IR 05000220/1989030
| ML17056A580 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 01/19/1990 |
| From: | Meyer G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17056A578 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-220-89-30, 50-410-89-19, IEB-88-007, IEB-88-7, NUDOCS 9001300320 | |
| Download: ML17056A580 (32) | |
Text
'eport Nos.:
Docket Nos.
License Nos.:
L'icensee:
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
50-220/89-30 50-410/89-19 50-220 50-410 DPR-63 NPF-69 Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation 301 Plainfield Road Syracuse, New York 13212 Faci 1 ity:
Location:
Dates:
Inspectors:
Approved by:
Nine Mile Point, Units 1 and
Scriba, New York October 19, 1989 through December 13, 1989
- W. A. Cook, Senior Resident Inspector R.
R.
Temps, Resident Inspector R.
A. Laura, Resident Inspector R.
A. Barkley, Reactor Engineer T.
. Walker, Op rati ns Engineer
.
W. Meyer, hief Reactor Projects Section o.
1B
/ ~gQ Date Ins ection Summar
Areas Ins ected:
Routine inspection by the resident inspectors of station activities including Unit
reload preparations and Unit 2 power operations, licensee action on previously identified items, plant tours, safety system walkdowns, surveillance and maintenance revi'ews, LER reviews and TI 2515/99 review.
Results:
The inspectors concluded that the improper performance of Inservice Testing vibration monitoring on the reactor building closed loop cooling pumps was a violation of Article IWP-4500, ASME Code,Section XI, 1983 Edition.
An Executive Summary follow EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Review of Plant Events (Modules 71710, 71707, 93702):
Unit
activities focused on preparing for core reload'.
Inspections at Unit 1 did not identify any noteworthy findings.
Unit 2 experienced a few unplanned plant transients and operating problems including:
flooding of the 250 fo'ot elevation of the Turbine Building due to a maintenance oversight; high copper, concentrations in the circulating water system imposing power operations restrictions; a reactor scram from 97%
power on December
due to EHC problems; an automatic scram signal while troubleshooting the EHC problem on December 2,
and another unit shutdown on December 9.due to high unidentified leakage inside containment.
Followu of Previous Identified Items (Modules 92700,.93702):
Review of pre-viously identified items at Unit 1 and 2 resulted in the closure of four items and the issuance of a violation for a previous unresolved item (identified dur-ing the IATI) regarding improper IST vibration monitoring of the RBCLC pumps.
Plant Tours (Modules 71707, 71710):
While in the Unit 2 control room, the inspector observed an SSS properly refuse to implement a temporary modification for which a safety evaluation had not been completed.
Surveillance and Maintenance Review (Module 61726, 62703):
Routine inspection at Unit 1 did n~: identify any noteworthy findings.
Inspections at Unit
identified minor implementation concerns.
The turbine building flood at Unit 2 was an example of poor and informal maintenance controls on non-safety related systems.
Licensee Event Re orts (Module 92700):
Review of the -LERs received during this inspection period and subsequent inspector followup determined that only one report (LER 89-20, Unit 2) required revision. by Niagara Mohawk.
S ecial Re orts (Module 90712):
Routine review and fol.lowup of these reports did not identify any noteworthy findings.
Tem orar Instruction Followu (Module 2515/99):
A review and close out of TI 2515/99 (NRC Bulletin 88-07, BWR Power Oscillations)
was conducted.
The inspector concluded that training provided per Bulletin 88-07 was effective.
Mid-SALP Assessment Meetin (Module 35502):
. During this inspection period the inspectors conducted a verbal Mid-SALP assessment.
Unit 1 and 2 activities since March 1, 1989 were discussed with senior station management on November 8, 1989.
Preliminary performance assessments and trends were dis-cussed with Niagara Mohawk management and their comments and assessments were also provided to the inspectors.
~dtt I
tdd1 331 3:
I
I
3 Ill tendents and a final inspection period exit meeting with the General Superin-tendent were hel DETAILS 1.
Review of Plant Events 1.1 Unit
The unit remained shutdown with the core off-loaded during this inspection period.
Preparations were in progress for fuel load tar-geted for the end of December 1989.
No significant operational events occurred during the inspection period.
1.2 Unit 2 As di scussed in the last routine report, a reactor scram from the neutron monitoring Intermediate Range occurred during the controlled shutdown on October 18 to repair an inside containment leak.
