IR 05000237/1986017
| ML17199F894 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 08/18/1986 |
| From: | Boyd D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17199F893 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-237-86-17, 50-249-86-20, IEB-86-002, IEB-86-2, NUDOCS 8608260259 | |
| Download: ML17199F894 (10) | |
Text
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No /86017(DRP); 50-249/86020(DRP)
Docket No ; 50-249 License No DPR-19; DPR-25 Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company P. 0. Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name:
Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3 Inspection At:
Dresden Site, Morris, IL Inspection Conducted:
June 16 thru August 4, 1986 Inspectors:
L. G. McGregor E. A. Hare Approved By:
~~~
D. C. Boyd, Chi~~-
Projects Section 2D Inspection Summary Inspection during the period of June 16 thru August 4, 1986 (RRpnrt Nns. 50-237/0l?(ORP); 50-249/020(DRP))
B-/C?-8~
Date Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced resident inspection of operational safety, followup of events, Regional requests, maintenance, surveillance, licensing event reports, IE bulletin followup, refueling activities, and emergency preparedness exercis Results:
Of the nine areas inspected, no violations of NRC requirements were identified.
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DETAILS Persons Contacted Commonwealth Edison Company
- D. Scott, Station Manager J. Wujciga, Production Superintendent
- R. Flessner, Services Superintendent T. Ciesla, Assistant Superintendent - Operations R. Zentner, Assistant Superintendent - Maintenance
- J. Brunner, Assistant Superintendent - Technical Services R. Christensen, Unit 1 Operating Engineer J. Almer, Unit 2 Operating Engineer J. Kotowski, Unit 3 Operating Engineer W. -Pietryga, Unit 3 Operating Engineer for Recirc. Piping Replacement J. Achterberg, Technical Staff Supervisor
- D. Adam, Compliance Administrator J. Doyle, Q.C. Supervisor D. Sharper, Waste Systems Engineer E. 0 1Connor, Radiation Chemistry Supervisor J. Mayer, Station Security Administrator W. Johnson, Chemistry Supervisor D. Saccomando, Radiation Protection Supervisor M. Jeisy, Q.A. Supervisor R. Stols, Q.A. Inspector H. Cobbs, Q.A. Inspector The inspectors also talked with and interviewed several other licensee employees, including members of the technical and engineering staffs, reactor and auxiliary operators, shift engineers and foremen, electrical, mech~nir~l nnrl in~tr1imPnt pPr~nnnPl, and contract security personne *Denotes those attending one or more exit interviews conducted on August 4, 1986 and informally at various times throughout the inspection perio.
Operational Safety Verification The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the period from June 16 to August 4, 198 The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected component Tours of the reactor buildings and turbine buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenanc *
During the inspection period while Unit 3 was in a maintenance outage, the inspectors verified that surveillance tests were conducted, containment integrity requirements were met, and emergency systems were available as necessar The inspectors, by observation and direct interview, verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security pla The inspectors observed plant housekeeping/cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection control During the inspection, the inspectors walked down the accessible portions of the systems listed below to verify operability by comparing system lineup with plant drawings, as-built configuration or present valve lineup lists; observing equipment conditions that could degrade performance; and verified that instrumentation was properly valved, functioning, and calibrate The inspectors reviewed new procedures and changes to procedures that were implemented during the inspection perio The review consisted of a verification for accuracy, correctness, and compliance with regulatory requirement The inspectors also witnessed portions of the radioactive waste system controls associated with radwaste shipments and barrelin These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under technical specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedure The following systems were inspected:
Unit 2 Low Pressure Coolant Injection Loop A Core Spray System Loop A Emergency Diesel Generator #2 Fuel Oil Emergency Diesel Generator #2 Air Starting Systems Unit 3 Low Pressure Coolant Injection Loop A & B Core Spray System Loop B Common Emergency Diesel Generator #2/3 Fuel Oil Emergency Diesel Generator #2/3 Air Starting Systems No violations or deviations were identified in this are * Followup of Events During the inspection period, the licensee experienced several events, some of which required prompt notification of the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.7 The inspectors pursued the events onsite with licensee and/or other NRC official In each case, the inspectors verified that the notification was correct and timely, if appropriate, that the licensee was taking prompt and appropriate actions, that activities were conducted within regulatory requirements and that corrective actions would prevent future recurrenc The specific events are as follows: July 12, 1986 - At approximately 0147 hours0.0017 days <br />0.0408 hours <br />2.430556e-4 weeks <br />5.59335e-5 months <br />, Unit 2 scrammed while performing a surveillance test on the lC Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV).
