, 1986 and one or more informal interviews at various times throughout the inspection perio Operational Safety Verification The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the period from September 30 through December 2, 198 The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected component Tours of Units 2 and 3 reactor buildings and turbine buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance.
- The inspectors witnessed the Unit 3 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Pump Test which was conducted to Procedure DOS 2300-3, Revision 1 The test was performed to take vibration measurements on the HPCI pump rotor. Measurements were taken by the licensee's tech staff on the number 2 and 3 bearing The data obtained will be analyzed and used as a preventative maintenance measure to preclude bearing failure The inspectors, by observation and direct interview, verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security pla The inspectors observed plant housekeeping/cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection control During the inspection, the inspectors walked down the accessible portions of the systems listed below to verify operability by comparing system lineup with plant drawings, as-built configuration or present valve lineup lists; observing equipment conditions that could degrade performance; and verified that instrumentation was properly valved, functioning, and calibrate The inspectors reviewed new procedures and changes to procedures that were implemented during the inspection perio The review consisted of a verification for accuracy, correctness, and compliance with regulatory requirement The inspectors also witnessed portions of the radioactive waste system controls associated with radwaste shipments and barrelin These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under Technical Specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedure The following systems were inspected:
Unit 2 Low Pressure Coolant Injection System Core Spray System Unit 3 Isolation Condenser High Pressure Coolant Injection System Common 2/3 Emergency Diesel Generator Standby Gas Treatment System No violations or deviations were identified in this are * Followup of Events During the inspection period, the licensee experienced several events, some of which required prompt notification of the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.7 The inspectors pursued the events onsite with the licensee and/or other NRC official In each case, the inspectors verified that the notification was correct and timely, if appropriate, that the licensee was taking prompt and appropriate actions, that activities were conducted within regulatory requirements and that corrective actions would prevent future recurrenc The specific events are as follows: Unit 3 - At 8:15 a.m., on October 14, 1986, while operating at 100%
power, a reactor scram occurred. A contractor decontaminating in the area of the main steam flow sensing lines, jarred the sensing lines and caused an erroneous high steam flow signal (120%) in the 11A
main steam line. This resulted in a Group I isolation and closure of the MSIV' Following the Group I isolation, the isolation condenser system was manually initiated at approximately 1010 pounds to control reactor pressure by throttling of the MO 3-1301-3 valve by the Unit Operato During this manual valve operation, the operator turned the control switch for Valve M0-3-1301-3 to the 11close 11 position. Thus, the isolation condenser system was isolated from the automatic initiation signa As a result, electromatic relief Valve (ERV) 3-203-38 opened when reactor pressure reached 1080 psig and remained open for 38 seconds until reactor pressure decreased to 1035 psi The setpoint pressure for the ERV is 1101 psig plus or minus 1 percent. Since the relief valve opened premature and outside the allowable setpoint error defined in Technical Specification 4.6.E, a drywell entry was made to check/
calibrate the pressure switch on 3-203-38 ER The pressure switch error has been attributed to setpoint drift. The setpoint was readjusted to 1101 psig and successfully tested per DIS 250- The licensee tested the remaining ERV's (3-203-3C, D, and E) and target rock relief valve (3-203-3A) and found them to open within the allowable setpoints. The unit went critical on October 16, 1986 at 11:15 p.m., and the turbine was tied to the grid at 9:13 on October 17, 1986, after the above problems were corrected and the investigations, testing, calibrations, and surveillances complete Unit 3 - On October 14, 1986, while the unit was shutdown and the reactor vessel depressurized following a reactor scram earlier in the day, a Group V (isolation condenser) containment isolation signal was received at 8:50 p.m. in the control roo The licensee believes the spurious signal may have been caused when the inner door to the drywell was closed a little harder than normal resulting in the 11 jarring 11 of an instrument rack near the doo This jarring may have actuated the isolation condenser condensate high flow/high steam flow relays resulting in the Group V isolation signal. All the ISCO instrument setpoints were checked and were within their
Technical Specification limits. Attempts to repeat the spurious signal by slamming the interlock door were unsuccessfu The licensee has initiated an Action Item Record (AIR No. 12-86-35)
to investigate and determine the cause of this even The licensee will issue a supplemental report to Reportable Occurrence 86-018-00 on Docket 05024 Unit 3 - On November 10, 1986 at 1:47 p.m., while operating at 98%
power, a reactor scram occurred due to an Instrument Mechanic (IM)
lifting incorrect power leads in a control room pane The IM was in the process of replacing the Shutdown Cooling Temperature Recorder (3-1040-2) per Work Request (WR-56657) in the 903-4 Control Room pane The IM removed wires from the wrong side of terminal block AA98 and 99 inside the 903-4 pane The power leads which were incorrectly lifted supplied power to drywell pneumatic supply valve (A0-3-4722).
