ML20056D052

Proposed Tech Specs Modifying Action Statement a of TS Section 3.5.1 & Moving Surveillance Requirement 4.5.1.b from TS Section 3/4.5.1 to TS Section 3/4.5.2 as Surveillance Requirement 4.5.2.c

ML20056D052
Person / Time
Site:	Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png
Issue date:	07/26/1993
From:	CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20056D050	List: B14502, Application for Amend to License DPR-61,proposing Changes to Modify Action Statement a of TS Section 3.5.1 & Moving Surveillance Requirement 4.5.1.b from TS 3/4.5.1 to TS 3/4.5.2 as Surveillance Requirement 4.5.2.c ML20056D052
References
NUDOCS 9308020260
Download: ML20056D052 (18)

Text

.

Docket No. 50-213 B14502 Haddam Neck Plant Proposed Revision to Technical Specifications ECCS Subsystems Marked-Up Pages of Technical Specifications l

l j

l July 1993 9300020260 930726 Fi PDR ADOCK 05000213 i@

P PDR Q

APR 2 61990

~ 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 3/4.5.1 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - Tava GREATER THAN OR E0 VAL TO 350*F LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.la Two independent Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) subsystems shall be OPERABLE with each subsystem comprised of:

1.

One OPERABLE centrifugal charging pump, 2.

One OPERABLE High Pressure Safety Injection pump, 3.

One OPERABLE Low Pressure Safety Injection pump, 4.

One OPERABLE RHR heat exchanger, 5.

One OPERABLE RHR pump, and 6.

An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the refueling water storage tank on a Safety Injection signal and manually transferring suction to the containment sump during the recirculation phase of operation.

b.

The flow path from the reactor cavity to the containment sump, which consists of four open reactor cavity pool seal hatches and open transfer canal drain valves shall be OPERAELE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

3 W d ACTION:

OPiil2AB g

a.

With one ECCS subsystem inoperable, tes the remaining High l

Pressure Safety Injection pump, Low ressure Safety Injection pump, or the RHR pump within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />; restore the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

b.

With the flow path from the reactor cavity to the containment sump inoperable, restore the flow path to OPERABLE status within one hour or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

c.

In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the Reactor Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date. The current value of the usage factor for each affected Safety Injection nozzle shall be provided in this Special Report whenever its value exceeds 0.70.

~

HADDAM NECK 3/4 5-1 Amendment No. 125 C

y

APR 2 61990 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS r

p.,

SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS kh 4.5.1 Each ECCS subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> by verifying that the following valves are in the indicated conditions:

Valve Number Valve function Valve Position RH-FCV-602 RHR Heat Exchanger Blocked closed.

Operator air Bypass Line supply isolated.

RH-FCV-795 RHR Heat Exchanger Blocked open position.

Discharge Line Operator air supply isolated.

RH-H0V-22 Containment Sump Closed. Manual Operator is Suction Line locked.

SI-MOV-24 RWST Line Locked open. Operator circuit breaker locked open.

RH-MOV-874 RHR Recirculation Locked closed. Operator Line circuit breaker locked open.

SI-MOV-854A HPSI Pump Open. Manual Operator is Suction Line locked.

-SI-MOV-854B - -HPSI-Pump Open. Manual Operator is Suction Line locked.

SI-MOV-901 RHR/HPSI Crosstie Closed. Manual Operator is locked.

SI-MOV-902 RHR/HPSI Crosstie Closed. Manual Operator is locked.

SI-MOV-903 HPSI Miniflow Open. Manual operator is locked.

l SI-MOV-904 HPSI Miniflow Open. Manual Operator is locked.

'b.

On start-up prior to entering Mode 4:

VALV LOCATION ACTION m

SI-V-905 I

op 1 Val ocked and locked Inje ine ttled position.

SI-V-906 HPSI loop 2 alve blocked and locked inject ~on1ine in M tiled position NLM

+.

SI-V-907 SI loop 3 Valve blocke locked I

injection line in throttled posit HADDAM NECK 3/4 5-2 Amendment No. 125

l APR 2 61990 EMERGENCY CORE C00 TING SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS (Continued)

' VALVE NO, LOCATION ACTION SI-V-908 SM 4

Va e and locked injection n throttled position.

t>e_ETE AMOV4dore deluge line Locked open.

tor circuit breaker locked open.

b/.

