B13169, Proposed Tech Specs,Revising Sections 3.6, Core Cooling Sys, 3.7, Min Water Vol & Boron Concentration in Refueling Water Storage Tank & 4.3, Core Cooling Sys-Periodic Testing, to Combine Into New Section 3.6, Eccs

Proposed Tech Specs,Revising Sections 3.6, Core Cooling Sys, 3.7, Min Water Vol & Boron Concentration in Refueling Water Storage Tank & 4.3, Core Cooling Sys-Periodic Testing, to Combine Into New Section 3.6, Eccs

ML20245C922
Person / Time
Site:	Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png
Issue date:	04/30/1989
From:	CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20245C920	List: B13169, Proposed Tech Specs,Revising Sections 3.6, Core Cooling Sys, 3.7, Min Water Vol & Boron Concentration in Refueling Water Storage Tank & 4.3, Core Cooling Sys-Periodic Testing, to Combine Into New Section 3.6, Eccs ML20245C918
References
B13169, NUDOCS 8904280029
Download: ML20245C922 (39)

Text

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Docket No. 50-213 B13169 i I t - -

r4 Attachment 1 .

Haddam Neck Plant Proposed Revision to Technical Specifications 1

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1 April 1989 8904280029 DR 890421  %

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ADOCK.05000213 PDC ..

u-_ a _.. _ _ _ _m.___.-..__ . . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _m_._ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . __._____._.._.___..___________________m___.____m__________m..________ ___-_

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• SECTION 2.0 SAFETY LIMITS AND MAXIMUM SAFETY SETTINGS P_ AGE j 2.1 Introduction 2-1 2.2 Reactor Core 2-1 l 2.3 Reactor Coolant System Pressure 2-4 {

2.4 Protective Instrumentation 2-5 j SECTION 3.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 3.1 Introduction 3-1 3.2 Reactor Coolant System Activity 3-2 3.3 Reactor Coolant System 3-3 3.4 Combined Heat-up, Cooldown and Pressure Limitations 3-5 3.5 Chemical and Volume Control System 3-8 3.6 Emergency Core Cooling Systems 3-10 3.7 Intentionally Left Blank 3-11 3.8 Turbine Cycle 3-12 3.9 Operational Safety Instrumentation and Control Systems 3.10 Reactivity Control Systems 3-14

. 11 Containment 3-16 3.12 Station Service Power 3-18 3.13 Refueling _

3 3.14 Primary System Leakage 3-25 3.15 Intentionally Left Blank 3-27 3.16 Intentionally Left Blank 3-28 3.17 Power Distribution Limits 3-30 3.18 Intentionally left Blank 3-32 3.19 Hydraulic Snubbers 3-38 3.20 Intentionally left Blank 3-39 3.21 Safety Related Equipment Flood Protection 3-40a 3.22 Fire Protection Systems 3-41 3.23 Post Accident Instrumentation 3-45 3.24 Special Test Exceptions 3-47 II

o-r SECTION 4.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS Pf_GE 4.1 Introduction 4-1 4.2 Operational Safety Items 4-2 4.3 Intentionally Left Blank 4-3 4.4 Containment Testing 4-5 4.5 Emergency Power System Periodic Testing 4-11 4.6 Radioactive Liquid Waste Release 4-13 4.7 Radioactive Gaseous Waste Release 4-15 4.8 Auxiliary Steam Generator Feed Pump 4-17 4.9 Main Steam Isolation Valves 4-18 4.10 Inservice Inspection and Reactor Vessel Surveillance 4-19 4.11 Deleted 4.12 High Energy Piping System Tests 4-24 4.13 Hydraulic Snubbers 4-26 4.14 Flood Protection Annunciation 4-29a 4.15 Fire Protection Systems 4-30 4.16 Post Accident Instrumentation 4-33 SECTION 5.0 DESIGN FEATURES 5.1 Introduction 5-1 5.2 Site Description 5-1 5.3 Reactor 5-2 5.4 Containment 5-4 i

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3.6 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 3.6.1 0 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - Tava GREATER THAN OR E0 VAL TO 350 E LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.la T o independent Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) subsystems shall be OPERABLE with each subsystem comprised of:

1. One OPERABLE centrifugal charging pump,

2. One OPERABLE High Pressure Safety Injection pump,

3. One OPERABLE Low Pressure Safety Injection pump,

4. One OPERABLE RHR hea? exchanger,

5. One OPERABLE RHR pum), and

6. An OPERABLE flow pata capable of taking suction from the refueling water storage tank 01 a Safety Injection signal and manually transferring suctior to the containment sump during the recirculation phase of operation.

b. The flow path from the reactor cavity to the containment sump, which consists of four open reactor cavity pool seal hatches and open transfer canal drain valves shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

a. With one ECCS subsystem inoperable, test the remaining High Pressure Safety Injection pump, Low Pressure Safety Injection pump, or the RHR pump within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />; restore the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

b. With the flow path from the reactor cavity to the containment sump inoperable, restore the flow path to OPERABLE status within one hour or be in H0T STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

c. In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the Reactor Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date. The current value of the usage factor for each affected Safety Injection nozzle shall be provided in this Special Report whenever its value exceeds 0.70.

