IR 05000220/1989011
| ML17056A119 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 07/05/1989 |
| From: | Conte R, Todd Fish, Howe A, Walker T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17056A118 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-220-89-11, NUDOCS 8907190210 | |
| Download: ML17056A119 (32) | |
Text
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No.
50-220/89-11 Docket No.
50-220 License No.
DPR-63 Licensee Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation 301 Plainfield Road Syracuse, New York 13212 Facility Name:
Nine Mile Point,'Unit
Inspection At:
Scriba, New York Inspection Conducted:
April 17 - May 12, 1989 Inspectors:
A.
Howe, Senio pe ations Engineer
. Walker, S
ior perations Engineer Date z ~/r Date Fish 0 'o s Engineer Approved by:
0 te R. Cont
, 4 f,
BWR Operations Section te Executive Summar A special announced safety 'inspection was conducted to evaluate the licensed operator requalification training program, to inspect the licensee's commit-ments concerning licensed operator training improvements, and to inspect the licensee's implementation of the Commission's Policy Statement, dated January 24, 1989, regarding the conduct of plant operations.
The inspection consisted of examinations of procedures, records, interviews with personnel, and observa-tions by the inspectors.
No violations or deviations were identified.
The NRC staff obtained a better understanding of the licensee's handling of the restart action plan (RAP) items.
Pending implementation review, these plans were adequate.
The NRC staff review would occur after Site Operation Review Committee (SORC) approval.
No RAP items were at the SORC approval stage; and, therefore, none were not ready for NRC review.. Accordingly, the inspection updated certain past inspection findings in the subject area and focused atten-tion on the licensee's licensed operator requalification process.
~907i902i0 8007is PDR ADOCK 05000220 PDC
The inspectors noted improvement in the licensed operator requalification program.
However, certain procedural requirements were still not clearly defined.
The licensee has initiated actions to enhance the staffing of the training department, but progress was slow.
The staffing level of instructors was minimal, and there was little time to provide additional (restart action plan commitment) training to these instructors.
Apparently, because of finan-cial disincentives and operation department resource demands, operators were not motivated to fill the rotational assignment positions set for them within the training department.
The operation-training department interface has improved, but a-residual tension still exists.
Operators acknowledged improved training quality in particular in the areas of EOP and simulator training.
Operators were gener-ally supportive of upper management's efforts to date, but there was an un-familiarity on their part with certain levels of management.
This unfamiliar-ity was apparently due to minimal interface between operators and management, indicating little management involvement in the plant.
There was no operator disruptive behavior in the classroom on simulator train-ing'bserved except for a telephone call during class.
Instructors were gener-ally helpful in the training process.
Certain crew weaknesses were noted dur-ing simulator training, which will be addressed in a future inspection.
The training records review indicated compliance with prncedures and regulatory requirements.
Adequate procedures exist to address simulator fidelity and to ensure appro-priate corrective actions for fidelity problems.
With respect to the Commission's Policy Statement on the Conduct of Operation, the licensee initiated a formal review in response to inspector questioning.
The criteria of the policy statement is covered by licensee procedure require-ments for NNP-I (NMP-2 remains to be'done).
The inspector noted a lack of consolidation of these procedural requirements.
The lack of formal review by the licensee also indicated a weakness in the management oversight of signifi-cant regulatory action, DETAILS 1.0 Introduction and Sco e of Review The purpose of this inspection was to evaluate the licensed operator requalification program and to verify completion or determine the current status of licensee corrective actions related to Restart'Action Plan (RAP)
Specific Issue No. 2, "Maintenance of Operator Licenses,"
and Specific Issue No. 3,
"Emergency Operating Procedures."
After the NRC staff gained a better understanding of the licensee's procedure for verification and review of the corrective actions, the NRC staff determined that the NRC would only evaluate the adequacy of the corrective actions after the li.censee had completed'internal verification and review of the. specific action.
At the time of the-inspection, the licensee had not verified or reviewed any of the corrective actions related to maintenance of operator licenses or Emergency Operating Procedures; therefore, the inspectors focused on the licensee's licensed operator requalification program as a
whole rather than concentrating on the specific corrective actions associ-ated with the RAP.
