GNRO-2005/00027, Technical Specification Bases Update to the NRC for Period Dated May 5,2005

Technical Specification Bases Update to the NRC for Period Dated May 5,2005

ML051290205
Person / Time
Site:	Grand Gulf
Issue date:	05/05/2005
From:	Bottemiller C Entergy Operations
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
GNRO-2005/00027
Download: ML051290205 (7)

Text

GNRO-2005/00027 May 5,2005 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Document Control Desk

Subject:

Technical Specification Bases Update to the NRC for Period Dated May 5,2005 Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Docket No. 50-416 License No. NPF-29

Dear Sir and Madam:

Pursuant to Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) Technical Specification 5.5.11, Entergy Operations, Inc. hereby submits an update of all changes made to GGNS Technical Specification Bases since the last submittal (GNRO-2004/00058 letter dated October 18, 2004 to the NRC from GGNS). This update is consistent with update frequency listed in 10CFR50.71(e).

s.

Should you have any questions, please contact Michael Larson at (601) 437-6685.

Yours truly, CAB/MJL attachment: GGNS Technical Specification Bases Revised Pages cc: (See Next Page)

GNRO-2005/00027 PAGE 2 Compton J. N. ,_ (w/o)

Levanwa y D. E. (Wise Carter) (wla)

Reynolds N. S. (w/a)

Smith 1.J. (Wise Carter) (w/a)

NRC Senior Resident Inspector Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Port Gibson, MS 39150 US. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ALL LETTERS ATTN: Dr. Bruce S. Mallett (w/2) 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400 Arlington, TX 76011-4005 U S . Nuclear Regulatory Commission ALL LETTERS - COURIER ATTN: Mr. , NRRIDLPM (w/2)

ATTN: ADDRESSEE ONLY ATTN: Courier Delivery Only Mail Stop OWFN/7D-1 I 1555 Rockville Pike Rockville. MD 20852-2378

ATTACHMENT to GNRO-2005/00027 Grand Gulf Technical Specification Bases Revised Pages dated May 5,2005 I LDC# I BASESPAGESAFFECTED I TOPIC of CHANGE I 05024 B 3.6-87; B 3.6-88, B 3.6-89, B Technical Specification Bases changes eliminating the 3.6-89a requirements for automatic secondary containment isolation on selected systems.

Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 EASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.1.3 and SR 3.6.4.1.4 REQUIREMENTS (continued) The SGT System exhausts t h e secondary containment atmosphere t o t h e environment t h r o u g h a p p r o p r i a t e t r e a t m e n t equipment.

To ensure t h a t a l l f i s s i o n products a r e t r e a t e d , S R 3 . 6 . 4 . 1 . 3 v e r i f i e s t h a t t h e SGT System w i l l r a p i d l y e s t a b l i s h a n d m a i n t a i n a pressure i n t h e secondary containment t h a t i s l e s s t h a n t h e lowest p o s t u l a t e d pressure e x t e r n a l t o t h e secondary containment boundary.

S R 3 . 6 . 4 . 1 . 4 demonstrates t h a t each O P E R A B L E SGT subsystem can m a i n t a i n a reduced pressure i n t h e secondary containment s u f f i c i e n t t o a l l o w the secondary containment t o be in thermal e q u i l i b r i u m a t steady s t a t e c o n d i t i o n s . The t e s t c r i t e r i o n s p e c i f i e d by SR 3.6.4.1.4 includes a n allowance f o r b u i l d i n g degradation between performances o f t h e s u r v e i l l a n c e . This allowance r e p r e s e n t s a d d i t i o n a l b u i l d i n g inleakage o f 125 scfm.

As discussed i n B 3 . 6 . 4 . 2 , the SGT System has t h e capacity t o m a i n t a i n secondary corltainment negative p r e s s u r e assuming t h e f a i l u r e o f a l l nonqualified l i n e s 2 inches a n d smaller p l u s o t h e r analyzed f a i l u r e s . The number a n d s i z e o f t h e s e I assumed f a i l u r e s can vary as p e n e t r a t i o n s a r e added or removed from t h e secondary containment boundary. To account f o r t h e absence o f t h e s e assumed f a i l u r e s under t e s t c o n d i t i o n s t h e t e s t c r i t e r i o n s p e c i f i e d by S R 3.6.4.1.4 i s modified. These f a i l u r e s could i n c r e a s e secondary containment i n - l e a k a g e by approximately 400 scfm. To account f o r t h i s a d d i t i o n a l i n - l e a k a g e , a n d i n a d d i t i o n t o I

t h e requirements of SR 3.6.4.1.4, each SGT subsystem must m a i n t a i n 2 0.331 inches o f vacuum water g a u g e i n t h e I secondary containment f o r 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> a t a f l o w r a t e I 4000 cfm.