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O EMERGENCY CORE C001.ING SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS Each ECCS subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> by verifying that the following valves are in the indicated conditions:

Valve Number Valve Function Valve Position RH-FCV-602 RHR Heat Exchanger Blocked closed. Operator air Bypass Line supply isolated.

RH-FCV-796 RHR Heat Exchanger Blocked in throttled position.

Discharge Line Operator air supply isolated.

Closed RHR-MOV-22 Containment Sump Closed.

Suction Line Manual Operator is locked.

SI-MOV-24 RWST Line Locked open. Operator circuit breaker locked open.

SI-FCV-875 HPSI Niniflow Line Blocked and locked open.

RH-M0V-074 RHR Recirculation Locked closed. Operator Line circuit breaker locked open.*

SI-MOV-854A HPSI Pump Locked open.

Suction Line SI-MOV-854B HPSI Pump Locked open.

Suction Line SI-MOV-901 RHR/HPSI Crosstie Locked closed.

SI-MOV-902 RHR/HPSI Crosstie Locked closed,

b. On start-up prior to entering Mode 4:

VALVE N0. LOCATION ACTION SI-V-905 HPSI Loop I Valve blocked and locked Injection Line in throttled position.

SI-V-906 HPSI loop 2 Valve blocked and locked injection line in throttled position SI-V-907 HPSI loop 3 Valve blocked and locked injectionline in throttled position.

SI-V-908 HPSI loop 4 Valve blocked and locked j injection line in throttled position. I SI-M0V-873 Core deluge line Valve is locked open and electrically disconnected.

Except as permitted by Surveillance Requirement C.2.

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! EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS l .

SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS (Continued)

c. At least once per 31 days by:

1) Verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position,

2) Manually cycling SI-MOV-24 from the full open position to approximately 1 inch of stem travel and returning to the full open position and cycling RH-M0V-874 from the full closed position to the full open position and back to the full closed position by use of the motor operator.

3) Verifying that each of the following pumps develops greater than or equal to the indicated discharge head pressure on recirculation flow when tested pursuant to Sections 4.10 A and B:

a) High Pressure Safety A 1392 psig Injection Pump B 1392 psig b) Low Pressure Safety A 322 psig Injection Pump B 322 psig c) Residual Heat Removal A 145 psig Pump B 145 psig

4) Verifying the hydraulic characteristics of the centrifugal charging pumps (A and B) pursuant to Sections 4.10 A and B.

d. By a visual inspection which verifies that no loose debris (rags, trash, clothing, etc.) is present in the containment which could be transported to the containment sump and cause restriction of the pump suctions during LOCA conditions. The visual inspection shall be performed:

1) Of all accessible areas of the containment prior to {

establishing CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY. This includes verifying l all reactor cavity pool seal hatches are open, gratings j installed, and also that the transfer canal drain valves '

WD-V-203 and WD-V-970 are open, and

2) Of the areas within containment affected by the work activity within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> following the completion of each containment entry, except for entries made only for surveillance or 4 inspection, when CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is established. In  !

the event of multiple containment entries, the inspection need not be performed more often than once every 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

e. At least once per 18 months by:

1) Verifying that when the RCS pressure (simulated or actual) increases above 400 psig, proper interlock action occurs to protect the RHR System from being overpressurized by the RCS. l 3-10b

EMERGENtY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS (Continued) 1

2) A visual inspection of the containment sump and verifying  !

that the drain trenches and cover gratings are not restricted .

by debris and show no evidence of structural distress or abnormal corrosion.

f. At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by:

1) Verifying that each automatic valve shown in Table 3.6-1 in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a Safety i Injection Actuation test signal,

2) Verifying that valves, RH-MOV-22 and'RH-V-808A, in the flow.

path for suction from the containment sump.can be opened by manual realignment, and l

3) Verifying that each of the following pumps start automatically upon receipt of a Safety Injection Actuation test signal:

a) High Pressure Safety Injection pump, and b) Low Pressure Safety Injection pump.

g. At least once per 60 months, during shutdown, by verifying that each of the following pumps develops greater than or equal to the indicated total head pressure and flow rate:

Total Flow-Head rate (feet, unless (com) otherwise indicated)

1) Centrifugal Charging A 2300 psig 360 Pump B 2300 psig 360

2) High Pressure Safety A 2250 1750 Injection Pump B 2250 1750 3-10c l 1

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EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 1

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-SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS (Continued) l Total Flow- .

Head rate j (feet,unless (com) otherwise indicated)

3) Low Pressure Safety A 590 5500 Injection Pump B 590 5500 1

l 4) RHR Pump A 300 2200 B 300 2200 l

l h. Periodic leakage testing of each ECCS check valves, SI-CV-862A, SI-CV-8628, SI-CV-862C, SI-CV-862D, SI-CV-872A, and SI-CV-872B shall be accomplished prior to entering MODE 1 operation:

1) After every time the plant is placed in the cold shutdown condition for refueling.

2) After every time the plant has been placed in the cold shutdown condition for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> if testing has not been accomplished.in the preceding 9 months.

3) Prior to returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair, or replacement work is performed.

