IA-92-198, Requests Written Answers Be Provided to Questions Developed During Discussions at Meeting on 660218,for ACRS Review. Lists Specific Questions Which Applicant Should Be Prepared to Discuss
| ML20128F066 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 02/23/1966 |
| From: | Fraley R Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Doan R US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20125A422 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-92-198 NUDOCS 9212080245 | |
| Download: ML20128F066 (13) | |
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February 23, IM6 MMosUumuH To Dr. R. L. Dome, Director Divistee of Reactor Licensing From : R. F. Fraley, Emeewtivo Secretary ACRS
Subject:
MILLSTOIE WUCLEAR POWER FIAff, ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE QUESTIONS L
At the ACES Seboommittee meeting se February 18,1M6, several gemettoes wre developed during disevasions with representatives of the applicant i and their cosewitants and contrastors for the M111stsee Moslear power Plaat. These questions are suneestised in the attached Itst for trees-mittal to the applicast4 It is requested that writtee amewers be pre-vided to these questimes for ACRs review of this projoet.
Several additional topies wre alee identified at this meeting, and the applicant was asked to be prepared to disease these itses des this pro-jact is next reviewed by the Committee. Spesifie questimes dish the applicant should be prepared to discuss are listed below
- 1. How will it be ascertaiend dether or eet the design conditimes have been exceeded if me e4rthquake occurst Will there be a eeisaosraph(s) iastalledi
- 2. Is it clear that a fire in the sostrel reos easset lead to grees failure of safety systeese, e.g., simultaneems withdrawal of redst
- 3. What would be the consequences of a postuist.ed assident is dish a este stama pipe breaks and both isolatise valves resenia opea, assumias other aspects of the pleet fumettoe as desigeodt Coe-sider various positioes for the pipe break. Bow would conse-quences cheese if sladdies ruptures se 1% of the fuel er if it of the fuel elements esit due to impeeper distribution of core spray?
- 4. Describe the calculation that leeds to the IC/see steek emisaise \nj j n.1 ,. n. n , e n, -- --- = w n > w. = - - - m. e = 1 4--1
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- 5. Deeeribe the noteorelegy program that will be perfereed to deter-alma the eheracteristies of the less durattaa "famiaattes esadt-tion sieb may eseur with an on-shore wind. - Describe the ef fect this condities pisy have os staak release rate limits.
- 4. Discuss the mechanical detaile dich tend to preelede er mitigate the speseguenses of a rod ejesties assident.
- 7. Discuss the sensequences, tastudias resoesentrattom in marias life, if unter is disaharsed from the feet 11ty at the mestems consentra-tion permitted by 10 CFR part 10.
- 8. State the usage faster for the primetyle types of stress eyeles to disk the pressure vessel will be subjected. Indiaates
- a. De mueber of times each type of eyele is anticipated.
- b. The ammismse ander ef each type ef eyele that the vessel te likaty to underge,
- s. N asser of eyelas whiah are aseeptable.
The roepeace to the ebeve should be is teres of the maalaus flaw sine that saa be tolerated.
- 9. Deseribe the is servise inspectime and surveillasse program for the pressure veseet is sees detail.
- 10. Diseuss dether it is eredible that an assident might e-u=-N the elastrieal distribution and instrumsstaties systems la such a way as te pcevest'use ef the ensinsered safeguards.
- 11. What are the eensequences if the centrol rods were all withdraum at the sans time due to a failure is the instrumsmaatime or drive systmas i for the redet can the pressure veseel withstand this assident?
- 11. Wha; acties would be takes in the event the standby diesel generater were found to be inoperative durias reacter operetten? Util the reaa-tor be ehet deus if the generator is set operativet 1
- 13. Will the everpower seram set point be lowered durias operaties with partial roeirculaties flow to meistata en acceptable buramet retic at thL eserpower seren set point? Eow will this he asseglished?
Attasheest:
ACES Sebeammittse Questises as c ' M111stees Westear power Statis.
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ACES SU30000GTTER QUESTION 05 x11.tssgEs NUC1AAR PUWER STATION
- 1. Discuss the consequences of an inadvertent rapid startup from low j temperature as it relates to allevable pressure vessel stresses and brittle fracture limits skich might exist at low temperature.
- 2. Def tse the fisw size and type is the piosaure vessel whiek is accepted in the specifications. ht fiswo larger la sine or of special significasse might not be detected, particularly is sense +
of irregular gesentry!
- 3. ht fisw sise is acespeed in the stude of the treasure vesself ht frequemeios of stud inspestime er replacespot is plemmed?
