IR 05000237/1986021
| ML17199F922 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 10/08/1986 |
| From: | Boyd D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17199F920 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-237-86-21, 50-249-86-26, IEB-86-002, IEB-86-2, NUDOCS 8610160467 | |
| Download: ML17199F922 (10) | |
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Reports No. 50-237/8602l(DRP); 50-249/86026(DRP)
Docket Nos. 50-237; 50-249 Licenses No. DPR-19; DPR-25 Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company P. 0. Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name:
Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3 Inspection At:
Dresden Site, Morris, IL Inspection Conducted:
August 5 through September 29, 1986 Inspectors:
L. G. McGregor E. A. Hctte P. D. Kaufman Approved By:
R.A.~
~
&~~
Projects Section 2D Inspect'i on Summary Date Inspection durin~ the period of August 5 through September 29, 1986 (Reports N /8602l~DRP); No. 50-249/86026(DRP))
Areas Inspected:
Routine unannounced resident inspection of operational safety, followup of events, maintenance, surveillances, licensee event reports, and I.E. Bulletin *
Results:
Of the six areas inspected, one violation of NRC requirements was i dent ifi ed (Severity Leve 1 IV ;.. failure to wear personne 1 dos fmetry and security badge - Section 2).
8610160'-1-67 86100-9 PDR ADOCK 05000237 G
DETAILS Persons Contacted Commonwealth Edison Company
- E. Eenigenburg, Station Manager J. Wujciga, Production Superintendent
- R. Flessner, Services Superintendent T. Ciesla, Assistant Superintendent, Operations R. Zentner, Assistant Superintendent, Maintenance J. Brunner, Assistant Superintendent, Technical Services R. Christensen, Unit 1 Operating Engineer J. Almer, Unit 2 Operatihg Engineer'
J. Kotowski, Unit 3 Operating Engineer W. Pietryga, Unit 3 Operating Engineer for Recirc. Piping Replacement J. Achterberg, Technical Staff Supervisor
- D. Adam, Compliance Administrator J. Doyle, Q.C. Supervisor D. Sharper, Waste Systems Engineer
- E. O'Connor, ~adiation Chemistry Supervisor
- J. Mayer, Station Security Admfoistrator W. Johnson, Chemistry Supervisor D. Saccomando, Radiation Protection Supervisor
- M. Jeisy, Q.A. Supervisor Stal~, Q.A. Inspector H. Cobbs, Q.A. Inspector The inspectors also talked with and interviewed several other licensee employees, including members of the technical and engineering staffs, reactor and auxiliary operators, shift engineers and foremen, electrical, mechanical and instrument personnel, and contract security personne *
- Denotes those attending one or more exit interviews conducted on September 29, 1986 and informally at various times throughout the inspection perio.
Operational Safety Verification The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the period from August 5 through September 29, 198 The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected component Tours of the reactor buildings and turbine buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenanc *
The inspectors witnessed portions of the Unit 3 startup and testing program following the ten.month refueling/recirculation pipe replacement outag During certain activities, the control room became crowded and uncoritrolle Better access control was utilized later in the power ascension stag The licensee has implemented a restricted area around the control panels which is controlled by the Nuclear Station Operator (NSO).
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During the initial turbine roll there was confusion between the General Electric and Brown Boveria Company vender representatives on what speeds to roll the turbine for vibration reading This should have been *
resolved prior to initiating the turbine.roll and not discussed in the control r6o *
Upon review of applicable logs, the Unit 3 log, center desk log and shift e~gineer log did. not clearly.describe the sequence of events leading up to the declaration of an Unusual Event on August 27, 1986 (see
Paragraph 3b).
The inspector had to go to the degraded equipment log to find* out why the core spray system *was declared inoperabl Other weaknesses noted in the control room log have been brought to the attention of licensee since the logs are legal documents and must be complete and accurat *
During the inspection period while Unit 3 was in outage, the inspectors verified that surveillance tests were conducted, containment integrity requirements were.met, and emergency systems were available as necessary.
The inspectors, by observation and direct interview, verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security'pla..