Leakage may be measured indirectly using pressure indicators, if accomplished in accordance with approved procedures and supported by computations showing that the method is capable of demonstrating compliance with the leakage criteria of Section 3.14.A.6. The minimum differential pressure across these check valves during these leakage tests shall not be less than 150 psid.

1. The correct position of each ECCS throttle valve listed below shall be verified within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> following completion of each valve stroking operation or maintenance on the valve when the ECCS subsystems are required to be OPERABLE.

ECCS Throttle Valves Valve Number SI-V-905 SI-V-906 SI-V-907 SI-V-908 RH-FCV-796 3-10d

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS (Continued) i

j. A flow balance test shall be performed, during Mode 5 or 6, following completion of modifications to the ECCS subsystems that alter the subsystem flow characteristics, to verify that:

1) For the High Pressure Safety Injection pump injection lines, with a single pump running and two lines isolated, the flow rate through each line is equal to 1000 100 gpm.

2) For RHR pump discharge lines, with a single pump running, the flow rate through the discharge line is equal to 1500 i 280 gpm.

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4 TABLE 3.6-1 SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATED AUTOMATIC VALVES VALVE NUMBER SI POSITION SI-MOV-861A Open l

SI-MOV-861B Open SI-MOV-861C Open SI-MOV-861D Open CD-MOV-871A Open CD-MOV-871B Open BA-H0V-373 Open LD-M0V-200 Closed LD-TV-230 Closed CH-MOV-257 Closed CH-S0V-242 Closed l'

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EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 3.6.2 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - Tava LESS THAN 3500F i LJflLING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.2a ' As a minimum, one ECCS subsystem comprised of the following shall be OPERABI2:

1. One OPERABLE centrifugal charging pump, *

2. One OPERABLE RHR heat exchanger,  !

3. One OPERA 3LE RHR pump,

4. An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the refueling water storage tank and manually transferring suction to the containment sump during the recirculation phase of operation,

b. The flow path from the reactor cavity to the containment sump  ;

which consists of four open reactor cavity pool hatches and open transfer canal drain valves shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 4.

ACTION:

a. With no ECCS subsystem OPERABLE because of the inoperability of either the centrifugal charging pump, or the flow path from the refueling water storage tank, containment sump or the reactor cavity to the containment. sump, restore at least one ECCS subsystem to OPERABLE status within I hour or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br />.

b. With no ECCS subsystem OPERABLE because of the inoperability of either the RHR heat exchanger or RHR pump, restore at least one ECCSsubsystemtoOPERABLgstatusormaintaintheReactorCoolant System T less than 350 F by use of alternate heat removal methods. avg

c. In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the Reactor Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date. The current value of the usage factor for each affected Safety Injection nozzle shall be provided in this Special Report whenever its value exceeds 0.70. ,

A maximum of one centrifugal charging pump, one metering pump, and no high pressure safety injection pumps shall be OPERABLE whenever the Low Temperature Overpressurization System (LTOP) is required.

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EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS

a. The ECCS subsystems shall be demonstrated OPERABLE per the applicable Surveillance Requirements of Specification 3.6.1 with the exception that, for valves RH-FCV-602 and RH-FCV-796, restoration of valve controls be allowed.

b. One centrifugal charging pump and both High Pressure Safety Injection pumps shall be demonstrated inoperable at least once per l

31dayswheneverthetemperatureofoneormoreofthegCScold legs of an unisolated loop is less than or equal to 315 F and the RCS is not vented by a minimum opening of 3 inches (nominal diameter) or its equivalent by verifying:

1) That the High Pressure Safety Injection pump motor circuit breakers are racked out and the cabinets locked,

2) That High Pressure Safety Injection pump discharge valves SI-V-855A and SI-V-855B are closed and locked, and

3) That the inoperable centrifugal charging pump's control switch is in the trip pullout position and red tagged, "Do Not Operate."

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EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 3.6.3 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.3 The refueling water storage tank (RWST) shall be OPERABLE with:

a. A minimum contained borated water volume of 230,000 gallons, l

b. A boron concentration of between 2200 and 2850 ppm,

c. A minimum water temperature of 600F, and

d. A maximum water temperature of 1200F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With the RWST inoperable, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within I hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS The RWST shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 7 days by:

1). Verifying the contained borated water volume in the tank, and

2) Verifying the boron concentration of the water.

b. At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by verifying the RWST temperature.

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EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 3.6.4 oH CONTROL SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITIQN FOR OPERATION 3.6.4 A system for controlling the pH of the core cooling water (i.e., TSP Storage Baskets) during the recirculation phase shall be OPERABLE. I APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4 ACTION:

With the pH control system (TSP Storage Baskets) inoperable, restore the system (TSP Storage Baskets) to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS The pH control system (TSP Storage Baskets) shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by:

a. Verifying that a minimLm total of 60 cubic feet of trisodium phosphate dodecahydrate (TSP) is contained in the TSP storage baskets, and

b. Verifying that when a representative sample of 0.35 0.05 lbs, of T5P from a TSP storage basket is submerged, without agitation, in 5015 gallons of 180110 F borated water from the RWST, the pH of the mixed solution is raised to greater than or equal to 6 within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

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. 3.6 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS BASES 3.6.1 and 3.6.2 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of two independent ECCS subsystems ensures that sufficient emergency core cooling e oability will be available in the event of a LOCA assuming the loss of one .absystem through any single 611ure consideration.

