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Category:CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS
MONTHYEARDD-99-12, Informs That Time Provided by NRC Regulation within Which Commission May Act to Review DD-99-12 Has Expired.With Certificate of Svc.Served on 9910281999-10-28028 October 1999 Informs That Time Provided by NRC Regulation within Which Commission May Act to Review DD-99-12 Has Expired.With Certificate of Svc.Served on 991028 ML20217N8261999-10-25025 October 1999 Discusses Errata Re 991021 Filing of Northeast Nuclear Energy Co Answer to Request for Hearing & Petition to Intervene B17901, Submits Statement of Personal Qualification (NRC Form 398) Along with Supporting Certification of Medical Exam by Facility Licensee (NRC from 396) in Support of License Renewal for PM Miner.Encls Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6)1999-10-18018 October 1999 Submits Statement of Personal Qualification (NRC Form 398) Along with Supporting Certification of Medical Exam by Facility Licensee (NRC from 396) in Support of License Renewal for PM Miner.Encls Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6) B17886, Requests Permission to Utilize Code Case N-623, Deferral of Insps of Shell-to-Flange & Head-to-Flange of Reactor Vessel,Section Xi,Div 1, for Millstone Unit 21999-10-18018 October 1999 Requests Permission to Utilize Code Case N-623, Deferral of Insps of Shell-to-Flange & Head-to-Flange of Reactor Vessel,Section Xi,Div 1, for Millstone Unit 2 05000336/LER-1999-012, Forwards LER 99-012-00,re Unrecoverable CEA Misalignment Entry Into TS 3.0.3 on 990917.Commitments Made by Util Are Encl1999-10-15015 October 1999 Forwards LER 99-012-00,re Unrecoverable CEA Misalignment Entry Into TS 3.0.3 on 990917.Commitments Made by Util Are Encl B17900, Forwards Revised Assumptions Used in Fuel Handling Accident Analysis & Summary of Results.List of Regulatory Commitments Are Listed in Attachment 11999-10-14014 October 1999 Forwards Revised Assumptions Used in Fuel Handling Accident Analysis & Summary of Results.List of Regulatory Commitments Are Listed in Attachment 1 ML20217G9491999-10-14014 October 1999 Forwards Exemption from Requirements of 1-CFR50,App E, Section IV.F.2.c,re Conduct of full-participation Exercise in Sept 1999,at Plant,Units 1,2 & 3 ML20217D9671999-10-12012 October 1999 Forwards Copy of Transcript of Public Meeting Held by NRC Staff & NNECO on 990825 at Waterford,Connecticut on Decommissioning Program for Millstone,Unit 1.Without Encl ML20217D3011999-10-0707 October 1999 Forwards Request for Addl Info Re Util 990118 Request for Amend to License NPF-49 to Allow full-core Offloads to Spent Fuel Pool During Core Offloads to Spent Fuel Pool During Core Offload Events ML20217F0031999-10-0606 October 1999 Forwards Original Petition to Intervene Being Filed on Behalf of Clients,Connecticut Coalition Against Millstone & Long Island Coalition Against Millstone,Iaw Provisions of 10CFR2.714 ML20217P1201999-10-0606 October 1999 Informs NRC of Proposed Acquisition of Parent Holding Company of Central Maine & Requests NRC Concurrence,Based on Threshold Review,That Proposed Acquisition Does Not,In Fact, Constitute Transfer Subject to 10CFR50.80 B17892, Requests Withdrawal of License Amend Application Re 24-month SG Tube Insp Surveillance Extensions,Submitted in Util 950726 & s to NRC1999-10-0505 October 1999 Requests Withdrawal of License Amend Application Re 24-month SG Tube Insp Surveillance Extensions,Submitted in Util 950726 & s to NRC ML20217B4711999-10-0404 October 1999 Informs That Staff Did Not Identify Any Safety Concerns Re Licensee Proposals to Modify Commitments Made for Action Items 4.2.1,4.2.2,4.5.1 & 4.5.2 of GL 83-28 by Providing Addl Justifications or Safety Bases for Changes ML20212K1241999-10-0101 October 1999 Responds to Recent Ltrs to Chairman Jackson,Commissioners & Wd Travers,Expressing Concern Re Millstone Npps.Nrc Continues to Monitor Performace of Millstone to Ensure That Public Health & Safety,Adequately Protected ML20212J3051999-10-0101 October 1999 Discusses GL 97-06 Re Degradation of SG Internals,Dtd 971230.GL Requested Each PWR Licensee to Submit Info That Will Enable NRC Staff to Verify Whether PWR SG Internals Comply & Conform to Current Licensing Basis for Facilities ML20212L2081999-10-0101 October 1999 Responds to Recent Ltrs to President Wj Clinton,Chairman Jackson & Commissioners & Wd Travers,Expressing Concerns Re Millstone NPPs & Continued Lack of Mgt Plan for Eastern Long Island.Nrc Continues to Monitor Plant Performance ML20212J9991999-10-0101 October 1999 Responds to Recent Ltr to President Clinton,H Clinton, Chairman Jackson &/Or Wd Travers Expressing Concern Re Millstone Npps.Nrc Continues to Monitor Performance of Plant to Ensure That Public Health & Safety Adequately Protected ML20212L1971999-10-0101 October 1999 Responds to Recent Ltr to Chairman Jackson & Commissioners Expressing Concerns Re Millstone NPPs & Continued Lack of Emergency Mgt Plan for Eastern Long Island.Nrc Continues to Monitor Plant Performance to Ensure Public Health & Safety ML20212J2451999-10-0101 October 1999 Informs That Util 980807 & 990629 Responses to GL 98-01, Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at NPPs Acceptable.Nrc Considers Subj GL to Be Closed for Units 2 &3 ML20212L1831999-10-0101 October 1999 Responds to Recent Ltr to Wd Travers Expressing Concerns Re Millstone NPPs & Continued Lack of Emergency Mgt Plan for Eastern Long Island.Nrc Continues to Monitor Performance of Millstone to Ensure Adequate Protection to Public Health ML20212L2171999-10-0101 October 1999 Responds to Recent Ltr to President Wj Clinton,Chairman Jackson & Commissioners,Wd Travers & Ferc,Expressing Concerns Re Millstone NPPs & Continued Lack of Emergency Mgt Plan for Eastern Long Island ML20217A9271999-09-30030 September 1999 Discusses Investigation Conducted at Millstone Nuclear Power Station by NRC OI Region I on 980319 to Determine If