ML20125A965
| ML20125A965 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 06/21/1965 |
| From: | US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20125A422 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-92-198 NUDOCS 9212090149 | |
| Download: ML20125A965 (11) | |
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DIVISION OF REACTCR LICENSIM REPORT TO ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFECUARDS IN THE MATTER OF CONNECTICUT LIGNT AW POWER COMPANY PRELIMINARY SITE EVALUATION - MILLSTONE POIlfr REACT (R
,s 4-Foto.by the Director.' Division of Reactor Licensinn The attached report has been prepared by the Divisios, of Reactor Licensing for_ consideration by the Advisory Commaittee on Reactor Safeguards at its -
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g Introduction A preliminary site report for Millstone Point, which is located on Long Island Sound near Waterford, Connecticut, was submitted on May 14, 1965, by the Connecticut Light and Power Company, the Hartford Electric Light Company, and the Western thesachusetts Electric Company. Specific data concerning the s size and type reactor, on site meteorology, and the area of the proposed sE'e t
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were not included in the submittal. The staff has completed a preliminary evaluation to determine the general suitability of the location and the approxi-mate site area required for construction of a 2500 Hw(t) PWR or BWR reactor assuming TID-14844 meteorology. Discussion A visit to the Millstone Point site was made by members of the staff on June 10, 1965. During discussions held with representatives of the Connecticut Light and Power Company, we were informed that either a PWR or BWR type reactor with a capacity of approximately 600 Hw(e) was being considered for the site. The Connecticut Light and Power Company currently owns or has options to purchase suf ficient land to provide an exclusion distance of approximately 0.5 mile. The population density data submitted shows no people within 0.25 mile, 3 people within 0.50 mile and 175 people within 1.0 mile. Based on the infor-mation submitted in the preliminary site evaluation report, the low population distance appears to be about 2-3 miles and the nearest population center (New London, Conn. - 33,000 population) is 4.7 miles from the site. We have requested that the applicant prepare a map of the site showing the exclusion M FTRIAL Us N L
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area, and also prepare data and a discussion of present and future population distribution. This information is expected to be available to the Committee prior to its July 6, 1965 Subcommittee Meeting at Millstone Point. The following results were obtained, using TID-14844 meteorology, assuming a PWR with single containment and a BWR with pressure suppression containment for a reactor that could have a power level up to 2500 Hv(t): Pressurized Water Reactor The minimum exclusion distance required for a PWR is generally determined by the consequences of a major loss of coolant accident. This accident is assumed to result in a 100% core meltdown and release of 100% of the noble gases, 50% of the halogens and 1% of the solids; credit is given for the 50% plate out of iodine within the containment. For the purpose of this analysis, it is also assumed that the PWR would be provided with a single containment with a leakage rate of 0.1% per day. The limiting condition for this accident under these conditions is the 2-hour thyroid dose. Such a reactor system would be similar to Connecticut-Yankee, which was given additional credit for its engineered safeguard systems (safety injection, containment spray, internal filtration) . A reactor system having equivalent engineered safeguards would be expected to be able to obtain similar credit. The minimum exclusion and low population distance for a 2500 Mw(t) PWR assuming: (a) no credit for engineered safeguards, and (b) reduction factor of eight for 2 hour dose, and factor of 30 for infinite dose (similar to that given to Connecticut-Yankee for engineered safeguards) are the following: l MPICI AL "SE-ONIN-- l
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3_ 2500 Hw(t) PWR Low Condition Exclusion Distance Population Distance no credit 1.0 mile 20 miles credit for engineered 0.3 mile 2 miles safeguards as indicated above A graph showing the minimum exclusion dis tance for a 2500 Mw(t) PWR as.;a function of equivalent leakage rate h attacted to this report. This curve pro-vides the exclusion distance for any amount of credit given for engineered safeguards. If no credit is given, the equivalent leakage is equal to the containment leakage specification. Boiling: Water Reactor The minimum exclusion distance required for a BWR is usually determined by the potential consequences of the steam line break accident outside the. contain-ment s tructure. This accident postulates failure of a main steam line in the pipe tunnel beyond the isolation valves. For the purposes of this analysis, we assumed that the reactor wo61d be similar to Jersey Central with its engineered safeguards characteristics; i.e. , pressure suppression containment with an - assumed leakage of 0.5% per day, and filtered emergency ventilation system exhausting the reactor building. For a BWR at Millstone Point, credit similar to that given to Jersey Central would be required for the expected exclusion distance '(factor of 8)p and for the low population distances provided((factor of 30) to meet Part 100 criteria. For the steam line rupture accident situation, it is assumed that the radioactivity of the primary coolant is at the maximum level permitted by the stack release rate at the time of the accident; this value is about 50 uc/cc. 4FICIAlcUSE- ONLY-
JXFICIAIT USTDNLY During the accident, about half of the primary coolant would escape before the system could be sealed by one of the dual isolation valves (this loss of coolant would not uncover the core), . Our analysis of such an accident assumed release of the radioactive steam from the pipe tunnel and turbine building over a period of two hours, and that _ the radioactive cloud remained near the surface. We believe that these assumptions represent the upper limit of the potential consequences of the accident. If credit were given for release of the steam over a shorter time period and rising of the steam cloud as it lef t the turbine building, the potential off-site doses would be reduced by at least a factor of 10 to 100. The following table lists the minimum exclusion distance required by the two hour thyroid dose for the steam line break accident, assuming the release of various amounts of radioactivity: 2500 Mw(t) BWR Condition Exclusion Distance Half primary coolant escapes 0.5 mile All primary coolant escapes before 0.9 mile valves close' All primary coolant plus fission gates: 3.0 miles from 1% additional failed fuel rods-es ape before valves clbeF ' If it is assumed that the facility stack height is at least 150 feet, the low population distance would also be determined by the steam line breakaaccident,- and would be the same as the mir'. mum exclusion distance given in the above table. If the stack height were only 100 feet, the low population distance would be about 2 miles, as determined by the potential consequences of a refueling accident in the refueling building. -p g , g. a am y n , DEFICIAL USE ONLY .