Either subsystem is capable of supplying sufficient co,e cooling to limit the peak cladding temperatures within acceptable limits for all postulated break sizes ranging from the double ended break of the largest RCS cold leg pipe downward. In addition, each ECCS subsystem provides long-term core cooling capability in the recirculation mode during the accident recovery period.

With the RCS temperature below 350 F,U one OPERABLE ECCS subsystem is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the limited core cooling requirements.

The limitation for a maximum of one centrifugal charging pump and one metering pump to be OPERABLE and the Surveillance Requirement to verify the remaining centrifugal charging pump and high pressure safety injection pumps to be inoperable below 315 F provides assurance that a mass addition pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single low temperature overpressurization relief valve.

In order to use the HPSI pumps to provide high pressure recirculation following a small break loss of coolant accident (LOCA) coincident with a single active failure, the following modifications to the emergency core ,

cooling system have been made. A piping crosstie between each HPSI pump 1 suction and the RHR pump discharge has been installed. Two valves, '

SI-M0V-901 and SI-M0V-902 have been installed in this crosstie. The two manual HPSI pump suction valves have been replaced with motor-operated valves, SI-MOV-854A and B, to prevent contaminated water from entering the RWST when using the HPSI pumps to provide flow to the core during recirculation. Currently, these valves are locked open.

The manual core deluge isolation valve has been replaced with a de-energized ntor-operated valve, SI-M0V-873. This valve is locked open to ensure that LJequate flow is available to the core deluge system.

The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensures that as a minimum, the assumptions used in the safety analyses are met and that subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained.

3-10k

ENERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSlfEi BASES Surveillance requirements for throttle valve position and flow balance testing provide assurance that proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of a LOCA.

Valve RH-FCV-796 is required to be throttled open within a specified range.

That throttled position has been determined by separate analyses to ensure acceptable core performance during post-LOCA recirculation.

The surveillance requirements test the operability of check valves which act as primary coolant system pressure isolation valves and thereby reduces the potential for an intersystem loss of coolant accident.

In order to use the high pressure safety injection (HPSI) pumps to perform high pressure recirculation (HPR) following a small break loss of coolant

, accident (LOCA), successful operation of SI-MOV-24 and RH-MOV-874 is required. The monthly surveillance to be performed on these two valves will increase the probability that the valves are available to perform their function during the small break LOCA. Since SI-MOV-24 will not be cloted to any measurable extent during the surveillance, there will be no effect on safety hjection availability. Surveillance on RH-M0V-874, will only last for a short time and the probability of a small break loss of coolant accident concurrent with the surveillance is extremely low. If the valve becomes inoperable during this time, RH-V-783 in series with RH-M0V-874 can be closed. Therefore, there will be no measurable impact on HPSI system availability as a result of the surveillance.

Reference:

FSAR - Section 6.3 3.6.3 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK The OPERABILITY of the refueling water storage tank (RWST) as part of the ECCS ensures that a sufficient supply of borated water is available for injection by the ECCS in the event of a LOCA. The limits on RWST minimum volume and boron concentration ensure that: (1) sufficient water is available within containment to permit recirculation cooling flow to the core, and (2) the reactor will remain subcritical in the cold condition following mixing of the RWST and the RCS water volumes with all control rods inserted except for the most reactive control assembly. These assumptions are consistent with the LOCA analyses.

The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics.

The maximum solution temperature for the RWST is based on design basis accident analysis.

The minimum solution temperature for the RWST is for freeze protection concerns. In addition, the minimum solution temperature for the RWST is also based on the stress analysis for the associated piping system and pressurized thermal shock.

3-101 j

. l EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS BASES 3.6.4 oH CONTROL SYSTEM The trisodium phos /.ite dodecahydrate (TSP) stored in porous wire mesh baskets located adjacent to the containment sump is provided to minimize the possibility of corrosion cracking in certain metal components during operation of the ECCS in the recirculation mode following a LOCA. The TSP provides this protection by dissolving in the sump water and causing a resultant pH of 2 7.0 based on the following conditions: (1) RWST boron concentration of 2850 ppm, 160,000 gallons of RWST volume injected (120,000 gallons during the injection phase, an additional 40,000 gallons during transfer to recirculation) and, (2) RCS and PZR at hot zero power conditions with a boron concentration of 2000 ppm.

If the entire contents of the RWST were injected into containment, sufficient TSP is available to raise the sump pH to 16.5. This is sufficiently high to reduce the susceptibility of stainless steel to stress corrosion cracking.