Contract Training Instructor Was Terminated for Raising Concerns About Quality of Training Matls ML20217B3221999-09-30030 September 1999 Refers to Investigation Rept 1-1997-035 Conducted at Millstone Nuclear Power Station by NRC Ofc of Investigation Field Ofc,Region I on 970915 to Determine Whether Former Health Physics Technician Discriminated Against ML20212J6621999-09-30030 September 1999 Informs of Completion of mid-cycle PPR of Units 2 & 3 on 990916.Identified Several Recent Instances in Which Condition Repts Were Not Initiated,Resulting in Untimely or Inadequate C/As.Historical Listing of Plant Issues Encl B17887, Requests Exemption from Requirements of 10CFR140.11(a)(4) Which Requires Licensees to Maintain Secondary Financial Protection Beyond Primary Layer1999-09-28028 September 1999 Requests Exemption from Requirements of 10CFR140.11(a)(4) Which Requires Licensees to Maintain Secondary Financial Protection Beyond Primary Layer ML20216J1341999-09-28028 September 1999 Ltr Contract:Task Order 49, Millstone Units 2 & 3 Employee Concerns Program Insp, Under Contract NRC-03-98-021 B17883, Forwards Mnps Unit 3 ISI Summary Rept,Cycle 6, IAW ASME Section XI,IWA-62301999-09-27027 September 1999 Forwards Mnps Unit 3 ISI Summary Rept,Cycle 6, IAW ASME Section XI,IWA-6230 B17890, Provides Response to GL 99-02, Laboratory Testing of Nuclear-Grade Activated Charcoal1999-09-27027 September 1999 Provides Response to GL 99-02, Laboratory Testing of Nuclear-Grade Activated Charcoal B17888, Informs That There No Longer Exists Need to Maintain Millstone Unit 2 SRO License for CA Hines,License SOP-10741-01,effective 9909151999-09-24024 September 1999 Informs That There No Longer Exists Need to Maintain Millstone Unit 2 SRO License for CA Hines,License SOP-10741-01,effective 990915 B17884, Forwards NRC Form 536, Operator Licensing Exam Data, for Mnps,Units 2 & 3,per Administrative Ltr 99-031999-09-24024 September 1999 Forwards NRC Form 536, Operator Licensing Exam Data, for Mnps,Units 2 & 3,per Administrative Ltr 99-03 ML20212F4961999-09-20020 September 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-245/99-08,50-336/99-08 & 50-423/99-08 on 990615-0809.Four Violations of NRC Requirements Occurred & Being Treated as Ncvs,Consistent with App C of Enforcement Policy 05000336/LER-1999-001, Forwards LER 99-001-00 Re Thermal Reactor Power Limit That Was Exceeded.Commitments Made by Util Encl1999-09-20020 September 1999 Forwards LER 99-001-00 Re Thermal Reactor Power Limit That Was Exceeded.Commitments Made by Util Encl B17867, Requests Relief from Requirements of 10CFR50.55a(g),IAW ASME Section XI for Millstone,Unit 3.Util Requests Relief from Performing Visual Exam of Reactor Pressure Supports to Extent Required by Code for Class 1 Supports1999-09-17017 September 1999 Requests Relief from Requirements of 10CFR50.55a(g),IAW ASME Section XI for Millstone,Unit 3.Util Requests Relief from Performing Visual Exam of Reactor Pressure Supports to Extent Required by Code for Class 1 Supports B17865, Provides NRC Staff with Updated Proposed Rev of FSAR Section 14.6.3, Radiological Consequences of SG Tube Failure. Updated Proposed Rev Will Replace Info Provided in Attachment 3 of Initial Submittal1999-09-16016 September 1999 Provides NRC Staff with Updated Proposed Rev of FSAR Section 14.6.3, Radiological Consequences of SG Tube Failure. Updated Proposed Rev Will Replace Info Provided in Attachment 3 of Initial Submittal B17876, Informs That Util Will Adopt Last Approved Northeast Util QA Program (Nuqap) Tr,Rev 21,dtd 990630,as Unit 1 Nuqap,Per Decision to Permanently Cease Operations at Subject Plant1999-09-16016 September 1999 Informs That Util Will Adopt Last Approved Northeast Util QA Program (Nuqap) Tr,Rev 21,dtd 990630,as Unit 1 Nuqap,Per Decision to Permanently Cease Operations at Subject Plant B17882, Forwards NRC Forms 398 & 369 in Support of License Renewal for Bb Parrish,License SOP-10399-2.Encl Withheld Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6)1999-09-15015 September 1999 Forwards NRC Forms 398 & 369 in Support of License Renewal for Bb Parrish,License SOP-10399-2.Encl Withheld Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6) B17881, Forwards NRC Form 398 & NRC Form 396 for Le Olsen,License SOP-10398-2.Encl Withheld Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6)1999-09-15015 September 1999 Forwards NRC Form 398 & NRC Form 396 for Le Olsen,License SOP-10398-2.Encl Withheld Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6) B17859, Forwards up-to-date Distribution Lists for NRC Correspondence to NNECO & NUSCO.Side-bars Indicate Changes from Previous Lists Provided to NRC on 9801281999-09-15015 September 1999 Forwards up-to-date Distribution Lists for NRC Correspondence to NNECO & NUSCO.Side-bars Indicate Changes from Previous Lists Provided to NRC on 980128 B17880, Forwards NRC Form 398 & NRC Form 396 for Rf Martin,License SOP-10397-0.Encls Withheld Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6)1999-09-15015 September 1999 Forwards NRC Form 398 & NRC Form 396 for Rf Martin,License SOP-10397-0.Encls Withheld Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6) B17872, Informs of Election to Consolidate Previous Commitments Re Work Observation Program with Two New Programmatic Commitments Listed in Attachment 11999-09-14014 September 1999 Informs of Election to Consolidate Previous Commitments Re Work Observation Program with Two New Programmatic Commitments Listed in Attachment 1 ML20212A9011999-09-10010 September 1999 Forwards Environ Assessment & Finding of No Significant Impact Re Application for Exemption,Dtd 990803.Proposed Exemption Would Provide Relief from Requirement of 10CFR50 ML20212A3171999-09-10010 September 1999 Discusses Investigation Rept 1-1998-045 Conducted on 981112 to Determine If Former Senior Health Physics Technician Being Denied Employment at Millstone in Retaliation for Having Raised Safety Concerns in Past.Synopsis Encl B17838, Forwards