Text

Proposed Tech Specs 3/4.1, Reactivity Control Sys
	ML20235Z269
Person / Time
Site:	Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png
Issue date:	03/06/1989
From:	; CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER CO.
To:	;
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ML20235Z263	List: B13151, Proposed Tech Specs 3/4.1, Reactivity Control Sys; ML20235Z261;
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	B13151, NUDOCS 8903150275
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Docket No. 50-213 813151 Attachment 1 The Proposed Revised Technical Specifications l

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March 1989 l 8903150275 890306 l

) PDR ADOCK 05000213 p PDL

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Section 3/4.1 Reactivity Control Systems l .,

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3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.1 B0 RATION CONTROL SHUTDOWN MARGIN FOUR LOOPS OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.1.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be greater than or equal to 1800 pcm.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2* (Four Loop Cperation).

ACTION:

With the SHUTDOWN MARGIN less than 1800 pcm, immediately initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 30 gpm of a solution containing greater than or equal to 14,000 ppm boron or its equivalent until the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN is restored.

SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS l

4.1.1'.1.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be determined to be greater than or equal to 1800 pcm:

a. Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months after detection of an inoserable control rod (s) and at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months thereafter w111e the rod (s) is inoperable. If the inoperable control rod is immovable or ,

untrippable, the above required SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be verified acceptable with an increased allowance for the withdrawn worth of the immovable or untrippable control rod (s);

b. When in MODE 1 or MODE 2 with K greater than or equal to 1 at !

least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months by verihfng that control bank withdrawal j is within the limits of Specific' tion 3.1.3.6.1; :

c. When in MODE 2 with K less than 1, within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months prior to achieving reactor criff[ality by verifying that the predicted critical control rod position is within the limits of Specification 3.1.3.6.1;

d. Prior to initial operation above 5% RATED THERMAL POWER after each fuel loading, by consideration of the factors of Specification 4.1.1.1.2. below, with the control banks at the maximum insertion limit of Specification 3.1.3.6.1; and i

See Special Test Exceptions Specification 3.10.1.

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, HADDAM NECK 3/4 1-1 l

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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS-SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS (Continued) 4.1.1.1.2 During MODE 1 operation, the overall core reactivity balance shall be ' compared to predicted values to demonstrate agreement within 1000 pcm at least once per 31 Effective Full Power Days (EFPD). This comparison shall consider at least those factors stated below. The predicted reactivity values shall be adjusted (normalized), if required, to correspond to the actual . core conditions prior to. exceeding a fuel burnup of 60 EFPD after each fuel loading.

1) Reactor Coolant System boron concentration,

2) Control rod position,

3) Reactor Coolant System average temperature,

4) ' Fuel burnup based on gross thermal energy generation,

5) Xenon concentration, and

6) Samarium concentration.

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HADDAM NECK 3/4 1-2

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. 1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS SHVTDOWN MARGIN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.1.2 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be greater than or equal to:

a. 1800 pcm with no reactor coolant loop idled or isolated,* or

b. 2600 pcm with one or more reactor loops idled or isolated, except during the startup of a reactor coolant pump. ,

1 APPLICABILITY: MODE 3. 1 ACTION:

With the SHUTDOWN MARGIN less than the required value, immediately initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 30 gpm of a solution containing greater than or equal to 14,000 ppm boron or its equivalent until the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN is restored.

SVRVElllANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.1.1.2 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be determined to be greater than or equal to the required value:

a. Within I hour after detection of an inoperable control rod (s) and at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months thereafter while the rod (s) is inoperable. If the inoperable control rod is immovable or untrippable, the SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be verified acceptable with an increased allowance for the withdrawn worth of the immovable or untrippable control rod (s); and

b. At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months by consideration of the following j factors:

1) Reactor Coolant System boron concentration,

2) Control rod position,

3) Reactor Coolant System average temperature,

4) Fuel burnup based on gross thermal energy generation,

5) Xenon concentration, and

6) Samarium concentration.

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Idled or isolated refers to the position of the loop stop valves, not the reactor coolant pump operating status.

HADDAM NECK 3/4 1-3

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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

' SHUTDOWN MARGIN A LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3'.1.1.3 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be greater than or equal to 2600 pcm. ,

APPLICABILITY: H0 DES 4 and 5. '

ACTION:

With the SHUTDOWN MARGIN less than 2600 pcm, immediately initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 30 gpm of a solution containing greater than or equal to 14,000 ppm boron or its equivalent until the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN is restored.

SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.1.1.3 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be determined to be greater or equal to 2600 pcm:

a. Within I hour after detection of an ino)erable control rod (s) and at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months thereafter w111e the rod (s) is inoperable. If the inoperable control rod is immovable or untrippable, the SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be verified acceptable with L

an increased allowance for the withdrawn worth of the immovable or untippable control rod (s); and

b. At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months by consideration of the following factors:

1) Reactor Coolant System boron concentration, 1

2) Control Rod position,

3) Reactor Coolant System average temperature,

4) Fuel burnup based on gross thermal energy generation,

5) Xenon concentration, and

6) Samarium concentration.

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HADDAM NECK 3/4 1-4

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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS SHUTDOWN MARGIN THREE LOOPS OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION l

3.1.1.4 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be greater than or equal to 2600 pcm.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2,* (Three Loop Operation).

ACTION:

1 With the SHUTDOWN MARGIN less than 2600 pcm, immediately initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 30 gpm of a solution containing greater than or equal to 14,000 ppm boron or its equivalent until the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN is restored.

SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.1.1.4.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be determined to be greater than or equal to 2600 pcm:

a. Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months after detection of an inoperable control rod (s) and at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months thereafter while the rod (s) is inoperable. If the inoperable control rod is immovable or untrippable, the above required SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be verified acceptable with an increased allowance for the withdrawn worth of the immovable or untrippable control rod (s);

b. When in MODE 1 or MODE 2 with K greater than or equal to 1 at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months by veriNfng that control bank withdrawal is within the limits of Specification 3.1.3.6.2;

c. When in MODE 2 with K less than 1, within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months prior to achieving reactor criff[ality by verifying that the predicted critical control rod position is within the limits of Specification 3.1.3.6.2;

d. Prior to initial operation above 5% RATED THERMAL POWER after each fuel loading, by consideration of the factors of Specification 4.1.1.4.2. below, with the control banks at the maximum insertion limit of Specification 3.1.3.6.2; and

See Special Test Exceptions Specification 3.10.1.

l HADDAM NECK 3/4 1-5 l

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L REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS (Continued) 4.1.1.4.2 During MODE 1 operation, the overall core reactivity balance

.t shall be compared to predicted values to demonstrate agreement within 1000 pcm at least once per 31 Effective Full Power Days (EFPD). This comparison shall consider at least those factors stated below. The predicted reactivity values shall be adjusted (normalized) to correspond to the actual

, core conditions prior to exceeding a fuel burnup of 60 EFPD after each fuel-1 loading.

1) Reactor Coolant System boron concentration,

2) Control rod position,

3) Reactor Coolant System average temperature,

4) Fuel burnup based on gross thermal energy generation,

5) Xenon concentration, and

6) Samarium concentration.

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HADDAM NEr,K 3/4 1 6

i REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS j l

MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT l

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION l

I 3.1.1.5 The moderator temperature coefficient (MTC) shall be:

a. Less positive than 5 pcm/ F for the all rods withdrawn, beginning of cycle life (BOL), hot zero THERMAL POWER condition; and

b. Less positive than 0 pcm/ F for the all rods withdrawn, BOL, RATED THERMAL POWER condition; and

c. Less negative than -29 pcm/ F for the all rods withdrawn, end of cycle life (E0L), RATED THERMAL POWER condition.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2 ** .

ACTION:

a. With the MTC more positive than the limits of Specifications 3.1.1.5a. or 3.1.1.5b. above, operation in MODES 1 and 2 may !

proceed provided:

1. Control rod withdrawal limits are established and maintaingd sufficient to restore the MTC to le athotzeroTHERMALPOWERor0pcm/gspositivethan5pcm/F F at RATED THERMAL POWER within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

These withdrawal limits shall be in addition to the insertion limits of Specification 3.1.3.6.1 or 3.1.3.6.2;

2. The control rods are maintained within the withdrawal limits established above until a subsequent calculation verifies ,

that the MTC has been restored to within its limit for the l all rods withdrawn condition; and

3. A Special Report is prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2, within 10 days, describing the value of the measured MTC, the interim control rod ;

withdrawal limits, and the predicted average core burnup l necessary for restoring the MTC to within its limit for the '

all rods withdrawn condition.

b. With the MTC more negative than the limit of Specification 3.1.1.5c. above, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

With K greater than or equal to 1.

