Text

Proposed Tech Spec 3.7.1.1.2,Action C Re Atmospheric Steam Dump Capability
	ML20059L070
Person / Time
Site:	Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png
Issue date:	01/25/1994
From:	; CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER CO.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20059L069	List: B14711, Application for Amend to License DPR-61,revising TS 3.7.1.1.2,Action C Re Atmospheric Steam Dump Capability; ML20059L070;
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1 Docket No. 50-213 B14711 R

i Haddam Neck Plant Proposed Revision to Technical Specifications Marked Up Pages t

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January 1994-9402030123 940125 IU PDR ADOCK 05000213

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H"Y 27o 1993 INDEX 0

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LIMIT'NG CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE RE001 EAGE SECTION 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - Tavg GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 350'F...3/4 5-l' l

3/4.5.1 TABLE 4.5-1 SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATED AUTOMATIC VALVES...........

3/4 5-6

-3/4 5-6 TABLE 4.5-2 ECCS MANUAL VALVES...................................

3/4 5-7 3/4.5.2 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - Tavg LESS THAN 350*F..................

3/4 5-9 3/4.5.3 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK...........................

3/4 5-10 3/4.5.4 pH CONTROL SYSTEM................

i 3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT 3/4 6-1 Containment Integrity...................................

3/4 6-2_

Containment Leakage.....................................

3/4 6 Containment Air Locks...................................

3/4 6-6 I nt ern al P re s su re.......................................

3/46-7 Air Temperature.........................................

Containment Vessel Structural Integrity.................

3/4 6-8 3/4 6-9 Containment Ventilation System..........................

3/4.6.2 CONTAINMENT AIR RECIRCULATIONSYSTEM....................

3/4 6-10 3/4 6-12 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES............................

3/4.7 PLANTS SYSTEUS 3/4.7.1

'URBINE r!CLE 3 4 7-1 S a fety V al ve s.. 9.8.f.. Ad.".d.i.*.?. 6tdi f.'...............

1 -l CL v &s s - *Lwst e 4$ 4 wL% ts F a ncA4 o n 7 5shn[AMLINESAFETYVALVESPERL00P....................

ST TABLE 3.7-1 3/4 7-3 Auxiliary feedwater System..............................

3/4 7-4 Auxiliary Feedwater Supp1y..............................

3/4 7-5 Specific Activity.......................................

t Amendment No. J2E.158 i

IX HADDAM NECK C104 t

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January 17 1992 0

3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 3/4.4.1 REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS AND COOLANT CIRCULATION STARTUP AND POWER OPERATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.1.1 All coolant loops shall be in operation with-associated-loop-step valves-OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: H0 DES I and 2.

ACTION:

With less than the above required reactor coolant loops in operation c&ths associated-loop 1 top-valves-not OPERABLE be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 i

hours.

SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENT 4.4.1.1[

At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months the above required reactor coolant loops s all be verified to be in operation and circulating reactor coolant 4\\

t and-that-power-is-available to-the-loop-stoirvalves--

4Arl-h2-At-least-once per-lemthsnycle-the-loop-stop-valves-through-(

-on e-compl ete-cycl e-o f-full-t ra vel L

E F

3/4 4-1 Amendment No. Jg,146.14f HADDAM NECK

'*" LD [Q j l

t 00T 2 71Tff 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE SAFETY VALVES - SELF ATUATicM Fownor)

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION M cd q ge, Te seAC cuhb0*J

+n4 3.7.1.1,(/11 mJai. steam line Code safety valves associated with5fach t m

generator of aTnonisolated reactor coolant loop shall be OPERABLE with, lift settings as fied in Table 3.7-1.*

g g,41 APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

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'a.__WHh:four-reactor-coolant-loops and-associated-steantgenerators operat-ios-ind=ene-or more-main-steam-line--Code-safety =v&lves-r peration-in-HODES4r-2r-and=3rinay-proceed-provided inoperable o

s that within-4-hours-the-inoperable-valie is= restored-to-OPERABLE r

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status;;otherwisei4e in-HOT-STANDBY within-the-nextThours-and NQ COLD-SHUTDOWN-within-the-fo11owing-3_0;h9uri. _ _ _

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,,-tcc tm4uu h h.>oo

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With(three-Nastor-cochnt-loop; :nd-ssoc4ated-steam-seneratortM

" in operation-and one or more main steam line Code safety valves j

=

associated with an operating loop inoperable,-operation in MODE --33 l

__5L may-proceed-provided--that-within 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months sdh_e inopephle_ valve +s. #l c.,

etored to OPERABLE status; otherwise, be in Gj.