Revs 34 & 35 to Physical Security Plan.Explanation of Changes Provided as Attachment 1.Without Encls1999-09-10010 September 1999 Forwards Revs 34 & 35 to Physical Security Plan.Explanation of Changes Provided as Attachment 1.Without Encls ML20212A7501999-09-10010 September 1999 Forwards Staff Requirements Memo Response,Dtd 990525,which Provides Actions NRC Plans for Continued Oversight of safety-conscious Work Environ & Employee Concerns Program ML20211J9291999-09-0303 September 1999 Forwards mark-ups & Retypes of Proposed Conforming License Changes Required in Connection with Transfers Being Sought in 990615 Application of Montaup Electric Co & New England Power Co for Transfer of Licenses & Ownership Interests ML20211K5171999-09-0202 September 1999 Expresses Appreciation for Support Provided for NRC Public Meeting on 990825 05000336/LER-1999-010, Forwards LER 99-010-00,documenting 990804 Event of Failure to Perform ASME Section XI IST on Pressurizer Relief Line Flow Control Sample Valve Following Maint Activities.List of Util Commitments Contained in Attachment 11999-09-0202 September 1999 Forwards LER 99-010-00,documenting 990804 Event of Failure to Perform ASME Section XI IST on Pressurizer Relief Line Flow Control Sample Valve Following Maint Activities.List of Util Commitments Contained in Attachment 1 ML20216H0591999-09-0202 September 1999 Responds to Re Issues Submitted by Cullen on Behalf of Several Petitioners Concerning Offsite Emergency Prepardeness for Millstone Nuclear Power Station ML20211N9241999-09-0101 September 1999 Forwards Document Classification Form for Insertion Into Emergency Planning Services Department Procedures ML20211H0741999-08-30030 August 1999 Discusses GL 92-01,Rev 1, Rv Structural Integrity, Issued by NRC on 950519 & NNECO Responses for Millstone Unit 2 & 980715.Informs That Staff Revised Info in Rvid & Released Info as Rvid Version 2 Based on Response Review 1999-09-30
[Table view] Category:INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE
MONTHYEARML20217N8261999-10-25025 October 1999 Discusses Errata Re 991021 Filing of Northeast Nuclear Energy Co Answer to Request for Hearing & Petition to Intervene B17886, Requests Permission to Utilize Code Case N-623, Deferral of Insps of Shell-to-Flange & Head-to-Flange of Reactor Vessel,Section Xi,Div 1, for Millstone Unit 21999-10-18018 October 1999 Requests Permission to Utilize Code Case N-623, Deferral of Insps of Shell-to-Flange & Head-to-Flange of Reactor Vessel,Section Xi,Div 1, for Millstone Unit 2 B17901, Submits Statement of Personal Qualification (NRC Form 398) Along with Supporting Certification of Medical Exam by Facility Licensee (NRC from 396) in Support of License Renewal for PM Miner.Encls Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6)1999-10-18018 October 1999 Submits Statement of Personal Qualification (NRC Form 398) Along with Supporting Certification of Medical Exam by Facility Licensee (NRC from 396) in Support of License Renewal for PM Miner.Encls Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6) 05000336/LER-1999-012, Forwards LER 99-012-00,re Unrecoverable CEA Misalignment Entry Into TS 3.0.3 on 990917.Commitments Made by Util Are Encl1999-10-15015 October 1999 Forwards LER 99-012-00,re Unrecoverable CEA Misalignment Entry Into TS 3.0.3 on 990917.Commitments Made by Util Are Encl B17900, Forwards Revised Assumptions Used in Fuel Handling Accident Analysis & Summary of Results.List of Regulatory Commitments Are Listed in Attachment 11999-10-14014 October 1999 Forwards Revised Assumptions Used in Fuel Handling Accident Analysis & Summary of Results.List of Regulatory Commitments Are Listed in Attachment 1 ML20217P1201999-10-0606 October 1999 Informs NRC of Proposed Acquisition of Parent Holding Company of Central Maine & Requests NRC Concurrence,Based on Threshold Review,That Proposed Acquisition Does Not,In Fact, Constitute Transfer Subject to 10CFR50.80 ML20217F0031999-10-0606 October 1999 Forwards Original Petition to Intervene Being Filed on Behalf of Clients,Connecticut Coalition Against Millstone & Long Island Coalition Against Millstone,Iaw Provisions of 10CFR2.714 B17892, Requests Withdrawal of License Amend Application Re 24-month SG Tube Insp Surveillance Extensions,Submitted in Util 950726 & s to NRC1999-10-0505 October 1999 Requests Withdrawal of License Amend Application Re 24-month SG Tube Insp Surveillance Extensions,Submitted in Util 950726 & s to NRC B17887, Requests Exemption from Requirements of 10CFR140.11(a)(4) Which Requires Licensees to Maintain Secondary Financial Protection Beyond Primary Layer1999-09-28028 September 1999 Requests Exemption from Requirements of 10CFR140.11(a)(4) Which Requires Licensees to Maintain Secondary Financial Protection Beyond Primary Layer B17883, Forwards Mnps Unit 3 ISI Summary Rept,Cycle 6, IAW ASME Section XI,IWA-62301999-09-27027 September 1999 Forwards Mnps Unit 3 ISI Summary Rept,Cycle 6, IAW ASME Section XI,IWA-6230 B17890, Provides Response to GL 99-02, Laboratory Testing of Nuclear-Grade Activated Charcoal1999-09-27027 September 1999 Provides Response to GL 99-02, Laboratory Testing of Nuclear-Grade Activated Charcoal B17884, Forwards NRC Form 536, Operator Licensing Exam Data, for Mnps,Units 2 & 3,per Administrative Ltr 99-031999-09-24024 September 1999 Forwards NRC Form 536, Operator Licensing Exam Data, for Mnps,Units 2 & 3,per Administrative Ltr 99-03 B17888, Informs That There No Longer Exists Need to Maintain Millstone Unit 2 SRO License for CA Hines,License SOP-10741-01,effective 9909151999-09-24024 September 1999 Informs That There No Longer Exists Need to Maintain Millstone Unit 2 SRO License for CA Hines,License SOP-10741-01,effective 990915 05000336/LER-1999-001, Forwards LER 99-001-00 Re Thermal Reactor Power Limit That Was Exceeded.Commitments Made by Util Encl1999-09-20020 September 1999 Forwards LER 99-001-00 Re Thermal Reactor Power Limit That Was Exceeded.Commitments Made