At least once per 31 days by:

1)

Verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.

2)

Verifying that each of the following pumps develops greater than or equal to the indicated discharge head pressure and differential pressure on recirculation flow when tested pursuant to Sections 4.0.5.

Discharge Head Differential Pressure Pressure a)

High Pressure Safety A

1392 psig 2 1374 psid C,s Injection Pump B

1392 psig 2 1374 psid b)

Low Pressure Safety A

322 psig 2 304 psid Injection Pump B

322 psig 2 304 psid c)

Residual Heat Removal A

I45 psig 2 112 psid Pump B

145 psig 2 112 psid 3)

Verifying the hydraulic characteristics of the centrifugal charging pumps (A and B) pursuant to Section 4.0.5.

4)

Verifying that containment sump suction valve RH-MOV-22 can be cycled manually from the control room and valve RH-V-BOSA can be manually cycled locally.

C d' By a visual inspection which verifies that no loose debris (rags, trash, clothing, etc.) is present in the containment which could be transported to the containment sump and cause restriction of the pump suctions during LOCA conditions. The visual inspection shall be performed:

1)

Of all accessible areas of the containment prior to establishing CONTAINt1ENT INTEGRITY. This includes verifying all reactor cavity pool seal hatches are open, gratings installed, and also that the transfer canal drain valves WD-V-203 and WD-V-970 are open, and HADDAM NECK 3/4 5-3 Amendment No. 125

January 7, 1992

?

EMERGENCY CORE C00t1NG SYSTEMS SURVElttANCE RE0VIREMENTS (Continued)

Of the areas within containment affected by the work activity 2) within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> following each containment entry, except for entries made only for surveillance or inspection, when CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is established.

In the event of multiple containment entries, an inspection shall be performed at least once every 72 Inspection required by this paragraph shall be performed hours.

prior to the containment air lock testing.

d,e'.

At least once per la months by:

RCS pressure (simulated or actual)

Verifying that when the 1) increases above 400 psig, proper interlock action occurs to protect the RHR System from being overpressurized by the RCS.

A visual inspection of the containment sump and verifying 2) that the drain trenches and cover gratings are not restricted by debris and show no evidence of structural distress or abnormal corrosion.

At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by:

e.f.

Verifying that each automatic and manual valve shown on Table

r. o h

?M 1) 4.5-1 in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a safety injection actuation test signal.

Verifying that each remote valye, shown on Table 4.5-2 in the

'2)

ECCS flow path can be cycled by manual action from the control room.

Verifying that each of the following pumps start 3) automatically upon receipt of a Safety Injection Actuation test signal:

a)

High Pressure Safety Injection pump, and h

b)

Low Pressure Safety Injection pump.

4)

Performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the charging flow transmitter.

At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, the remotely f g.

be controlled, motor-operated containment spray water valve shall The test will be considered operated under a "no-flow" condition.

satisfactory if visual observation shows that the valve has operated satisfactorily.

C.

3/4 5-4 AmendmentNo.7/jii,147 HADDAM NECK 0003

APR 2 61990 Ffin'j,ENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS (Continued) mm:

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p.

Periodic leakage testing of each ECCS check valves, SI-CV-862A, SI-CV-862B, SI-CV-862C, SI-CV-862D, SI-CV-872A, and SI-CV-872B shall be accomplished prior to entering MODE 1 operation:

1)

After every time the plant is placed in the cold shutdown condition for refueling.

2)

After every time the plant has been placed in the cold shutdown condition for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> if testing has not been accomplished in the preceding 9 months.

3)

Prior to returning 'the valve to service after maintenance, repair, or replacement work is performed.

Leakage may be measured indirectly using pressure indicc ars, if accomplished in accordance with approved procedures and :upported by computations showing that the method is capable of demonstrating compliance with the leakage criteria of Section 3.4.6.2.

The minimum differential pressure across these check valves during these leakage tests shall not be less than 150 psid.

h f.