Restart from this shutdown was delayed due to a circulating water flood of the turbine building 250 foot elevation following maintenance on the condenser waterboxes and due to a related event involving a
high copper concentration in the circulating water system (CWS).
The reactc; was taken critical on October 26, but subsequently shut down on October 28 due to the inability to discharge circulating water to the lake due to New York State discharge limits on copper.
The unit was returned to,power on November 7, once an agreement was obtained from the State Department of Environmental Conservation which allowed discharge of the CWS water via the Unit 1 circulating water system for additional dilution.
The unit operated at reduced power due to CWS chemistry and feed pump problems.
The unit scrammed on December
from 97%
power due to an electro hydraulic control (EHC)
system malfunction.
While shutdown on December 2,
the unit experienced an automatic scram that occurred during EHC troubleshooting.
The reactor was restarted on December
and shut down again on December
due to unidentified drywell leak-age.
The unit remained shutdown through the end of this inspection period.
a.
A main condenser'tube inspection was performed in the F water-box.
Preparation'for this work included opening several manways to gain access to the tubes and opening one upper manway to pro-mote ventilation.
The job was completed and mechanical mainten-ance supervision reported this to Operations personnel in the control room.
While filling the waterbox for system restora-tion, several thousand gallons of water spilled out of the upper manway flooding the 250 foot elevation in the turbine building.
The upper manway was inadvertently left open by the Mechanical Maintenance Department personne The inspector determined that the maintenance was not proced-urally controlled because it was non-safety related.
The inspector's assessment was that maintenance supervision lost
. control of system integrity due to 'nformal work practices.
Further, operations personnel did not detect the open manway when performing the system restoration walkdown.
The inspector identified that NHPC took the following corrective actions:
~
Operations management conducted a meeting with each shift to discuss this event and several other recent events caused by personnel error.
The inspector attended one of these meetings and considered it to be a positive response t'o the recent personnel errors.
Each shift was required to provide written feedback on the meeting, including ways to eliminate future events'.
A control procedure.will be developed for use when entering a. large component/confined space such as the condenser, in addition to the Chemistry Department air quality check pro-cedure.
This will ensure all openings are documented and get, restored.
3.
Training was conducted with maintenance personnel on con-trol of equipment markups and proper communications during system turnovers.
b.
On December 1,
the unit experienced a reactor scram while oper-ating at 97%
power.
Post trip review of the GETARS computer trace indicated the initiating event was the turbine control valves went shut and all five bypass valves opened, These actions were caused by an electro-hydraulic control (EHC) system malfunction.
The closure of the turbine control valves caused a
reactor'ressure transient which resulted in an average power range monitor neutron flux upscale trip.
No emergency core cooling systems were initiated and reactor water level was maintained via normal methods.
A review of EHC system relays that could have caused the trip was performed, and three suspect relay boards were replaced.
The exact cause of the system failure was not identified.
Pro-per response of the turbine control and bypass valves was observed during subsequent testing.
The inspector's assessment of this transient was that the operators took proper actions to restore plant conditions subsequent to the reactor scram and that reasonable effort was expended to identify the EHC malfunctio While shutdown (Mode 3) on December 2, with reactor pressure 186 psia and main steam isolation valves open,'roubleshooting of the EHC system was in progress when an automatic reactor scram occurred.
The scram signal was generated on low (Level 3) water level as a result of the turbine bypass valves opening and closing twice causing swell and shrink.
The operators took manual control and restored level to its normal band.
There were no ECCS 'system actuations.
NMPC investigation revealed I&C technicians had removed some control cards in the EHC cabinet with the intent of preventing the bypass valves from opening.
The electrical drawing used by the technicians did not include a modification to the circuit that provided another input to the turbine bypass valves.
Thus,
'during troubleshooting the bypass valves inadvertently cycled open and shut twice.
The GE Control Line-Up Drawing did not reflect the modification, because NMPC erroneously assumed General Electric updated this type of drawing.
This drawing had been issued from the document control center as a Niagara Mohawk controlled drawing.
The inspector determined that there were other controlled lower tier diagrams available which correctly reflected the EHC system modification, but were not selected for use because the Control Line-up Drawings are generally better suited for troubleshoot-ing.
NMPC management placed a hold on all GE 'Control Line-up Drawings until they are properly updated and told station staff of their restricted Information Only use.
