IR 05000220/1989014

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Insp Repts 50-220/89-14 & 50-410/89-11 on 890515-17.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Emergency Preparedness & Licensee Full Participation Annual Emergency Exercise on 890516
ML17056A042
Person / Time
Site: Nine Mile Point  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 06/06/1989
From: Craig Gordon, Lazarus W
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML17056A041 List:
References
50-220-89-14, 50-410-89-11, NUDOCS 8906140344
Download: ML17056A042 (10)


Text

U.S.

NUCLEAR REGUIAIQRY (XNMISSION

REGION I

Docket Nos.

50-220 50-410 License Nos.

DPR-53 DPR-69 Priority Category C

Licensee:

Nia Mohawk Pcarer Qo ration 301 P amfxeld Roa cuse New Yor 13212 Facility Name: Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Units 1

& 2 Inspection At: Scriba New York NRC Team Mea6~rs:

A, C. Z.

rdon, Regs Team Iea er C. Amato, Region I C. Conklin, Region I B. Haagensm, Sonalysts R. ~, RI Approved By:

. J. z, Qu.ef, Emergency Pre Section ion ion on Ma 15-17 1989 Re rt Nos. 50-220 89-14

& 50-410 89-11 Areas Routine announced emergency preparedness inspection and o

tron of the licensee's full participation annual ~ency prep-atedness exercise conducted on May 16, 1989.

%he inspection was performed by a team of five NRC Region I and contractor personnel.

Results:

No violations were identified.

Lhe licensee's ~nse actions for

~

~

tEis exercise were adequate to provide protective measures for the health and safety of the public.

8906140344 890506 PDR ADDCK 05000220 G

PNU

1. 0 ~ns Contacted

'Ihe following licensee representatives attended the exit meeting held on May 17, 1989:

J. Beratta, Security M. Boyle, Nuclear Services L. Burkhardt, Executive Vice President M. Colomb, Nuclear ~atory Compliance J.

Conway, Technical Assistant K. Dahlia~, Station Superintendent Unit 1 W. Drew, Maintenance M. Falise, Maintenance E. Gordon, Radiological Support W. Hansen, Quality Assurance D. Howes, Emergency Prepares J. Kalsh, Public Information D. ZeCuyer, Emergency Preparedness G. Melchiorre, Public Information T. Peeling, Emergency Preparedness M. Peifer, Nuclear Services J. ~, Quality Assurance R. Randall, Unit 1 Operations W. Rapin, Rochester Gas

& Electric R. Remms, Chemistzy A. Rivers, Training K. Sweet, Maintenance P. Volza, Radiation Protection J. Willis, General Superintendent During the conduct of the inspection, other licensee ~ency response per-sonnel were interviewed and observed.

2.0 The Nine Mile Point full-participation exercise was conducted on May 16, 1989, from 8:00 a.m. until 3:00 p.m.

2. 1 Pre-exercise Activities

%he exercise objectives, submitted to the NRC Region I on February 14, 1989 were reviewed and, following revision, de~xuned to adequately test the licensee's Emergency Plan.

On March 15, 1989 the licensee submitted the complete scenario package for NRC review and evaluation.

Region I representatives had telephone conversations with the licensee's emergency preparedness staff to discuss the scope and content of the scenari As a result, minor revisions were made to the scenario ard supporting data provided by the licensee. It was detexmined that the revised scenario would provide for the adequate testing of major portions of the Emexgency Plan Implementing Process (EPIP) ard also provided the opportunity for licensee personnel to demonstrate those areas previously identified by the NRC as in need of corrective action.

NRC cbsexvers atterded a licensee briefing on May 15, 1989 ard participated in the discussion of emergency response actions expected during the scenario.

Suggested NRC changes to the scenario were made by the licensee and were also discucmed during the briefing.

%he licensee stated that certain emexgency response activities would be simulated ard indicated in the scenario that controllers would intercede in exexcise activities to prevent scenario deviations or disruption of normal plant operations.

'Lhe exercise scenario included the following events:

lass of onsite ard offsite AC power; Increasing in-plant radiation levels; loss of Coolant Accident (DXA);

Activation of Emergency Response Facilities; Offsite release of radioactivity to the environment; Declaration of Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency classifications; and Management of recovery operations.