Loss of power to this valve caused it to fail closed, which resulted in the MSIV 1s drifting close due to loss of air. A full reactor scram was subsequently received due to 11MSIV 1s Not Full Open
- During the scram 24 of the 177 control rods went full in and 11bounced 11 back to the 02 position instead of the full-in 00 position. Also, during the scram, the selected Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) Train 11A 11 failed to start as require The 11 8 11 train did start as designed after the 11A 11 train faile The 11A 11 train power supply was from 11Dirty Power 11 or house power, thus it didn 1t start when called upo The licensee has corrected the power supply problem and the reactor was made critical at 11:18 a.m. and the unit returned to service at 6:03 p.m. on November 11, 198 Unit 3 - At 9:58 a.m. on November 13, 1986, while operating at 93%
power, the reactor scrammed on a high power (APRM) spike due to the closure of Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV-18).
Maintenance personnel were troubleshooting the auxiliary feed from Bus 36-4, which was feeding the essential service bus because of problems with the essential service bus uninterruptible power suppl The opening of this auxiliary power supply caused a momentary loss of power and a half scram on safety channel B, which was followed by a full reactor scram within a few second The half scram was attributed to momentary loss of essential power causing a voltage drop to the A.C. powered solenoid valves, which in conjunction with D.C. powered solenoid valves maintain air pressure to operate the MSIV 1 Circuit testing of the D.C. solenoid valve on MSIV-18 established that it had failed, thus leaving only the A.C. solenoid valve controlling air pressur The voltage drop (caused by the throw-over of the essential power) was sufficient enough to cause the solenoid to interrupt air pressure and result in the closure of MSIV-1 This increased reactor system pressure, causing a high-high APRM spike on all 6 channels resulting in an automatic reactor scra The licensee replaced the failed D.C. solenoid on MSIV-18 and restarted the unit on November 15, 1986.
5 Unit 3 - On November 19, 1986, at 6:20 p.m., a GSEP - Unusual Event was declared because the Unit 2/3 Emergency Diesel Generator was out-of-service for a quarterly inspection and the 11A 11 Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) system was declared inoperable due to Suppression Pool suction valve MO 1501-5A being declared inoperabl With these systems inoperable, the Technical Specifications required the unit to be shut down within 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> At 5:47 a.m. on November 20, 1986, the GSEP - Unusual Event was terminated when the 2/3 Emergency Diesel Generator was returned to service and successfully teste The licensee has since completed repairs to the torque limit switch operator of suction valve MO 1501-5 The inspector informed the licensee on November 25, 1986, that the Red Phone log book in the control room was lacking an entry - that being the call on November 20, 1986 at 5:47 a.m., by a Shift Engineer terminating the-Unusual Event of November 19, 198 The center desk log did have an entry of this cal Unit 2 - On November 29, 1986, at 3:45 p.m. with the unit at 15%
power, and entering a refueling outage, a GSEP Unusual Event was declared due to the containment/drywell atmosphere oxygen concentration being greater than 4% oxygen and the reactor cooling pressure above 90 psig with the reactor in the Run Mode for more than the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period permitted by Technical Specification 3.7. At 5:10 p.m. on November 29, 1986, the Unusual Event was terminated when the reactor was manually scrammed by placing the mode switch in the shutdown positio Details of this event are still under review by the Resident Inspectors and Region III office. This is considered an unresolved item (50-249/86029-01).