The full scope of corrective actions will be reviewed upon i.ssuance of the asso-ciated LER.
Following resolution of the EHC system problems, a plant startup was commenced.
While establishing turbine shell warming, it was noted that the bypass valve (for shell warming) would not open.
Troubleshooting revealed that a cable installed to support gen-erator torsional testing was interfering with proper operation of the EHC system.
This cable had been installed for approxi-mately six months, but its configuration was recently modified to allow remote turbine torsional testing monitoring.
The inspector questioned the engineering staff whether this modifi-cation was appropriately reviewed by NMPC to assess plant impact.
NMPC was still investigating at the conclusion of the report perio on Previous Identified Items 2.1 Unit
'a ~
b.
Inspection Report 89-04 (Section 3. 1) described three concerns the inspectors identified with respect to the core spray and containment spray strainers and associated pedestal supports.
In October, the residents met with NMPC engineers from Salina Meadows.
During that meeting, NMPC described the design intent and construction of the pedestals and other design constraints related to the support of the basket strainers.
NMPC also dis-cussed corrective actions taken to address the concern of exposed steel re-bar in the pedestals, The inspectors found the meeting useful and informative and were satisfied that NMPC had adequately addressed the inspectors'oncerns regarding design and construction of the strainers and associated support pedestals.
(Closed)
Unresolved Item (50-220/88-80-01):
Niagara Mohawk actions to ensure the timely review and closeout of NRC and industry information.
Niagara Mohawk submitted a
response to the NRC on this item dated March 31, 1989.
In that response, Niagara Mohawk agreed to provide additional staffing to the Operational Experience Assessment (OEA)
group to reduce the backlog of open NRC and industry information.
The inspector discussed the staffing of the OEA group with the OEA supervisor and noted that since mid-1988, permanent staffing in the OEA group doubled.
In addition, 23 contract employees are presently on staff to aid in the reduction of the backlog.
As a result, the backlog of OEA items has dropped over 33 per-cent. since January 1989.
The inspector considered this effort a
substantial management commitment of resources and adequate to reduce the work backlog in a
timely manner.
This issue is closed.
(Cl osed)
Unresolved Item (50-220/89-81-06):
During the Inte-grated Assessment Team Inspection an NRC inspector reviewed the performance of the Nl-ST-V7, inservice testing of the reactor building closed loop cooling (RBCLC)
pumps.
The inspector identified that a vibration measurement pickup device was placed on the inboard mechanical seal of the RBCLC pump in lieu of the inboard bearing housing.
This monitoring was contrary to the requirements of Article IWP-4500,Section XI of the ASME Code.
This is a violation.
(VIOLATION 50-220/89-30-01).
Subsequent to this finding, NMPC performed a preliminary root cause analysis and implemented short term corrective actions.
In addition, an inservice testing (IST) engineer was required to observe all pump testing to ensure proper data acquisition.
The inspector reviewed the following short term corrective actions:
1.
Assess other IST pump baseline vibration tests completed to date.
This review led to the retest of pumps in the RBCLC, control room chilled water and diesel generator cooling water systems.
These pumps were retested and the results were satisfactory.
2.
Remove all vibration points on IST pumps and reestablish correct points for IST vibration monitoring.
Red dots were painted on the pumps to designate testing locations.
A separate color was utilized for other non-IST'esting
.locations.
3.
Revalidate pump sketches in the IST pump test procedures recognize the red dot as the testing location, specify probe type and add a caution to terminate testing i, any red dots are missing or suspect.
4.
Conduct training of IKC technicians on the revised requirements.
The formal root cause analysis was later completed by the Inde-pendent Safety Evaluation Group (ISEG)
and a Corrective Action Request (CAR) 89.1014 was initiated to track corrective action completion.
The inspector reviewed the results of this analysis and found it to be thorough.
The NRC agreed with the conclus-ions of the Niagara Nohawk, root cause analysis, which stated that ineffective engineering management resulted in:
allowing improper data acquisition; allowing acceptance criteria being established during performance verification activity; allowing test procedures to handle conflicting criteria; and inadequate management IST support organization.
The inspector performed a field verification of 15 of the
pumps in the IST program.
One minor discrepancy was noted with the identification of a test location for the three emergency service water pumps not matching the IST pump diagram.