How asey stude saa fail without threatestas the integrity of the closuret
- 4. Describe how senti leaks is the pressere vessel usuld be detested and the acties to be taken,- should such eeser. New is 4 :Me response assured in the event of a previses emisteese of small leaks in other parts of the systant
- 5. Which missiles are protested for and which missiles are not pro-tected fort
- 6. ht are the positive reestivity effects des to fusi releeaties?
Can this 7 _:_r- affest reestivity treasients like the rod ajectten eseident signifisamtly?
- 7. If one postulates the rapid propagaties of a erask streenferem-tially, with the-eeetained emergy of the system, what would happen .
to the upper sectima of the veseal including shearing of' pipes, etc.?
- 8. Can you visualise any problem free the propagaties of a creek free top to bottom of the vessel but est through the heedt
- 9. Are you eensidering procedures for detesting the propagattee of cracks within the pressure vessel wellt OmCE > , , , , . . . . , ,,, , , , , , , _ ,
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E 2 F. I Consnents on RECUVED Design and Analysis Report Amendment No. 1 Millstone Nuclear Power StationO !"9 L P'.1 12 5 3 Dated February 2, 1966 Prepared by h.pya'fCC * "
REACTOR SM E.'ARDS Environmental Meteorological Research Branch Institute for Atmospheric Sciences February 25, 1966 I
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Site Meteorotomy Question 1(a) b Because of the lack of applicable data it is difficult to refute or confirm in a quantitative way whether isolated downwind terrain prominences have any effect on decreasing the distance between the ground and the elevated plume centerline, thus affecting the ground concentration._ Obviously, laminar air flow approaching an. isolated terrain obstacle must either flow around or over the obstacle (1). The streamlines at the level of the elevated plume centerline will be compressed as well as raised to some extent as the '
flow goes over the obstacle.- The figure at- the bottom of page 246, reference (1) shows graphically how the distance between the ground and the top stream-p lines is decreased. From casual observation -in the rolling countryside just north of Washington, D. C. , elevated smoke plumes on early mornings with strong surface-based radiation inversions tend to move horizontally and are little affected by the undulations of the terrain below. The field experi-j isental data at Humboldt Bay, Eureka, California cited by the applicant . include I 11 field trails, only one of which was performed under inversion conditions and even that trial _was under widely meandering wind directions and wind L speeds averaging about 1 aph. It is obvious from the fluorescent particle ,
data that for tne trials which went in the direction of Humboldt Hill, relatively_ good diffusion existed since the maximum ground concentration was '
always between the s tack and Humboldt Hill.
Site Meteorology. Ques tion 1(b)
It has not been demonstrated that at Millstone Point a fumigation condition caused by stable air over cold water moving-inland cannot persist for periods in excess of two hours with significant frequency. To various degrees, Hewson, Gill and Walke (2) show this condition to exist numerous times and show a' case (run #11) where the stable elevated plume reaches _ the-ground at 1/2 mile. . They describe the plume first as coning in a fashion typical of a stable atmosphere with a low wind ' speed. .Next there appears a region in which there is very little vertical diffusion. Af ter about 1/2 mile the plume shows considerable vertical diffusion" and visibly reaches the ground as .shown by their graphic profile of the cloud dimensions.
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The existence of transition states of diffusion raises the broader ques: ion of how one appropriately describes the meteorology of the site.
As was pointed out in our previous comments, this involves not only on-site information (e.g. on-site meteorological cower) but also data at points where s marked transition occurs because of land-water: contrasts.
This, perhaps, could most easily (and inexpensively) be done by a com-prehensive smoke plume photography study. However, this has the _
disadvantage of being limited primarily _ to daylight hours because of the photographic requirement, although some successful time exposure photographa of plumes have been made in full moonlight.
Site Hydroloar (Original Report)
At the request of the Site Analysis Branch, Division of Reactor Licensing we have been requested to comment on the question of the- effect of hurricane storm surge on the maximum expected high water mark. The high water data reported in Table 11-13, page 11-4-1 of the original report is _ taken directly= from the appropriate figures in U. S. Weather.