No violations or deviations were identified in this are.
Monthly Maintenance Observation Station maintenance activiUes of safety related systems and components listed below were observed/reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conf-0rmance with technical specification The following items were considered during this review:
the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and, fire prevention controls were implemente Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipment maintenance which may affect system performanc The following maintenance activities were observed/reviewed:
Unit 2 2B - Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) Heat Exchanger Tube Plugging and Cleaning Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generator quarterly inspection 125 volt Battery Rack Replacement and Replacement of the 2 and 2A 125 Volt 100 ampere Battery Chargers with 200 ampere Chargers Unit 3 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Pump vibration ~est Common Unit 2/3 Emergency Diesel Generator 6 Month Inspection No violations or deviations were identified in this are.
Licensee Event Reports Followup Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with technical specification Unit 2 (Closed) 86022-00:
Fire Main Valve Position Not Verified on Schedule Due to an Oversight by the Operations Departmen Fire suppression water system inspection surveillances exceeded the 31 day (plus 25 percent)
valve position verificatio The valves FM 2-4101-510 and FM 3-4101-507 were verified open (normal position) on September 1, 1986, one day beyond the critical surveillance due dat (Closed) 86022-01:
Fire Main Valve Position Not Verified on Schedule Due to an Oversight by the Operations Department. A Supplemental Report was issued to correct item No. 13 Component Failures. The Cause Code" and
"Reportable to NPRDS 11 items were filled out incorrectl No component failure occurre (Closed) 86023-00:
Failure of Power Supply 2-1705-7B to the Reactor Building Ventilation Monitors Caused Automatic Initiation of the Standby Gas Treatment Syste The failure of the power supply for channel 11 B" Reactor Building ventilation monitoring system was the result of a defective dial component within the power supply which regulates the power output from the power suppl The problem was corrected when power supply 2-1705-7B was replaced like for like and successfully teste *
Unit 3 (Closed) 86012-00:
Manual Scram Due to Excessive Number of Control Rod Drive (CRD) Accumulator Alarms Caused by CRD Pump Tri Charging water manual isolation valve for CRD M-3 stuck open causing the 38 Control Rod Drive pump to run out and trip on low suction pressure. A new stem and disc were installed in the charging water manual valve (3-305-113) on CRD M-The valve was then successfully tested to ensure complete sealin (Closed) 86012-01:
Manual Scram Due to Excessive Number of Control Rod Drive (CRD) Accumulator Alarms Caused by CRD Pump Trip. Supplemental Report was issued to correct procedure number and title used for the surveillanc (Closed) 86015-00:
Failure to Perform the Unit 3 Quarterly Storage Battery Surveillance During the Required Surveillance Interval Due to Personnel Erro Missed critical surveillance due date of July 29, 198 The required surveillance was performed on July 1, 1986 beyond the 25 percent allowable extension interval. Discovery and recognition that the missed surveillance was a Technical Specification violation occurred on September 24, 198 Dresden Administrative Procedure (OAP) 11-2, "Surveillance Program", has been revised to have the Surveillance Coordinator submit a Surveillance Frequency Overdue List to the effected departmental leads for review and comment should any item exceed the due dat (Closed) 86016-00:
Reactor Scram on Low Condenser Vacuum Due to Circulating Water Flow Reversal Valve Failur Main condenser flow reversal valve 3-44020 failed in mid~position causing a condenser low vacuum reactor scra The setscrew holding the motor pinion gear in place apparently vibrated loose, which caused the pinion gear to become uncoupled from the motor drive shaft preventing the valve from fully changing position during flow reversal. The motor pinion gear was reinstalled and the setscrew tightened on valve 3-44020. Also, all other main condenser circulating water flow reversing valve motors were inspected and the setscrews checked for tightnes In addition, all pinion gears were safety wired in place to prevent future uncouplings from the motor shaf (Closed) 86016-01:
Reactor Scram on Low Condenser Vacuum Due to Circulating Water Flow Reversal Valve Failure. A Supplemental Report was issued to provide Component Failure information and correct a typographical erro (Closed) 86017-00:
Contractor Inadvertently Jars Main Steam Line High Flow Sensing Lines Resulting in Group I Isolation and Subsequent Reactor Scra Review of this event is documented under Paragraph 3.a. of this repor (Closed) 86018-00:
Spurious Group V Containment Isolatio Review of this event is documented in Paragraph 3.b. of this repor *
The preceding LERs have been reviewed against the criteria of 10 CFR 2, Appendix C, and the incidents described meet all of the following requirement Thus no Notice of Violation is being issued for these item The event was identified by the licensee, The event was an incident that, according to the current enforcement policy, met the criteria for Severity levels IV or V violations, The event was appropriately reported, The event was or will be corrected (including measures to prevent recurrence within a reasonable amount of time), and The event was not a violation that could have been prevented by the licensee's corrective actions for a previous violatio No violations or deviations were identified in this are.