This was promptly corrected by a procedure chang.2 Unit In summary, the inspector found the sh'ort term and long term corrective actions to be appropriate and well thought out.
How-ever, CAR 89. 1014 indicated ten IST program and implementation deficiencies which the inspector assessed to be due to ineffec-tive IST engineering management oversight of the program.
In that the root causes of this violation have been identified, the corrective actions developed and implemented, and the inspector has reviewed these efforts prior to the conclusion of this inspection period with NMPC management, no response to this Notice of Violation is required.
However, the inspector planned to continue to monitor implementation of, the IST vibration test-ing and review final closure of CAR 89. 1014.
(Closed)
Violation (50-410/88-30-01):
Design control measures were inadequate for verifying the adequacy of the design of a
modification.
This violation involved the failure to meet ambient room temper-ature requirements while calibrating an in~trument transmitter.
Further, design basis calculations regarding changes to the response time for the reactor coolant system (RCS)
flow input signal to the average power range monitors (APRMs),
due to the addition of a variable damping circuit, were not available for the inspector to review.
The inspector determined during his review of this violation that these issues did not pose any technical safety concern, but rather posed an administrative control problem with the potential for causing a safety problem.
Niagara Mohawk's response to the violation, dated March 10, 1989 stated that a
memorandum was issued from the Unit 2 manager of nuclear design advising engineering department personnel to use extra caution in assuring that the input for. 10 CFR 50.59 evalu-ations is sufficiently detailed and clear.
Further, procedure NT-100.B, regarding the preparation and control of safety evalu-'tions, was revised to clarify the review responsibility of the engineers preparing and reviewing safety evaluations.
In addi-tion, a
new Nuclear Engineering and Licensing Procedure (NE8 L-056)
was written to specifically delineate how engineering department inspection and 'installation plans are to be writte With regard to the second portion of the violation dealing with the design calculations, Niagara Mohawk stated in their response to the violation that the calculations for the modification were contained in GE System Design Record File No.
AOO-980-6.
GE does not normally provide these calculations to customers for proprietary reasons.
However, these records were made available for audit by the NRC and Niagara Mohawk auditors.
The inspector determined, after an extensive review, that the response time changes caused by the additional damping circuit installed by the modification presented no technica'l safety concern.
Fur-ther, since the design basis calculations were retrievable from GE and readily identifiable and traceable to this modification, the original inspector concerns were resolved.
This violation is closed.
b..
(Closed)
Unresolved Item (50-410/88-08-03)-.
Three primary con-tainment penetrations did not receive local leak rate tests (LLRTs).
During an earlier inspection period, Niagara Mohawk identified what was an apparent oversight in the local leak rate testing of three containment penetrations.
Further review iden-tified that these three pen -trations were installed spares and that the inside containment portion of the penetrations had welded end caps.
The inspector determined that the station staff surveyed all other containment penetrations to ensure no other penetrations were over looked by the LLRT surveillance pro-gram.
One additional penetration (with a
welded end cap)
was identified during this Niagara Mohawk review.
This item is closed.
3.
Plant Ins ection Tours During this reporting period, the inspectors toured the Unit 1 and 2 con-trol rooms and accessible plant areas to monitor station activities and independently assess equipment status, radiological conditions, safety and adherence to regulatory requirements.
The following assessments were made:
3.1 Unit
Efforts towards decontamination of plant areas continued with notice-able improvement in general plant cleanliness.
Initial preparations for cleanup of the 225 foot level in the old Radwaste Building con-tinued and training on use of the robotic arm was scheduled to commence in January 199.2 Unit 2 a.
The inspector identified several valves with excessive packing leakage in the reactor building and notified the control room for appropriate repair or adjustments.
Housekeeping was generally good with only minor discrepancies noted.
b.
The inspector monitored the Station Shift Supervisor (SSS) dur-ing his normal duties in the control room for a
two hour period and made two observations.
First, an I&C technician requested the SSS to call materials engineering and quality assurance to help expedite the procurement of a safety-related fuse.
The SSS complied with the request and contacted the two different groups.
The inspector concluded that the technician should have utilized his own chain of command to expedite the process rather than burden the, SSS.
The second observation concerned a
systems engineer from the technical support group interacting with the SSS about making a
temporary modification to the circulating water system.
The engineer requ sted the SSS to prepare and hang a
system markup to support the tie-in of a.modification prior to the performance, of the 50.59 evaluation.