HUTDOWN within the p x 0 hours0 days 0 hours 0 weeks 0 months .

f SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT M _lf @

s,I.o soc -,y 4.7.I.1,1InadditiontotherequirementfofSpecifica$ ion 4.3.5,eachmain-steam line code safety valva associatep with each steam generaMr shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by checking itsysetpoint each refueling.

The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 3.

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A1 loops must be operable in MODES 1 and 2.

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i HADDAM NECK 3/4 7-1 AmendmentNo.JJJ,JfJ,,th 0201

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4 Lo PLANT SYSTEMS SAFETY VALVES-REMOTE ACTUATION FUNCTION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.1.1.2 The remote actuation function for one main steam line safety

~ valve for each operating steam generator (MS-SV-14, 24, 34, and 44) shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3 i

ACTION:

a.

With the remote actuation function of one main steam line safety valve l

associated with an operating steam generator inoperable, restore the remote actuation function on the valve to OPERABLE status with 7 days if repairs are feasible without shutting down;. otherwise, restore the remote actuation feature to OPERABLE status at the next scheduled refueling.

b.

With the remote actuation function of two main steam line safety valves associated with operating steam gen;mors inoperable, restore the remote actuation function of at least one valve to OPERABLE status within 7 days; otherwise, be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

c.

With the remote actuation function of three or more main steam line safety valves associated with operating steam generators inoperable, restore the remote actuation function on at least two of the required valves to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months ; otherwiss, be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and HOT SHUTDOWi@ithin the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

W Q, fv&h M.b p re s;s ure w s5 t SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.7.1.1.2 The remote actuation function for main steam safety valves MS-SV-14, 24, 34, and 44 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE each refueling by cycling each of the above safety valves from the control room. The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 3.

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HADDAM NECK 3/4 1-la Amendment No.

vTsk y

APR 2 61990 TABLE 3.7-1 STEAM LINE SAFETY VALVES PER LOOP t

VALVE NUMBER LIFT SETTING d3%)*

VALVE SIZE a.

MS SV 11, 21, 31, 41 985 psig 6Q8 b.

MS SV 12,,22, 32, 42 1015 psig 6Q8 c.

MS SV 13, 23,'33, 43 1025 psig 6Q8 d.

MS SV 14, 24, 34, 44 1034 psig 6Q8 The lift setting pressure shall correspond to ambient conditions of the valve at nominal operating temperature and pressure.

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6 HADDAM NECK 3/4 7-2 Amendment No. 125

i 3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM OU jjg i

' BASES m

REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS AND COOLANT CIRCULATION 3/4.4 The plant is designed to operate with all reactor coolant loops in operat and maintain DNBR above that point which provides 95% confidence at a 95% probability level that DNB has not occurred during all normal opera l

With less than the required reactor coolant loops in operation, the plant shall be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 and anticipated transients.

The loop _isolationvalvasare-required-to-be-OPERABLE-in-the-oper a ti ng-l oop si n-o rd er-to-te rmina te_the-p r4ma ry_.to_s e.con hours.

7 he event of a steam,jenerator-tube-rupturer In MODE 3, two reactor coolant loops provide sufficient heat removal capa-bility for removing core decay heat even in the event o A single reactor coolant loop provides sufficient heat removal capa-accident.

bility for deczy heat if a bank withdrawal accident can be prevented (i.e.,

BLE.

by opening the reactor trip system breakers or de-energizing the contro Single failure considerations require that two loops be drive lift coils).