by Util Encl B17867, Requests Relief from Requirements of 10CFR50.55a(g),IAW ASME Section XI for Millstone,Unit 3.Util Requests Relief from Performing Visual Exam of Reactor Pressure Supports to Extent Required by Code for Class 1 Supports1999-09-17017 September 1999 Requests Relief from Requirements of 10CFR50.55a(g),IAW ASME Section XI for Millstone,Unit 3.Util Requests Relief from Performing Visual Exam of Reactor Pressure Supports to Extent Required by Code for Class 1 Supports B17876, Informs That Util Will Adopt Last Approved Northeast Util QA Program (Nuqap) Tr,Rev 21,dtd 990630,as Unit 1 Nuqap,Per Decision to Permanently Cease Operations at Subject Plant1999-09-16016 September 1999 Informs That Util Will Adopt Last Approved Northeast Util QA Program (Nuqap) Tr,Rev 21,dtd 990630,as Unit 1 Nuqap,Per Decision to Permanently Cease Operations at Subject Plant B17865, Provides NRC Staff with Updated Proposed Rev of FSAR Section 14.6.3, Radiological Consequences of SG Tube Failure. Updated Proposed Rev Will Replace Info Provided in Attachment 3 of Initial Submittal1999-09-16016 September 1999 Provides NRC Staff with Updated Proposed Rev of FSAR Section 14.6.3, Radiological Consequences of SG Tube Failure. Updated Proposed Rev Will Replace Info Provided in Attachment 3 of Initial Submittal B17881, Forwards NRC Form 398 & NRC Form 396 for Le Olsen,License SOP-10398-2.Encl Withheld Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6)1999-09-15015 September 1999 Forwards NRC Form 398 & NRC Form 396 for Le Olsen,License SOP-10398-2.Encl Withheld Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6) B17880, Forwards NRC Form 398 & NRC Form 396 for Rf Martin,License SOP-10397-0.Encls Withheld Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6)1999-09-15015 September 1999 Forwards NRC Form 398 & NRC Form 396 for Rf Martin,License SOP-10397-0.Encls Withheld Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6) B17859, Forwards up-to-date Distribution Lists for NRC Correspondence to NNECO & NUSCO.Side-bars Indicate Changes from Previous Lists Provided to NRC on 9801281999-09-15015 September 1999 Forwards up-to-date Distribution Lists for NRC Correspondence to NNECO & NUSCO.Side-bars Indicate Changes from Previous Lists Provided to NRC on 980128 B17882, Forwards NRC Forms 398 & 369 in Support of License Renewal for Bb Parrish,License SOP-10399-2.Encl Withheld Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6)1999-09-15015 September 1999 Forwards NRC Forms 398 & 369 in Support of License Renewal for Bb Parrish,License SOP-10399-2.Encl Withheld Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6) B17872, Informs of Election to Consolidate Previous Commitments Re Work Observation Program with Two New Programmatic Commitments Listed in Attachment 11999-09-14014 September 1999 Informs of Election to Consolidate Previous Commitments Re Work Observation Program with Two New Programmatic Commitments Listed in Attachment 1 B17838, Forwards Revs 34 & 35 to Physical Security Plan.Explanation of Changes Provided as Attachment 1.Without Encls1999-09-10010 September 1999 Forwards Revs 34 & 35 to Physical Security Plan.Explanation of Changes Provided as Attachment 1.Without Encls ML20211J9291999-09-0303 September 1999 Forwards mark-ups & Retypes of Proposed Conforming License Changes Required in Connection with Transfers Being Sought in 990615 Application of Montaup Electric Co & New England Power Co for Transfer of Licenses & Ownership Interests 05000336/LER-1999-010, Forwards LER 99-010-00,documenting 990804 Event of Failure to Perform ASME Section XI IST on Pressurizer Relief Line Flow Control Sample Valve Following Maint Activities.List of Util Commitments Contained in Attachment 11999-09-0202 September 1999 Forwards LER 99-010-00,documenting 990804 Event of Failure to Perform ASME Section XI IST on Pressurizer Relief Line Flow Control Sample Valve Following Maint Activities.List of Util Commitments Contained in Attachment 1 ML20216H0591999-09-0202 September 1999 Responds to Re Issues Submitted by Cullen on Behalf of Several Petitioners Concerning Offsite Emergency Prepardeness for Millstone Nuclear Power Station ML20211N9241999-09-0101 September 1999 Forwards Document Classification Form for Insertion Into Emergency Planning Services Department Procedures B17851, Forwards Semiannual fitness-for-duty Program Performance Data for 990101-990630 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 1,2 & 3,IAW 10CFR26.71(d)1999-08-27027 August 1999 Forwards Semiannual fitness-for-duty Program Performance Data for 990101-990630 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 1,2 & 3,IAW 10CFR26.71(d) B17855, Forwards NRC Forms 398 & 396 in Support of License Renewal for SRO TE Grilley,SOP-4053-04.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR2.7901999-08-17017 August 1999 Forwards NRC Forms 398 & 396 in Support of License Renewal for SRO TE Grilley,SOP-4053-04.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790 B17849, Forwards Second Quarter Backlog Performance Rept for 1999, Which Represents Fourth Rept on Mnps Performance Since Restart of Unit 3 & First Status Update for Unit 2.No Regulatory Commitments Are Contained in Ltr1999-08-16016 August 1999 Forwards Second Quarter Backlog Performance Rept for 1999, Which Represents Fourth Rept on Mnps Performance Since Restart of Unit 3 & First Status Update for Unit 2.No Regulatory Commitments Are Contained in Ltr B17854, Forwards Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 2,per TS 6.9.1.7.Revised Repts for May & June Also Encl Which Reflect Correct Faulty Printometer Readings1999-08-14014 August 1999 Forwards Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 2,per TS 6.9.1.7.Revised Repts for May & June Also Encl Which Reflect Correct Faulty Printometer Readings B17850, Forwards First Lhc Quarterly Assessment Rept for Assessment Performed 990621 to 990701.NNECO Taking Appropriate Actions to Address Observations in