When asked by the SSS, the engineer neither knew the status of the 50.59 evaluation nor did he understand why one'as required prior to the start of this work.
The SSS did not approve the request to start work and gave the engineer guidance on how to proceed.
The inspector was con-cerned that the engineer was not properly prepared.
These observations indicated some unnecessary overburdening of the SSS and distraction of him from his routine duties and responsibilities.
Further, these observations indicated poor preparation by the IEC and engineering organizations for their respective work activities and a potential for over-reliance on the operations'taff to screen and perform certain work activ-ities.
These observations were discussed with station manage-ment, who shared the inspector's concerns.
4.
Surveillance and Haintenance Review The inspectors observed portions of the surveillance testing and mainten-ance activities listed below to verify that the test instrumentation was properly calibrated, approved procedures were used, the work was performed by qualified personnel, limiting conditions for operations were met, appropriate system or component isolation was provided and the-system was correctly restored following the testing or maintenance activit.1 Unit
'a ~
N1-89-6, simulates Loss of Off-Site Power/Loss of Coolant Acci-dent (LOOP/LOCA) conditions and tests the automatic response of
,
various plant components.
Specific interest in the test reper-formed on November 21 was for testing the transfer capabilities of the Motor Generator (MG) sets.
(MG set 162 experienced prob-lems when this test was last run in September and resulted in several emergency ventilation initiations and reactor scr ams, see LER 89-12).
MG set 162 functioned properly during the retest; however, problems were encountered with EDG 103 tripping on an'verspeed condition.
Adjustments'ere made to the EDG 103 governor and test Nl-89-6 was reperformed on November 27 satis-
factori ly.
The inspector reviewed the test results and di s-,
" cussed them with the Station Shift Supervisor.
The testing was well understood by the operators and properly executed.
b.
Nl-ST-f25, IST of.the EDG cool ing water pumps and Nl-ST-M4, monthly operability test of the EDGs
~
Due to problems encoun-tered in obtaining consistent IST results for the EDG cooling eater pumps, caused by fluctuations in backpressure, Nl-ST-f25 was generated.
Part of this procedure removes a check valve in the cooling system and installs a temporary throttle valve which is used to obtain consistent backpressure readings.
Following the test, the check valve internals are reinstalled and N1-ST-M4 performed to verify operability of the
.EDG.
The inspector observed the testing to be satisfactorily performed.
Maintenance on the MG sets in accordance with N1-89-11 and Nl-89-12 was observed.
Troubleshooting and maintenance on EDG 103's circuitry to locate a problem with a failure of the three minute cool down run to occur upon securing the EDG was also observed.
The maintenance and troubleshooting activities observed were properly execu'ted in accordance with station pro-cedures and technicians were knowledgeable.
of the work being performed.
4.2 Unit 2 a
~
The inspector observed a portion of electrical preventive main-tenance being performed on the motor breaker for ZSWP*STR4C (rotating service water strainer)
per Procedure NZ-EPM-GEN-R580.
The tech'nicians performing the work followed the procedure and were very experienced with the equipment.
In addition, the inspector verified this work was processed utilizing a
post maintenance test sheet and a plant impact sheet.
The inspector observed supervisory oversight at the job sit While performing the maintenance, the breaker was racked out and removed from the cubicle.
A red markup
. tag hanging on the breaker switch was removed and reattached to the front of the empty cubicle by the maintenance personnel.
The inspector questioned this practice of maintenance personnel moving red mark-up tags without operations involvement.
Station management committed to review this work practice and notify the inspector of their assessment and corrective action.
The inspector observed maintenance on the actuator of valve 2GTS*MOV2A, including the filling of the hydraulic cylinder with oil.
The inspector discussed the activity with the technicians and found them to be experienced and knowledgeable'he inspector accompanied a control room E operator (licensed reactor operator)
while performing shift checks per Technical Specifications.=
The operator was very thorough while recording and evaluating data.
It took approximately 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> to com-plete the checks.
A meeting was held with Unit 2 station management concerning Technical Specification (TS) 3.6. 1.7.a which limits opening the containment purge system supply.and exhaust lines to 90 hours0.00104 days <br />0.025 hours <br />1.488095e-4 weeks <br />3.4245e-5 months <br /> per 365 days for'enting or purging.
It was reported that Unit
accumulated 89.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> since February 1989.