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The inspectors observed plant housekeeping/cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection control During the inspection, the inspectors walked dowh the accessible portions of the systems listed below to verify operability by comparing system lineup with plant drawings, as-built'configuratiOn or present valve lineup *
lists; observing equipment conditions that could degrade performanee; and verified that instrumentation was properly valved, functioning, and calibrate *
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The inspectors reviewed new procedures and changes to procedures that were implemented during the inspection period. *The re~iew consisted of a verification for accuracy; correctness, and compliance with regulatory requirement The inspectors also witnessed portions of the radioactive waste system controlS associated with radwaste shipments and barrelin **
These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established und~r technical specifications, 10 CFR, and admiriistrative procedures.
The following systems were inspected:
Unit 2 Isolation Condenser Standby Liquid Control System Unit 3 Low Pressure Coolant Injection System II Core Spray System B Common Standby Gas Treatment System 2/3 Emergency Diesel Ge~erator While conducting a plant tour on August 14, 1986, the resident inspectors noticed a licensee employee's personnel dosimetry (thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD) badge an'd self-reading pocket dosimeter) and security badge lyin~ on an instrument rack along with the individual's clothih The individual was observed performing maintenance activity on the Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) Pum~ 2 *
The resident inspectors immediately notified the Radiation Chemistry department of the situation. A radiation chemistry technician was *
dispatched to the area to insure proper placement 6f the worker's dosimetry and security badg Since.the employee and his TLD were in the same dos~ rate area, ~ dose was not assessed t6 the worke The licensee has made prompt corrective actions and no response to this nonconforming condition is necessar The above incident is considered in violation **
of 10 CFR 20.202, 10 CFR 73.55 and the licensee's FSAR (237/86021-01; 249/86026-01).
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One violation was identified in this are.
Followup of Events During the inspection period, the licensee experienced several events, some of which required* prompt notification of the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.7 The inspectors pursued the events onsite with licensee and/or other NRC official In each case, the inspectors verified that the notification was correct and timely, if appropriate, that the licensee was taking prompt and appropriate acti6ns, th~t a~tivities were conducted within regu1atory requirements and that corrective actions would prevent future recurrenc rhe specific events are as follows: Unit 2 - At 2:35 p.m. on August 11, 1986, while operating at 91%
power, a reactor scram occurre A reactor operator was replacing a iight bulb in the annunciator panel for the recirculating lube oil pump when a short circuit deve1ope This short circuit of the
- non-running oil pump caused the recirculating pump to trip resulting in the reactor water level increasing to the*t~rbine trip setpoint. **
All systems responded as designed, however, 55 of the 177 control rods inserted to the 02 position instead of the full in position 0 Region III placed an operational hold on the reactor sta~tup until a review could be completed on why such a large number of control rods did not fully inser At 9:00 p.m. on August 11, after reviewing the event, Region III informed the Senior 'Resident to remove the*
operational hold and allow the unit to restar Unit 3 - At 7:28 a.m. on August 23, 1986, the unit started up from a ten month refuel/recirculation pipe replacement outag The reactor was made critical at 4:24 p.m. at" low pressure with rated pressure tests proceedin On August 26, 1986 at 12:00 noon, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was declared inoperable due to the HPCI Glarid Seal Leak Off.(GSLO) pump being declared inoperabl On August 27, 1986, at 12:45 a~m., with the unit at 19%. power, a GSEP unusual event was declared when the Core Spray (CS) System 2 was unable to maintain system pressure and declared inoperable along with the HPCI system.* While performing the subsequent required testing for the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) being out of service, the Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) System and the 2/3 Emergency Diesel Generator were also declared inoperable due to various equipment failure The unit was then brought down to cold shutdown as require The 3A LPCI heater exchanger heads were removed and the tubes cleaned due to a high dP across the secondary side of the heat exchange The unit was made critical on August 31, 1986, after all equipment problems identified in the above systems were corrected. *
No violations or deviations were identified in this are.
Monthly Maintenance Observation Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and components listed below were observed/reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides* and industry codes or standards and in conformance with 'techni~al specifications..
The following items were considered during this review:
the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were
removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing* and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or *systems to service; quality control records were maintained;. activities were accomplished by
qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls.were implemented; and, fire preventi6n controls
- were implemente Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety re 1 ated equipment maintenance which inay affect systeni performance*:
The following maintenance activities were observed/reviewed:
Unit 2 2B Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water heat exchanger cleaning Unit 3 3A and 3C Reactor Feedwater Heater discharge pipe line 3A Control Rod Drive Pump inboard bearing * * *
Common Repair and pressure test of river discharge pipe line Unit 2/3 makeup Demineralizers repair diaphr~gni valves on A & B filters
No violations or deviations were identified in this are.