Rept1999-08-11011 August 1999 Forwards First Lhc Quarterly Assessment Rept for Assessment Performed 990621 to 990701.NNECO Taking Appropriate Actions to Address Observations in Rept B17837, Forwards COLR for Cycle 7, for Millstone Unit 3,IAW TS 6.9.1.6.Explanation of Changes to COLR Also Encl1999-08-0707 August 1999 Forwards COLR for Cycle 7, for Millstone Unit 3,IAW TS 6.9.1.6.Explanation of Changes to COLR Also Encl B17657, Requests Schedular Exemption from Emergency Plan Exercise Requirements of 10CFR50,App E,Part Iv,Section F,Paragraph 2.c.Requests That Nrc/Fema Evaluated Exercise Be Conducted in Mar 2000 Rather than Sept 19991999-08-0303 August 1999 Requests Schedular Exemption from Emergency Plan Exercise Requirements of 10CFR50,App E,Part Iv,Section F,Paragraph 2.c.Requests That Nrc/Fema Evaluated Exercise Be Conducted in Mar 2000 Rather than Sept 1999 B17845, Forwards Revised Commitment for Surveillance Scheduling & Tracking.Options for Surveillance Scheduling & Tracking Methodologies to Be Incorporated in Standardized Station Surveillance Program Are Currently Being Reconsidered1999-08-0202 August 1999 Forwards Revised Commitment for Surveillance Scheduling & Tracking.Options for Surveillance Scheduling & Tracking Methodologies to Be Incorporated in Standardized Station Surveillance Program Are Currently Being Reconsidered B17831, Informs NRC Staff That Change 3 to Rev 25 of Mnps Emergency Plan Was Implemented on 990715.Change Removes Facility Organizational Charts from Emergency Plan & Identifies Relocation to Nuqap1999-07-26026 July 1999 Informs NRC Staff That Change 3 to Rev 25 of Mnps Emergency Plan Was Implemented on 990715.Change Removes Facility Organizational Charts from Emergency Plan & Identifies Relocation to Nuqap B17834, Forwards Proprietary Revised NRC Form 398,which Certifies That SL Doboe Has Completed Eligibility Requirements for Sro,Per 10CFR55.31.Proprietary Info Withheld1999-07-20020 July 1999 Forwards Proprietary Revised NRC Form 398,which Certifies That SL Doboe Has Completed Eligibility Requirements for Sro,Per 10CFR55.31.Proprietary Info Withheld B17836, Forwards Revised NRC Form 396 & Supporting Physician Rept for Licensed Operator Restricted from Licensed Duties, Effective 990628,due to Medical Condition.Without Encl1999-07-20020 July 1999 Forwards Revised NRC Form 396 & Supporting Physician Rept for Licensed Operator Restricted from Licensed Duties, Effective 990628,due to Medical Condition.Without Encl B17811, Submits Response to NRC AL 99-02,requesting That Licensees Provide Numerical Estimates of Licensing Actions to Be Expected to Be Submitted in Fy 2000 & 20011999-07-20020 July 1999 Submits Response to NRC AL 99-02,requesting That Licensees Provide Numerical Estimates of Licensing Actions to Be Expected to Be Submitted in Fy 2000 & 2001 ML20210S9911999-07-18018 July 1999 Requests NRC Intervene for All Shareholders of New England Electric System & to Help with Merger with National Grid Group & That NRC Petition Security & Exchange Commission to Investigate Matter Relative to No Shareholder Options B17835, Forwards Rev 33 to Millstone Station Physical Security Plan, Per 10CFR50.54(p)(2).Licensee Determined That Changes Do Not Decrease Effectiveness of Plan.Rev Withheld from Public Disclosure,Per 10CFR2.790(d)(1)1999-07-16016 July 1999 Forwards Rev 33 to Millstone Station Physical Security Plan, Per 10CFR50.54(p)(2).Licensee Determined That Changes Do Not Decrease Effectiveness of Plan.Rev Withheld from Public Disclosure,Per 10CFR2.790(d)(1) B17818, Provides NRC Staff with Change to TS Bases Sections 3/4.5.2 & 3/4.5.3, ECCS Subsystems for Info Only.Change Was Reviewed & Approved by Unit 3 Plant Operations Review Committee IAW Provisions of 10CFR50.591999-07-16016 July 1999 Provides NRC Staff with Change to TS Bases Sections 3/4.5.2 & 3/4.5.3, ECCS Subsystems for Info Only.Change Was Reviewed & Approved by Unit 3 Plant Operations Review Committee IAW Provisions of 10CFR50.59 B17824, Forwards Monthly Oeprating Rept for June 1999 & Revised Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Millstone Unit 21999-07-13013 July 1999 Forwards Monthly Oeprating Rept for June 1999 & Revised Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Millstone Unit 2 ML20212K1701999-07-13013 July 1999 Submits Concerns Re Millstone & Continued Lack of Emergency Mgt Plan for Eastern Long Island.Nrc Should Provide Adequate Emergency Planning in Case of Radiological Accident B17816, Provides Certification That M Lettrich,Has Completed Eligibility Requirements,Per 10CFR55.31 for Operator License.Util Requests That Licensing Action Be Taken for Named Individual1999-07-0101 July 1999 Provides Certification That M Lettrich,Has Completed Eligibility Requirements,Per 10CFR55.31 for Operator License.Util Requests That Licensing Action Be Taken for Named Individual B17801, Forwards 10CFR50.59 Annual Rept for Period Jan-Dec 1998. Various Changes That Were Initiated in Previous Yrs & Completed in 1998,also Incorporated Into Annual Rept1999-06-30030 June 1999 Forwards 10CFR50.59 Annual Rept for Period Jan-Dec 1998. Various Changes That Were Initiated in Previous Yrs & Completed in 1998,also Incorporated Into Annual Rept B17819, Forwards Rev 17 to FSAR & Addendum 6 to Annual Rept.Nneco Recently Completed Review of Unit 2 Design & Licensing Bases Which Resulted in Changes to FSAR Provided in Encl 1.Encl 2 Includes Info Covering Changes Not Included in1999-06-30030 June 1999 Forwards Rev 17 to FSAR & Addendum 6 to Annual Rept.Nneco Recently Completed Review of Unit 2 Design & Licensing Bases Which Resulted in Changes to FSAR Provided in Encl 1.Encl 2 Includes Info Covering Changes Not Included in B17780, Forwards Rev 21,Change 0 to Northeast Utilities QAP (Nuqap) TR, IAW 10CFR50.54(a)(3).Changes to TR Are Shown as Text in Bold Italics1999-06-30030 June 1999 Forwards Rev 21,Change 0 to Northeast Utilities QAP (Nuqap) TR, IAW 10CFR50.54(a)(3).Changes to TR Are Shown as Text in Bold Italics B17723, Responds to NRC Request for Info Re GL 98-01, Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at Npps. Y2K Readiness Disclosure for Units 2 & 3 Encl.Without Encl1999-06-29029 June 1999 Responds to NRC Request for Info Re GL 98-01, Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at Npps. Y2K Readiness Disclosure for Units 2 & 3 Encl.Without Encl B17767, Forwards Rev 12 to FSAR & Addendum 3 to Annual Rept, for Millstone Unit 3,per 10CFR50.71(e) & 10CFR50.4(b)(6). No New Regulatory Commitments Contained in Ltr1999-06-29029 June 1999 Forwards Rev 12 to FSAR & Addendum 3 to Annual Rept, for Millstone Unit 3,per 10CFR50.71(e) & 10CFR50.4(b)(6). No New Regulatory Commitments Contained in Ltr 1999-09-03