Bureau Technical Paper #48(3). However, on the 1938 and 1954 hurricanes it is noted that. "Many of the elevations -shown result from averaging- from two to ten values.obtained within a space of one to two'ailee of coast-line. The range of values combined to obtain a single value f.s frequently greater than 2 f t. "Also,-it should be noted that in the case' of Hurricane Carol of 1954 that high water levels of 12.6 and 11.8 were reported along the open coast just west _ of ths. hurricane path and about 25 miles west of '
Millstone Point. Thus , excludinn wave runup (computed to be about- 5. fee t -
by applicant) in the calculation of a maximum credible high water level, a value of 13 to 14 feet above mean sea level would seen possible. This compares to a value of 9.2 feet excluding wave runup in the original Design and Analysis ' Report.-
References (1) Scorer, R. S. 1958: " Natural Aerodynamics Pergamon Press, London 313 pp.- (see page 246) .
(2)- -Hewson E. W., Gill, G. C. and Walke, G. J., 1963: Smoke Plume Photography Study,' Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant, Charlevoix, Michigan" Progress Report No. 3, Dept. - of Meteorology and;0ceanography, -
University of Michigan (04-015-3-P), 87 pp.
(3) DeMarrais,- G. A. , Holzworth, G. C. 'and Hooler, C.- R. 1965: " Meteorological l Summaries-Pertinent to Atmospheric Transport and Dispersion Over Southern __
California." Technical Paper No. 54, U. S. Weather Bureau,- Washington, D. C.- ,
86 pp.
.. w4 lC I I March 4, 19 M s
$90EIT W EVENTS RELATES TO DEVEIMIENT W ;
ORAL VS. WRITTEN ORASETS K MELidi m P9 2 f_REAC E S (1) Jamary 21, 1966 - List of ACRs Seestions transmitted to IRL for writtaa reply on Brookwood Reactor (R. F.
Fraley memo to E. G. Case fo11ceing SC Neeting on '
Jan. 27, 1964). Included questices.se quality com-trol of stude and stud failure (#7), a sire. pressurr.
vessel crack (#13) and a long. pressure vessel _ creek
(#34).
(2) February 10-12.1964. 70th ACEA Ming - ACR4 agreed to ask M111 stems Point for written anssors to an appro-priate list' of questions - similar to those developed for trookweed La January. - several questions for an oral reply were aise developed for Brookwood and Millstone which dealt with-the eensegusases and com-tata===t of the pressure vessel head as a nissile and a cirsumferential pressure vessel ereek.
(3) February 14 4946 - R. F. Fraley teleses to E. S. Case transmitted questions for oral reply by treeksood and M111stees. Alerted E. 4. Case to the writtam questions heias developed .for IdL11steme.= Case indisated that the oral geoetiens created a prob-les of transmittal for M k. ,
L (4) February 13. 1966 - Memo from R. F. Fraley to R. L. Deam I
dated 2/15/64 with questions fer. written reply re liquid weste handling.
I (5) Fahpaary la.1964 - E. 8. Case indisated that he had L obtalaed approval to & transmit the questione .
for an oral 9eply V E111staas.
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At the seedlusion of the meeting R. Coe (Consultaat to M111stooe) empressed grave consera to Dr. Eabel over the requiremsat for written answers to questions dealing with eatestrophic pressure vessel failures.
Dr. Eabel discussed this with me af ter the- meeting and I agreed te bring the matter to the attsattom of Dr. Okreat.
(7) February Ili_llM - I received a teleses from E. 6. Case in whiah he inquired if the ACBS wee reviewias its posities with re ped to the need for writtem answers to the Brookwood/HL11stens questions en satastrophic pressure vessel failures. Be-indicated that A.Wytes (Legal Ceument for Brookwood) had salted te make this inquiry based os information he had resetved seneerna ing the M111stema subeausittee meettag. (It was met; ,
i elear how he had obtained this infemmaties.) I advised l Mr. Case that ne destatea had been mek to modify or l
i withdraw the Comittee's questions sa Beeskueed er M111 stone.4(An advanced set of the Brookwood anewsrs wee received on Feb. 21, 1 M6 and the answers La amendment form unre received on Messh 1,1344.)
I During the day on Tuesday, this seject uns discussed j maeng Okreat, Sabel, Etherington, Falladine and Freley.
It was eventually decided that. the regsirement for writtaa answers to the questices se Du h and l
W111stema dealing with estastrophia pressure vessel failures would be withdraum and oral. replies would be satisfestery. I called E. 6. Case te advise him of.
chia desisies but he-taformed me that the answere to
-the Brookwood questione had already been submitted in vriting. Mr. Case . suggested that, based es sam-menta by Mr. Uptee. Breekweed had decided that it -
would eresta more of a problem to try to empleta to potential intervenere, etc., why they had met been anewsrod in writing than it would to answer the.
questions.