The inspections, conducted over several weeks involved: (I) review of training department procedures for content and adequacy, (2) random observations of training activities, including classroom and simulator training, (3) interviews with personnel, and (4) audits of operator training records and instructor certification records.
These techniques were used to evaluate: (I) how management will ensure the operators receive adequate requalification'raining, (2) whether or not licensed operators understood the requirements for attending requalification train-ing, (3) the working relationship between the Operations and Training departments, as well as between operators and upper management, (4) the training organization staffing and technical competency; (5) simulator configuration controls, and (6) the-implementation of the Commission's Policy on conduct of operations.
The.licensed operator interviews were conducted among 13 licensed personnel.
The inspectors used a consistent set of questions aimed at addressing the above-noted six objectives of this inspection.
The results, whether positive or negative, reflect a substantial majority of operator assessment or understanding of the area.
Where a substantial majority could not be ascertained, the results were considered,
"mixed."
2.0 Restart Corrective Actions To gain 'an understanding of the licensee's administrative process for documentation, verification, review and approval of RAP corrective actions, the inspectors interviewed licensee personnel responsible for tracking, completing, verifying and reviewing the action A Corrective Action Closure Form (CACF) is completed by the responsible department when a corrective action is completed.
Attached to this form is any applicable documentation needed for verification and review of the corrective action.
After the corrective action is completed, the action is,verified'by the designated department (i.e., guality Assurance or Nuclear Compliance and Verification) and a Verification Action Closure Form (VACF) is completed.
No verifications are performed until the CACF is completed and signed.
The completed CACF and VACF, along with any supporting documentation are submitted to the Stations Operations Review Committee (SORC) for review and approval.
After SORC approval, the Restart Assessment Panel is'responsible for evaluating the effectiveness of the corrective action.
The NRC staff determined that it will not make any conclusions as to the adequacy of specific, corrective actions until after SORC approvals The overall effectiveness of these actions will be addressed separately in future inspections.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's working schedule and the completed CACFs for corrective actions associated with the RAP Specific Issue Nos.
and 3.
The inspectors also discussed the status of completion and veri-fication of these corrective actions with the responsible individuals.
Most of the CACFs had been signed indicating, that the corrective action is complete, but the verification process was only complete for a few items.
No RAP corrective actions associated with maintenance of operator licenses or emergency operating procedures (EOPs)
had been reviewed by SORC at the time of this inspection.
In summary, the licensee's process for review and approval of RAP items is adequate, pending implementation review by NRC staff.
Since no RAP items had SORC approval and, therefore,
-were not ready for NRC staff review, the inspection focused on the licensed operator requalification program.
3.0 Re uglification Trainin Pro ram 3. 1 Mana ement Oversi ht and Interface with Licensed 0 erators Previous NRC inspections identified an apparent lack of management attention to the licensed operator requalification training program ( Inspection Reports 50-220/88-10 and 50-220/88-22).
The licensee has defined several corrective actions in their Restart Action Plan to correct this deficiency.
The inspectors interviewed cognizant licensee management personnel and reviewed procedures to understand how management oversight will ensure that effective requalification training is provided to the licensed operators.
.The licensee has revised Nuclear Training Procedure NTP-ll, "Licensed Operator Retraining and Continuing Training" to more clearly define management responsibilities and accountability with respect to requal-ification training program participation.
Although improved, NTP-ll,
Revision 6 (effective date March 29, 1989), still does not clearly define management responsibilities.
For example, Section 3.5.4 of NTP-11 states that situations in which normally scheduled training cannot be attended should be discussed with the General Superintend-ent, Nuclear Generation, but does not give any guidelines for resolution of the situation.
Also, Section 3.5.5 states that make-up training should be scheduled,
"at the direction of" the General Superintendent, and Section 3.5.7 states that the license holders who are deficient in required training will be notified, "at the direct-ion of" the Unit Operations Superintendent.
These steps do not clearly define responsibility for ensuring that any missed training is completed.
Licensee management issued Station General Order 88-03 to promulgate policy with regard to the planning and conduct of training.
The Station General Order tasks line management with responsibility and accountability for training and holds the Training Oepartment respon-sible for providing training in response to the needs of line manage-ment.