[Table view] |
Text
uabione omm . none rerry na., roterrora, er ,
p) Northeast Utilities System P.o.iw 128 l Waterford, cT 0638.LO128 (203) 447 1791 j i
1 January 28,1997 I l
Docket No. 50-423 l B16105 l Re.: 10CFR50.109 )'
10CFR50.54(f)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk ,
Washington, DC 20555-0001 l Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit No. 3 Response to Requested Action 1 of Generic Letter 96-06 Assurance of Equipment Operability and Containment integrity During Desian-Basis Accident Conditions i l !
In a letter dated September 30,1996, the NRC transmitted Generic Letter (GL) 96-06, l
" Assurance of Equipmont Operability and Containment integrity During Design-Basis Accident Conditions." The NRC requested that licensees submit a letter within 30 days of the date of the subject GL indicating whether or not the Requested Actions will be ,
3 completed and whether or not Requested Information will be submitted within 120 days of the date of the GL. Specifically, the GL requests licensees to determine: .
(1) If containment air cooler cooling water systems are susceptible to either waterhammer or two-phase flow conditions during postulated accident conditions; and n
(2) If piping systems that penetrate containment are susceptible to thermal )
expansion of fluid so that overpressurization of piping could occur. I The GL requests that Actions 1 and 2 above be reviewed based on the plant's postulated accident conditions, as well as with respect to the scenarios referenced in the GL. Operability of affected systems should be assessed and corrective actions 9702050017 970128 '
l PDR P
ADOCK 05000423 PDR D'[V 063422-9 REV.1-95
I j U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l B16105\Page 2 t
jl taken as appropriate in accordance with 10CFR50, Appendix B and the plant operating
) license. l 3
l Accordingly, in a letter dated October 30,1996, Northeast Nuclear Energy Company
! (NNECO) reported that Millstone Unit No. 3 would complete Requested Action 1 and j submit the written summary report for the action within 120 days of the date of the GL l l (i.e., January 28,1997). The response for the written summary report for completion of j the action is as follows.
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- - Actions Taken in Response to the Reauested Actions i i
! NNECO performed an Engineering Evaluation that reviewed cooling water systems
, serving the containment air recirculation (CAR) coolers for two-phase flow and i i waterhammer susceptibility during design basis accident conditions. (A summary of the !
- evaluation is provided in Attachment 2 of this submittal.) Plant conditions considered in !
the evaluation include:
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. Containment Depressurization Actuation (CDA) signal, concurrent with a Loss of
- Offsite Power (LOP) signal, j i l l . Small or Intermediate break Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA), with no CDA j signal, concurrent with a LOP signal, f
!. . Events with a CDA signal and offsite power available, i
! e Events with a Safety injection System (SIS) signal and offsite power available, j and I
! . LOP event.
l l In addition, the susceptibility to two-phase flow and waterhammer was evaluated for i other containment heat removal systems.
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i Conclusions that were Reached Relative to Susceptibility for Waterhammer and Two-
! Phase Flow in the Containment Air Cooler Coolina Water System and l l Overoressurization of Pipina that Penetrates Containment 3
- e Failure scenarios (two-phase flow or waterhammer) postulated in the GL and j involving the CAR System are not expected to occur at Millstone Unit No. 3. l Our October 30,1996 letter reported that the engineering review, to determine if j any piping sections of isolated water-filled piping systems that penetrate
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission B16105\Page 3 7
- containment are susceptible to thermally induced overpressurization during Design Basis Accidents (Requested Action 2), is scheduled to be completed in i
conjunction with a review of Stress Data Packages (SDPs) for Category I piping
- systems. The review of the SDPs is scheduled to be completed prior to unit j startup as part of the ongoing unit recovery plan. Completion of Requested
, Action 2 for Millstone Unit No. 3 and submittal of a written summary report will be i completed prior to startup, as previously reported in the October 30,1996 letter.
l j - In addition, a review of system configuration shows that the Recirculation Spray System j
(RSS) heat exchangers and associated piping at Millstone Unit No. 3 could experience j- water column separation if the RSS pumps are restarted after being stopped during j post LOCA conditions. Water column rejoining after the RSS pumps are restarted has the potential for creating unacceptable waterhammer loads upon the RSS piping.
i l Basis for Continued Operability of Affected Systems and Components. As Acolicable 1
1 If a Design Basis Accident (DBA) occurred coincident with or without a LOP signal, the
! CAR fan cooling system would not be susceptible to two-phase flow, steam formation or j waterhammer.