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SFFICIAL-USE ONLY-5- The application for Dresden 11 proposes the installation of flow reducing orifices in the steam lines to limit the consequences of this accident. These flow reducers uould limit the steam velocity to double the normal value if a line bi4ak should occur (steam flow would approach sonic velocity without the reducing orifices). It is expected that only one-sixth of the primary coolant would be lost under these conditions; consequently, the minimum required exclusion distance would be reduced to about 0.25 mile. However, it should be noted that the adequacy and reliability of this feature has not yet been evaluated by the staff. The consequences of the loss of coolant accident (100% core meltdown using TID release fractions) were also analyzed, and found not to be limiting for either the mhtimum exclusion or low population distance. Calculations were performed assuming: (1) release of activity from a 100 foot stack at 0.5% per day with 90% filter efficiency, and (2) exfiltration from the refueling building (0.5% per day leakage from the containment, 100% per day leakage from the refueling building, 40 mph wind velocity) wi th no stack release. The following results are presented for comparison purposes: k. e r Condition Wake of Building Exclusion Distance - 0.25 Mile) 2 Hour Exposure Infinita_ Exposure Stack Release Thyroid -- 0.02 rem 0.9 rem Whole Body -- 1.4 rem 11 rem Exfiltration Thyroid 32 rem -- -- Whole Body 0.2 -- -- Conclusion Assuming a minimum exclusion distance of about 0.5 mile and a low popuistion distance of '2-3 miles for the Hillstone Point site, this location should be 1 l j JFFICL%JISE ONLY-- ) l
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3 Cemments on RECEIVED
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ON R Ds
/ j l De sign nd Analysis Report u.s. A.c.c V
M [Millson Nuclear Power Station
' ate November 12, 1965 . JAN 131%.
MY j I h/ Prepared by Ati
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pas 4 Environmental Meteorological Research;Br ~
. Institute for Atmospheric December 29, 1965 ,,j j.Scien[ces'
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The location of the Millstone site at the end of a peninsula'alWhi the north shore of Lon8 Island Sound necessitates the consideration of the effect of extended overwater trajectories on the dispersive capacity of the atmosphere as well as the complex situation of diff usion in tran-sitional states due to the land-water differences adjacent to the site. from an analysis [1] of wind fluctuation data taken simultaneously on the east and west shores of Chesapeake Bay, the standard deviation of the horizontal wind direction (06) generally decreased on the average by a factor of 2 af ter a 7-mile fetch over water while the wind speed increased by a factor of from 1.2 to 2.0. This same trend is apparent in the over-water 10, 11 andand12). overland Using awind fluctuation 00 method to predictdata at Millstone downwind Point[2(Tables 11-9) concentrations
,~ implies larger concentrations by a f actor of about 3 with overwater, as compared to overland trajectories, assuming no change in wind speed. The increase in wind speed, due in large part to the smoother overwater flow, will partially counteract the effect of the wind direction fluctuation.