The unexplained sudden closure of this isolation valve caused a pressure and high flux spik Repeated operational tests of the valve did not indicate any electrical or mechanical problem The electrical maintenance department did, however, replace the 10 percent closure MSIV limit switche The Senior Resident Inspector made an initial drywell entry, after the reactor scram, to monitor the valve operatio July 13, 1986 - At approximately 1420 hours0.0164 days <br />0.394 hours <br />0.00235 weeks <br />5.4031e-4 months <br />, Unit 2 scrammed on condenser low vacuu A loose coupling on the gland seal relief valve was tightened and vacuum was establishe The reactor was made critical on July 14, 1986 at 0140 hours0.00162 days <br />0.0389 hours <br />2.314815e-4 weeks <br />5.327e-5 months <br /> and was paralleled to the power grid at 1445 hours0.0167 days <br />0.401 hours <br />0.00239 weeks <br />5.498225e-4 months <br /> of the same day with continued power operations during this reporting perio No violations or deviations were identified in this are.
Regional Request The resident inspectors were requested to collect data on licensee performance indicators as directed by temporary instruction 2515/8 The trial program involves numerous performance indicaLors, seven of which require data collection by the resident inspector The licensee was informed of the general purpose of the data collection and provided adequate and timely response to the residents* requests for the specific dat.
Monthly Maintenance Observation Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and components listed below were observed/reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with technical specification The following items were considered during this review:
the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were
inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and, fire prevention controls were implemente Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipment maintenance which may affect system performanc The following maintenance activities were observed/reviewed:
Unit 2 Intermediate Range Monitor (!RM) Testing of +24 Volt Fuses Source Range Monitor (SRM) Testing of +24 Volt Fuses Work Request D51719 - 125 Volt D.C. Battery Charge Replaced resistor in high voltage trip circui Work Request D51092 - Replace Limit Switch on MSIV-I Unit 3
!RM Testing of +24 Volt Fuses SRM Testing of +24 Volt Fuses Cable Tunnel Cleaning Activities; See Report 86011; 86014 Followup of Events - June 5, 1986 -
11 Ruptured seal in high pressure Electro-Hydraulic Contra 1 Oil ( EHC)
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Work Request D54361 - Bus 34-1 Main Feed Breaker to Bus 39; replaced auxiliary switch because of bad contact Common Radwaste River Discharge Pipe Replacement of Damaged Line No violations or deviations were identified in this are.
Monthly Surveillance Observation The inspectors observed surveillance testing required by technical specifications for the items listed below and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed with technical specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified du.ring the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
- The inspectors witnessed portions of the following test activities:
Unit 3 Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test (CILRT)
ASME Section XI Hydrostatic Inservice Test; test of Reactor Recirculation Piping at 110 percent above operating pressur No violations or deviations were identified in this are.