For events where a CDA or Containment Isolation Phase B (CIB) signal is not initiated i (with or without a LOP signal), the evaluation demonstrates that the CAR cooling system would not be susceptible to two-phase flow, steam formation or waterhammer,
! and therefore remain operable.
l j The containment heat removal function during a DBA is provided by the Quench Spray j System (OSS) and the RSS. The evaluation identified a condition in which a water j column separation and subsequent waterhammer could be experienced in the RSS
{ system during a design basis accident. This condition was reported in accordance with '
l the provisions of 10CFR50.72. Based on this condition, the RSS System is determined j
! to be inoperable. Issues discovered as a result of the review will be further i investigated in accordance with the Corrective Action Program and will be reported in i l accordance with the provisions of 10CFR50.73.
i Corrective Actions Implemented or Are Planned to be implemented i
The identified condition, in which an RSS water column separation and subsequent waterhammer could be experienced during a DBA will be investigated in accordance
. with the Corrective Action Program and will be reported in accordance with the provisions of 10CFR50.73.
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission B16105\Page 4 If Systems were Found to be Susceptible to the Conditions that are Discussed in this Generic Letter. Identify the Systems Affected and Describe the Specific Circumstances involved l
l Water column separation may occur in the RSS piping between the pump and heat exchanger due to system design and hydraulics, if the RSS pump is tripped after the system is filled with water. This water vapor space could collapse due to system pressures after the RSS pump is restarted and create a waterhammer that could damage the RSS pressure boundary. These containment isolation valves may also be adversely affected by the waterhammer effects creating a potential radiation release pathway. In addition, if the containment sump water temperature is high, RSS pressure boundary damage could create a harsh environment in the Emergency Safety Features Building (ESFB), which is beyond the plant design basis. ESFB flooding beyond that currently postulated may also be possible. With respect to containment and core heat removal functions, increased containment sump water flow due to the failed train could adversely affect the redundant RSS train due to the common RSS sump design.
Comm:tments Attachment 1 provides the regulatory commitments in this submittal.
NNECO is continuing to review the licensing and design bases of Millstone Unit No. 3 pursuant to the requirements set forth in the Staff's 50.54(f) letter of April 4,1996. If any discrepancies are discovered during this review, that affect the conclusions of this letter, a supplement will be provided.
Should you have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Mr. James M. Peschel at (860) 437-5840.
Very truly yours, NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY WJ
~
John Paul Cowan Millstone Unit No. 3, Recovery Officer
1 1 U.S. Nucisar Regulatory Commission B16105\Page 5 Subscribed and sworn to before me this J I day of J/ pan / 1997 v /
DataCommis6hpires:[AV
. . . m . . ,s r. u S 6 2C'O/
NOTARY PUBUC
- ommission Expires November 4 M cc
- H. J. Miller, Region 1 Administrator
- J. W. Andersen, NRC Project Manager, Millstone Unit No. 3 A. C. Ceme, Senior Resident inspector, Millstone Unit No. 3
- W. D. Travers, Dr., Director, Special Projects i
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.. - l Docket No. 50-423 B16105 i
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Attachment 1 1 Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit No. 3 ;
List of Reculatory Commitments
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January 1997
l U.S. Nuctsar Regulatory Commission 816105\ Attachment 1\Page 1 Enclosure List of Regulatory Commitments The following table identifies those actions committed to by NNECO in this document.'
Any other actions discussed in the submittal reprc:sent intended or planned actions by NNECO. They are described to the NRC for the NRC's information and are not regulatory commitments. Pleace notify the Manager - Nuclear Licensing at the Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit No. 3 of any questions regarding this document or any associated regulatory commitments.
Commitment Committed Date or Outage B16105-1: Investigate RSS issues discovered as a result of the February 12,1997 review for completion of Requested Action 1 of GL 96-06 and report in accordance with the provisions of 10CFR50.73.
B15962-4: Complete Requested Action 2 of GL 96-06 and submit Prior to Unit Startup the requested information per the recommendation of the GL. ,
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Docket No. 50-423 B16105 t
l Attachment 2 Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit No. 3 Response to Generic Letter 96-06 Completion of Reauested Action 1 j
January 1997 1 I
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l B16105\ Attachment 2\Page 1 Reauested Action 1 !
Determine if containment air cooler cooling water systems are susceptible to either waterhammer or two phase flow conditions during postulated accident conditions.
Response
1.0 Purpose NNECO performed an Engineering Evaluation to address the issue of ;
containment air cooler cooling water systems susceptibility to waterhammer and two-phase flow during design basis accidents addressed by Requested Action 1 of NRC Generic Letter 96-06. Completion of the evaluation identifies potential system vulnerabilities in the RSS system.
2.0 Backaround On September 30,1996, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued Generic Letter (GL) 96-06 to address issues related to equipment operability and '
containment integrity during design basis accident conditions. Other industry documentation issued prior to the generic letter includes NRC Information Notice 96-45 and Westinghouse's NSAL 96-003 based on events identified by the Pacific Gas & Electric Company (Diablo Canyon) and the Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company (Haddam Neck).
According to NNECO's preliminary response to the NRC, dated October 30,1996, which contains the schedule to address the above issues for Northeast Utilities (NU) plants, NNECO committed to provide the NRC with a written summary report to address Requested Action 1 of the GL for Millstone Unit No. 3 within 120 days of the date of the Generic Letter (i.e., January 28,1997). For Requested Action 2 of the GL for Millstone Unit No. 3, NNECO committed to provide a summary report prior to Unit startup as part of the Unit Recovery Plan. i
- 3. Discussion The evaluation reviewed the following plant conditions: '
- CDA signal, concurrent with a LOP,
. Small or Intermediate break LOCA, with no CDA signal, concurrent with a LOP,
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1 U.S. Nucirr R:gul: tory Commission B16105\Att chm nt 2\Pcg3 2
. Events with CDA signal and offsite power available,
. Events with Safety injection System (SIS) signal and offsite power available,
. LOP event. l In addition, the susceptibility to two-phase flow and waterhammer was evaluated for other containment heat removal systems.