The primary overwater trajectories at the site is flow f rom the southwest, southeast and north where the water surface extends for 1,1-1/2 and 9 miles, respectively,before reaching land. In the first two cases there has been essentially an unlimited overwater fetch before the air reaches the site. The situation of elevated sources at or near the land-water boundary brings up the Hewson, Gill . and Walke [3]inquestion of diffusion their smoke in transitional plume photography studystates. at Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant show that the initial slow vertical and horizontal spreading caused by lake-induced, low-level inversion (see Run 6) persists inland in this case to about 1-1/2 miles before the effect of the rougher warmer land surf ace is noticed on an elevated (250-f t) plume. The effect produced is that of fumigation and can last for many hours. Our review of the applicant's meteorological dif fusion evaluation methods indicates that the f.iispersion models used are not sufficiently related to existing site data and do not take into account in a realistic way the
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ACRS OFFICE C0FY DO NOT hEMOVE ks k
u.ique physical dif ferences of this peninsula site as compared, for example, to a continental site such as Dresden. Specific comments are as follows (1) It is stated in the report that the primary measured dif f usion parameter, og 0, has a value of less than 20 degrees-mph about 17. of the time at a level of 152 f eet above mean se: level. This i s not in agreement with Table 11-3-13 which indicates that thi condition occurs about 25% of the time for overwater (water to land) trajectories. (2) The assumption of a con stant stack height out to a distance- nine miles does not take into account that there are isolated terrAl avations which rise to 100 feet at a distance of 1-1/2 miles, 250 feet','st . miles, and 500 feet at 10 miles. (3) The special situation of fumigation 7bf an elevated plume was assumed to persist on the average for about 15 minutes. This is generally true for the continental f umigation conditions occurring around sunrise when the nocturnal surf ace inversion is dissipated by hesting from the ground. How ev e r , the cooling of the Icwer layers of the atmosphere due to a trajectory over a cold water surf ace and then subsc-quent travel over a warmer land surf ace (e.g. the Long Island Sound sea breeze) could well cause the fumigation of an effluent plume lasting many hours. (4) The model used to predict the height of rise of a stern cloud - f rom a postulated pipe rupture in the turbine building seems unrealistic. The use of an empirical4 formuga based on the open burning of solid rocket fuel at the rate of 10 to 10 cal / sec does not seem applicabic to a dif fuse steam cloud issuing f rom numerous openings in a building. Further-more, the extension of the model to wind speeds of 50 mph is entirely out of the range of the rocket f uel results and does not seem valid. From cosuai observation of steam clouds, a rise of 6200 feet, even under calm condit.ons, is extremely unrealistic. More realistically, one would expect such a cloud to rise only a few hundred feet because of the heat energy dissipated within the turbine building, the diff use nature of the steam as it reaches the oatside atmosphere not only through roof vents but through de's and windows, and the physical changes which the steam will undergo. I ,ummary, we feel that an important aspect of the meteorology of the Millstone Point site to be considered is the eff ect of land-water dif-f erences upon the dispersion of the postulated effluent releases. This involves not only on-site information (e.g. on-site metcom logical tower) but data on the transition states of the atmosphere. For example, a climatological joint-frequency distribution of land versus water surface temperatures would be a usef ul and measurable parameter. It would be our
- preliminary estimation that a sea breeze, f umigation condition would give a l
controlling air concentration of 1 x 10
- p-sec/cc per curie released at a distance of f rom 1/2 to 1 mile from the stack f or two hours. This value is an order of magnitude greater than any value listed in Table XIV-23. If
! for any reason a ground release can be postulated, concentrations at 1/2 l mile could be 1 x 10-3 pc -sec/cc per curie released. l i
. . _ . _ . _ _ . _ _ . . __ . _ . . . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ - . . . _ . . . _ _ _ - - . . . . _ ... m . . _ - -.
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Ref erence s [1] Slade, D. H., 1962: " Atmospheric Dispersion Over Chesapeake Bay"' Monthly Weather Review, 90, 217-224 [2] Slade, D. H., 1965: " Dispersion Estimates from PollutanUnetaases of a Few Seconds to 8 Hours in Duration. Technical Note 2-d b.1, Department of Commerce, ESSA /WB, 23 pp. 2ds .1 - Tff L,
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[3] Hewson, E. W. , Cill, G. C. and Walke, G. J. ,1963i J " Photography Study, Big Rock Point Nuclear Plantj -:Charlevoix! Michigan" Progress Report #3,- Dept. of Meteorology and Oceanography, Univ. of Michigan (04 015-3-P), 87 pp. f 1
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, , , l, . l :g w Comments on , Preliminary Site Evaluation .. Millstons Point, Waterford, Conneettsut m -- , j Prepared by Q i .
'ycL v l Environmental Meteorologica11Research Dreap'l , .
Office of Meteorological Rasaar$h.e: 9 2 Y June 17,1965 Q,y@9 l' ' ' jp3)<?} O The meteorological summary on page 70 of this report seems reasonable. ' The site could, as mentioned, bear* the full brunt of a tropical storn. Extra tropical storas, while not as severe, can be arpected more frequently, at least a fav times per year and winds in excess of 50 knots are likely to occur on these occasions. Mention is made of a meteorological program which has been initiated. - l No mention is made of the type of diffusion models that will be employed , or of the type of data that are required by such models. If properly used3 the continuous wind records from Nosnk, Connecticut could be inval-unble for a first measure of the diffusion climate. Due to die effect of the extended overwater trajectory immediately upwind or downwind of the site, we believed that the use of meteorological data from the Brookhavan l National Laboratory is of limited value with regard to the assesament of , the atmospheric diffusion capacity of the Hillstone Point site. .
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