- SeeSp6NalTestExceptionsSpecification 3.10.2.

HADDAM NECK 3/4 1-7

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.1.1.5 The~ MTC shall be determined to be within its limits during each fuel cycle as follows:

a. .The MTC shall be measured and compared to the BOL limit of Specification 3.1.1.5a. above. .. prior to initial operation above 5%

of RATED THERMAL POWER, after each fuel loading;

b. The measured MTC shall be adjusted to the BOL, RATED THERMAL POWER conditions and compared to the BOL limit of Specification 3.1.1.5b. above, prior to initial operation above 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER, after each fuel loading; and

c. The measured MTC shall be adjusted to EOL, RATED THERMAL POWER conditions and compared to the E0L limit of Specification 3.1.1.5c above, prior to initial power operation above 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER, after each fuel loading.

HADDAM NECK 3/4 1-8

REACTIVITY CONTROL' SYSTEMS

,; MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR CRITICALITY

' LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION i

3.1.1.6 iThe Reactor Coolang System operating temperature (T"V9) shall be

.. greater than or equal to 525 F.

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' APPLICABILITY: MODES l'and 2* **.

ACTION:

less than 525 0F With a restore T'Reactor Coolant System operating temperature (Ttowithinitslimitwithin15minutesor8X 1

withinthlVRext.15 minutes.:

.- SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.1.6 The Reactor Coolant Systgm temperature (T,y9) shall be determined to be greater than or equal to 525 F:

a.- Within 15 minutes prior to achieving reactor criticality, and

b. At least once per 30 minutes when the reactog is critical and the Reactor Coolant System T is less than 530 F with the T avg -T ref DeviationAlarmnotreselyg

- greater than or equal to 1.

'** With K [fal Test Exceptions Specification 3.10.2.

SeeSpl 1

tlADDAM NECK 3/4 1-9 q

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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.2 B0 RATION SYSTEMS FLOW PATH - SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.1 As a minimum, one of the following boron injection flow paths shall be OPERABLE, and capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency power source:

a. A flow path from the boric acid tank

via either a boric acid pump and a centrifugal charging pump or a gravity feed connection and the metering pump to the Reactor Coolant System, or

b. The flow path from the refueling water storage tank via a charging pump (centrifugal or metering) to the Reactor Coolant System.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With none of the above flow paths OPERABLE or capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency power source, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.

SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.1.2.1 At least one of the above required flow paths shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 7 days by verifying that the temperature of the heag traced portion of the flow path is greater than or equal to 140 F when a flow path from the boric acid tank is used, and l

b. At least once per 7 days by operating each boric acid pump on recirculation to the boric acid tank when a flow path from the boric acid tank is used, and

c. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.

' valve BA-V-399 shall be locked open and shall not be closed unless the RCS is borated to the boron concentration provided in Specification 3.9.1.

l HADDAM NECK 3/4 1-10 1

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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS l

FLOW PATHS - OPERATING i LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.2' At least two* of the following three boron injection flow paths shall be OPERABLE.

a. The flow path from the boric acid tank ** via. a gravity feed line

and the metering pump to the Reactor Coolant System.

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b. Two flow paths from the boric acid tank ** via boric acid pumps and centrifugal charging pumps to the Reactor Coolant System.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTIONt With only' one of the above required boron injection flow paths to the Reactor Coolant' System OPERABLE, restore at least two flow paths to OPERABLE statuswithin72hoursorbeinatleastHOTSTANDBYagdboratedtoa SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to at least 2600 pcm at 200 F within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ; restore at least two flow paths to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in. COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.1.2.2 The above required flow paths shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 7 days by verifying that the temperature of the heattracedportionoftheffowpathfromtheboricacidtankis greater than or equal to 140 F.

b. At least once per 7 days by operating each boric acid pump on recirculation to the boric acid tank.

Only one boron injection flow path is required to be OPERABLE whenever the Overpressure Protection System of Specification 3.4.9.3a is required.

- Valve BA-V-399 shall be locked open and shall not be closed unless the RCS is borated to the boron concentration provided in Specification 3.9.1.