I.E. Information Notice Followup Each of the following I.E. Information Notices (!EN) was reviewed by the Resident Inspector to verify (1) that the information notice was received by licensee management, (2) that a review for applicability was performed, and (3) that if the information notice was applicable to the facility, applicable actions were taken or were scheduled to be take (Closed) !EN 86-67:
Portable Moisture/Density.Gauges:
Recent Incidents and Common Violations of Requirement for Use, Transportation and Storag Not applicable to Dresde (Closed) !EN 86-84:
Rupture of a Nominal 40 Millicurie Iodine-125 Brachytherapy Seed Causing Significant Spread of Radioactive Contaminatio Not applicable to Dresde (Closed) !EN 86-85:
Enforcement Actions Against Medical Licensees for Willful Failure to Report Misadministration Not applicable to Dresde (Closed) IEN 86-86:
Clarification of Requirements for Fabrication and Export of Certain Previously Approved Type B Package Not applicable to Dresde (Closed) IEN 86-92:
Pressurizer Safety Valve Reliabilit Not applicable to Dresde No violations or deviations were identified in this are.
IE Bulletin Followup The following IE Bulletin was reviewed by the Resident Inspectors to determine if:
(1) the licensee's written response was submitted within the time limitations stated in the bulletin, (2) the written response
- included all information required to be reported, (3) the written response included adequate corrective action commitments based on information presented in the bulletin and the licensee's response, (4)
licensee management forwarded copies of the written response to the required onsite management representatives, (5) information discussed in the licensee's response was accurate, and (6) the corrective action taken was as described in the respons (Closed) I.E.Bulletin 86-03, Revision 0 (237/86003-BB; 249/86003-BB):
"Potential Failure of Multiple ECCS Pumps Due to Single Failure of Air-Operated Valve in Minimum Flow Recirculation Line."
The licensee's written response dated November 14, 1986, states that the single-failure problem does not exist at any of their stations. Actions required of BWR plants in response to I.E.Bulletin 86-01 were not repeated, as directed, in response to this I.E. Bulleti No violations or deviations were identified in this are.
Management Meeting at Dresden On November 19, 1986, a meeting was held at the Dresden site to discuss recent management changes within the licensee's site organization and also within the NRCs Region III and Nuclear Reactor Regulation Licensing staf In addition, a site tour was conducted by all NRC attendees to examine on site housekeeping activities Report Review During the inspection period, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's Monthly Operating Report for September and October, 198 The inspectors confirmed that the information provided met the requirements of Technical Specification 6.6.A.3 and Regulatory Guide 1.1 The licensee announced the following Dresden site management changes effective November 24, 1986:
J. Kotowski, Assistant Superintendent Work Planning transferred to Assistant Superintendent Operation T. Ciesla, Assistant Superintendent Operations transferred to Assistant Superintendent Work Plannin.