Each individual is held responsible for attendance at sche-duled training'ine management is responsible for scheduling re-quired training and ensuring that individuals attend as scheduled.
No provisions are defined in the Station General Order for ensuring that missed training is completed.
Observation and evaluation of licensed operator performance is another area that requires management oversight.
NTP-11, Section 4.2, describes the requirements for continuous evaluation of the licensed operators.
It clearly specifies that,
"systematic observa-tion and evaluation of the performance and competency" of the opera-tors be made by the Station Superintendent and his designated repre-sentatives, but describes a procedure to be used that does not meet the intent of continuous evaluation.
The procedure consists only of a quarterly review of records and ensuring that the required reacti-vitiy control manipulations are scheduled.
The procedure does not include any requirements for direct observation and evaluation of operator performance.
Interviews of cognizant licensee management personnel indicated that the responsible managers had a clear understanding of their responsi-bilities even though these responsibilities were not well defined in procedures, as noted above.
Management appeared to understand the problems associated with providing effective requalification training and has well defined methods for addressing these problems.
The adequacy of these methods will be evaluated as part of the assessment of RAP corrective actions prior to restart.
The licensee management agreed to review the above-noted inspector comments on NTP-11, Interviews with licensed operators indicated that current management attention to training was high and that the operations department takes responsibility for training quality.
Many operators indicated
personal responsibility for training quality.
The operators indi-cated acceptance of the new management policy regarding professional conduct in training sessions.
However, most operators believe that the policy, while a response to incidents of unprofessional behavior in the classroom, was aimed at a few "other" individuals and not themselves because their behavior was acceptable.
The operators expressed a great deal of support for the unit super-intendent.
However, opinions were mixed about other levels of line management up to the Vice President - Nuclear apparently because of their unfamiliarity with these individuals and their backgrounds.
Overall, the operators interviewed were generally supportive of management efforts to date.
At the exit meeting, licensee management acknowledged that the opera-tor unfamiliarity was due in part to certain levels of management not frequenting the plant and interfacing with plant operators.
The licensee representative also acknowledged initiating action to reverse this situation, based on the findings of a previous NRC team inspection (No. 50-220/89-200).
The following open item was addressed.
~0 en 0 en Item 220/88-10-03
Deficiencies in mana ement involve ment in the licensed o erator re uglification ro ram.
Inspection Report 50-220/88-10 addressed concerns with management involvement in assuring requalification training program effectiveness and compli-ance.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's Restart Action plan and determined that these deficiencies, in general, are addressed by proposed corrective actions; however, Open Item 88-10-03 remains open pending resolution of the above-noted comments.
3.2 Trainin Attendance The following open. items were addressed.
0 en 0 en Item 220/88-10-01
Incom lete re uglification train-
~in
.
In March 1988, an NRC inspection Inspection Report 50-220/
88-10) identified that portions of required requalification training for the requalification period ending in February 1988 had not been completed.
In response to Confirmatory Action Letter 88-13, the licensee committed to completing all requalification training for Unit 1 licensed operators as required by their approved licensed operator training program.
The inspectors reviewed licensee corresp-ondence and Requalification Training Status Reports from 1989, Cycles 1 and 2.
Results of this review indicated that all the in-complete training had been completed except for one licensed Senior Reactor Operator (SRO).
The licensee determined that there was no
longer a need for the individual's license and the license had been termin'ated.
The incomplete training was also discussed at an Enforcement Conference with the licensee, held on March 30, 1989.'o ensure that all required requalification training is completed in the future, the licensee made several changes to its training proce-dures.
NTP-11 was revised to more clearly specify the requirements for attendance and the actions to be taken if training is not comple-ted as scheduled.
NTP-11 requires that all license holders be provided with a'schedule for each requalification cycle that indica-tes all required training.
These changes appear to be effective since there were only a few cases of incomplete training found at the time of this inspection.
For these cases, the reasons for the missed training were well documented and corrective action was proposed (i.e., rescheduling:or license termination).
0 en 0 en Item 220/88-10-02
Failure to notif Station Su erin-tendent of missed trainin
.
Approximately 50% of the training that was missed in the 1987 requalification period was not identified to the Station Superintendent, as required by procedure.