HADDAM NECK 3/4 1-11

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va REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

. FLOW PATHS - OPERATING SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS (Con't.)

b. - At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position;

c. At least once per 18 months during shutdown by verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a Safety Injection Actuation test signal; and

d. At least once per 18 months by verifying that the flow path required by Specification 3.1.2.2.a delivers flow to the Reactor Coolant System.

l HADDAM NECK 3/4 1-12

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS CHARGING PUMP - SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.3 One charging pump (centrifugal or metering) in the boron injection flow path required by Specification 3.1.2.1 shall be OPERABLE and capable of ,

being powered from an OPERABLE emergency power source. j APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With no charging oump (centrifugal or metering) OPERABLE or capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency power source, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.

SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.1.2.3.1 The above required charging pump (centrifugal only) shall be demonstrated OPERABLE as required by Specification 4.5.1.c.4.

4.1.2.3.2 The above required charging pump (metering) shall be i demonstrated OPERABLE at least once every 31 days by running the pump at its maximum speed.

4.1.2.3.3 One centrifugal charging pump shall be demonstrated inoperable by verifying that the control switch is in the trip pullout position at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months whenever the Overpressure Protection System of Specification 3.4.9.3a is required.

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HADDAM NECK 3/4 1-13

f REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS CHARGING PUMPS - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.4 At least two* charging pumps (centrifugal or metering) in the ;

boron injection flow paths required by Specification 3.1.2.2 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With only one charging pump OPERABLE, restore at least two charging pumps to OPERABLEstatuswithin72hoursorbeinatleastHOTSTANgBYandboratedto the SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to at least 2600 pcm at 200 F within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ; restore at least two charging pumps to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.1.2.4.1 The above required charging pumps (centrifugal) shall be demonstrated OPERABLE as required by Specification 4.5.1.c.4.

4.1.2.4.2 The above required charging pump (metering) shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once every 31 days by running the pump at its maximum speed.

A maximum of one charging pump and one metering pump shall be OPERABLE whenever the Overpressure Protection System of Specification 3.4.9.3a l is required.

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HADDAM NECK 3/4 1-14

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS B0 RATED WATER SOURCE - SHVTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.5 As a minimum, one of the following borated water sources

shall be ,

OPERABLE:

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a. The boric acid mix tank and at least one associated Heat Tracing System with: l

1) A minimum contained borated water volume of 5000 gallons, i

2) Between 14,000 and 22,500 ppm of boron, and

3) A minimum solution temperature of 140 F.

b. The refueling water storage tank (RWST) and at least one associated Heat Tracing System with:

1) A minimum contained borated water vulume of 50,000 gallons,

2) A minimum boron concentration of 2200 ppm, and l

3) A minimum solution temperature of 60 F.

l APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With no borated water source OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.

SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.1.2.5 The above required borated water source shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 7 days by:

1) Verifying the boron concentration of the water,

2) Verifying the contained barated water volume, and 1

, 3) Verifying the boric acid mix tank solution temperature when it is the source of borated water.

b. At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months by verifying the RWST temperature when itisthesourcgofboratedwaterandtheoutsideairtemperature is less than 60 F.

Maintenance which requires draining of the boric acid mix tank shall be allowed only when the Reactor Coolant System is borated to the boron concentration provided in Specification 3.9.1.

HADDAM NECK 3/4 1-15

l REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BORATED WATER SOURCES - OPERATING LIMIT!NG LONDITION FOR OPERATION l

3.1.2.6 The following borated water source

shall be OPERABLE:

a. The boric acid mix tank and at least one associated Heat Tracing System shall be OPERABLE with:

l 1) A minimum contained borated water volume of 12,000 gallons,

2) Between 14,000 and 22,500 ppm of boron, and !

l 3) A minimum solution temperature of 140 F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

a. With the boric acid mix tank inoperable, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and borated to the SHUTDOWN o

MARGIN equivalent to at least 2600 pcm at 200 F; restore the boric acid mix tank to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

Maintenaiice which requires draining of the boric acid mix tank shall be allowed only when the Reactor Coolant System is borated to the boron concentration provided in Specification 3.9.1.

i HADDAM NECK 3/4 1-16 l

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS B0 RATED WATER SOURCES - OPERATING SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.1.2.6.1 The boric acid mix tank shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 7 days by:

a. Verifying t he boron concentration in the water, -

b. Verifying the contained borated water volume of the water source, and

c. Verifying the boric acid mix tank solution temperature.

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HADDAM NECK 3/4 1-17

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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS {

1 3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES BANK HEIGHT LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION )

3.1.3.1 All shutdown and control rods shall be OPERABLE and positioned within 24 steps indicated position (RPI) of their bank position, as indicated by the average of the RPI for the respective bank. 1 APPLICABILITY: MODES 1* and 2*.