OPERABLE.

removal capa-In MODE 4, two reactor coolant loops provide sufficient heat bility for removing decay heat even in the event of a bank withdrawal Single failure considerations require that. three loops be A single reactor coolant or RHR loop provides sufficient heat accident.

removal capability for decay heat if a bank withdrawal accident can be OPERABLE.

prevented, '

., by opening the reactor trip system breakers or deenergizing the control rod drive lift coils. Single failure considerations require that two loops be OPERABLE.

In MODE 5 with reactor coolant loops filled, a single RHR loop providesOperation sufficient heat removal capability for removing decay heat.

RHR loop is not required during a reactor coolant system heatup provided reactor coolant pumps are operating in at least two unisolated loops with A

steam generator secondary side narrow range water level greater than 25%.

bank withdrawal accident is prevented by opening the reactor trip systemSingle failu breakers or de-energizing the control rod drive lift coils.

considerations require that at least two RHR loops be OPERABLE.

sufficient heat removal capability for removing decay h drawal accident is prevented by opening the reactor trip system breakers or Single f ailure considera-de-energizing the control rod drive lif t coils.tions and the unavaila component require that at least two RHR loops be OPERABLE.

The operation of one Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) ol reactivity changes during baron concentration reductions in the will, therefore, be within the capability of operator recognition and Coolant System.

control.

Amendment No. J#,168 B3/4 4-1 HADDAM NECK

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4 nay. ti, tyva 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3 &

M 3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE p

4 0 5,4 d 4

3/4.7.1.1 SAFETY VALVES The OPERABILITY of theNn steam line Code safety valves ensures that the Secondary Coolant System pressure will. be limited to below 110%,(1100 psia), of its design pressure of 1000 psia during the most severe anticipated system operational transient. The maximum relieving capacity is associated with a Turbine tri) from 100% RATED THERMAL POWER coincident with an assumed loss of condenser 1 eat sink (i.e., no steam bypass to the condenser).

The specified valve lift settings and relieving capacities are in accordance with the requirements of Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Yessel Code, 1971 Edition. The design total relieving capacity for all valves on all of the steam lines is 9,504,000 lbs/hr which is 120% of the total secondary steam flow of 7,872,000 lbs/hr at 100% RATED THERMAL POWER.

_,. nmxr I wog 3/4.7.1.2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Auxiliary Feedwater System ensures that the Reactor Coolant System can be cooled down to less than 350*F from normal operating conditions in the event of a total loss of offsite power.

Each steam turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump has a capacity sufficient to ensure adequate delivery of feedwater flow to remove decay heat and reduce the Reactor Coolant System temperature to less than 350*F within the Residual Heat Removal System operating range. With one auxiliary feedwater pump inoperable, the safest mode of operation is HOT SHUTDOWN with the decay heat removal function capable of being provided by the RHR System. With two steam turbine-driven feedwater pumps inoperable, at least one pump must be restored to OPERABLE with 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months from the time that the second pump is declared inoperable, or be in HOT STANDBY within the next six hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN with the following six hours.

In addition, both the pumps must be restored to OPERABLE within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months from the time of initial loss of the first pump or be in HOT STANDBY in the next six hours and HOT SHUTDOWN within the following six hours.

The auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system's design basis requires AFW to be automatically initiated and to be independent of any AC electrical power source for at least two hours. The AFW pump / turbine governor's DC powered hydraulic pump, controls, and DC power supply are required to be OPERABLE -

for the asscciated AFW pump to be OPERABLE.

If the DC pump automatic start instrumentation does not function, the associated AFW pump remains OPERABLE as long as the DC powered hydraulic pump is started and maintained operating in accordance with the stated ACTION statement.