The correct position of each ECCS throttle valve listed below shall be verified within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> following completion of each valve stroking operation o maintenance on the valve when the ECCS

.g@y subsystems are required to be OPERABLE.

ECCS Throttle Valves Valve Number SI-V-905 SI-V-906 SI-V-907 SI-V-908 Lj.

A flow balance test shall be performed, during Mode 5 or 6, following completion of modifications to the ECCS subsystems that alter the subsystem flow characteristics, to verify that for the High Pressure Safety Injection pump injection lines, with a single pump running a;id two lints isolated, the flow rate through each unisolated line is equal to 1000 100 gpm.

HADDAM NECK 3/4 5-5 Amendment No. 125

APR 2 61990 EMEpGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS gg SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS g) w 4.5.2 a.

The ECCS subsystems sisall be de.nonstrated OPERABLE per the applicable Surveillance Requirements of Specification 3.5.1 with the exception that, for valves RH-FCV-602 and RH-FCV-796, restoration of valve controls be allowed.

b.

One centrifugal charging pump and both High Pressure Safety Injection pumps shall be demonstrated inoperable at least once per 31 days whenever the temperature of one or more of the'RCg cold legs of an unisolated loop is less than or equal to 315 F and the RCS is not vented by a minimun opening of 3 inches (nominal diameter) or its equivalent by verifying:

1)

That the High Pressure Safety Injection pump motor circuit breakers are racked out and the cabinets locked, 2)

That High Pressure Safety Injection pump discharge valves SI-V-855A and SI-V-855B are closed and locked, and 3)

That the inoperable centrifugal charging pump's control t

switch is in the trip pullout position and red tagged,

'Do Not Operate."

nu hh$

4.

Adn3 Hode t c.

on gag _u7 psy g c.7, cg VA LV 6 Ab.

toc ag igg Vdve, blocked and letkecl 51-v-qos Hest toep I la %mwed tuilan.

Igteb L;g blockd onA loM Valve.

Si W-94 g?si toop 2 brnMed po n on-L ecb liu.

n 3

Vdve b1ccked wJ locked

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s i -v-90'1 g?J i losf 3 MMied P O5ktoA -

'At-in Tn'je CIton vo k bM ked o^d Ioded j

s t - V-967 HPJi Epp 4 b %<oked ?SYg.

Tn3ech.cn L;g Let%d open. operab eco t

si -tnoV-O S Core ddop e breder - gachd open.

3 i

1 HADDAM NECK ) / 1 3/4 5-8 Amendment No. 125

APM SM 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.5.1 and 3/4.5.2 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of two independent ECCS subsystems ensures that sufficient emergency core cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA assuming the loss of one subsystem through any single failure consideration.

Either subsystem is capable of supplying sufficient core cooling to limit the peak cladding temperatures within acceptable limits for all postulated break sizes ranging from the double ended break of the largest RCS cold leg pipe downward. In addition, each ECCS subsystem provides long-term core cooling capability in the recirculation mode during the accident recovery period.

W SM- 'A'

- With the RCS temperature below 350 F, one OPERABLE ECCS subsystem is accept-able without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reac-In tivity condition of the reactor and the limited core cooling requirements.

Mode 4, the RHR heat exchanger (s) may be considered OPERABLE while aligned to the Component Cooling System.

The limitation for a maximum of one centrifugal charging pur:p and one metering pump to be OPERABLE and the Surveillance Requirement to verify the remaining centrifugal charging,purp and high pressure safety injection pumps to be inoperable below 315 F provides assurance that a mass addition pressure transient can be relieved oy the operation of a single low temperature overpressurization relief valve.

In order to use the HPSI pumps to provide high pressure recirculation follow-ing a small break loss of coolant accident (LOCA) coincident with a single active failure, the folbwing modifications to the emergency core cooling system have been made. A piping crosstic between each HPSI pump suction and the RHR pump discharge has been installed. Two valves, SI-MOV-g01 and SI-MOV-902 have been installed in this crosstie. The two manual HPSI pump suction valves have been replaced with motor-operated valves, SI-MOV-854A and B, to prevent contaminated water from entering the RWST when using the HPSI pumps to provide flow to the core during recirculation. Two MOVs (SI-MOV-903 and 904) in series have been added to the HPSI miniflow line to provide for redundant isolation of the RWST during sump recirculation.

l The manual core deluge isolation valve has been replaced with a de-energized motor-operated valve, SI-MOV-873. This valve is locked open with the breaker locked open to ensure that adequate flow is available to the core deluge The valve may be energized and closed if a core deluge valve failed j

system.

to close during transfer to sump recirculation.

