IR 05000237/1986027
| ML17199F988 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 01/08/1987 |
| From: | Darrin Butler, Phillips M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17199F987 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-237-86-27, 50-249-86-32, NUDOCS 8701150280 | |
| Download: ML17199F988 (8) | |
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I I I Reports No. 50-237/86027(DRS); S0-249/86032(DRS)
Docket Nos. 50-237; 50-249 Licenses No. DPR-19; DPR-25 Licensee:
Corrmonwealth Edison Comµany P. 0. Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Narre:
Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3 Inspection At:
Morris, Illinois Inspection Car.ducted:
December
.qM_(JL~
D. S. Butler 15-18' 1986 Inspector:
Approved By: Cl ~
,,, ""
M~illips, Chief Operational Programs Section Inspection Surrmary Date Date Inspection on December 15-18, 1986 (Reports No. 50-237/86027(DRS);
No. 5d-249/860T2TDRS))
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--
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced ins~ection on the effectiveness of licensed operator training (IE Module No. 41701) and the effectiveness of non-licensed staff training (IE Module No. 41400).
Results:
Of the two areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie PDR ADOCK 05000237 Q
FDR
- DETAILS Persons Contacted
- E~ Eenigenburg, Station Manager
- R. Flessner, Superintendent, Services
- J. Wujciga, Superintendent, ?roduction
- J. Kotowski, Assistant Superintendent, Operations
- R. Zentner, Assistant Superintendent, Maintenance
- D. Adam, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor
- S. Stiles, Principal Instructor
- R. Holman, EP Coordinator U.S. Nuclear RegulEtor1_Commission
- P. Kaufman, Resident Inspector
- M. Smith, EP Specialist
- T. Ploski, EP Analyst
- Denotes those in attendance at the exit meeting on December 18, 1986.
The inspector also talked with and interviewed other members of the Licensee's staff during the course of the inspection. Training The inspection consisted of a review of deviation reports which occurred during the years 1985 through 1986, to determine if personnel were cognizar.t of the event and that lessons learned were factored back into the training progra The inspection was not designed to be an evaluation of the licensee's overall training progra That evaluation is currently performed by the Institute for Nuclear Power Operations
{INPO) as part of the training accreditation proces At the time of thi inspection, three of the training programs had been accredited. These were as follows:
(1) Non-licensed Operator; (2) Licensed Operator; and (3) Senior Reactor Operator. The Licensed Operator Requalification program had been reviewed by INP The seven remaining programs had been formally submitted for accreditation. These were as follows:
(4) Shift Technical Advisor; (5) Instrument Maintenance; (6) Electrical Maintenance; (7) Mechanical Maintenance; (8) Radiation Protection; (9)
Che~istry, and (10) Technical personnel. Accreditation of these programs was expected by the Spring of 198 Licensed Operator Traini~~ Effectiveness (4J70JJ The inspector reviewed operational events, and interviewed plant personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of training programs for licensed personnel.
- Deviation Report Review Of approximately 508 deviation reports reviewed, the inspector chose four reports for further review as listed below:
Deviation Report Number 12-3-85-100 12-3-86-19 12-3-86-39 12-2-86-73 Description Unit 3 Reactor Scram on Low Reactor Water Level Automatic Start of the Unit 3 Emergency Diesel Generator Automatic Start of the Unit 2/3 Emergency Diesel Generator Inadvertent Loss of Power to M0-2-1301-4 Valve Deviation Report No. 12-3-85-100 dealt with a reactor trip generated by low reactor water level. The feedwater control system had been recently update The licensee's root cause determination revealed that inadequate procedures describing operation and balancing of the master and individual feedwater level controllers was the major cause of the eve~t. The Nuclear Station Operator (NSO) was urfamiliar with the controller balancing routine, and without an adequate *procedure to follow, the NSO improperly placed the master cc~troller into servic To prevent recurrence of this event, a procedure describing operation and balance of the feedwater cortrollers will be writte In addition, this DR was placed in the required reading package (Book of the Week, 85-22).