A requirement was added to NTP-11 to issue a Requalification Training Status Report at the completion of each scheduled requalification cycle.
This report includes a listing of all outstanding training at the time of the report.
The Requalification Training Status Report is required to be distributed to station and operations management as well as to those license holders who have missed training.
The failure to notify management of missed training was also discussed at the Enforcement Conference with the licensee, held on March 30, 1989.
3.3 Based on interviews of 13 licensed operators, the inspectors deter-mined that the operators knew that attendance at training was required and that they were personally responsible for making up missed training.
They also knew that they were responsible to verify th'e accuracy of applications for license renewal (NRC Form 398).
They did not know the required components of. the requalification program as described in licensee Nuclear Training Procedure (NTP) 11, but some stated they could look them up in "10 CFR," if needed.
Licensee management. stated that NTP-11 had been discussed with the licensed operators, and they committed to re-discuss this procedure with the operators.
0 erations/Trainin Interface Previous NRC inspections have noted weaknesses in the relationship between the Operations and Training Departments.
The inspectors interviewed licensee personnel from both departments to gain an understanding of what methods are available to provide feedback to the training department and how that feedback is incorporated into
the requalification program.
The inspectors also reviewed training procedures to assess the means of communications between the two departments.
Based on interviews, it was noted that the licensed operators were aware of methods to provide feedback to the Training Department via shift meetings at the end of each training week, training evaluation forms, or input to the Operation Training Program Advisory Committee (OTPAC).
Those that discussed OTPAC were very positive about the program.'he OTPAC provides a direct interdepartment interface to resolve problems and recommend training improvements for operators.
3.4 At the time of the inspection, the training staff for Unit 1 requal-ification was reviewing methods of trending and incorporating the feedback from the operators similar, to those in use for the Unit 2 requalification program.
This review was a result of a previous NRC inspection ( Inspection Report 50-220/89-200)
which noted differences in the methods used for evaluating and incorporating operator feed-back between the two programs.
The Training Department has developed a method to formally notify the Operations chain of command of changes in the approved training schedule, deficiencies in licensed operator performance, the results of operator feedback, and any other problems encountered during training that relate to operations.
NTP-ll, section 3.5.6 requires that any significant deviations from the approved training schedule are to be noted in the Requalification Training Status Report which is issued after the completion of each requalification cycle.
The procedure also requires that any classroom situations which have negatively affected or hindered the training process be addressed in the status report.
The inspectors reviewed the Requalification Status Repor.t for Cycle 2.
This report noted deviations in the training schedule due to an unscheduled INPO evaluation and in-house evaluations of the operators on the simulator.
Operator comments from the end-of-course evaluations were also addressed in the status report along with the proposed corrective action.
Based on the interviews, the inspectors also noted a residual tension between operations-and training departments (see 3.4 below).
Staffin /Instructor Trainin and ualifications The inspectors discussed the present training organization staffing and plans for future staffing with the Training Superintendent, the Unit 1 Operations Superintendent and the Unit 1 Requalification Training Program Coordinator.
Instructor training and qualifica-tions were also discussed with the training personne At the time of the inspection, the Unit 1 requalification training program was being administered, by a minimal number of instructors.
Due to the problems with instructor resources, no time has been available to provide the training for the instructors that the licensee committed to as part of the Restart Action Plan.
The licensee has attempted to enhance the training department with experienced licensed personnel from the Operations Department through a rotational program.
However, progress
.in fully staffing these rotational positions has been slow.
Operators interviewed have little motivation to transfer out of operations and into the training
'epartment to become instructors, apparently because of financial disincentiyes.
Interviews indicated loss of income and shortage of operator replacements as significant barriers to such a transfer.
In response, management has drafted a
new pay scale (draft to be completed by the end of May 1989)
and is currently training more licensed operators'he inspectors reviewed the procedure associated with training and qualification of instructors and audited four licensed operator instructor files.
The documentation in the. instructors'iles indi-cates that:
( 1) the instructors meet or exceed the technical quali-fications established in NTP 16, "Training/Con'tinued Training of Nuclear Instructors,"
and NTP, 16. 1, "Training/Continued Training of Simulator Instructors,"
and (2) these NTPs are being adhered to when obtaining or maintaining technical and instructional qualification.