ACTION: .

a. With one or more rods inoperable due to being immovable as a result of excessive friction or mechanical interference or known to be untrippable, determine that the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 or Specification 3.1.1.4 is satisfied within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

b. With one rod trippable but inoperable due to causes other than addressed by ACTION a., above, or misaligned from its group position by more than 24 steps, POWER OPERATION may continue provided that within I hour:

1. The rod is restored to OPERABLE status within the above alignment requirements, or

2. The rod is declared inoperable and the remainder of the rods in the bank with the inoperable rod are aligned to within 24 steps of the inoperable rod while maintaining the rod sequence and insertion limits of Figure 3.1-1 or Figure 3.1-2. The THERMAL POWER Level shall be restricted pursuant to Specification 3.1.3.6.1 during subsequent four loop operation or Specification 3.1.3.6.2 during subsequent three loop operation, or

3. The rod is declared inoperable and the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 for four loop operation or Specification 3.1.1.4 for three loop operation is satisfied. POWER OPERATION may then continue provided that:

a) The THERMAL POWER level is reduced to less than or equal to 65% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next hour and within the following 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months the Nuclear Overpower Trip Setpoint is reduced to less than or equal to 72% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

b) The SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 for four loop operation or Specification 3.1.1.4 for three loop operation is determined at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ;

See $pecial Test Exceptions Specification 3.10.2.

HADDAM NECK 3/4 1-18 1

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION l

i ACTION (Continued) c) A power distribution map is obtgined from the movable incore detectors and LHGR and F ar '

within their limits within 72 hNrs;eandverified to be I d) A reevaluation of each accident analysis of Table 3.1-1 j>

is performed within 10 days; this reevaluation shall confirm that the previously analyzed results of these I accidents remain valid for the duration of operation under these conditions;

c. With more than one rod misaligned from its bank position by more l than 24 steps (indicated position), be in HOT STANDBY within 6 '

hours.

SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.1.3.1 The position of each rod shall be determined to be within the position limit by verifying the individual rod positions at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months except during time intervals when the rod position deviation monitor is inoperable, then verify the individual rod positions at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .

4.1.3.2 Each rod not fully inserted in the core shall be determined to be OPERABLE by movement of at least 10 steps in any one direction at least once per 31 days.

l l

HADDAM NECK 3/4 1-19

TABLE 3.1-1

' ACCIDENT' ANALYSIS RE0VIRING REEVALUATION IN THE EVENT OF AN INOPERABLE CONTROL R0D Rod Cluster Control Assembly Insertion Characteristics Rod Cluster Control Assembly Misalignment Loss of Reactor Coolant from Small Ruptured Pipes or from Cracks in large Pipes Which Actuates the Emergency Core Cooling System Major Reactor Coolant System Pipe Ruptures (Loss of Coolant Accident)

Major Secondary System. Pipe Rupture Rupture of a Control Rod Drive Mechanism Housing (Rod Cluster Control Assembly Ejection)

HADDAM NECK 3/4 1-20

~

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS i POSITION INDICATION SYSTEMS-0PERATING

,, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.3.2 The Group Position Indication System (group step counters) and the Individual Rod Position Indication System (IRPI) shall be OPERABLE and capable of determining'the control rod positions within 16 steps.

APPLICABILITY _Y_;. MODES 1 and 2.

ACTION:

a. With a maximum of one individual rod position indicator per bank inoperable, restrict the movement of the rod group which includes the nonindicating rod to 8 steps from the position last determined prior to loss of the nonindicating rod. If the

)osition of the nonindicating rod is not determined within 8 1ours, declare the rod inoperable and refer to Specification 3.1.3.1.

b. With a maximum of one group rod position indicator per bank inoperable either:

1. Verify that all individual rod position indicators for the affected bank are OPERABLE and that the most withdrawn rod and the least withdrawn rod of the bank are within a maximum of 32 steps of each other at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months , or

2. With four loops operating, reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 65% of RATED THERMAL POWER within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months , or

3. With three loops operating, reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 16% of RATED THERMAL POWER within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .

c. With more than one individual rod position indicator or group rod position indicator per bank inoperable, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months with the reactor trip breakers open or the control rod drive lift coils deenergized.

SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.1.3.2 Each group and individual rod position indicator shall be

. determined to be OPERABLE by verifying that the bank average individual rod position and the group rod position agree within 16 steps at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months except during time intervals when the rod position deviation monitor is inoperable, then compare the individual rod position and the ,

group rod position at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . i HADDAM NECK 3/4 1-21

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS POSITION INDICATION SYSTEM-SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.3.3 The Individual Rod Position Indicator System shall be OPERABLE and capable of determining the control rod position within 16 steps for each shutdown or control rod not fully inserted.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 3* **, 4* **, and 5* **.

ACTION:

With less than the above required rod position indicator (s) OPERABLE, immediately open the Reactor Trip System breakers. i SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.1.3.3 Each of the above required individual rod position indicator (s) shall be determined to be OPERABLE at least once per refueling by verifying that the individual rod position indicators agree with the group rod position indicators within 16 steps when exercised over the full-range of rod travel.

With the Reactor Trip System breakers in the closed position.

- See Special Test Exemptions Specification 3.10.3.

l l

l HADDAM NECK 3/4 1-22 t--__ _ - - - - - - - - - - - _ _ - . - - - - - -. - - - - - - - - - - - - _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _ - - - - _ - - - - - - _ _ _ ._

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS I R0D DROP TIME i i

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.3.4 The measured individual rod drop time from fully withdrawn position shall be less than 2.5 seconds from the fully withdrawn position to the bottom of the dashpot with T a greater than 525 F and four reactor coolant pumps operating. A drop lfme of 2.45 sec. shall be used if only 3 reactor coolant pumps are operating while the drop tests are made. !

)

APPLICABILITY: MODES I and 2.

ACTION:

With the drop time of any rod determined to exceed the above limit, restore the rod drop time to within the above limit prior to proceeding to MODE 1 or

2. ;

SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.1.3.4 The rod drop time shall be demonstrated through measurement prior !

to reactor criticality:

a. For all rods following each removal of the reactor vessel head,

b. For specifically affected individual rods following any maintenance on or modification to the control rod drive system which could affect the drop time of those specific rods, and

c. At least once per 18 months.

l HADDAM NECK 3/4 1-23

' REACTIVITY' CONTROL SYSTEMS SHVTDOWN R0D INSERTION LIMIT l q

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 1

3.1.3.5 All shutdown rods shall be withdrawn to equal to or greater than 320 steps.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1* and 2* **.

ACTION: !

With a maximum of one shutdown rod not fully withdrawn, except for-surveillance testing pursuant to Specification 4.1.3.1.2, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months either:

a. Fully withdraw the shutdown rod, or

b. Declare the shutdown rod to be inoperable and apply Specification 3.1.3.1.

SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.1.3.5 Each shutdown rod shall be determined to be fully withdrawn:

a. Within 15 minutes prior to withdrawal of any rods in Control Bank A or B during an approach to reactor criticality, and

b. At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months thereafter.

See Special. Test Exceptions Specification 3.10.2.

With Keff greater than or equal to 1.

HADDAM NECK 3/4 1-24

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS l

l CONTROL GROUP INSERTION LIMITS 1

FOUR LOOPS OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.3.6.1 The control banks shall be limited in physical insertion as _

shown in Figure 3.1-1.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1* and 2* ** (Four Loop Operation).

ACTION:

With the control banks inserted beyond tL above insertion limits, except for surveillance testing pursuant to Specification 4.1.3.1.2:

a. Immediately initiate action to .astore the control banks to within the limits within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months , or

b. Imediately initiate action to reduce THERMAL POWER within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months I to less than or equal to that fraction of RATED THERMAL POWER !

which is allowed by the bank position using the above figure, or ;

c. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.1.3.6.1 The position of each control bank shall be determined to be within the insertion limits at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months by verifying the individual rod positions.

See Special Test Exceptions Specification 3.10.2.

With Keff greater than or equal to 1.

HADDAM NECK 3/4 1-25

\

I-

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l FIGURE +rt' A00 INSERTION LIMIT VS. POWER LEVEL, FOUR LOOP OPERATION 2000 t t i.I.

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FULLY INSERTED-+ 0 20 70 120 170 220 270 320 j GROUP B STEPS WITHDRAWN 150 200 250 300 320 +- FULLY WITHDRAWN GROUP A STEPS WITHDRAWN

" 3NI {

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS CONTROL GROUP INSERTION LIMITS THREE LOOPS OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION I

3.1.3.6.2 The control banks shall be limited in physical insertion as ;

shown in Figure 3.1-2. l APPLICABILITY: MODES 1* and 2* ** (Three Loop Operation).