Exit Interview The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
informally throughout the inspection period and at the conclusion of the inspection on December 2, 1986, and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activitie The inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspectio The licensee did not identify any such documents/processes as proprietar The licensee acknowledged the findings of the inspectio The following maintenance activities were observed/reviewed:
Unit 2 2B - Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) Heat Exchanger Tube Plugging and Cleaning Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generator quarterly inspection 125 volt Battery Rack Replacement and Replacement of the 2 and 2A 125 Volt 100 ampere Battery Chargers with 200 ampere Chargers Unit 3 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Pump vibration test Common Unit 2/3 Emergency Diesel Generator 6 Month Inspection No violations or deviations were identified in this are.
Licensee Event Reports Followup Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with technical specification Unit 2 (Closed) 86022-00:
Fire Main Valve Position Not Verified on Schedule Due to an Oversight by the Operations Departmen Fire suppression water system inspection surveillances exceeded the 31 day (plus 25 percent)
valve position verificatio The valves FM 2-4101-510 and FM 3-4101-507 were verified open (normal position) on September 1, 1986, one day beyond the critical surveillance due dat (Closed) 86022-01:
Fire Main Valve Position Not Verified on Schedule Due to an Oversight by the Operations Departmen A Supplemental Report was issued to correct item No. 13 Component Failure The "Cause Code 11 and 11Reportable to NPRDS 11 items were filled out incorrectl No component failure occurre (Closed) 86023-00:
Failure of Power Supply 2-1705-7B to the Reactor Building Ventilation Monitors Caused Automatic Initiation of the Standby Gas Treatment Syste The failure of the power supply for channel 11 B
Reactor Building ventilation monitoring system was the result of a defective dial component within the power supply which regulates the power output from the power suppl The problem was corrected when power supply 2-1705-7B was replaced like for like and successfully teste Unit 3 (Closed) 86012-00:
Manual Scram Due to Excessive Number of Control Rod Drive (CRD) Accumulator Alarms Caused by CRD Pump Tri Charging water manual isolation valve for CRD M-3 stuck open causing the 38 Control Rod Drive pump to run out and tri-p on low suction pressur A new stem and disc were installed in the charging water manual valve (3-305-113) on CRD M-The valve was then successfully tested to ensure complete sealin (Closed) 86012-01:
Manual Scram Due to Excessive Number of Control Rod Drive (CRD) Accumulator Alarms Caused by CRD Pump Trip. Supplemental Report was issued to correct procedure number and title used for the surveillanc (Closed) 86015-00:
Failure to Perform the Unit 3 Quarterly Storage Battery Surveillance During the Required Surveillance Interval Due to Personnel Erro Missed critical surveillance due date of July 29, 198 The required surveillance was performed on July 1, 1986 beyond the 25 percent allowable extension interval. Discovery and recognition that the missed surveillance was a Technical Specification violation occurred on September 24, 198 Dresden Administrative Procedure (OAP) 11-2, 11Surveillance Program
, has been revised to have the Surveillance Coordinator submit a Surveillance Frequency Overdue List to the effected departmental leads for review and comment should any item exceed the due dat (Closed) 86016-00:
Reactor Scram on Low Condenser Vacuum Due to Circulating Water Flow Reversal Valve Failur Main condenser flow reversal valve 3-44020 failed in mid-position causing a condenser low vacuum reactor scra The setscrew holding the motor pinion gear in place apparently vibrated loose, which caused the pinion gear to become uncoupled from the motor drive shaft preventing the valve from fully changing position during flow reversa The motor pinion gear was reinstalled and the setscrew tightened on valve 3-4402 Also, all other main condenser circulating water flow reversing valve motors were inspected and the setscrews checked for tightnes In addition, all pinion gears were safety wired in place to prevent fut~re uncouplings from the motor shaf (Closed) 86016-01:
Reactor Scram on Low Condenser Vacuum Due to Circulating Water Flow Reversal Valve Failure. A Supplemental Report was issued to provide Component Failure information and correct a typographical erro (Closed) 86017-00:
Contractor Inadvertently Jars Main Steam Line High Flow Sensing Lines Resulting in Group I Isolation and Subsequent Reactor Scra Review of this event is documented under Paragraph 3.a. of this repor (Closed) 86018-00:
Spurious Group V Containment Isolatio Review of this event is documented in Paragraph 3.b. of this repor ~..