This value r e p r e s e n t s t h e m i n i m u m required d i f f e r e n t i a l p r e s s u r e a t I 4000 scfm system flow needed t o ensure t h a t t h e i n t e g r i t y of t h e SGT System b o u n d a r y w i l l meet i t s design requirement of 2 0 . 2 5 inches o f vacuum water gauge i n response t o p o s t u l a t e d a c c i d e n t s .

Therefore, t h e s e two t e s t s a r e used t o ensure secondary I containment boundary i n t e g r i t y . Since t h e s e SRs a r e secondary containment t e s t s , they need not be performed w i t h

( c o n t i nued)

GRAND G U L F E 3.6-87 LDC 05024

SCIVs 6 3.6.4.2 B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS B 3.6.4.2 Secondary Containment I s o l a t i o n Valves ( S C I V s )

BASES BACKGROUND The f u n c t i o n o f t h e S C I V s , i n combination w i t h o t h e r a c c i d e n t m i t i g a t i o n systems, i s t o l i m i t f i s s i o n product r e l e a s e during a n d f o l l o w i n g postulated Design Basis Accidents (DBAs) (Ref. 1 ) . Secondary containment i s o l a t i o n w i t h i n t h e time l i m i t s s p e c i f i e a f o r those i s o l a t i o n valves designed t o c l o s e automatically ensures t h a t f i s s i o n products t h a t l e a k from primary containment following a D B A ,

t h a t a r e released during c e r t a i n o p e r a t i o n s when primary containment i s n o t required t o b e OPERABLE, or t h a t t a k e p l a c e o u t s i d e primary containment, a r e maintained w i t h i n t h e secondary containment boundary.

The O P E R A B I L I T Y requirements f o r S C I V s help ensure t h a t a n adequate secondary containment boundary i s maintained during a n d a f t e r a n accident by'minimizing p o t e n t i a l p a t h s t o t h e environment, I s o l a t i o n b a r r i e r ( s 1 f o r t h e p e n e t r a t i o n a r e discussed i n Reference 2 . The i s o l a t i o n devices addressed by t h i s LCO a r e e i t h e r passive or a c t i v e . Closed m a n u a l I dampers a n d v a l v e s , d e - a c t i v a t e d automatic dampers a n d valves secured i n t h e i r closed p o s i t i o n , check valves w i t h flow through t h e valve secured, rupture d i s k s , dampers secured i n t h e closed p o s i t i o n , and b l i n d f l a n g e s a r e considered passive devices. Check v a l v e s , automatic dampers a n d v a l v e s , a n d valves operated remotely designed t o c l o s e following a n accident a r e considered a c t i v e devices.

Automatic SCIVs c l o s e on a secondary containment i s o l a t i o n signal t o e s t a b l i s h a boundary f o r untreated r a d i o a c t i v e material w i t h i n secondary containment following a DBA o r other accidents.

Other p e n e t r a t i o n s ( 2 . 5 inches a n d l a r g e r which do not perform a s a f e t y function or supply a source of makeup t o t h e R P V ) a r e iSGlatf?d by t h e use of dampers or valves i n t h e closed p o s i t i o n , rupture d i s k s , or b l i n d f l a n g e s . Smaller l i n e s a r e properly o r i f i c e d i f t h e i r f a i l u r e could provide a leakage p a t h which w o u l d exceed t h e capacity of the S t a n d b y Gas Treatment System.

( cont inued 1 GRAND G U L F B 3.6-88 LDC 05024

SCIVS B 3.6.4.2 BASES BACKGROUND Analysis have shown t h a t i n a d d i t i o n t o building leakage (conti n u e d ) paths, the f a i l u r e o f nonquafified l i n e s 2 inches a n d smaller penetrating the secondary containment plus the f o l l o w i n g a d d i t i o n a l f a i l u r e s w i l l n o t jeopardize the f u n c t i o n a l i n t e g r i t y o f the secondary containment by p r o v i d i n g a leakage p a t h which exceeds the c a p a c i t y o f t h e standby g a s treatment system.