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Docket'No. 50-213 B13169 Attachment 2 Haddam Neck-P1 ant

. Description of Individual Proposed Changes to Technical Specifications and Discussion on Significant Hazards Consideration 3.6, Emergency Core Cooling System i

i April 1989

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Attachment 2 B13169/Page1 Technical Specification Section 3.6. Emeraency Core Coolina System The Haddam Neck Plant Technical Specification Section 3.6, " Core Cooling Systems," Section 3.7, " Minimum Water Volume and Boron Concentration in the Refueling Water Storage Tank," and Section 4.3, " Core Cooling Systems -

Periodic Testing," have been revised and combined into a newly titled Section 3.6, "Emergeng Core Cooling Systems." In addition, Administrative Technical Specification for Section 3.6 and 4.3 have been incorporated into this new Section 3.6, " Emergency Core Cooling Systems." This new section follows the Westinghouse Standard Technical Specification (H STS) format. These proposed changes are compared to the Haddam Neck Plant Technical Specifications, the Administrative Technical Specifications at the Haddam Neck Plant, and the H STS. A matrix summarizing this comparison is included in Attachment 3. In addition, Attachment 4 provides an existing Technical Specification Cross-Reference. The intent of this attachment is to provide a means to be certain that all sections in the existing Technical Specifications are either totally incorporated in the proposed Technical Specifications or a justification is provided for its deletion.

Description of the proposed Technical Specifications 3 J5 Emeraency Core Coolina Systems (ECCS) 3.6.1 ECCS Subsystems - T areater than or eaual to 3500F Limitina Condition for Operation The Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) requires the minimum equipment required to be available to accomplish the core cooling safety function following an accident which renders the steam generators effectively unavail-able, such as a large break LOCA. Two independent and redundant ECCS trains are required to ensure that at least one is available assuming a single failure in the other train. In addition, the proposed changes specify that an operable flow path from either the refueling water storage tank (RWST) or the containment sump to the safety injection pumps is a part of the ECCS. The existing Technical Specifications specify this in a more general way (i.e.,

such system valves and interlocks are required for proper operation of Core Cooling Systems). Both requirements are equivalent, but the proposed Techni-cal Specifications provide a more precise wording and are equivalent to the M STS. In addition, the proposed Technical Specifications specify that a flow path consisting of four reactor cavity pool hatches, gratings, and open transfer canal drain valves be operable. This is a new requirement following the installation of the permanent reactor cavity pool seal.

(1) Administrative Technical Specifications at Haddam Neck are administrative procedures that were implemented as an interim measure prior to converting the Technical Specifications to the STS format.

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, . Attachment 2 B13169/Page 2 l Action With one ECCS train not fully operable, the Action Statement requires testing the remaining pump and restoring the inoperable train to fully operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. When the required Action can not be completed within the required completion time, a controlled shutdown is required. This is consis-tent with the W STS. The Administrative Technical Specification requirement to be in hot shutdown in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> is equivalent to the proposed Technical Specifications. Since the Haddam Neck Plant Technical Specifications do not contain this action requirement, this is an additional limitation not present in the existing Technical Specification. The Action Statement (b) also adds a new requirement that if the flow path from the reactor cavity to the contain-ment sump is inoperable, restoration to operable status within one hour must be made, otherwise the plant must initiate shutdown. This new requirement enhances the availability of the ECCS operating in the recirculation mode.

The Action Statement (c) adds a new requirement for updating the usage factor for each safety injection nozzle. This allows monitoring the thermal fatigue of the nozzles.

Surveillance Requirements There are a few minor differences in the ECCS operability requirement in the proposed changes as compared to the existing Technical Specification and these are descr b d below.

1. Item a The operability requirements list valves RH-FCV-602 and RH-FCV-796 as blocked closed and throttled, respectively, and the valve operator air supply isolated. The existing Technical Specifications have these valves locked in their positions and the air supply isolated whenever the reactor is critical and T > 3500F. For MODES 1, 2, and 3 both require-ments are similar, there@e, there is no impact on the performance of the ECCS. MODE 4 is discussed under Section 3.6.2.

The existing TS specifies the post LOCA recirculation requirements for valve RH-MOV-22 as locked in the open position and the circuit breaker locked open. The proposed Technical Specifications specify the normal operation requirements for this valve as closed and the manual operator locked. During normal operation, this valve should be closed and this position is consistent with the Emergency Response Procedure ES-1.3 which requires the operators to open the valve to initiate recirculation during a LOCA transient.

2. Item e This section adds new surveillance requirements concerning a) proper interlock action to protect the RHR system from being overpressurized and, b) visual inspection of the containment sump. As such, these new requirements enhance the reliability of the ECCS system.

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Attachment 2 B1,3169/Page 3

3. Item f This item lists the surveillance requirements for ECCS subsystems that i are to be performed at least once per 18 months during shutdown. The j expanded list includes verification that each automatic vn.1ve listed in i Table 3.6-1 actuates to its correct position on a Sifety Injection ]

Actuation test signal. In addition, verification of operability by manual realignment of valves RH-M0V-22 and RH-V-808A is also required.

These new requirements increase the reliability of the ECCS.

3.6.2 ECCS Subsystems - T less than 3500F Limitino Condit'ya for Operation With the RCS taporature below 3500F, one operable ECCS subsystem is accept-able without sc.gle failure consideration on the basis of the stable react-ivity condition of the reactor and the limited core cooling requirement. This LC0 is also equivalent to the H STS. In addition, this section defines an operable flow path from either the RWST or the containment sump to the safety injection pumps, which is not included in the existing Technical Specifica-tions. Also included in the operability requirements is an additional flow path consisting of four open reactor cavity pool hatches and open transfer canal drain valves. These changes clearly enhance the availability of the ECCS systems.