Continuing training was provided in requalification general information sessions (held during 1/20 through 2/28/86) for all licensed individual Operating personnel interviewed were cognizant of this even Deviation Rep~rt No. 12-3-86-19 dealt with the automatic start of the EOG due to personnel error. The licensee's root cause determination indicated the NSO tripping of. the wrong breaker was caused by an inattentiveness to detail due to a large amount of control room work activity. The NSO and SCRE involved were instructed to minimize control room distractions. The DR was placed in Book of the Week 86-34. Operations personnel interviewed were cognizant of this even Deviation Report No. 12-3-86-39 dealt with the automatic start of the EOG due to personnel error. The EOG auto-started due to the Bus 33-1 auto-start relay circuitry not being bypassed by opening test switch "J." The DR was placed in Book of the Week 86-4 Continuing training was provided in requalification 9eneral information sessions (held on 11/10 through 12/19/86) for all
licensed individuals. Operations personnel interviewed were cognizant of this event; however, they did indicate they gained electrical print fameliarity on the job and could use formal training on electrical print readin It was undetennined whether formal training would have prevented this even Deviation Report No. 12-2-86-73 dealt with the inadvertent loss of power to motor operated valve M0-2-1301-4 due to personnel erro The licensee's root cause detennination indicated an Equipment Operator (EO) racked out the wrong breaker; however, insufficient labeling of the alternate feed breaker to M0-3-1301-4 contributed to the even The licensee has installed new labels, and discussed the event with the Unit Foreman and EO The DR was placed in Book of the Week 86-52. Operations personnel interviewed were cognizant of the even In all of the above cases, the inspector determined the training was adequate to address the event and prevent its recurrenc Licensed Operator Training The licensee's training program provided several means of disseminating information related to operating deficiencies and events to licensed operator The Training Department issued and controlled required reading and incorporation of lessons learned from past events into the classroom training subject matte Each licensed individual was completing the Licensed Operator Required Reading which was scheduled by the Training Supervisor on a weekly basis and provided in the numbered Book of Wee The infonnation included in the required reading was changes in facility license; changes in design; review of applicable procedure changes; review of abnormal and emergency-procedures; review of industry and in-house operating experiences; and other information affecting the operation of the plant. Training department personnel ensured the required re'ading package was completed within six weeks of its issue dat Training on plant modifications was controlled by the Modification Approval Shee The Training Supervisor received the modification packag Training requirement_s were determined by the following codes:
(1)
R - Assigned to the Licensed Operator required reading book (2)
L - To be presented by classroom lecture to applicable departments/personnel
(3)
M - A Training Department memorandum surrmarizing the plant modification The Training Department Modification Coordinator would ensure the training was complete The Training Supervisor would sign the Modification Approval Sheet that training necessary fer operation was complet In addition, the QC Supervisor and QA Superintendent had final responsibility to verify training was completed. There appeared to be adequate controls to ensure plant modifications were factored back into the training progra The licensee's formal training program for operations personnel had been accredited by INPO, and as such included the basics of task analysis. Licensed instructors were assigned to an operating shift for a minimum of six days per yea In addition, some licensed instructors participated in the Company's Supervisor on Shift (SOS)
progra The licensed operator requalification program was meeting regulatory requirements for reactivity and control manipulation Review of the licensee's training records indicated-they were typically attempting to complete the manipulations required on an annual basis and those specified on a two year cycle within a one year period. Surrmary All the operations personnel interviewed indicated that they felt-the Training Department was providing adequate training. There was a gocd feedback path between operations and training. Operators were aware of the opportunities to input suggestions for revisions to the training progra Based on discussions in the previous paragraphs, the following item should be considered for program improvement:
The licensee should incorporate electrical print reading into the license operator training progra.