Svstem F a i 1 ure Fire Protection ( w a t e r ) C r i t i c a l Crack Fire Protection (carbon d f o x i d e ) Break P l a n t Service Water C r i t i c a l Crack P l a n t Chilled Mater C r i t i c a l Crack Instrument A i r C r i t i c a l Crack I n the absence o f other a c t i v e f a i l u r e s , analyses have shown I t h a t the required negative pressure can be maintained given the a d d i t i o n a l f a i l u r e of a single nonisolated l i n e as large as 4 inches. A s a r e s u l t , the following l i n e s which penetrate the secondary containment a n d terminate there

( i . e . , they do n o t continue through the secondary containment and also penetrate the primary containment) are provided w i t h a single i s o l a t i o n valve, rather t h a n two, a t the secondary penetration:

a. 4-inch makeup water supply l i n e

b. 3-inch domestic water s u p p y l i n e

c. 4-inch RHR backwash l i n e

d. 3-inch backwash t r a n s f e r pump discharge l i n e

e. 3-inch floor a n d equipment d r a i n l i n e The single isolation valve for each o f the above l i n e s i s a n air-operated valve which f a i l s closed; i n addition, each operator i s provided w i t h redundant solenoid valves which receive a c t u a t i o n signals from redundant sources. I n t h i s manner, i t i s ensured t h a t , given any single f a i l u r e , o n l y one of the above l i n e s w i l l be nonisolated, which as stated above i s w i t h i n the capacity of the SGTS.

continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.6-89 LDC 05024

SCIVs 0 3.6.4.2 BASES BACKGROUND A l t h o u g h n o t needed t o e n s u r e t h e i n t e g r i t y o f s e c o n d a r y (continued) c o n t a i n m e n t , t h o s e systems t h a t p e n e t r a t e t h e p r i m a r y c o n t a i n m e n t i P 7 1 and P53) a r e p o t e n t i a l s o u r c e s o f s e c o n d a r y c o n t a i n m e n t b y p a s s l e a k a g e . Secondary c o n t a i n m e n t i s o l a t i o n o f t h e i n s t r u m e n t a i r ( P 5 3 ) s y s t e m i s not r e q u i r e d s i n c e t h e s y s t e m i s v e n t e d t o t h e s e c o n d a r y c o n t a i n m e n t when t h e s y s t e m i s no l o n g e r o p e r a t i n g a t a p r e s s u r e g r e a t e r t h a n containment. T h i s l o w p r e s s u r e c o n d i t i o n i s i n d i c a t i v e of a c o n d i t i o n t h a t t h e s y s t e m i s no l o n g e r a v a i l a b l e and e n s u r e s t h e i n s t r u m e n t a i r system i s n o t a source o f secondary c o n t a i n m e n t bypass l e a k a g e . The s y s t e m i s v e n t e d i n response t o low pressure i n t h e instrument a i r system w e l l b e f o r e s y s t e m p r e s s u r e i s r e d u c e d t o b e l o w t h e 15 p s i g containment pressure.

F o r t h e P l a n t C h i l l e d Water s y s t e m (PCW), an a n a l y s i s d e m o n s t r a t e d t h a t t h e p i p i n g a r r a n g e m e n t and l o o p s e a l s c r e a t e d b y t h e s y s t e m i n t h e a u x i l i a r y b u i l d i n g e s t a b l i s h an e f f e c t i v e b a r r i e r t o b y p a s s l e a k a g e . As a r e s u l t , s e c o n d a r y c o n t a i n m e n t i s o l a t i o n o f t h e PCW s y s t e m i s n o t r e q u i r e d .

APPLICABLE The SCIVs must be OPERABLE t o e n s u r e t h e s e c o n d a r y SAFETY ANALYSES containment b a r r i e r t o f i s s i o n product releases i s e s t a b l i s h e d . The p r i n c i p a l a c c i d e n t s f o r w h i c h t h e secondary containment boundary i s r e q u i r e d a r e a l o s s o f c o o l a n t a c c i d e n t ( R e f . 11, a f u e l h a n d l i n g a c c i d e n t i n v o l v i n g the handling o f recently i r r a d i a t e d fuel ( i . e . 9 f u e l t h a t has o c c u p i e d p a r t o f a c r i t i c a l r e a c t o r c o r e w i t h i n t h e p r e v i o u s 24 h o u r s ) ( R e f . 3 ) . The s e c o n d a r y c o n t a i n m e n t p e r f o r m s no a c t i v e f u n c t i o n i n r e s p o n s e t o e a c h o f t h e s e l i m i t i n g e v e n t s , b u t t h e b o u n d a r y e s t a b l i s h e d by S C I V s i s r e q u i r e d t o ensure t h a t leakage from t h e p r i m a r y c o n t a i n m e n t i s p r o c e s s e d b y t h e S t a n d b y Gas T r e a t m e n t ( S G T )

System b e f o r e b e i n g r e l e a s e d t o t h e e n v i r o n m e n t .

C conti nued 1 GRAND GULF B 3-6-89a LDC 05024