No discrepancies were noted.
3.5 Simulator Trainin The inspectors observed simulator training and evaluation sessions for two (2) operating crews.
These sessions consisted of scenarios performed on the Unit 1 simulator.
The inspector noted that the scenarios met basic training. objectives but contained
"generic" training objectives as well as operator actions that were not expli-citly defined.
The inspector concluded that the licensee evaluation and crew self-critiques were conducted professionally and candidly.
The inspector also noted a sharp contrast between the performance of the two shift crews.
One shift demonstrated marginal command-and-control at the supervisory level as well as one instance of an opera-tor not following a procedure - which directly caused a reactor simulator scram.
The other shift demonstrated strong command-and-control-at the supervisory level, strict procedural compliance, and good communications between all operators throughout the training session.
The licensee acknowledged that this latter crew's perform-ance is superior to all of the other crews, and they are pursuing several options which should improve the other five crews'erform-ance to equal the strongest crew (such as having the other crews observe the strong crew's simulator sessions).
Operators interviewed generally acknowledged improvements in the quality of simulator training.
The NRC review of operating crew performance is addressed in NRC Inspection 50-220/89-13.
3.6 Simulator Confi uration Control As a restart action plan corrective action, the licensee committed to revise training procedures to systematically identify, prioritize and track changes to the simulator, to identify and correct simulator deficiencies, to install modifications which impact training and to document simulator fidelity"differences and discuss them before training sessions to allow operators to respond as appropriate to meet training objectives.
To inspect these commitments in part, the inspector reviewed Nuclear Training Instruction (NTI) 4.5.2,
"Simulator Operating Procedure Instruction Unit 1 and Unit 2," dated May 1985 and NTI 4.5.3, "Simulator Configuration Management,"
dated November 1988, documentation of simulator deficiencies, and documen-tation of simulator-to-plant d'fferences.
The inspector also discussed the above mentioned procedures with members of the Unit 1 requalification training staff and questioned Unit 1 licensed opera-tors on feedback of fidelity information.
3.7 The inspector noted that the procedures reviewed were adequate to identify, prioritize, and track changes to the simulator.
The inspector had some questions on specific implementation practices that will be reviewed in later inspections.
The inspector also concluded via review of simulator fidelity documentation, discussion with Unit 1 requalification personnel and Unit 1 licensed operators that simulator differences and discrepancies were covered in training sessions as appropriate.
Classroom Trainin The inspector observed the conduct of requalification classroom training.
The scheduled topics were modified that morning, but the training staff substituted training originally scheduled for later that week, with minimal disruption to the class..
A telephone call into the classroom disrupted the lecture for about three minutes.
The inspector discussed the policy of maintaining a telephone in the classroom with licensee management and learned that the problem was known and that the telephone's location (in the classroom itself) was merely a convenience for operators'he licensee recognized that calls were disruptive and committed to removing the telephones from classrooms.
Otherwise, class conduct was professional and the instructors answered all questions to the satisfaction of the operator The inspector also interviewed licensed operators about training materials and methods.
The majority of operators indicated that training methods and materials were improving.
3.8 Trainin Documentation The inspector audited a number of licensed operator training files using Nuclear Training Instruction (NTI) 2. 1, "Individual Trainin Files" (Revision 5, dated April 8, 1987)
as the reference document.
While the training files contained the records and documents required by sections 7 and.8 of NTI 2. 1; these materials were randomly filed and out of sequence instead. of being.organized into the sub-sections required by NTI 2. 1.7 and 2. 1.8.
~The licensee committed to organizing its training files so as to meet the intent of NTI 2.1.
3.9 0 erator Behavior Throughout the inspection (interview, classroom and simulator obser-vation) operators did not display any adverse behavior to the situa-tion in which they participated.
The only observed disruptive behavior was a telephone call in the middle of class which licensee management apparently tolerated before the inspection.
Overall, the operators were cooperative with the NRC's interview process.
3.10
~Summar The inspectors noted improvement in the licensed operator requali-fication program.
However, certain procedural requirements were still not clearly defined.
The licensee has initiated actions to enhance the staffing of the training department, but progress was slow.
