ML20248D771

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Proposed Tech Spec 3/4.5.1 Revising ECCS to Reflect Component Configurations Following 1989 Refueling Outage Mods to ECCS to Resolve Single Failure Concerns Identified on Three Separate Occassions
ML20248D771
Person / Time
Site: Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png
Issue date: 08/02/1989
From:
CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20248D762 List:
References
NUDOCS 8908110131
Download: ML20248D771 (13)
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Text

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I' 3/4.5 ~ EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 3/4.5.1 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - Tavo GREATER THAN OR E0 VAL TO 350*F LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

, 3.5.la . _ Two independent Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS)' subsystems shall be.0PERABLE with each subsystem comprised cf:

1. One OPERABLE centrifugal charging pump,
2. One OPERABLE High Pressure Safety Injection pump, {

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3. One OPERABLE Low Pressure Safety Injection pump, '
4. One OPERABLE RHR heat exchanger,
5. One OPERABLE RHR pump, and
6. An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction- from the refueling water storage tank on a Safety Injection signal and manually l transferring suction to the containment sump during the J recirculation phase of operation.
b. The flow path from the reactor cavity to the containment sump, which consists of four open reactor cavity pool seal hatches and open transfer canal drain valves shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

a. With one ECCS subsystem inoperable, test the remaining High Pressure Safety Injection pump, Low Pressure Safety Injection pump, or the RHR pump within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />; restore the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. ,
b. With the flow path from the reactor cavity to the containment sump

, inoperable, restore the flow path to OPERABLE status within one i hour or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD- i SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

c. In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the Reactor Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date. The current value of  ;

the usage factor for each affected Safety Injection nozzle shall be provided in thh Special Report whenever its value exceeds 0.70.

890811oj31 890002  ?

PDR ADOCK 05000213 '

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HADDAM NECK 3/4 5-1

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'EMEliGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.5.1 Each ECCS subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> by verifying that the following valves are in the indicated conditions:

Valve Number Valve Function Valve Position RH-FCV-602 RHR Heat Exchanger Blocked closed. Operator air Bypass Line supply isolated.

RH-FCV-796 RHR Heat Exchanger Blocked open position.

Discharge Line Operator air supply isolated.

RHR-H0V-22 Containment Sump Closed. Manual Operator is Suction Line locked.

SI-MOV-24 RWST Line Locked open. Operator circuit breaker locked open.

RH-MOV-874 RHR Recirculation Locked closed. Operator Line circuit breaker locked open.

SI-M0V-854A HPSI Pump Open. Manual Operator is Suction Line locked.

SI-M0V-854B HPSI Pump Open. Manual Operator is Suction Line locked.

SI-H0V-901 RHR/HPSI Crosstie Clored. Manual Operator is locked.

SI-MOV-902 PJiR/HPSI Crosstie Closed. Manual Operator is locked.

SI-MOV-903 HPSI Miniflow Open. Manual operator is locked. .

SI-M0V-904 HPSI Miniflow Open. Manual Operator is locked.

b. On start-up prior to entering Mode 4:

VALVE NO. LOCATION ACTION SI-V-905 HPSI Loop 1 Valve blocked and locked injection Line in throttled position.

SI-V-906 HPSI loop 2 Valve blocked and locked injection line in throttled position SI-V-907 HPSI loop 3 Valve blocked and locked injection line in throttled position.

Except as permitted by Surveillance Requirement C.2.

HADDAM NECK 3/4 5-2 l

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,kMER'GENCY'CORECOOLINGSYSTEMS i SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Contjf s d)- l 1

i VALVE N0; LOCATION ACTION SI-V-908 HPSI loop 4 Valve blocked and locked )

injection line in throttled position. 1 i

SI-M0V-873 Core deluge line Locked open. Operator circuit )

breaker locked open.  !

c. At least once per 31 days by:
1) Verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated or i automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.
2) Verifying that each of the following pumps develops greater than or equal to the indicated discharge head pressure and -

differential pressure on recirculation flow when tested  :

pursuant to Sections 4.0.5. -

Discharge Head Differential Pressure Pressura a) High Pressure Safety A 1392 psig 1 1374 psid Injection Pump B 1392 psig 1 1374 psid b) Low Pressure Safety A 322 psig 1 304 psid Injection Pump B 322 psig 1 304 psid c) Residual Heat Removal A 145 psig 1 112 psid Pump B 145 psig 1 112 psid