The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensures that as a minimum, the assumptions used in the safety analyses are met and that subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained.

Surveillance requirements for throttle valve position and flow balance testing provide assurance that proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of a LOCA.

HADDAM NECK B3/4 5-1 Amendment No. 125 j

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i Docket No. 50-213 B14502

.i b

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t Haddam Neck Plant i

Proposed Revision to Technical Specifications ECCS Subsystems Retyped Pages of Technical Specifications

.]

i

)

1 i

July 1993

i 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS l

-3/4.5.1 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - Tava GREATER THAN OR E00AL TO 350*F LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION l

3.5.la Two independent Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) subsystems shall be OPERABLE with each subsystem comprised of:

1.

One OPERABLE centrifugal charging pump, 2.

One OPERABLE High Pressure Safety Injection pump, 3.

One OPERABLE Low Pressure Safety Injection pump, 4.

One OPERABLE RHR heat exchanger, 5.

One OPERABLE RHR pump, and 6.

An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the refueling water storage tank on a Safety Injection signal and manually-transferring suction to the containment sump during the recirculation phase of operation.

b.

The flow path from the reactor cavity to the containment sump, which consists of four open reactor cavity pool seal hatches and open transfer canal drain valves shall be OPERABLE.

~

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

a.

With one ECCS subsystem inoperable, verify OPERABILITY of the remaining High Pressure Safety Injection pump, Low Pressure Safety Injection pump, or the RHR pump within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />; restore the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

b.

With the flow path from the reactor cavity to the containment sump inoperable, restore the flow path to OPERABLE status within one hour or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTOOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

c.

In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the Reactor Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prepared and i

submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the j

total accumulated actuation cycles to date. The current value of the usage factor for each affected Safety Injection nozzle shall be provided in this Special Report whenever. its value exceeds 0.70.

HADDAM NECK 3/4 5-1 Amendment No J#,

0174 l

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.5.1 Each ECCS subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> by verifying that the following valves are in the indicated conditions:

Valve Number Valve Function Valve Position RH-FCV-602 RHR Heat Exchanger Blocked closed. Operator air Bypass Line supply isolated.

R.H-FCV-796 RHR Heat Exchanger Blocked open position.

Discharge Line Operator air supply isolated.

RH-MOV-22 Containment Sump Closed. Manual Operator is Suction Line locked.

SI-M0V-24 RWST Line Locked open. Operator circuit breaker locked open.

RH-MOV-874 RHR Recirculation Locked closed. Operator Line circuit breaker locked open.

SI-MOV-854A HPSI Pump Open. Manual Operator is Suction Line locked.

SI-MOV-854B HPSI Pump Open. Manual Operator is Suction Line locked.

SI-MOV-901 RHR/HPSI Crosstie Closed. Manual Operator is locked.

SI-MOV-902 RHR/HPSI Crosstie Closed. Manual Operator is l

locked.

t SI-M0V-903 HPSI Miniflow Open. Manual operator is locked.

SI-MOV-904 HPSI Miniflow Open. Manual Operator is locked.

1 i

HADDAM NECK 3/4 5-2 Amendment No. J2E 0174

S EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

' SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS (Continued) b.

At least once per 31 days by:

l 1)

Verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, scaled, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.

2)

Verifying that each of the following pumps develops greater than or equal to the indicated discharge head pressure and differential pressure on recirculation flow when tested pursuant to Sections 4.0.5.