3/4.7.1.3 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SUPPLY The OPERABILITY of the demineralized water storage tank (DWST) and primary water storage tank (PWST) with the minimum water volume ensures that sufficient water is available to maintain the RCS at HOT STANDBY conditions for 16 hours1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months with steam discharge to the atmosphere concurrent with total HADDAM NECK B3/4 7-1 Amendment No. JJJ, J/J, //J.158f 0133 j

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BASES 3/4.7.1.1-SAFE'lY VALVES INSERTI The OPERABILITY of the remote actuation function on four of the main steam safety valves (one per steam line) provides the ability to rapidly cool and depressurize the plant without reliance on the main condenser or other non safety related balance of plant equipment. This method of cooldown would be used following a steam generator tube mpture accompanied with a loss of offsite power or a loss of the main condenser. A minimum of two of these valves are capable of rapidly cooling down the plant following a steam generator tube rupture. The valve associated with the faulted steam generator is not used during this cooldown.

t i

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a Insert IILto Bases Section 3/4.7.1.1 i

With the remote actuation function of three or more main steam safety valves inoperable,1the ability to mitigate a steam generator tube rupture may not be available.

Reactor Coolant' System l

depressurization to less than 900 psig is required to. preclude i

a steam generator. tube ruputre from' opening a main steam safety valve on the faulted steam generator and causing a radiological-

' release, if the plant is placed in-MODE 4 as a result of this condition.

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I Docket No. 50-213'~

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B14711 L

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i Haddam Neck Plant Proposed Revision to Technical Specifications i

Retyped Pages i

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t January 1994

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LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION EME 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 3/4.5.1 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - Tavg GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 350*F 3/4 5-1 TABLE 4.5-1 SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATED AUTOMATIC VALVES 3/4 5-6 TABLE 4.5-2 ECCS MANUAL VALVES 3/4 5-6 3/4.5.2 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - Tavg LESS THAN 350*F........... 3/4 5-7 3/4.5.3 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK................ 3/4 5-9 3/4.5.4 pH CONTROL SYSTEM....................

3/4 5-10 3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT Containment Integrity 3/4 6-1 Containment Leakage

.................... ~3/4 6-2 Containment Air Locks 3/4 6-4 Internal Pressure 3/4 6-6 Air Temperature 3/4 6-7:

Containment Vessel Structural Integrity 3/4 6-8 Containment Ventilation System............... 3/4 6-9 3/4.6.2 CONTAINMENT AIR RECIRCULATION SYSTEM...........

3/4 6-10 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES..............

. 3/4 6-12 3/4.7 PLANTS SYSTEMS 3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE Safety Valves - Self Actuation function 3/4 7-1 Safety Valves - Remote Actuation Function 3/4 7-la TABLE 3.7-1 STEAM LINE SAFETY VALVES PER LOOP............ 3/4 7-2 Auxiliary Feedwater System................. 3/4 7-3 Auxiliary feedwater Supply................. 3/4 7-4 Specific Activity 3/4 7-5 HADDAM NECK IX Amendment No. J/E, JEE, 0230

l I

3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 3/4.4.1 REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS AND COOLANT CIRCULATION STARTUP AND POWER OPERATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

-3.4.1.1 All coolant loops shall be in operation.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1 and 2.

ACTION:

With less than the above required reactor coolant loops in operation be in at I

least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 4.4.1.1 At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months the above required reactor coolant loops shall be verified to be in operation and circulating reactor coolant.

liADDAM NECK 3/4 4-1 Amendment No. J2E, Jf, Jf,3, 0231

3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE SAFETY VALVES - SELF ACTUATION FUNCTION l-LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.1.1.1 The self actuation function of all main steam line Code safety valves associated with the steam generator of each unisolated reactor coolant loop shall be OPERABLE with self actuated lift settings 'as specified in Table 3.7-1.*

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

l With the self actuation function on one or more main steam line Code safety valves associated with an operating loop inoperable, within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months restore the inoperable valve to OPERABLE status; otherwise, be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 4.7.1.1.1 In addition to the requirements of Specification 4.0.5, each main steam line code safety valve associated with each steam generator shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by checking its self actuating setpoint each refueling.

The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 3.