3.1 CDA Concurrent With A LOP For Millstone Unit No. 3, the CAR fan coolers cool the containment during normal i plant operations. However, these fan coolers are not credited in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Chapter 6 or Chapter 15 accident analyses for removing containment heat nor maintaining containment integrity during (or after) a design basis accident (DM). During a large break LOCA or main steam line break event, a CDA signal is initiated. Waterhammer is not a concern for this systern during a DBA because the Reactor Plant Component Cooling Water (CCP) pumps are automatically stopped by the CDA signal and stay off throughout the event. The CCP pumps are manually restarted by operator action later in the event (at containment pressure below 17.5 psia), when containment heat loads I are not capable of causing steam formation in the CCP piping.
Additiomi system features are available to avoid two-phase flow or steam void l formation during design basis accident conditions. These includo containment l isolation of the CCP oiping locp into the CAR fan coolers on a Containment isolation Phase B (CIB) sign:i. This signal is initiated simultaneously with the CDA signal at approximately 10 psig containment pressure. Also, relief valves j are installed to provide piping protection due to fluid thermal expansion. In addition, sufficient elevation head is available from tN Chilled Water System (CDS) and CCP surge tanks to the CCP piping loop to avoid steam formation i during the DBA.
3.2 Small Break LOCA With Concurrent LOP (no CDA)
For intermediate and small break LOCAs concurrent with a LOP signal, the CDA signal may not initiate. However, a Safety injection System (SIS) signal is initiated at some point during the event. The CAR fans are in operation for this event. Since containment pressure does not reach the CDA signal setpoint during this event, there is not enough energy in the containment atmosphere to produce saturated conditions in the CAR fan cooling coils during the DBA. In l addition, sufficient nlevation head is available from the CDS and CCP surge tanks to the CCP piping 9 to avoid steam formation.
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, U.S. Nuciser Regulatory Commission B16105\ Attachment 2\Page 3
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! 3.3 Events With CDA Sianal And Offsite Power Available For a CDA signal with offsite power available, flow from the CCP system to the j CAR fan coolers is not established since the containment isolation valves close on a CIB signal. Also, the CCP pumps are automatically stopped by the CDA
. signal and stay off throughout the event. Therefore, waterhammer conditions are i not a concern. In addition, steam formation or two-phase flow conditions are not a concern due to the automatic containment isolation of the CCP piping feeding the CAR fan coolers and available elevation head from the CDS and CCP surge tanks to the CCP piping loop. Relief valves in the CCP piping loop provide piping and equipment protection given fluid thermal expansion after closure of the containment isolation valves.
3.4 Events With SIS Sianal And Offsite Power Available Given an SIS signal without a LOP, switchover from CDS to CCP flow for the CAR fans is expected to occur with the CAR fans in operation. The CCP pumps, which are in operation prior to the event, provide the necessary head to move flow through the coolers. If switchover from CDS to CCP is not accomplished due to valve failure, the relief valves in the CAR fan system provide piping and -
equipment protection given fluid thermal expansion. Also, operation of the CDS pumps and surge tank static head prior to valve switchover ensures that sufficient head is available to preclude steam formation in the piping.
3.5 Lp_ss Of Offsite Power Event The CAR fans are operated during a LOP event for equipment protection.
However, this event alone does not result in steam voiding or two-phase flow inside the CAR cooling coils because the normal containment heat load during this event is well within the capacity of the CAR fan coolers. Therefore, Millstone Un:t No. 3 CAR cooling coils are not susceptible to two-phase flow, steam formation, or waterhammer events during this event. l 3.6 Other Containment Heat Removal Systems The nuclear safety related method for containment heat removal during design basis accident is provided by the Quench Spray System (OSS) and Recirculation Spray System (RSS). The QSS system takes suction from the refueling water storage tank (RWST) and is activated during the LOCA injection phase. QSS C piping two-phase flow or viaterhammer +ould not occur since there are no heat exchangers or piping loops where voio or steam pockets could be trapped, and the water coming from the RWST is maintained between 40 *F and 50 *F, per ,
plant Technical Specifications.
.U.S. Nucinar Regulatory Commission j 816105\Attachm:nt 2\Page 4 l
j The RSS system, however, is automatically activated at approximately 11 minutes :
after a CDA signal is initiated (assuming offsite power available). During a DBA, l
- the RSS pumps take suction from the containment sump, and the containment
j heat is removed by the RSS heat exchangers located downstream of the RSS :
- pumps. A review of system configuration showc that the RSS heat exchangers i
{ and associated piping could experience water column separation, if the RSS .
pumps are restarted after being stopped. This concern was reported on January i 13,1997 as a condition that is outside the plant design basis, pursuant to t 10CFR50.72. Millstone Unit No. 3 is particularly susceptible to RSS system water i column separation because no in-line check valves exist to prevent reverse flow i to the sump and a check valve exists after a system high point, thus preventing !
j system drain down. This RSS piping configuration is susceptible to water column
} separation, if the RSS pump stops. Column rejoining after the pumps are started i has the potential for creating unacceptable waterhammer loads. This condition i will be investigated further and resolved in accordance with the Corrective Action l Program and reported in accordance with the provisions of 10CFR50.73.
l 1 l l 4.0 Safety Sionificance i.
l The engineering evaluation has determined tat the Millstone Unit No. 3
. containment fan coolers are not susceptible to steam void formation, two-phase i
flow and waterhammer issues discussed in NRC GL 96-06. Also, the containment -
- air recirculation fan coolers are not credited for mitigating the consequences of f I any accident described in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). The ;
l evaluation demonstrates that the two-phase flow or waterhammer events j described in NRC GL 96-06 are not expected to occur for the CAR fan cooling j system. Thus, there is no adverse safety significance to the CAR fan coolers.
! However, the evaluation determined that one of the safety grade systems used for j containment heat removal during the recirculation phase of a DBA (i.e., the
! Recirculation Spray System) may be susceptible to water column separation and ;
j waterhammer during post-accident conditions. This condition will be investigated i further as indicated above.
i 5.0 Conclusion :
Millstone Unit No. 3 is not susceptible to CAR fan cooling system steam ,
formation, two-phase flow and/or waterhammer for the conditions reported in NRC GL 96-06.
The evaluation identified a condition in which a water column separation and subsequent waterhammer could be experienced in the RSS system during a design basis accident. Issues discovered as a result of the review will be ,
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i U.S. Nucl:gr Regulatory Commission ,
B16105%ttachment 2\Page 5 '
- investigated in accordance with the Corrective Action Program and reported in ,
- . accordance with the provisions of 10CFR50.73.
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