Action A new requirement in Item (a) is that the flow path for the reactor cavity to ,

I the containment sump must be operable as part of the ECCS subsystem. This specification is more conservative as compared to the current TS. Item (c) represents a new requirement to keep the safety injection nozzle usage factor updated. This is similar to the requirements of Modes 1, 2, and 3. The Action Statements are also equivalent to the M STS.

Surveillance Requirements The added surveillance for the ECCS subsystems refers to the requirements of Section 3.6.1 which were discussed above. The only deviation is that in Mode 4 the operators need to control the plant cooldown rate and the proposed '

Technical Specifications allows them to restore controls to the RHR heat exchanger valves RH-FCV-602 and RH-FCV-796.

Surveillance Requirements not included in Section 3.6.1 and 3.6.2 The existing Technical Specifications surveillance requirements contained in Section 4.3 list a few requirements that are not listed in the surveillance requirements of Section 3.6.1 and 3.6.2 of the proposed Technical Specifica-tions. In most cases, these requirements are contained in other sections of the revised Technical Specification (see Attachment 3 for Technical Specifica-tion Comparison Matrix).

Attachment 2 813169/Page 4

1) The existing Technical Specifications specify the operation of the diesel generator and its associated pumps be verified during each refuel shutdown. ThisrequirementiscontainedintheproposedSection3.12.y

2) The metering pump is tested monthly in the existing Technical Specifica-tions (Section 4.3, Item B.2). This requirement is cov in the proposed Standard Technical Specification Section 4.1.2.4.2.ged

3) The existing Technical Specifications call for a periodic testing of the containment spray water valve during each refueling shutdown (Item D, Section 4.3). The proposed section eliminates this testing. While preserving this testing option may seem worthwhile, it should be noted that the containment design basis analysis does not credit the contain- j ment spray system, crediting instead the containment air circulation fans '

to maintain pressure below the design limit, following a postulated large break LOCA and main steamline break. It should also be noted that the containment spray can be used only if both LPSI pumps are available. If only one ECCS train is credited, as is normally assumed in the LOCA analyses, the spray cannot be used since this would cause cavitation of the one available LPSI pump.

3.6.3. Refuelina Water Storace Tank Limitina Condition for Operation The requirements for the Limiting Condition for Operation have been expanded by adding the minimum and maximum allowable temperatures of the RWST water for freeze protection and safety analysis concerns, respectively. In addi-tion, the minimum solution temperature for the RWST is also based on the stress analysis for the associated piping system and pressurized thermal shock. The specified boron concentration range of 2200 to 2850 ppm in the water is specified. The lower limit is typically used in the safety analysis while the higher limit is coordinated with the trisodium phosphate dodecahydrate (TSP) requirement to maintain pH control. Therefore, the proposed Technical Specification is conservative with respect to the existing Technical Specification and is equivalent to the M STS.

Action With the RWST inoperable, the ECCS can not perform its design function. Under i these conditions, prompt action must be taken to restore the RWST to operable I status or to place the unit in a Mode in which the ECCS is not required. In the Action Statement, an unavailability of the RWST has been limited to a maximum of I hour, otherwise initiation of plant shutdown to hot standby (2) E. J. Mroczka letter to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Electric Power System, dated August 29, 1988.

(3) E. J. Mroczka letter to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Reactivity Controls System, dated March 6,1989.

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. Attachment 2 B13169/Page 5 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> must be made. This new requirement is included as an enhance-ment to safety and is equivalent to the M STS.

Surveillance Requirements The only required surveillance in the existing Technical Specification Section 4.2 is a weekly check for minimum boron concentration. In addition to this weekly surveillance for boron concentration, the proposed section i requires a weekly surveillance of the contained volume and a daily temperature I surveillance. The proposed Technical Specification Surveillance requirements are equivalent to the H STS.

3.6.4. oH Control System This is a new specification and it does not have any corresponding section in the existing Technical Specifications. It also has no corresponding section the W STS.

The requirement to have a minimum volume of trisodium phosphate dodecahydrate (TSP) in the containment sump assures that the pH of the reactor coolant which migrates to the containment sump during emergency core cooling will be raised to a value which will not cause excessive corrosion of equipment inside the containment during long-term sump recirculation. Since this system is passive, an 18 month surveillance to verify the presence of a sufficient volume of TSP to aica the sump pH is sufficient to assure availability.

The corresponding bases section adequately explains the need and operation of the TSP baskets.

The addition of this specification represents a new requirement which is included in the Technical Specifications as an enhancement to safety.

Significant Hazards Consideration In accordance with 10CFR50.92, CYAPC0 has reviewed the proposed Technical Specification Sections 3.6.1 through 3.6.4 and has concluded that they do not involve a significant hazards consideration. The basis for this conclusion is that the three criteria of 10CFR50.92(c) are not compromised. The proposed changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration because the changes would rct:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The determination of whether or not a proposed change is equivalent, more restrictive (or a new requirement) or less restrictive is based on the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) and Applicability Requirements since it is these requirements which will impact the design basis accidents. In general, the conversion to the y STS yields more extensive and/or restrictive Action or Surveillance Requirements. As described above, most of the changes are more restric-tive in that there are no comparable requirements in the existing Techni-cal Specifications, and the proposed changes are equivalent to the H STS.