Licensee Event Reports Followup Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with technical specifications Unit 2 (Closed) 86011-00 Low Water Level SCRAM due to Feedwater Regulating Valve Failur Licensee investigation indicated that the 118 11 reactor feedwater regulating valve 1 s booster bypass relay faile The booster bypass relay was subsequently replace (Closed) 86012-00 Reactor SCRAM While Improperly Placing a Jumper During Mode Switch Replacemen While installing the jumper, the electricians were unable to maintain circuit continuit The licensee 1 s corrective action is to review the design of the low condenser vacuum and Main Steam Line valve closure circuitry during the next training sessio (Closed)
86013-00 Reactor Vessel Not Vented at Less Than 149°F due to Personnel Erro Licensee investigation showed that the operating run~llldrl rdilt:LI Lu 1:11~ur*t: Ll1dL d v1:11L fJd.Ll1 rur* Lhe reac.Lor vessel Wl established before removing the drywell pneumatic air system from service irt un.ler tu µer*rurm 1110.ir1t.e11d.11ce ur1 the n!dcLur* uuilui11y Lu Lor*u::. vacuum relief valv A Technical Specification change was initiated to change the minimum operating temperature of 149°F to 100°F and to remove the vessel venting requirement Personnel were counseled in the proper procedur (Closed)
86014-00 Smoke Detector Semi-Annual Maintenance Test Exceeded Scheduled Completion Dat The Electrical Maintenance Department (EM)
did not meet the scheduled completion date due to incorrectly set priorities placed upon outage-related activities at the tim To prevent recurrence of this event, the Fire Marshall sent a memorandum to the EM department explaining the importance of completing Technical Sp~cification related surveillances on schedule.
- Unit 3 (Closed)
86005-00 Auto.matic Start of the Unit 3 Emergency Diesel Generator (DG) due to Personnel Erro The Nuclear Station Operator inadvertently opened Bus 34-1 feed breaker instead of Bus 39 main feed breake This caused the Unit 3 Emergency DG to star This event was discussed with the individual involve (Closed)
86006-00 Group II and Group III Primary Containment Isolation due to Personnel Erro Licensee investigation found that Substation Construction performed work on the Analog Trip System (ATS) panel believing that it had been properly isolated and taken out of servic Several fuses in both RPS circuits blew, causing the group isolation All fuses were replaced and isolation signals cleare Personnel involved were counseled on the proper procedur (Closed)
86007-00 Automatic Initiation of Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT)
and Isolation of Reactor Building Ventilation System due to Personnel Erro An incorrectly prepared out-of-service request overlooked the relays in the circuit which initiate SBGT and isolate the Reactor Building ventilation syste When the fuse was removed from.the circuit, the systems automatically started and isolated as designe The error
- was discussed concerning the necessity for using caution when preparing outages of this typ (Closed)
86008-00 Drywell Radiation Monitor Failure Caused by Personnel Error Resulting in a Group II Primary Containment Isolatio The monitor failure was caused by a short circuit in a 600 volt DC power supply cable located in the Unit 3 cable tunne The Electrical Maintenance Department unknowingly moved or stepped on the 600 V DC cable while performing maintenance wor As corrective action, the monitor and cable were repaire The preceding LERs h~ve been reviewed against the criteria of 10 CFR 2, ~
Appendix C, and the incidents described meet all of the following requirement Thus, no Notice of Violation is being issued for Lhese item The event was identified by the licensee,
. The event was an incident that, according to the current enforcement policy, met the criteria for Severity levels IV or V violations, The event was appropriately reported, The event was or will be corrected (including measures to prevent recurrence within a reasonable amount of time), and The event was not a violation that could have been prevented by the licensee's corrective actions for a previous violatio No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
7 IE Bulletin Followup The following IE Bulletin was reviewed by the Resident Inspector to determine if:
(1) the licensee 1s written response was submitted within the time limitations stated in the bulletin, (2) the written response included all information required to be reported, (3) the written response included adequate corrective action commitments based on information presented in the bulletin and the licensee 1 s response, (4)
licensee management forwarded copies of the written response to the required onsite management representatives, (5) information discussed in the licensee 1 s response was accurate, and (6) the corrective action taken was as described in the respons (Closed)
!EB 86-02 Static 110 11 Ring Differential Pressure Switche Dresden does not have the Static 0-Ring Model 102 or 103 differential pressure switches installed in a safety related electrical equipment capacit Therefore, this IE Bulletin is not applicable to the Dresden Statio This Bulletin is considered closed for Units 2 and No violations or deviations were identified in this are.