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Dr. Embel who decided that, in view of the above, the questions to Millstone should include similiar inquiries re catastrophic pressure vessel failure es originally planned.
Dr. Okreet proposed that this subject be scheduled for discussion at the Marsh ACRs meeting.
(8) February 23.19M - The questions for a written reply on M111stens were treammitted to ML by R. F. Fraley meme.
(9) March 2.. LtM - written emewers te Acts guestions on Milletone were received.
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_LetterJeevested (App 11eamte were teforend at the February 18, IM6 Subcoemetttee meettes that a letter might not he writtaa at the March 19M imeet is.s . )
$ loc _,haround I N H111 stone Potet subeometttee visited the ette of the pre- '
posed Milletone Nuetear power 8tettes sa July 6,1MS. la its .,
July 19, 1965 letter, followina review of the proposed site. I the Cosmoittee concluded tFat the ette uma aseeptable for a 2500 W(t) pressurised er be!!1es water reester, if adequate coataimmest and engimmered eafeswatde ere previded. -
On November 15, IMS, en applicat tee for a seestreettee permit ,
was filed aceenpasted by the Destas and Analysts tepert for the reester. This was fe11ewed by a anL/M111 stems point asettee se December 12 and 23,1965 to seasider the applicaties, and a set of DEL quetiems wee euheequently forwarded f.e the applicante on Jessary 14, 19M . The reply to these questions wee received by the ABC en February 2, IM6. - Os February 18, IM6, a sub- ,
committee meet tes wee held Suheessittes queettens were subse-quantly forwarded to BEL es . Asary 25,19% for trenootttet to the applicante and the answere t those queettees were re-cetved en March 3,1Me. The toutwo schedule for the regula-tory process, agreed to hetWz. ib LW. Staf f and the applicante, costasylates teemasse of a contrwtton pe. wit on June 1,19M.
t Questions:
- 1. The DEL emetysis states that the Reguustory Staff believee '
that the poteettal high water problem at the site should he re-eelved by further informattee tree the applisente and from the . ;
DEL oonsultante. The U. S. Coologiest Survey report, resolved after the DEL esatysts was forwarded to the- ACRS, indicates that a-etern eurge might eeuse the water surface to rise to 16.1 - 14.4 feet above seen ses level at the site. The esport aloe todientes that were and flood deesse 5 to 25 feet aheve this height might secur. Further .taferusties from this parties.
1er Det seesultant appears to hevo made the ped'.es of possible high water at the eit? less resolved.- Cessmente regardies this metter might he asked of the DEL 8taff and the app 11eaese.
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- 2. DEL sonstudes its report with a list of seven items, ta !
addities to the high water problem, whieb will require resolv-ties durias enestreettee and prior to operettom of the facility. I nose items ares !
- 1. ne adequacy of the Centrol Red niebte Support structure. i
- 2. ne effects of a failwe in the esotrol red salester system cousias the withJroual of 2 l eentrol rede.
- 3. he effects of a tese of redendency to the Contatammet sprey Systems in the evoet of a l rupture of a errey header.
- 4. We treastemt effects of a wdden less of lead einse the hypeos systes new has a 10Cf. sapeetty.
- 5. We preventies of diesel generator ever.
leed. '
- 6. Raoults of noteoretogical site tests.
- 7. Comt h integrity in the evoet of fa.
sility atack failure.
Some of the above appear ts require early resoluttee, and perhaps '
should be resolved 6t the seestructies permit stage, esposta11y the effect es sentaiammet integrity in the event of fatture of the fseility steek. DRI. eight be asked when theae-itees will be i resolved. t
- 3. CE une asked at the pobruary 18, 1966 Subeensittoe meettag=
to be prepared to discuss the possibility of the -failure. of one - '
of the esta steem itse isolation valves resulting is failure of the other. (his is aseitar to a question asked regarding Dreedom 1.)
- 4. no February 23, 1966 asserenden to DkL listed 13 ACRS ques-times that the applisents abeeld be prepared ta disemos at the full Committee meeting.
- 5. It should be meted that the applissets have est really enewared the egal acts gesettene (developed at the 70th moottag) with regard te what might be does to oestata a satastrophie pree-sure vessel fatture, sesh as a brittle failure ef the pressure vessel well er less of the pressure vessel head. Disenssion at-cmcr> . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . _ . . . . . .. _ _ _ . . . . . .
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4-the subcometttee meeting dealt primilarly with the inarodibility of such accidente. It appears that emewere to these questions will be provided saly if the Acts insists.