For the few changes that are less restrictive, justification is provided for the changes. Since the proposed Sections 3.6.1 through 3.6.4 do not I

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. Attachment 2 B13169/Page 6 reduce the availability or the reliability of the ECCS, the consequences )

of.the design basis accidents remain unchanged. l

2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated. Because there are no hardware modifications associated with the proposed changes, the performance of safety related systems remains unaffected during operations. The operability require-ments are increased over the current requirements thus enhancing the performance of safety systems. Therefore, the proposed Technical Speci-fications will not modify the plant response to the point where it can be considered a new accident nor are any credible failure modes created.

3. Involve a significan* reduction in a margin of . safety. Because the changes proposed herein provide acceptable results for the design basis accident, no additional burden will be placed on the protective bound-artes for postulated accidents. In addition, there are no plant hardware modifications associated with this change and hence, there is no direct impact on the protective boundaries. The proposed Technical Specifica-tions do not affect the safety limits of the protective boundaries and the bases of the proposed Technical Specifications have been modified to reflect the proposed changes.

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Docket No. 50-213 B13169 Attachment 3 Haddam Neck Plant

-Technical Specification Comparison Matrix Proposed Section 3.6 April 1989

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Attachment 3 l

• Page 1 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION COMPARISON MATRIX I l

l Introduction l

The Technical Specification Comparison Matrix (TSCM) was prepared to <

facilitate the revision of the existing Haddam Neck Technical Specifications I (T.S.). The TSCM is set up denoting the proposed Technical Specification section numbers in the left hand column followed by a short description.

The next column lists the corresponding existing T.S. section number. The final two columns compare the requirements contained in the proposed section with the existing T.S. and the Westinghouse STS, respectively. The key at the bottom of each page provides an explanation for the symbols located in

. the two comparison columns. The equivalent notation "E" may either denote that exact wording has been transposed from the existing T.S. or different verbage conveying equivalent requirements has been used. In many case:,,

there was not a one-for-one relationship, but rather multi-section relationships, whereas the requirements in a given T.S. section may be divided between several different sections in the proposed Technical Specification. The additional requirement notation "++" denotes that the proposed Technical Specification is more restrictive because it is an entirely new requirement as compared to the existing T.S. or it is more restrictive in the sense that the existing T.S. requirements have been changed such that they are more restrictive.

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. Attachment 3

.Page 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION COMPARISON MATRIX Existing Comparison Comparison Current With Existing With}!

T.S.# Description T.S. # T.S. STS 3.6.1 ECCS Subsystem 2350 F 3.6.1.a ECCS Subsystem

! 1. Centrifugal charging pump 3.6.A-I.1.b Adm E E

2. HPSI pump 3.6.A-I.1.a Adm E E

3. LPSI pump 3.6.A-I.1.c Adm E E

4. RHR heat. exchanger 3.6.A-I.2 Adm i E

5. RHR pump 3.6.A-I.1.d Adm E

6. Flow path RWST to sump 3.6.A.I.3 Adm r. E 3.6.1.b Recirculation flow path - 3.6.A-I.3 Adm E E pool hatches Applicability 3.6.A Adm E E Action 3.6.A-I.4 Adm E E Surveillance: Demonstrated Operable

a. Once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> 3.6.B.1 E E

b. Startup prior to Entering Mode 4 3.6.B.2 c E

c. Once per 31 days 4.3.B.I.a Adm E E 4.3.B.1,2 and 4 E E

d. Visual inspection 4.3.G Adm E ++(1)

e. Once per 18 months -

++(2) E(4)

f. Once per 18 months-s/d 4.3:B.3, 4.3.A.1- E(3) E

g. Once per 60 months-s/d Table 4.2-1 Item 14 ++(5) E

h. Leak testing of ECCS l check valve 4.3.F E ++ I

i. Position of ECCS throttle valve 4.3.G E *(6)

j. Flow balance test 4.3.H E *(7) {

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.- ' Attachment 3 i

.Page.3 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION ,

COMPARISON MATRIX i

Existing Comparison Comparison J Current With Existing With H T.S.# Description T.S. # T.S. STS 3.6.2 ECCS subsystem 1350 0  ;

3.6.2.a ECCS Subsystem i

1. Centrifugal charging pump 3.6.A-II.1 Adm E E.

2. RHR heat exchanger. 3.6.A-II.2 Adm E E

3. RHR pump 3.6.A-II.3 Adm E. E

4. Flow path from RWST and 3.6.A-II.4 Adm- E E from containment sump

. 3.6.2.b Flow path - Pool' hatches 3.6.A-II.4 Adm E E Applicability 3.6.A-II Adm E E Action 3.6.A-II.5 and 6 Adm ++(8) E Surveillance: Demonstrated 3.6.B (d) E Operable - 4.3G Adm, 4.3.A.1 and 2 Demonstrated Inoperable 3.6.C, 3.6.0, 4.3.E E *(10) 3.6.3 RWST

a. Water volume 3.7 E E

b. Boron concentration 3.7 E E

c. Minimum temperature -

++ E

d. Maximum temperature -

++ E Applicability 3.7 E E Action -

++ E Surveillance: Demonstrated Table 4.2-2, Item 3 Operable -

++ E 3.6.4 pH Control -

++ ++

Applicability -

++ ++

Action -

++ ++

Surveillance: Demonstrated Operable -

++ ++

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . i

. Attachment 3 )

.Page 4 9

Notes E- Equivalent requirements

• -- Less restrictive requirements

++ = Additional requirements f

(1) Additional requirements for visual inspections are included in proposed j Technical Specifications (T.S.) (i.e., seal hatches are open and valves open.)