Non-Licensed Staff Trai~in9_Effectiven~ss (41400)
The inspector reviewed operational events and interviewed personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of training programs for non-licensed personne Deviation Report Review Of approximately 508 deviation reports reviewed, the inspector chose four reports for further review as listed below:
12-3-86-46 12-3-86-85 12-3-86-88 12-3-86-94 Description Failure of Yarway LIS-263-728 to*
Trip Reactor Scram Reactor Scram Trip of HPCI Emergency Bearing Oil Pump Deviation Report No. 12-3-86-46 dealt with a misa1igr.ed magnet trip assembly in a Yarway level indicating switc The licensee root cause determination indicated the problem with the Yarway switch was due to the internal mechanical mechanism of the switc Instrument mechanics were cognizant of the event and indicated they did receive training on aligning the Yarway magnet trip assembl Deviation Report No. 12-3-86-85 dealt with the input of a half-scram from switching essential power sources during electrical maintenanc During the electrical trouble shooting, a spurious half-scram from the APRM flow biased circuitry completed the full scra The electrical half-scram was caused by personnel erro The licensee root cause determination indicated there was a break-down in corrmunications between the electrical foreman and operation The electrical foreman did not verify the essential bus configuration prior to removing it from service.. The electrical foreman has been tasked with writing a guideline detailing steps and requirements for cormiunicating with operators prior to performing wor This event was discussed in the weekly "Tailgate** meeting held on November 17, 1986. Electrical Maintenance personnel interviewed
- were cognizant of this repor Deviation Report No. 12-3-86-88 dealt with a reactor scram caused by removing the incorrect power lead. The licensee's root cause detennination attributed the event to personnel error. The maintenance instructions were adequate to prevent this event. This event was discussed in the weekly "Tailgate" meeting held on November 17, 198 Instrument Maintenance personnel interviewed were cognizant of this even Deviation Report No. 12-3-86-94 dealt with the tripping of the HPCI emergency bearing oil pum The.investigation indicated the brushes were found misaligne Interviews with electrical personnel indicated the brushes were worn from rough spots on the motor corrmutator. There was no training impac In all of the above cases, the training given as a result of the event was adequate to address the event and prevent its recurrenc Maintenance Training Each Maintenance Department had a Training Coordinator (TC).
The licensee selected individuals who had considerable experience in their department for this position, and the TCs were considered to be qualified by the licensee as on-the-job (OJT) evaluators based on their experienc The master mechanics selected additional OJT evaluators (typically foreman) who met the same OJT evaluator experience qualifications as the TC The TC maintained a working copy of their department Training Matrix in the foreman's desk area. This would provide the foreman easy access to the Matrix for selection of qualified mechanic The Matrix was task oriente The TCs were using past work experience to update the Matri The inspector noted two items of concern:
(1) there was no Matrix or record package maintained for qualifying the OJT evaluators on all the tasks; and (2) procedure OPP 6,
"Mechanical and Electrical Maintenance Training," on page 5 referred to the working copy of the Matrix as an "ir.formation only" cop The OJT program was directed toward the application of previously taught knowledge and skills to maintain plant equipmen The OJT program was presented by the Maintenance and Training Department personnel using lesson plans and OJT guide Safety and general plant information was given to maintenance personnel during their weekly "Tailgate" meeting. A typical
"Tailgate" package may include information on the quarterly safety responsibilities, regulatory update, personnel and plant safet items, and items of departmental concern The inspector noted information on personnel errors was included in the packag These items stemmed form past licensee events (Deviation Reports).
The attendance requirement for a "Tailgate" meeting was 80% of the sho There was no policy in effect to ensure personnel who were not in attendance would receive this infonnation (similar to licensed individual required reading requirements). Surrmary All the maintenance personnel interviewed indicated the Training Department was responsive to their training need Review of the deviation reports demonstrated that their was a good feedback path from maintenance to the training departmen The inspector noted several maintenance personnel were unaware of their opportunity to input suggestions for revisions to the training program and to request specific training (Training Inquiry Fenn).
Based on discussions in the previous paragraphs, the following items should be considered for program improvement:
1-. -
0
0 OJT evaluators should be qualified to the sam! tasks as the people they are evaluatin The "for information only" should be removed from procedure OPP 6(page 5).
Training credit should be taken for the Tailgate" packages, and a program established to ensure that all applicable shop personnel have reviewed the "Tailgate" packag The Training Inquiry form should be reviewed (OPP Form 115) with all maintenance personne.
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
on December 18, 1986, to discuss the scope and findings of the inspection. The licensee acknowledged the statements made by the inspector with respect to items discussed in the repor The inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspectio The licensee did not identify any such document/processes as proprietar