'Ihe above events caused the activation of the licensee's onsite and offsite emexgency ~nse facilities.

2. 2 Activities Observed During the conduct of the licensee's exexcise, NRC team members made detailed 6~exvations of the activation ard augmentation of the ~ency organization, activation of ~ency ~nse facilities, ard actions of emergency response personnel durirq the operation of the emexgency response facilities.

'lhe following activities were observed:

1.

Detection, classification, and assessment of the scenario events; 2.

Direction and coordination of the emergency ~nse;

.

3.

Notification of licensee personnel and offsite agencies; 4.

Ceetmunications/information flow, and record keep~;

5.

Assessment and projection of radiological dose and consideration of protective actions;

6.

Provisions for in-plant radiation protection; 7.

Performance of offsite and in-plant radiological surveys; 8.

Maintenance of site security and acct control; 9.

Performance of technical support, repair and chive actions; 10.

Provisions for communicating information to the public; and ll.

Management of reccvery operations.

3. 0 Exercise Observations The NRC team noted that the licensee's activation and augmentation of the emexgency organization, activations of the ~ency ~nse facilities, and use of the facilities were generally consistent with their emergency response plan and implementing p~ures.

3. 1 Exercise Str

%he team also noted the follcaring actions that provided strong positive indi-cation of their ability to cope with abnormal plant conditions:

Classifications of ~ency conditions were proper and notifications to offsxte authorities were tmely; Information flow on plant conditions between the control room and the TSC provided good support of TSC decisionmaking; Portable radio transmissions by damage repair teams were clear and team tracking by the TSC and OSC was continuously updated; Proper evaluation of plant conditions was made prior to upgrading the protective action recommendation issued to State and local authorities.

Interface with the NRC Incident ~nse Team was effective and proved beneficial in resolving key operational problems.

Discussions at the end of the exercise concerning termination of the agency were thorough and good evaluation of all plant COIlcL1t3.ons was consxdered e

3.2 Areas For rovement

'Ihe NRC team identified the following areas which did not have a significant negative impact on overall performance during the exercise, but should be evaluated for chive action.

The licensee conducted an adequate self~itique of the exercise which also identified these areas.

Control room staff did not use N1-SOP-5 for loss of 115 kV lines when wan~ted and also was observed using uncontrolled copies of electrical schematic Durirq the initial stages of the response, two communicators were marginally adequate to field all incoming calls in addition to providing immediate notifications to offsite authorities.

Radiological parameters such as containment high range monitors, stack gas monitors, and key area monitors are not trended on TSC status boanls.

Initial calculation of core damage was inco~ and did not receive proper supervisory review, however, it was pmmptly corrected.

Methodology for providing RECS notifications from the TSC is inefficient since final approval of offsite notification and other outside cammunications come fnan the EOF.

4. 0 Licensee Action on Previousl Identified Items Based upon discussions with licensee representatives, aamination of procedures and records, and observations made by the NRC team during the exercise, the items identified during the previous emergency exercise were acceptably demonstrated and are closed:

(CADGED) 50-220/88-26-01; 50-410/88-25-01: Emerg~ Operating Procedures are not consistent with Technical Specifications on actions to be taken when suppression pool taq~ture limit exceeded (CXDSED) 50-220/88-26-04; 50-410/88-25-04:

Inaccurate information contained in press rel~.

(CLOSED) 50-220/88-26-06; 50-410/88-25-06:

RECS notification delayed more than 15 minutes after Alert declared.

6.0 Exit Meet'nd NRC Criti e

Following the licensee's self-critique, the NRC team met with the licensee representatives listed in Section 1 of this report.

Team observations made during the exercise were summarized.

'Ihe licensee was informed that 'previously identified items were adequately addressed and that no violations were observed.

Although there were areas identified for chive action, the NRC team determined that within the scope and limitations of the scenario, the licensee's performance demonstrated that they could implement their Emergency Plan and Emexgency Plan Implementing Procedures in a manner that would provide adequate protective measures for the health and safety of the public.

Licensee management ackrxmledged the findings and indicated that they would evaluate and take appropriate action regarding the items identified for corrective action.

At, no time during this inspection did the inspectors provide any written information to the license