Monthly Surveillance Observation The inspectors observed survei 11 ance testing required by techni ca 1 specifitations for the items listed below arid v~rified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures! that test
instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed with technical specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the indi~idual directing thP test, and that anv defitiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appruµriate management personrie *
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The inspectors witnessed portions of the following test activities:
Isolation Condenser Five Year Heat Removal Capability Test (DOS 1300-1)
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Automatic Blowdown System at Low Pressure and Rated Pressure (bOS 250-5)
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HPCI MOV Valves and Pump Operability Test (DOS 2300-1)
HPCI Overspeed Test (DOS 2300-2)
HPCI System Pump Test (DOS 2300-3)
Monthly HPCI System Pump Test for the Inservice Test Program (DOS 2300-6)
Unirradiated Fuel Receipt (DFP 800-2)
Nuclear Fuel Receiving Inspection and Core Preparation of Fuel Bundle (DFP-800-3)
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Fuel Channeling in the Fuel Prep Machine (DFP 800-5)
No violations or deviations were identified in this are.
Licensee Event Reports Followup Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with technical specification Unit 2 (Closed) 86011-01 Low Water Level SCRAM Due to Feedwater Regulating Valve Failur A Supplemental Report was issued to change cause code from Design, Manufacturing*, Construction/Installation deficiency to component failur The 118 11 reactor feedwater regulating valve's booster relay faile *
(Closed) 86015-00 Failure to Continuously Monitor Unit 2 Gaseous Effluent Particulate Due to Incorrectly Installed Sample Filter Due to Personnel Erro The Reactor Building ventilation particulate sampler filter had broken due to improper installation by a* Rad Chem Technicia The licensee will procure a different filter ele~ent holding apparatus since this is becoming a repetitive proble *
(Closed) 86016-00 Reactor SCRAM on Condenser Low Vacuum Due to Disconnected Pipe Unio Licensee investigation found a one inch pipe union on a drain line to the condenser separate The union was reconnected and vacuum was restore Subsequent investigation found that the line had been worked on and~ upon completion, restored to its original conditio The union may not of been sufficiently tightened thus allowing it to vibrate loos~ during unit startu *.
(Closed) 86017-00 Reactor SCRAM While Surveillance Testing MSIV 1s Due to a Fail Limit Switch Resulting in MSIV Full Closur Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) lC went fully closed causing a pressure and neutron flux spi~e and a subsequent.reactor SCRAM.* The limit switch and test switch were replaced and cycled with no further problem (Closed) 86018-00 Failure to Take Reactor Coolant Sample During Reactor Startup:
Technical Specifications required a sample of reactor coolant be taken every four hours and analyzed for conductivity and chloride conten A sample was taken 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> and 20 minutes after the last sample due to mis-communications within the Radiation Chemistry Departmen The
Lead Radiation Chemistry Foreman discussed the event with each of the involved individual *
(Closed) 86019-00 Reactor SCRAM From Main Turbine Trip on High Water Level Due to Failure of Feedwater Regulating Valv The operator tried to manually close the 11A 11 feedwater regulating valve and noticed the position i~dication showed no movement: After disassembling and inspecting the failed regulator valve, a keeper from a feedwater pump check valve was found jammed under the regulator valve's seat preventing it from clo.sin The keeper was removed and the regulating valve was
cycled successfull *
(Closed) 86020-00 Overstress of Small Bore Torus Attached Piping Supports Due to Architect Engineer Erro The cause of the event was a de~ign error on the part of the Mark I project Archit~ct Engineers during the Mark I modification projec Nutech Erigineers utilized*a
non-conservative assumption* in the analysi The pipe supports which do not presently meet code stress allowable limits will be modifie (Closed) 86021-00 Due to Procedural Inadequacy Iodine and Particulate Radiation Levels were not Continuously Monitore Licensee investigation found the separate particulate, Iodine, and noble gas (SPING) monitor tripped due to light leaking through the filte Since the existing procedure did not address the possibility that the accident mode of operation could occur when tri~ped, the ~equired sample was not take As corrective action, a new procedure was written explaining this type of event and the leak allowing light to enter the system has been fixe Unit 3 (Closed) 86009-00 Automatic Start of the 2/3 Diesel Generator (DG) Due to Personnel Erro The Operating Foreman! who prepared the