The discussion focused on the different methods to obtain TS relief since Unit 2 was so close to the limit.
At the conclusion of the meeting, NNPC indicated they will pursue a license amendment through the normal process..
The inspector reviewed surveillance procedure N2-0SP-CPS-9001, which requires the operators to compute the total time the valves are opened in the'ast 365 days prior to opening the valves.
Inspector review of completed surveillances found them to be properly performed.
As'art of this surveillance the inspector determined that the chief shift operator (CSO)
main-tains a
Control Room Purge/Vent Log which summarizes'he con-tainment purge system valve operations.
The inspector noted this log was not maintained in a
clear and concise manner.
Particularly, some entries in the log regarding cumulative time in the previous 365 days were computed incorrectly.
However, the mistakes were in the conservative direction.
Operations management agreed that the logs could be better maintained and committed to improve the format of the lo e.
ll The inspector observed an auxiliary operator charge control rod drive hydraulic control unit (HCU) 58-35 'his was accomplished per Operating Procedure 30.
The operator followed the procedure verbatim and did a
good job.
The inspector asked if a work request (MR) was initiated to fix the slow nitrogen bleed down problem and found that WR 170379 was issued for this purpose.
The inspector considered this to be a nuisance problem since the accumulator needed to be recharged at approximately four hour intervals.
The priority of the work request was.subsequently el evated to expedite fixing this leak.
The inspector reviewed a chronology of maintenance on HCU 58-35 since August 14, 1989 and noted that there have been five different work requests processed and.-
wor ked to address nitrogen bleed down of this HCU.
Actions taken by the maintenance department to resolve this particular HCU problem appeared to be ineffective.
Niagara mohawk mainten-ance management acknowledged this observation and requested engineering staff review of the HCU design and maintenance practices.
6.
=
Review of Licensee Event Re orts LERs The LERs submitted to the NRC were reviewed to determine whether the details were, clearly reported, the cause(s)
properly identified and the corrective actions appropriate.
The inspectors also determined whether the assessment of potential safety consequences had been properly evalu-ated, whether generic implications were indicated, whether the event war-ranted on site follow-up, whether the reporting requirements of
CFR 50.72, were applicable, and whether the requirements of
CFR 50.-73 had been properly met.
(Note: the dates indicated are the event dates)
6.1 Unit
The following LERs were reviewed and found to be satisfactory:
LER 89-09, Improper installation of penetration plug assem-bly due to poor written communication (August 3, 1989).
LER 89-12, Reactor scram and reactor building emergency ventilation initiation due to loss of reactor protection system bus 11 (September 17, 1989).
LER 89-13, Reactor scram due to voltage surge on reactor protection bus 11 (September 29, 1989)
~
LER 89-14, Redundant safety systems inoperable due to lack of a
complete program to calibrate non-Technical Specifi-cation instrumentation (October 4, 1989).
6.2 Unit 2 a.
The following LERs were reviewed and found to be satisfactory:
LER 89-21, Inadvertent primary containment, vent and purge isolation caused by a lightening strike to the 'main stack affecting the gaseous.radiation monitors (August 15, 1989).
LER 89-22, Standby gas treatment system initiation due to electrical fault (October 7, 1989).
I'ER 89-23, Standby gas tr'eatment system initiation as, a
result of a
spurious high signal from a reactor building ventilation radiation monitor (September 6, 1989).
LER 89-24, Manual reactor scram due to equipment failure
, and entry into the restricted operating zone (September 8,
1989).
LER 89-25, Technical Specification surveillance on elec-trical breaker lineups not performed due to personnel error (September 8, 1989).
LER 89-26, Secondary containment isolation and standby gas treatment system initiation due to spurious trip signals caused by high
. frequency welding (September 26, 1989).
LER 89-27, Missed chemistry surveillance due to inadequate task scheduling and assignment results in Technical Specif-ication violation (September 13, 1989).
b.
For the following LER, Niagara Mohawk has committed to issue a
supplemental report.
This report will be reviewed in a
subse-quent inspection period:
LER 89-20, Niagara Mohawk found the IST vibration accept-ance criteria for the Division I, II, III emergency diesel generators (EDG) fuel oil transfer pumps to be incorrect.
When the correct acceptance criteria was applied to past test results, Niagara Mohawk identified that the Division II pumps were in the required action range ten times and the Division III pumps were in the required action range one time.