3) Verifying the hydraulic characteristics of the centrifugal charging pumps (A and 8) pursuant to Section 4.0.5.
4) Verifying that containment sump suction valve RH-M0V-22 can '

, be cycled manually from the control room and valve RH-V-808A can be manually cycled locally.

d. By a visual inspection which verifies that no loose debris (rags, trash, clothing, etc.) is present in the containment which could be transported to the containment sump and cause restriction of the pump suctions during LOCA conditions. The visual inspection shall be performed:
1) Of all acces.;ible areas of the containment prior to establishing CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY. This includes verifying all reactor cavity pool seal hatches are open, gratings installed, and also that the transfer canal drain valves WD-V-203 and WD-V-970 are open, and HADDAM NECK 3/4 5-3

_ _ _ - - - - - - . - - - - - - - i

. EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS (Continued)

2) Of the areas within containment affected by the work activity within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> following each containment entry, except for entries made only for surveillance or inspection, when CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is established. In the event of multiple containment entries, an inspection shall be performed at least once every 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. Inspection required by this paragraph shall be performed prior to the containment air lock testing.
e. At least once per 18 months by:
1) Verifying that when the RCS pressure (simulated or actual) increases above 400 psig, proper interlock action occurs to protect the RHR System from being overpressurized by the RCS.
2) A visual inspection of the containment sump and verifying that the drain trenches and cover gratings are not rstricted by debris and show no evidence of structural distress or abnormal corrosion.
f. At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by:
1) Verifying that each automatic manual valve shown on Table 4.5-1 in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a safety injection actuation test signal.
2) Verifying that each remote valve, shown on Table 4.5-2 in the ECCS flow path can be cycled by manual action from the control room.
3) Verifying that each of the following pumps start automatically upon receipt of a Safety Injection Actuation test signal:

a) High Pressure Safety Injection pump, and b) Low Pressure Safety Injection pump.

g. At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, the remotely controlled, motor-operated containment spray water valve shall be operated under a "no-flow" condition. The test will be considered satisfactory if visual observation shows that the valve has operated satisfactorily, i

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i HADDAM NECK 3/4 5-4

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.EMER5ENCYCOREC00 LING' SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

h. Periodic leakage testing of each ECCS check valves, S'I-CV-862A, SI-CV-8628, SI-CV-862C, SI-CV-862D, SI-CV-872At and SI-CV-8728 shall be accomplished p Or to entering MODE 1 operation:
1) After every time the plant is placed in the cold shutdown condition for refueling.
2) After every time the plant has been placed in the cold shutdown condition for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> if testing has not been accomplished in the preceding 9 months.
3) Prior to returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair, or replacement work is performed.

Leakage may be measured indirectly using pressure indicators, if accomplished in accordance with approved procedures and supported by computations showing that the method is capable of demonstrating compliance with the leakage criteria of Section 3.4.6.2. The minimum differential pressure'across these check

._ valves during these leakage tests shall not be less than 150 psid.

1. The correct position of each ECCS throttle valve listed below shall be verified within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> following completion of each valve stroking operation or maintenance on tha valve when the ECCS subsystems are required to be OPERABLE.

ECCS Throttle Valves Valve Number SI-V-905 SI-V-906 SI-V-907 SI-V-908

j. A flow balance test shall be performed, during Mode 5 or 6, following completion of modifications to the ECCS subsystems that alter the subsystem flow characteristics, to verify that for the High Pressure Safety Injection pump injection lines, with a single.

pump running and two lines isolated, the flow rate through each unisolated line is equal to 1000 100 gpm.

HADDAM NECK 3/4 5-5

i .-. . .