All loops must be OPERABLE in MODES I and 2 HADDAM NECK 3/4 7-1 Amendment No. JJE, JfE, JEE, 0232

)

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1 ELANT SYSTEMS 2

1AEETY VALVES-REMOTE ACTUATION FUNCTION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.1.1.2 The remote actuation function for one main steam line safety valve for each operating steam generator (MS-SV-14, 24, 34, and 44) shall be r

OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, and 3 ACTION:

a.

With the remote actuation function of one main steam line safety valve associated with an operating steam generator inoperable, restore the remote actuation function ~on the valve to OPERABLE status with 7 days if repairs are feasible without shutting down; otherwise, restore the remote actuation feature to OPERABLE status at the next scheduled refueling.

b.

With the remote actuation function of two main steam line safety valves associated with operating steam generators inoperable, restore the remote actuation function of at least one valve to OPERABLE status within 7 days; otherwise, be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and HOT SHUTOOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

c.

With the remote actuation function of three or more main steam line safety valves associated v+:h operating steam generators inoperable, restore the remote actuatson function on at least two of the required valves to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months ; otherwise, be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and HOT SHUTDOWN, with RCS pressure less than 900 psig, within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 4.7.1.1.2 The remote actuation function for main steam safety valves MS-SV-14, 24, 34, and 44 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE each refueling by cycling each of the above safety valves from the control room. The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 13.

HADDAM NECK 3/4 7-la Amendment No.

0232

TABLE 3.7-1 STEAM LINE SAFETY VALVES PER LOOP

' VALVE NUMBER LIFT SETTING (13%)*

VALVE SIZE a.

MS-SV 11, 21, 31, 41 985 psig 6Q8 b.

MS SV 12, 22, 32, 42 1015 psig 6'Q 8 c.

MS SV 13, 23, 33, 43 1025 psig 6'Q 8-d.

MS SV 14, 24, 34, 44#

1034 psig 6 Q 8' l

The lift setting pressure shall correspond to ambient conditions of the valve at nominal operating temperature and pressure.

1 These valves are also capable of remote manual operation from the control room.

5 P

HADDAM NECK 3/4 7-2 Amendmeret No. //E, 0232

3/4e4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

~

.l BASES 3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS AND COOLANT CIRCULATION The plant is designed to operate with all reactor coolant loops in operation and maintain DNBR above that point which provides 95% confidence at a 95% probability level that DNB has not occurred during all normal operations and anticipated transients. With less than the required reactor coolant loops in operation, the plant shall be in at least H0T STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

In MODE 3, two reactor coolant loops provide sufficient heat removal capa-bility for removing core decay heat even in the event of a bank withdrawal accident. Single failure considerations require that three loops be OPERA-BLE. A single reactor coolant loop provides sufficient heat removal capa-bility for decay heat if a bank withdrawal accident can be prevented (i.e.,

by opening the reactor trip system breakers or de-energizing the control-rod drive lift coils).

Single failure considerations require that two loops be i

OPERABLE.

In MODE 4, two reactor coolant loops provide sufficient heat removal capa-bility for removing decay heat even in the event of a bank withdrawal accident. Single failure considerations require that three loops be OPERABLE. A single reactor coolant or RHR loop provides sufficient heat i

removal capability for decay heat if a bank withdrawal accident can be prevented, i.e., by opening the reactor trip system breakers or deenergizing the control rod drive lift coils. Single failure considerations require i

that two loops be OPERABLE.

In MODE 5 with reactor coolant loops filled, a single RHR loop provides j

sufficient heat removal capability for removing decay heat. Operation of an RHR loop is not required during a reactor coolant system heatup provided reactor coolant pumps are operating in at least two unisolated loops with j

steam generator secondary side narrow range water level greater than 25%. A bank withdrawal accident is prevented by opening the reactoc trip system breakers or de-energizing the control rod drive lift coils.

Single failure considerations require that at least two RHR loops be OPERABLE.

In MODE 5 with reactor coolant loops not filled, a single RHR loop provides sufficient heat removal capability for removing decay heat. A bank with-drawal accident is prevented by opening the reactor trip system breakers or de-energizing the control rod drive lift coils.

Single failure considera-tions and the unavailability of the steam generators as a heat removing component require that at least two RHR loops be OPERABLE.