The number of staff instructors was minimally sufficient, and there was little time to provide additional (restart action plan commitment) training to these instructors.
Apparently, because of financial disincentives and operation department resource demands, operators were not motivated to fill the rotational assignment posi-tions set for.them within the training department.
The operation-training department interface has improved, but a resi-dual tension still exists.
Operators acknowledged improved training quality, in particular, in the area of EOP and simulator training.
Operators were generally supportive of upper'management's efforts to date, but there was an unfamiliarity on their part with certain levels of management apparently because of a weak interface at this level indicating little management involvement in the plant inter-
.
facing with operators.
Licensee upper management representatives acknowledged these finding There was no disruptive behavior observed in the classroom or in simulator training, except for a telephone call during class.
Instructors were generally helpful in the training process.
Certain crew weaknesses were noted during simulator training, and they will be addressed in a future inspection.
The training records review indicated compliance with procedures and regulatory requirements.
4.0 Emer enc 0 eratin Procedures The licensee has numerous RAP corrective actions associated with the Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs).
The inspectors discussed these actions with management and reviewed the policy statement concerning EOPs.
The EOPs in the flowchart format have been approved and were implemented as of March 27, 1989.
Administrative procedure AP-2.0, "Production and Control of Procedures,"
has been revised to
, include Quality Assurance (QA) in the review process for the EOPs.
5.0 Extensive training has been provided in the classroom and the simu-lator to upgrade licensed operator proficiency in the use of EOPs.
These efforts appear to be successful.
The majority of operators indicated that EOP training had significantly improved, that they had a greater familiarity with the procedures and their bases, and an improved understanding of the importance of EOPs.
The adequacy of the licensee's corrective actions will be assessed in future inspections prior to restart, including evaluations of opera-tor performance on the simulator.
(NRC Inspection No. 50-220/89-13).
Conduct of 0 erations Polic Statement On January 24, 1989, the Commission issued a Policy Statement on the Conduct of Nuclear Power Plant Operations.
The Commission listed nine criteria reflecting its expectations concerning the conduct of operations in control rooms by licensed operat'ors at nuclear reactors.
The pol.icy statement was iss'ued as guidance and it was not considered a rule or regulation.
It indicated that utility manage-ment should routinely monitor such conduct, review their procedures and policies. on such conduct to assure they support an environment for professional conduct.
At the beginning of the inspection, the inspector asked licensee management representatives what action they had taken in response to this policy statement, in terms of assuring procedural coverage for the nine criteria and any other self imposed management expectations on performance by both licensed and non-licensed personnel.
The inspector also queried licensee representatives, on consolidation efforts to establish these criteria and expectations in a single administrative document (procedure or manual).
Based on a sample review the inspector determined that many different
.types of licensee documents covered the various aspects of the Commission's criteria.
The licensee representatives acknowledged that no formal review of this policy statement for procedural cover-age was conducted but they committed to do such a review by the second week of this inspection.
During the first week of this inspection, there was a general belief by licensee representatives that licensee'ocuments met the'policy statement criteria; During the second week of the inspection, a licensee representative provided a tabulation of the criteria to the various licensee docu-ments which assured procedural coverage.
The correlation was only for NMPl (not NMP2), and the licensee representatives committed to do the same for NMP2.
Licensee representatives also explained that a long term item was to consolidate a number of facility administrative procedures into a
single document addressing higher tier programs.
They were receptive to such a consolidation into a Conduct of Operations type document.
Based on this review, the inspector concluded that various NMP1 facility procedures implement the criteria provided by the Commission in the Conduct of Operations.
The'inspection identified a need to consolidate these procedures, into a single document.
In light of NMP1's present status, the lack of formal review or intent to review coverage for both NMP1 and NMP2 relative to this policy statement reflected a weakness in the licensee's management oversight function.
Management was informed of the purpose and scope of the inspection at the entrance interview.
The findings of the inspection were period-ically discussed with station management throughout the inspection period and were summarized at an interim exit meeting on April 27, 1989, and a final exit meeting on May 12, 1989.
Licensee representatives at the exit meetings are listed in Appendix A of this repor APPENDIX A'.
Interim Exit and Exit Attendees 5h*R
"R.
AC R.