Refueling Activities The inspectors verified that, prior to reloading fuel in the core, all surveillance testing required by Technical Specifications and licensee procedures had been completed; verified that, during the outage, periodic testing of refueling related equipment was performed as required; verified that containment integrity was maintained as required by Technical Specifications; verified that good housekeeping practices were maintained in the refueling area; and verified that staffing during refueling was in accordance with applicable requirement Several shifts of the fuel handling operations were observed and refueling activities were verified to be in accordance with Technical Specifications and approved procedure The inspectors witnessed portions of Unit 3 reactor vessel fuel loading and verified conformance with applicable plant refueling procedures DFr 800-6, DfP 000 7, and DFP 800- No violations or deviations were identified in this are.
Surveillance - Refueling The inspectors observed/reviewed the Reactor Vessel ASME Hydrostatic Test, Control Rod Drive Friction Tests and Fuel Support Piece Verification on Unit 3 to verify that the tests were covered by properly approved procedures; that the procedures used were consistent with regulatory requirements, licensee commitments, and administrative controls; that minimum crew requirements were met, test prerequisites were completed, special test equipment was calibrated and in service, and required data was recorded for final review and analysis; that the qualifications of personnel conducting the test were adequate; and that the test results were adequat No violations or deviations were identified in this are *
1 Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test (CILRT) Test Witnessing The licensee pressurized the containment and started the stabilization period at 5:42 a.m. on July 25, 198 The CILRT was started at 10:02 a.m. on July 25, 198 Bechtel Topic Report BN-TOP-1, Revision 1, dated November 1972, was followed by the license This required only a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> test duration tim The actual test duration time was 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> 20 minute The verification test was started at 2:22 a.m. on July 26, 198 A supplemental leak of 14.0 SCFM was induce Due to a flow meter being improperly set up, (i.e., set up for inlet conditions not the calculated outlet conditions) only a leakage of 7.0 SCFM had actually been induce A second verification test was started at 10:02 a.m. on July 26, 198 Following the successful 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> verification test, the licensee depressurized the containmen Valve Lineup Verification Valve lineups for the following systems were verified correct to insure that no fluid could enter the.containment atmosphere and that proper venting was provide Low Pressure Coolant Injection Nitrogen Inerting System Reactor Vessel Head Main Steam and Main Steam Drains Containment System Core Spray Shutdown Cooling Standby Liquid Control HiQh Pressure Coolant Injection Rcactor Water Clean up During the valve lineup review Lhe inspeLLur r1uLet.1 thdt Vcilve 3-1501-288 did not have a caution tag hung for the CILRT outage in the control roo The valve did indicate the proper position since it was out-of-service from a previous outag HPCI valve 3-2301-28 indicated an open position on panel 903-The caution tag stated that the valve is to be in the closed positio The inspector brought it to the attention of the operator, who informed the Unit 3 operating engineer of the valve's positio The operator attempted to close the valve which was found to have failed in the open position. A temporary procedure change was incorporated into DIS 1600-8 11 Unit 2/3 Integrated Primary Containment Leak Rate Test 11 *
The inspector did not view this valve failure to be a problem since it did fail in the conservative position.
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1 Independent Inspection Emergency Preparedness Exercise The resident inspectors were part of the regional inspection team for the Emergency Preparedness Exercis The inspectors observed station activities during the annual emergency exercise between 8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. on July 9, 198 The inspectors observed the response primarily from the control room and the technical support center (TSC).
The resident inspectors verified that simulated actions were appropriate from an operational perspective and, in addition, assured that normal operations of the two operating units were not disrupted or ignore The resident inspectors attended the exit meeting with the licensee on July 10, 1986 at the emergency offsite facility (EOF) in Mazon, Illinoi A special inspection report (50-237/86009(DRSS); 50-249/860ll(DRSS)) was issued by the inspection tea No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in this are.
Report Review During the inspection period, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's Monthly Operating Report for Jul The inspectors confirmed that the information provided met the requirements of Technical Specification 6.6.A.3 and Regulatory Guide 1.16.
1 Exit Interview The inspectors met with licen~ee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
informally throughout the inspection period and at the conclusion of the inspection on August 4, 1986, and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activitie The inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the ins1.H~ctlun report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspectio The licensee did not identify any such documents/processes as proprietar The licensee acknowledged the findings of the inspectio