out-of-service requestl overlooked the auto-start relay circuitry to the D The Operating Foreman was made aware ot the 1mporla11tl:! ur µaying close atte~tion tri detail to prevent recurrence of this kin *
(Closed) 86010-00 Auto Blowdown Timers Exceeded Technical Specification Limit Due to Instrument Setpoint Drif The Licensee's investigation found the cause of the time delay relays trip beyond their Technical Specifications Limit to be attributed to instrument setpoint drif Both re lays were recalibrated and operated successfully at their respective recalibration setpoirit *
(Closed) 86011-00 Automatic Start of Standby Gas Treatment Resulting From a Grounded Wire and Blown Fuse During Ma'intenance Activit *
Licensee investigation revealed that while the Electrician was" removing the energized lead from the position indicating limit switch for a valve, inadvertent contact was made* between the lead and metal valve body
resulting in the blown fus A memorandum discussing this event ~as presented to the Electrical Maintenance Department oii this even (Closed) 86013-00 Unit Shutdown Due to Exceeding Limiting Conditions for Operations on Emergency Core Cooling Systems.* An UnusLlal Event was decla~ed and normal unit shutdown proceeded due to the Hiah Pressure Coolant
Injection (HPCI) System and the 11B 11 Core Spray (CS) system being declared in6perable:
Fu~ther testing showed that the 2/3 Diesel Generatcir failed to close onto bus 33-1 and the test flow line valve for the Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) system showed dual position indicatio All equipment ~as fixed pribr to replacing the s~stems back in servic (Closed) 86014-00 High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI)
Inoperative Due to Plugged Gland Seal Leak Off (GSLO).Pump Suction Scree The GSLO pump drain failed to adequately dr~in the HPCI condenser hotwell and* the HPCI system was declared inoperabl The Mechanical Maintenance Department cleared the debris from the screen, which allowed adequate flow through the screens and subsequently
sufficient conden~ate supply to the GSLO pum *
The preceding LERs have been reviewed against the criteria of 10 CFR 2, Appendix C, and the incidents described~eet all of the following
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re~uirements. Thus no Notice of Violation is being issued for these item ** The event was identified by the licensee, The event was an incident that, according to the current enforcement policy, met the criteria for Severity levels IV or V violations, The eveht was appropriately reported, **
- The event was or.will be corrected (including measures to prevent recurrence within a reasonab 1 e amc:iunt of time); and
- The event was not a violation that could have been prevented by the licensee's corrective actions for a previous violatio No violations or deviations were identified in this are.
IE Bulletin Followuo The following IE Bulletin was reviewed by the Resident Inspector to determine.if:
(1) the licensee's written response was submitted within the time limitations stated in the bulletin, (2) the written response included all information required to be reported, (3) the written response included adequate corrective action commitments based on information.presented in the bulletin and the licensee's response, (4)
licensee management forwarded copies of the written response.to the* *
required onsite management representatives, (5) information discussed in the licensee's response was accurate, and (6) the corrective action taken was as described iri the respons (Open)
I.E.Bulletin 86-02, Revision 0 (237/86002-BB; 249/86002-BB):
"Static 110 11 Ring Differential Pressure Switches.
This I.E. Bulletin, which was closed in Inspection Reports No. 237/86017(DRP);
No. 249/86020(DRP), is being reopene The licensee's response dated July 25, 1986 'to Mr. James Keppler, only specified that static-o-ring Model Nc:i. 102 or No. 103 differential o~essure switches are not used in safety related electrical equipment capacities at Dresde The licensee was requested by the NRC Re~ident Inspector to review all systems
- important to safety as defined in 10 CFR 50.49, and if any of these model switches have been installed in these system The licen~ee is to submit a revised response to I.E. Bulletin 86-0 No violations or deviations were identified in this are.
Report Review During the inspection period, the inspectors reviewed the licensee 1 S Monthly Operating Repo~t for August, 198 The inspectors confirmed that the information provided met the requirements of Technical Specification 6.6.A.3 and ReQulatory Guide 1.16. *
- Exit Interview The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
informally throughout the inspectioh period and at the conclusion of the inspection on September 29, 1986, and summarized the scope and findings of the inspectioh activitie *
The inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspectio The licensee* did not identify any such documents/processes as proprietar The licensee acknowledged'the*
findinQS of the inspection~