Discharge Head Differential Pressure Pressure i

a)

High Pressure Safety A

1392 psig 2 1374 psid Injection Pump B

1392 psig 2 1374 psid b)

Low Prassure Safety A

322 psig 2 304 psid i

Injection Pump B

322 psig 2 304 psid c)

Residual Heat Removal A

145 psig 1 112 psid Pump B

145 psig 2 112 psid 3)

Verifying the hydraulic characteristics of the centrifugal i

charging pumps (A and B) pursuant to Section 4.0.5.

e 4)

Verifying that containment sump suction valve RH-MOV-22 can be cycled manually from the control room and valve RH-V-808A

-l can be manually cycled locally.

c.

By a visual inspection which verifies that no loose debris (rags, trash, clothing, etc.) is present in the containment which could be transported to the containment sump and cause restriction-of the pump suctions during LOCA conditions. The ' visual inspection shall be performed:

1)

Of all accessible areas of the containment prior to establishing CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY. This includes verifying all reactor cavity pool seal hatches are open,- gratings installed, and also that the transfer canal' drain valves WD-V-203 and WD-V-970 are open, and 1

i l

l HADDAM NECK 3/4 5-3 Amendment No. JJE 0174 I

i

\\

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SVRVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS (tontinued) 2)

Of the areas within containment affected by the work activity within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> following each containment entry, except for entries made only for surveillance or inspection, when CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is established.

In the event of multiple containment entries, an inspection shall be performed at least once every 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

Inspection required by this paragraph shall be performed prior to the containment air lock testing.

d.

At least once per 18 months by:

1)

Verifying t.

when the RCS pressure (simulated or actual) increases t

400 psig, proper interlock action occurs to protect ti._ RF.ystem from being overpressurized by the RCS.

2)

A visual inspection of the containment sump and verifying that the drain trenches and cover gratings are not restricted by debris and show no evidence of structural distress or abnormal corrosion.

e.

At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by:

l 1)

Verifying that each automatic and manual valve shown on Table 4.5-1 in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a safety injection actuation test signal.

2)

Verifying that each remote valve, shown on Table 4.5-2 in the ECCS flow path can ba cycled by manual action from the control room.

3)

Verifying that each of the following pumps start i

automatically upon receipt of a Safety Injection Actuation test signal:

a)

High Pressure Safety Injection pump, and i

b)

Low Pressure Safety Injection pump.

l 4)

Performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the charging flow transmitter.

f.

At least once per 18 months, during

shutdown, the remotely controlled, motor-operated containment spray water valve shall be operated under a "no-flow" condition.

The test will be considered satisfactory if visual observation shows that the valve has operated satisfactorily.

HADDAM NECK 3/4 5-4 Amendment No. JU, JA7, 0174

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.5.2 a.

The ECCS subsystems shall be demonstrated OPERABLE per the applicable Surveillance Requirements of Specification 3.5.1 with the exception

that, for valves RH-FCV-602 and RH-FCV-796, restoration of valve controls be allowed.

b.

One centrifugal charging pump and both High Pressure Safety Injection pumps shall be demonstrated inoperable at least once per 31 days whenever the temperature of one or more of the RCg cold legs of an unisolated loop is less than or equal to 315 F and the RCS is not vented by a minimum opening of 3 inches (nominal diameter) or its equivalent by verifying:

1)

That the High Pressure Safety Injection pump motor circuit breakers are racked out and the cabinets locked, 2)

That High Pressure Safety Injection pump discharge valves SI-V-855A and SI-V-8558 are closed and locked, and l

3)

That the inoperable centrifugal charging pump's control switch is in the trip pullout position and red tagged, "Do Not Operate."

c.

On start-up prior to entering Mode 4:

VALVE NO.

LOCATION ACTION l

l SI-V-905 HPSI Loop 1 Valve blocked and locked l

Injection line in throttled position.

SI-V-906 HPSI loop 2 Valve blocked and locked Injection line in throttled position.

SI-V-907 HPSI loop 3 Valve blocked and locked Injection line in throttled position.

SI-V-908 HPSI loop 4 Valve blocked and locked Injection line in throttled position.

SI-MOV-873 Core deluge line Locked open. Operator circuit breaker locked open.

i HADDAM NECK 3/4 5-8 Amendment No. JJE 0175 l

l l

1

f EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS (Continued) g.