The preceding LERs have been reviewed against the criteria of 10 CFR 2, Appendix C, and the incidents described meet all of the following requirement Thus no Notice of Violation is being issued for these item The event was identified by the licensee, The event was an incident that, according to the current enforcement policy, met the criteria for Severity levels IV or V violations, The event was appropriately reported, The event was or will be corrected (including measures to prevent recurrence within a reasonable amount of time), and The event was not a violation that could have been prevented by the licensee 1s corrective actions for a previous violatio No violations or deviations were identified in this are.
I.E. Information Notice Followup Each of the following I.E. Information Notices (IEN) was reviewed by the Resident Inspector to verify (1) that the information notice was received by licensee management, (2) that a review for applicability was performed, and (3) that if the information notice was applicable to the facility, applicable actions were taken or were scheduled to be take (Closed) IEN 86-67:
Portable Moisture/Density Gauges:
Recent Incidents and Common Violations of Requirement for Use, Transportation and Storag Not applicable to Dresde (Closed) IEN 86-84:
Rupture of a Nominal 40 Millicurie Iodine-125 Brachytherapy Seed Causing Significant Spread of Radioactive Contaminatio Not applicable to Dresde (Closed) IEN 86-85:
Enforcement Actions Against Medical Licensees for Willful Failure to Report Misadministration Not applicable to Dresde (Closed) IEN 86-86:
Clarification of Requirements for Fabrication and Export of Certain Previously Approved Type B Package Not applicable to Dresde (Closed) IEN 86-92:
Pressurizer Safety Valve Reliabilit Not applicable to Dresde No violations or deviations were identified in this are.
IE Bulletin Followup The following IE Bulletin was reviewed by the Resident Inspectors to determine if:
(1) the licensee 1s written response was submitted within the time limitations stated in the bulletin, (2) the written response
.. '
included all information required to be reported, (3) the written response included adequate corrective action commitments based on information presented in the bulletin and the licensee's response, (4)
licensee management forwarded copies of the written response to the required onsite management representatives, (5) information discussed in the licensee's response was accurate, and (6) the corrective action taken was as described in the respons (Closed) I.E.Bulletin 86-03, Revision 0 (237/86003-BB; 249/86003-BB):
"Potential Failure of Multiple ECCS Pumps Due to Single Failure of Air-Operated Valve in Minimum Flow Recirculation Line." The licensee's written response dated November 14, 1986, states that the single-failure problem does not exist at any of their stations. Actions required of BWR plants in response to I.E.Bulletin 86-01 were not repeated, as directed, in response to this I.E. Bulleti No violations or deviations were identified in this are.
Management Meeting at Dresden On November 19, 1986, a meeting was held at the Dresden site to discuss recent management changes within the licensee's site organization and also within the NRCs Region III and Nuclear Reactor Regulation Licensing staf In addition, a site tour was conducted by all NRC attendees to examine on site housekeeping activitie.
Report Review During the inspection period, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's Monthly Operating Report for September and October, 198 The inspectors confirmed that the information provided met the requirements of Technical Specification 6.6.A.3 and Regulatory Guide 1.1 The licensee announced the following Dresden site management changes effective November 24, 1986:
J. Kotowski, Assistant Superintendent Work Planning transferred to Assistant Superintendent Operation T. Ciesla, Assistant Superintendent Operations transferred to Assistant Superintendent Work Plannin.
Exit Interview The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
informally throughout the inspection period and at the conclusion of the inspection on December 2, 1986, and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activitie The inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspectio The licensee did not identify any such documents/processes as proprietary. The licensee acknowledged the findings of the inspectio