The operation of one Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) or one RHR pump provides adequate flow to ensure mixing, prevent stratification and produce gradual reactivity changes during boron concentration reductions in the Reactor Coolant System.

The reactivity change rate associated with boron reduction will, therefore, be within the capability of operator recognition and control.

HADDAM NECK B3/4 4-1 Amendment No. //E, JJE, 0233

~

3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

. BASES 3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE 3/4.7.1.1 SAFETY VALVES The OPERABILITY of the self actuation function of the main steam line Code safety valves ensures that the Secondary Coolant System pressure will be limited to below 110%,(1100 psia), of its design pressure of 1000 psia during the most severe anticipated system operational transient.

The maximum relieving capacity is associated with a Turbine trip from 100% RATED THERMAL POWER coincident with an assumed loss of condenser heat sink (i.e., no steam bypass to the condenser).

The specified valve lift settings and relieving capacities are in accordance with the requirements of Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, 1971 Edition. The design total relieving capacity for all valves on all of the steam lines is 9,504,000 lbs/hr which is 120% of the total secondary steam flow of 7,872,000 lbs/hr at 100% RATED THERMAL POWER.

The OPERABILITY of the remote actuation function on four of the main steam safety valves (one per steam line) provides the ability to rapidly cool and depressurize the plant without reliance on the main condenser or other nonsafety related balance of plant equipment. This method of cooldown would be used following a steam generator tube rupture accompanied with a loss of offsite power or a loss of the main condenser. A minimum of two of these valves are capable of rapidly cooling down the plant following a steam generator tube rupture.

The valve associated with the faulted steam generator is not used during this ccoldown.

With the remote actuation function of three or more main steam safety valves inoperable, the ability to mitigate a steam generator tube rupture may-not be available.

Reactor Coolant System depressurization to less than 900 psig is required to preclude a steam generator tube rupture from opening a main steam safety valve on the faulted steam generator and causing a radiological release, if the plant is placed in MODE 4 as a result of this condition.

3/4.7.1.2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Auxiliary Feedwater System ensures that the Reactor Coolant System can be cooled down to 1 css than 350*F from normal operating conditions in the event of a total loss of offsite power.

Each steam turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump has a capacity sufficient to ensure adequate delivery of feedwater flow to remove decay heat and reduce.the Reactor Coolant System temperature to less than 350*F within the Residual Heat Removal System operating range. With one auxiliary feedwater pump inoperable, the safest mode of operation is HOT SHUTDOWN with the decay heat removal function capable of being provided by the RHR System. With two steam turbine-driven feedwater pumps inoperable, at least one pump must be restored'to OPERABLE with 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months from the time that the second pump is declared inoperable, or be in HOT STANDBY within the next six hours and in HADDAM NECK B3/4 7-1 Amendment No. JJE, JfE, J/S, i

ons J$$,

o

3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS BASES AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM (continued)

HOT SHUTDOWN with the following six hours.

In addition, both the pumps must be restored to OPERABLE within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months from the time of initial loss of the first pump or be in HOT STANDBY in the next six hours and HOT SHUTDOWN within the following six hours.

The auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system's design basis requires AFW to be automatically initiated and to be independent of any AC electrical power source for at least two hours. The AFW pump / turbine governor's DC powered hydraulic pump, controls, and DC power supply are required to be OPERABLE for the associated AFW pump to be OPERABLE.

If the DC mump automatic start instrumentation does not function, the associated AFW pu3p remains OPERABLE as long as the DC powered hydraulic pump is started and maintained operating in accordance with the stated ACTION statement.

3/4.7.1.3 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SUPPLY I

i The OPERABILITY of the demineralized water storage tank (DWST) and primary water storage tank (PWST) with the minimum water volume ensures that sufficient water is available to maintain the RCS at HOT STANDBY conditions for 16 hours1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months with steam discharge to the atmosphere concurrent with total 1

HADDAM NECK B3/4 7-la -

Amendment No. J25, J/E, Jff, l

ons J$$,

i i

ML20059L070

Text

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