Periodic leakage testing of each ECCS check valves, SI-CV-862A, l

I SI-CV-862B, SI-CV-862C, SI-CV-862D, SI-CV-872A, and SI-CV-8728 shall be accomplished prior to entering MODE 1 operation:

1)

After every time the plant is placed in the cold shutdown condition for refueling.

2)

After every time the plant has been placed in the cold shutdown condition for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> if testing has not been accomplished in the preceding 9 months.

3)

Prior to_ returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair, or replacement work is performed.

Leakage may be measured indirectly using pressure indicators, if accomplished in accordance with approved procedures and supported by computations showing that the method is capable of demonstrating compliance with the leakage criteria of Section 3.4.6.2.

The minimum differential pressure across these check valves during these leakage tests shall not be less than 150 psid.

h.

The correct position of each ECCS throttle valve listea below shall l

be verified within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> following completion of each valve stroking operation or maintenance on the valve when the ECCS subsystems are required to be OPERABLE.

ECCS Throttle Valves Valve Number SI-V-905 SI-V-906 SI-V-907 SI-V-908 i.

A flow balance test shall be performed, during Mode 5 or 6,

following completion of modifications to the ECCS subsystems that alter the subsystem flow characteristics, to verify that for the High Pressure Safety Injection pump injection lines, with a single pump running and two lines isolated, the flow rate through each unisolated line is equal to 1000 100 gpm.

HADDAM NECK 3/4 5-5 Amendment No. JD,

0174

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3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.5.1 and 3/4.5.2 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of two independent ECCS subsystems ensures that sufficient emergency core cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA assuming the loss of one subsystem through any single failure consideration.

Either subsystem is capable of supplying sufficient core cooling to limit the peak cladding temperatures within acceptable limits for all postulated break sizes ranging from the double ended break of the largest RCS cold leg pipe downward. In addition, each ECCS sub.;ystem provides long-term core cooling capability in the recirculation mode during the accident recovery period.

With the RCS temperature greater than or equal to 350*F and if one ECCS subsystem is inoperable, the other subsystem (i.e., HPSI, LPSI or RHR) must be verified to be OPERABLE within two hours. A verification of OPERABILITY is an administrative check, by examination of appropriate plant records (e.g., logs and surveillance test records) to determine that the remaining ECCS subsystem is not inoperable.

With the RCS temperature below 350*F, one OPERABLE ECCS subsystem is accept-l able without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reac-tivity condition of the reactor and the limited core cooling requirements.

In Mode 4, the RHR heat exchanger (s) may be considered OPERABLE while aligned to the Component Cooling System.

The limitation for a maximum of one centrifugal charging pump and one metering pump to be OPERABLE and the Surveillance Requirement to verify the remaining centrifugal charging pump and high pressure safety injection pumps to be inoperable below 3I5*F provides assurance that a mass additica pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single low temperature overpressurization relief valve.

In order to use the HPSI pumps to provide high pressure recirculation follow-ing a small break loss of coolant accident (LOCA) coincident with a single active failure, the following modifications to the emergency core cooling system have been made. A piping crosstie between each HPSI pump suction and the RHR pump discharge has been installed. Two valves, SI-MOV-901 and SI-MOV-902 have been installed in this crosstie. The two manual HPSI pump suction valves have been replaced with motor-operated valves, SI-M0V-854A and B, to prevent contaminated water from entering the RWST when using the HPSI pumps to provide flow to the core during recirculation. Two MOVs (SI-MOV-903 and 904) in series have been added to the HPSI miniflow line to provide for redundant isolation of the RWST during sump recirculation.

The manual core deluge isolation valve has been replaced with a de-energized motor-operated valve, SI-MOV-873. This valve is locked open with the breaker locked open to ensure that adequate flow is available to the core deluge system.

The valve may be energized and closed if a core deluge valve failed to close during transfer to sump recirculation.

HADDAM NECK B3/4 5-I Amendment No. J U 0176

3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS j

BASES 3/4.5.1 and 3/4.5.2 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS (Continued)

The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensures that as a minimum, the assumptions used in the safety analyses are met and that subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained.

Surveillance requirements for throttle valve position and flow balar.ce testing provide assurance that proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of a LOCA.

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Hpp{AMNECK B3/4 5-la Amendment No. JJE I

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