AG
"K.
- (
M.
K.
M ~
T.
- L
- p G.
- p
"M.
A*D R.
- R A.
~R.
R.
"R.
- G
- D RJ B. Abbott E. Abbott Beckham Bough Brownell Buckley Burkhardt Colomb Dahlberg Dooley Egan Fenton Harrison Larizza Mangano Peifer Ranalli Randall Remus Rivers Sanaker Seifried Smith Weimer White Willis Station Superintendent, Unit 2 Technical Assessment (}uality Assurance Nuclear Compliance and Verification Nuclear Regulatory Compliance Nuclear Compliance and Verification Executive Vice President - Nuclear Operations Nuclear Re'gulatory Compliance Station Superintendent, Unit 1.
Nuclear Regulatory Compliance ISEG Nuclear Engineer equality Assurance Planning RGKE Site Engineering Nuclear Services Assistant Station Shift Supervisor, Unit 2 Operations Superintendent, Unit
Superintendent, Chemistry and Rad.
Management Superintendent Training, Nuclear Training Supervisor, Unit
Assistant Superintendent
- Operations Training Operations Superintendent, Unit 2 Training Supervisor, Unit 2 Nuclear Compliance and Verification General Superintendent, Nuclear Generation 2.
Persons Contacted The following personnel provided information during the course of this inspection.
K. Dahlberg R. Randall A. Rivers R. Seifried R.
Sanaker D. White R.
Bough M. Dooley G. Brownell R.
Fenton J.
Dougherty Station Superintendent, Unit
Operations Superintendent, Unit
Training Superintendent Assistant Superintendent
- Operations Training Requali fication Coordinator Nuclear Compliance and Verification Nuclear Compliance and Verification Nuclear Regulatory Compl iance Nuclear Regulatory Compliance equality Assurance guality Assurance Inspectors also contacted certain licensed operators and training instructors in order to conduct formal interview Appendix A 3.
Documents Reviewed
AP-2.0 Production and Control of Procedures, Rev.
11, April,21, 1989 NTP-11 Licensed Operator Retraining and Continuing Training, Rev. 6, March 29, 1989
~
NTP-16 Training/Continued Training of Nuclear Instructors, Rev. 2, August 15, 1988 NTP-16. 1 Training/Continued Training of Simulator Instructors, Rev. 0, August 15, 1988
~
NTI-l.1 Nuclear Training Department Organization and Responsibilities, Rev.
4, September 21, 1988
~
NTI-2. 1 Individual Training Files, Rev. 6, April 8, 1987
~
NTI-3. 1 Instructor Performance Evaluation, Rev. 2, March 13, 1989
. ~
NTI-4.3. 1 Development, Implementation and Evaluation of Simulator Training, Rev.
2, March 1, 1989 NTI-4.4 TSD Implementation of Training, Rev.
3, April 20, 1987
~
NTI-4.5 Evaluation of Training, Rev. 4, April 20, 1987 NTI-4.5.3 Simulator Configuration Management, Rev.
2, December 23, 1988
~
Station General Order 88-3 Nl-ODI-1.03 Operations Policy ¹2:
Emergency Operating Procedures, Rev. 0; Februar~
13, 1989
~
Requalification Training Status Reports
- ~
OTPAC Charter OTPAC Meeting Minutes
,CACFs associated with RAP Specific Issues 2 and
Root Cause Evaluation 89100
- Attended Interim Exit only (April 29, 1989)
""Attended Exit only (May 12, 1989)
3.
5.
Facility:
f>f 1"P 2.
Docket No./Report Nn.: SV->>o')l'5-j) 4.
Functional Area:
0 ~T'~
6.
7.
Inspection Hours For This Functional Area:
Inspector:
Aowc T Pij l
~ l4c,~k~
Inspection Dates:
g '7k i I/>>/Ey Category Rating (1,2 or 3):
/9 8.
Prepare a completed, typed, SALP Input.
Start in the space below and continue on a separate sheet if necessary:
9.
Submitted by Inspector (Sign/date):
. 10.
Approved by DRS Section Chief.
(Sign/date)
DISTRIBUTION'RS Files DRP Section Chief for the Reactor Inspected Revised:
2/1987