TABLE 4.5-1 SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATED AUTOMATIC' VALVES-VALVE NUMBER SI POSITION

. SI-MOV-861A Open 1

SI-MOV-861B Open SI-MOV-861C Open SI-MOV-8610 Open CD-M0V-871A Open

, CD-M0V-871B Open BA-MOV-373 Open BA-MOV-32 Open LD-MOV-200 Closed LD-TV-230- Closed CH-MOV-257 Closed CH-MOV-2578 Closed CH-SOV-242- Closed CH-S0V-242B Closed TABLE 4.5-2 ECCS MANUAL VALVES Valve Number SI-MOV SI-MOV-873 SI-MOV-854A SI-MOV-854B SI-MOV-901 SI-M0V-902 SI-MOV-903 SI-MOV-904 CH-MOV-33A CH-MOV-33B i I

HADDAM NECK 3/4 5-6 i

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EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS U

3/_i.5.2 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - Tava LESS THAN 350 F LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.2a As a minimum, one ECCS subsystem comprised of the following shall be OPERABLE:

1. One OPERABLE centrifugal charging pun.p, *
2. One OPERABLE RHR heat exchanger,
3. One OPERABLE RHR pump,
4. An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the refueling water storage tank and manually transferring suction to the containment sump during the recirculation phase of operation.
b. The flow path from the reactor cavity to the containment sump which consists of four open reactor cavity pool hatches and open transfer canal drain valves shall be OPERABLE, APPLICABILITY: MODE 4.

EUQN:

a. With no ECCS subsystem OPERABLE because of the inoperability of either the centrifugal charging pump, or the flow path from the refueling water storage tank, containment sump or the reactor cavity to the containment sump, restore at least one ECCS subsystem to OPERABLE status within I hour or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br />. f
b. i9th no ECCS subsystem OPERABLE because of the inoperability of eitnis tha RHR heat exchanger or RHR pump, restore at least one J

ECCS subsystem to OPERABLg status or maintain the Reactor Coolant  ;

System T less than 350 F by use of alternate heat removal methods."V9

c. In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the Reactor Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within '

90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date. The current value of the usage factor for each affected Safety Injection nozzle shall be provided in this Special Report whenever its value exceeds 0.70.

A maximum of one centrifugal charging pump, one metering pump, and no high pressure safety injection pumps shall be OPERABLE whenever the Low Temperature Overpressurization System (LTOP) is required.

HADDAM NECK 3/4 5-7

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.EMERdENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS' SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.5.2' a. The ECCS subsystems shall be demonstrated OPERABLE per the applicable Surveillance Requirements of Specification 3.6.1 with the exception that, for valves RH-FCV-602 and RH-FCV-796, restoration of valve controls be allowed.

b. One centrifugal charging pump and both High Pressure Safety Injection pumps shall be demonstrated inoperable at least once per 31 days whenever the temperature of one or more of the RCg cold legs of an unisolated loop is less than or equal to 315 F and the RCS is not vented by a minimum opening of 3 inches (nominal diameter) or its equivalent by verifying:
1) That the High Pressure Safety Injection pump motor circuit breakers are racked out and the cabinets locked,
2) That High Pressure Safety Injection pump discharge valves SI-V-855A and 51-V-855B are closed and locked, and
3) That the inoperable centrifugal charging pump's control switch is in the trip pullout position and red tagged, "Do Not Operate."

HADDAM NECK 3/4 5-8 a - _ _______ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . __ __ __ _ _ _ .

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.[MER'ENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEMS G

l 3/4.5.3 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.3 The refueling water storage tank (RWST) shall be OPERABLE with:

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a. A minimun contained borated water volume of 230,000 gallons,
b. A boron concentration of between 2200 and 2850 ppm, i
c. A minimum water temperature of 60 F, and j
d. A maximum water temperature of 120 F.

APPLICABILITY: H0 DES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With the RWST inoperable, restore the tank to OPERACLE status within I hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.5.3 The RWST shall be deiaonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 7 days by:
1) Verifying the contained borated water volume in the tank, and
2) Verifying the boron concentration of the water.
b. At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by verifying the RWST temperature. j HADDAM NECK 3/4 5-9

I f MER'GENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 3/4.5.4 'oH CONTROL SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.4 A system for controlling the pH of the core cooling water (i.e., TSP Storage Baskets) during the recirculation phase shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4 ACTION:

With the pH control system (TSP Storage Baskets) inoperable, restore the system-(TSP Storage Baskets) to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN the.following 6' hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.5.4 The pH control system (TSP Storage Baskets) shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by:

a. Verifying that a minimum total of 60 cubic feet of trisodium phosphate dodecahydrate (TSP) is contained in the TSP storage baskets, and
b. Verifying that when a representative sample of 0.35i 0.05 lbs. of TSP from a TSP storage basket is submerged, without agitation, in 5015 gallons of 18010 nF borated water from the RWST, the pH of the mixed solution is raised to greater than or equal to 6 within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

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HADDAM NECK 3/4 5-10

3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.5.1 and 3/4.5.2 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of two independent ECCS subsystems ensures that sufficient emergency core cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA assuming the loss of 'one subsystem through any single failure consideration.