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" ' ,' e Envitonmental Scienct Services Admini ttration Hny 24, 1968 N Hillitent rite i n unique in uopnri t.on to inland Lite t in that onshore ilow, uhich is of most immediate concern becaut:e of the site boundary, is predorninantly a stablo ilow as it pn6ces the top of the ro6ctor r. tack. Concequcntly, the atnoophr ric process which would cause the bichant ground concentrations itorn an initi al elevated plurra would be one of rapid downward mixing. Such a pseudo fumigation procoob has been discuased cnd docurncated by Vtm der lloven [1] and in our comrwntr of December 29,1965 r4nd February 25,1966 and i s alf o dia. cussed by the applicant bar.ed on a specici st udy by Downe and Col li n c [2,') :.nd i ncluded nt. Appendix A-2. A critten1 f actor in
, , computing of f-r i to g round-level contentrationr, ar sumi ng ch ontbore f u 1gction r.odel i 6 t he inland dir t anc( at which the 1and - i nduced tutbalence rc aches the c.t a bl e plunw. An e npirical relationnhl p i s available [1] which fits very well the measuremer.ts repc.ited bj Bouno and Collins [2] where for 17 caer. of onthore gradient , the htight of the mixtd layer reached th: f. trak beirbt (114 m t er n) at an om race di r.tance of 3000 rwter s f rorn t.ht bo ot h wi t h c*, rnnat .
vind speed value of 4.5 m/ #.ec and pot ent in) ten <pc rature di f f erence in .
the overwater inve rr. ion of 2.50C, II:na ve r , for r.n individual case, uh t te f or exa.mpl e the wind 1. peed i h reduced in the ill ust rat ion above to 2 r:J t ec, the empi rical relation:.hi p i ndicate s f un.igation nt a distance of 400 m from the 60urce. 94 vould dir.cgree with the Applicant that necording to their Lt u.!y [2] the closest dit:tance at uhleb post.ible fumication would occut i6 at 2333 mete to f rom the rource. llewson, Gill and Walhe Dj thou a case (run 611) et the Dig Ilock l'oi nt reactor site there f ron, a 78 no t e r s t ach the s t i.bl e elevated plu...e reachet t he prot,ind at a distance of r.vu u. m-11arly, kohinson, fuerly and Cran.er [4) show a 76 meter high plume tr a hin;,
the ground at the same di r.tance for the llueboldt hny reactor of te.
Tr,cm evidence presently available, including the cite rwitorological d .ta which s.hosn that fumigation conditions could occur inland f roa.
. the plant about 25 percent. of the tine cnd that t. table or very stable atmospheric conditions with onthore winds are obr.ervec 36 parcent of
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9 th: t ot al .nr.ual hou r s, ut vr ulcl cencludc thc.t pe r si s t s. nl (at Icost 1
2 hourt) f u~.i ptic n c c ' di t wt.s c a" occu r at t h. nearest e f f - t i t.c j
ice,dary cJ au t 1/ 2 ra l c to the r: . t hut. Tha s ( ficet would be l
i rm.m. nc' uncer s. lightly ttab1c init2 al plun < undit ions wi th lou .
wind 5;c c d t. Ac c uni rq Pacquill Type E inverrion conditions, a vand speed of 2 m/tec, the f umir.ation rnodel would result in a ground ic yc1 cor. centration of 4.4 x 10-5 tec/M Ubich is four timer, tre ater than the controlling '
of f site ectinate listed in Tabic XIV-17 of
} the FSAR.
1 l
References i
[1] Van der lloven,1. (1967), "Atnnt.pheric Transport and Di f f usion at Coastal Sites," 1:ucl eat Safety, L(5), pp. 490-4H.
[2] Bowne,11. E. and C. F. Collins (1967), "Sunnary Report , 1966 Suraer Pilo'; Balloon and Wiresunde Observationc, Millstone Point." TRC Scrvice Corporation, llartford, Conn., 31 pp.
l [3] llewson, E. W. , C. C. 0111 and G. J. Walke (1963), " Smoke Plune Photogrcphy Study, Big Roch Point !;uclear Plant, Charlevoix, lu chigan." Progret,s Ecport 03, Dept. of Het corology and Oceanography, Univ. of Michigan (04 015-3-P) ,
g 67 pp.
[4) kobini.cn, L.11. , D. L. Ebc tly, and H. E. Cramer (1965), "&tcorology
- and Atnospheric Dif fucion in the Vicinity of the llemboldt llay Power Plant, Pacific Gas and Electric Company, Meteorologic al
'] Ciface, 85 pp. '
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