Generally, when in the required action range, pumps are declared inoperable and corrective action's are taken.
The LER analysis section stated the event was reportable because actions of the IST program were not carried out.
In'ummary, the LER stated the EDGs were never inoperable or potentially inoperable due to the inability of the transfer pumps to function properl Thi s conclusion seeme'd to be inconsi stent with Niagara Mohawk's practice of declaring pumps inoperable when found-to be in the required action range.
Accordingly, the inspector disagreed with Niagara Mohawk's conclusion that the EDGs were never inoperable or poten-tially inoperable.
TS 3.8. 1.2 requires that two fuel oil transfer pumps per diesel shall be available to consider the EDG operable.
In conclusion, this LER did not properly assess EDG operability or plant impact during the times the fuel oil transfer pumps were inoperable.
The inspectors requested the LER, be revised to assess this condition and Niagara Mohawk agreed to submit a, revision.
7.
Review of S ecial Re orts The following Special Reports were reviewed by the inspectors:
Unit
Special Report dated August 11, 1989:
NMP 53963 Special Report dated October 30, 1989:
NMP 56893 Special Report dated November 13, 1989:
NMP 59037 Special Report dated November 16, 1989:
NMP 59046 The inspector determined that the reports were issued on time and that proper compensatory actions were initiated as required by plant TS
~
Each of the reports describe events which requi red initiation of an Occurrence Report and subsequent inclusion in and issuance of a
Special Report.
These reports were satisfactorily written and properly described the events.
8.
Tem orar Instruction Followu
- Unit
Trainin on BWR Power Oscillations -
TI 2515/99 The purpose of this inspection was to evaluate the effectiveness of the training provided on power oscillations as part of the implementation of NRC Bulletin (NRCB) 88-07 and Supplement 1 to this bulletin.
In a letter dated February 1,
1989, Niagara Mohawk committed to complete the imple-mentation of the bulletin prior to restart of Nine Mile Point Unit 1.
The inspector discussed Niagara Mohawk's plans for simulator modifications with the simulator supervisor.
An enhancement to model power osci llations was included in the 1990 budget, This enhancement will be similar,to the malfunction'vailable on the Unit 2 simulator.
The power oscillation mal-function will only be effective in the restricted zone, following a
transient and the magnitude of the osci llations will be variable.
This enhancement is expected, by Niagara Mohawk, to be an adequate tool for providing training on the detection and mitigation of power oscillation The inspector observed training on power oscillations administered to licensed operators as part of their requalification training program.
The training included discussions of the power oscillation event at LaSalle, thermal-hydraulic instability, the factors that affect stability in boil-ing water reactors (BWRs),
and the restricted zone boundaries.
Actions for detecting and mitigating power oscillations were also discussed.
There was some confusion among the operators concerning the definition of the 80 percent rod line, but the instructor adequately addressed their concerns.
The training provided adequately addressed the requirements of NRCB 88-07 and Supplement l.
The inspector interviewed licensed ROs and SROs to determine the effec-tiveness of the training provided on power osci llations and to determine whether or not they were aware of the corrective actions required to ter-minate osci llations.
Some operators were not aware of all the factor s that affect stability in BWRs, but this would not prevent them from effec-tively detecting and mitigating power oscillations.
Findings from these interviews and previous inspections indicated that the training provided was effective.
The review per this Temporary Instruction is complete.
Mid-SALP Assessment On November 8, the resident inspectors met with senior station management on site'to discuss verbally the inspectors'id-SALP period assessment of Niagara Mohawk performance.
Assessments and trends were based upon the activities observed by the resident staff since March 1, 1989.
The inspectors discussed assessments at Unit 1 in the areas of problem solving and standards of performance, consistent with the IATI's findings, and at Unit 2 regarding personnel errors in the areas of operations and mainten-ance.
Station management provided their assessments and discussed their plans and progress regarding the above areas and the area of lit annun-=
ciators.
The written SALP report will be issued following the completion of the assessment period on February 28, 1990.
Exit Meetin s
At periodic intervals and at the conclusion of the inspection, meetings were held with senior station management to discuss, the scope and findings of this inspection.
Based on the NRC Region I review of this report and discussions held with Niagara Mohawk representatives, it was determined that this report does not contain Safeguards or
CFR 2.790 information.