(2) Verification of proper interlock action to protect the RHR system from being overpressurized by the RCS is required in the proposed T.S. {

(3) The expanded list includes verification that each automatic valve listed in Table 3.6-1 actuates to its correct function on a safety injection actuation test signal. In addition, the proposed T.S. requires verification that 2 valves in the containment sump can be opened by manual realignment.

(4) The RHR isolation valves do not have an autoclosure interlock if the RCS pressure exceeds the RHR design pressure.

(5) Flow rate verification for HPSI, LPSI, RHR and charging pumps are required in the proposed T.S. while the only requirement in the existing T.S. is to calibrate ue RHR pump flow.

(6) W STS requires verification of correct position of ECCS throttle valves once per 18 months.

(7) The proposed T.S. does not include a flow balance test for the charging pumps.

(8) The proposed T.S. requires a Special Report in the event the ECCS is activated and injects water into the RCS.

(9) See comparison with T.S. #3.6.1 Surveillance for a listing of differences.

(10) The proposed T.S. requires an inoperability demonstratist of the HPSI and a charging pump once per 31 days vs once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> in the H STS.

?' c Docket No.~50-213 B13169 Attachment 4 Haddam Neck Plant Existing Technical Specifications Cross-Reference 1

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April 1989

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1. .. Attachment 4

. ,,B13169/Page 1 Existing Technical Specifications o- Cross-Reference Existina T.S.# Description Proposed TS 3.6 Administrative Core Cooling System i Technical Specification.

1 3.6. A-I Applicability 3.6.1 3.6 A-1.1 Pumps 3.6.1.a.1.2,3,5 3.6 A-I.2 RHR heat exchangers 3.6.1.a.1.4 3.6 A-I.3 Flow paths 3.6.1.a.1.6 and 3.6.1.b 3.6 A-I.4 One ECCS train 3.6.a Action Inoperable 3.6 A-II Applicability 3.6.2 3.6 A-II.1 One charging pump 3.6.2.a.1 3.6 A-II.2 One RHR heat exchanger 3.6.2.a.2 3.6 A-II.3 One RHR pump 3.6.2.a.3-3.6 A-II.4 Flow paths 3.6.2.a.4and3.6.2.b 3.6 A-II.5 No ECCS train 3.6.2 Action a operable because of one charging pump or flow path inoperable 3.6 A-II.6 No ECCS train 3.6.2 Action b operable because of the RHR pump or RHR heat exchanger inoperable 3.6 Core cooling system 3.6 A See Administrative Technical Specification 3.6 A-I.1 3.6.B.1 Valve operability once Surveillance per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Requirement (SR)(a) 3.6.B.2 Valve operability on SR(b) startup prior to entering Mode 4

4 l- "S Attachment 4

' # [ Bla169/Page 2-

! 1 Existino T.S.#~ Description Proposed TS 3.6.C Actions to disable Section 3.6.2 (SR)(b)

HPSI pumps 3.6.D Actions to disable the Section 3.6.2 (SR)(b)

Centrifugal Charging pump l

3.7 RWST Volume and Boron 3.1.2.5b, 3.6.3a, and 3.6.3b 4.3 Administrative Core Cooling Systems Periodic Testing Technical Specification l

4.3.B.I.a Once in 31 days - 3.6.1 SR (c.1) verify valves are in correct position 4.3.G Visual inspection for 3.6.1 SR(d) no loose debris 4.3 Core Cooling Systems Periodic Testing 4.3.A.1 Once per 18 months - 3.6.1 SR(f) s/d - automatic operation of the ECCS 4.3.A.2 Verification of 3.12 starting of D.Gs and pumps 4.3.A.3 Control board 3.12 indications 4.3.A.4 Venting prerequisite 3.3.4.2 (Existing) for test 4.3.B.1 Monthly pump test on 3.6.1 SR(c3) recirculation 4.3.8.2 Monthly testing of 3.6.1 SR(c4) charging and metering pumps 4.3.B.3 Cycling of safety 3.6.1 SR(fl) injection and core deluge valves 4.3.B.4 Exercise two valves 3.6.1 SR(c2) 4.3.C Testing requirement on 3.6.1 Action remaining pump

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, Attachment 4

, JL3169/Page3 o"

.Existina T.S.# Description Proposed TS

'4.3.0 Motor-operated (1) containment spray water valve 4.3.E Demonstrate pumps 3.6.2 SR(b) inoperable

' 4.3.F . Periodic leak testing 3.6.1 SR(h) of each ECCS check valve shown in

. Table 4.3-1 (6 valves) 4.3.G Correct position of 3.6.1 SR(i)

ECCS throttle valve 4.3.H - . Flow Balance Test 3.6.1 SR(j)

N_ gig (1) The proposed Technical Specification eliminates this testing as the containment design basis analysis does .not credit. the containment spray system.

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