Either subsystem is capable of supplying sufficient core cooling to limit the peak cladding temperatures within acceptable limits for all postulated break sizes ranging from the double ended break of the largest RCS cold leg pipe downward. In addition, each ECCS subsystem provide; long-term core cooling capability in the recirculation mode during the accident recovery period.

With the RCS temperature below 350 F, one OPERABLE ECCS subsystem is accept-able without sing _le failure consideration on the basis of the stable reac-tivity condition of the reactor and the limited core cooling requirements.

The limitation for a maximum of one centrifugal charging pump and one metering pump to be OPERABLE and the Surveillance Requirement to verify the remaining centrifugal charging jump and high pressure safety injection pumps to be inoperable below 315 F provides assurance that a mass addition pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single low temperature overpressurization relief valve.

In order to use the HPSI pumps to provide high pressure recirculation follow-ing a small break loss of coolant accident (LOCA) coincident with a single active failure, the following modifications to the emergency core cooling system have been made A piping crosstie between each HPSI pump suction and the RHR pump discharge has been installed. Two valves, SI-M0V-901 and SI-MOV-902 have been installed in this crosstie. The two manual HPSI pump suction valves have been replaced with motor-operated valves, SI-MOV-854A and B, to prevent contaminated water from entering the RWST when using the HPSI pumps to provide flow to the core during recirculation. Two MOVs (SI-M0V-903 and 904) in series have been added to the HPSI miniflow line to provide for redundant isolation of the RWST during sump recirculation.

The m'anual core deluge isolation valve has been replaced with a de-energized motor-operated valve, SI-H0V-873. This valve is locked open with the breaker locked open to ensure that adequate flow is available to the core deluge system. The valve may be energized and closed if a core deluge valve failed to close during transfer to sump recirculation.

The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensures that as a minimum, the assumptions used in the safety analyses are met and that subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained.

HADDAM NECK B3/4 5-1

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l EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 1

i BASES Surveillance requirements for throttle valve position and flow balance testing provide assurance that proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of a LOCA.

l l The surveillance requirements test the operability of check valves which act as primary coolant system pressure isolation valves and thereby reduces the potential for an intersystem loss of coolant accident.

Reference:

UFSAR - Section 6.3 3/4,,5.3 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK The OPERABILITY of the refueling water storage tank (RWST) as part of the ECCS ensures that a sufficient supply of borated water is availaole for injection by the ECCS in the event of a LOCA. The limits on RWST minimum volume and boron concentration ensure that: (1) sufficient water is available within containment to permit recirculation cooling flow to the core, and (2) the reactor will remain subcritical in the cold condition following mixing of the RWST and the RCS water volumes with all control rods inserted except for the most reactive control assembly. These assumptions are consistent with the LOCA analyses.

The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics.

The maximum / minimum solution temperature for the RWST in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 are based on safety analysis assumptions.

The minimum solution temperature for the RWST is for freeze protection concerns. In addition, the minimum solution temperature for the RWST is also based on the stress analysis for the associated piping system and pressurized thermal shock. .

HADDAM NECK B3/4 5-2

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l EMERGENCY-CORE COOLING SYSTEMS BASES ,

3/4.5.4 oH CONTROL SYSTEM The trisodium phosphate dodecahydrate (TSP) stored in porous wire mesh baskets located adjacent to the containment sump is provided to minimize the possibility of corrosion cracking in certain metal components during operation of the ECCS in the recirculation mode following a LOCA. . The TSP provides this protection by dissolving in the sur;;p water and causing a resultant pH of 2 7.0 based on the following conditions: (1). RWST boron concentri. tion of 2850 ppm,160,000 gallons of RWST volume injected (120,000 gallons during the injection phase, an additional 40,000 gallons during transfer to' recirculation) and, (2) RCS and PZR at hot zero power conditions with a boron concentration of 2000 ppm.

If the entire contents of the RWST were injected into containment, sufficient TSP is available to raise the sump pH to 16.5. This is sufficiently high to reduce the susceptibility of stainless steel to stress corrosion cracking.

HADDAM NECK B3/4 5-3

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