ACTION:

With the control banks inserted beyond the above insertion limits, except for surveillance testing pursuant to Specification 4.1.3.1.2:

a. Immediately initiate action to restore the control banks to within the limits within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months , or

.b. Immediately initiate action to reduce THERMAL POWER within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months to less than or equal to that fraction of RATED THERMAL POWER which is allowed by the bank position using the above figure, or

c. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.1.3.6.2 The position of each control bank shall be determined to be within the insertion limits at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months by verifying the individual rod positions.

See Special Test Exceptions Specification 3.10.2.

With Keff greater than or equal to 1. l 2

i l'

l HADDAM NECK 3/4 1-27

i

}

I L l-L. ,

J, FIGURE +r+> A00 INSERTION LIMIT VS. POWER LEVEL.

THREE LOOP OPERATION 1400

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. )

y 3/4.1 ' REACTIVITY CONTROL' SYSTEMS ;

g BASES 3/4.1.1 B0 RATION CONTROL' 3/4.1.1.1. 3/4.1.1.2. and 3/4.1.1.3 SHUT 00WN MARGIN' A sufficient SHUTDOWN MARGIN ensures that:'(1) the reactor can be made subcritical from all operating conditions, (2) the reactivity transients associated with postulated accident conditions are controllable within acceptable limits, and (3) the reactor will be maintained sufficiently subcritical to preclude inadvertent criticality'in the shutdown condition.

SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements vary throughout core life as a function of fuel j depletion, RCS boron concentration, and RCS'Tcondition during and f-cycle life (E0L), MODES is 1, 2 and 3 o associated with a postulated steam line break accident and resulting RCS cooldown. In the accident analysis, a minimum SHVTDOWN MARGIN of 1800 pcm for four loop operation and 2600 pcm for'three . loop operation is assumed.

0)eration in MODE 3 with two operating reactor coolant pumps is bounded by tie four loop-steam line break analysis. Operation in MODE.3 with one operating reactor coolant pump and two OPERABLE reactor coolant loops (both i loop stop valves open in each loo)) .is bounded by the three loop steam line !

break analysis.-- Because of the s1 ort time involved, the 2600 pcm SHUTDOWN MARGIN ~ limit need not be applied to the closure of the cold leg stop valve in order to restart the reactor coolant pumps from an initial four loop operation condition. The most restrictive condition in MODES 4 and 5 is associated with the boron dilution accident. In the analysis of this accident, a minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN of 2600 pc.n in MODES 4 and 5 is required i to' control the reactivity. transient. Accordingly, the SHUTDOWN MARGIN !

requirements are based upon this limiting condition and are consistent with j current design basis assumptions.

3/4.1.1.4 MODERATOR TEMPERATURE C0 EFFICIENT The limits on the moderator temperature coefficient (MTC) are provided to ensure that the value of this coefficient remains within the limiting condition assumed in the accident and transient analysis.

The M1C values of this specification are associated with a specific set of l

plant conditions; measurement of MTC values at conditions other than those l explicitly stated with extrapolauon to the specified conditions is acceptable. Correction factors shall account for fuel and moderator temperature and baron concentration.

l HADDAM NECK B3/4 1-1 l L _ - - - _ - - _ _

l REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT (Continued)

The Surveillance Requirement for measurement of the MTC at the beginning of the fuel cycle is adequate to confirm that the MTC remains within its limits since this coefficient changes slowly due principally to the reduction in RCS boron concentration associated with fuel burnup.

3/4.1.1.5 MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR CRITICALITY This specification ensures that the reactor will not be made gcritical with the Reactor Coolant System average temperature less than 525 F. This limitation is required to ensure: (1) the moderator temperature coefficient is within it analyzed temperature range, (2) the trip instrumentation is j within its normal operating range, (3) the pressurizer is capable of being '

in an OPERABLE status with a steam bubble, and (4) the reactor vessel is above its minimum RT temperature.

NDT 3/4.1.2 B0 RATION SYSTEMS The boration systems ensure that negative reactivity control is available !

during each MODE of facility operation. The components required to perform t this function include: (1) borated water sources, (2) charging pumps, (3) separhte flow paths, (4) boric acid transfer pumps, (5) associated Heat Tracing Systems, and (6) an emergency power supply from OPERABLE diesel generators.

With the PCS average temperature above 200 F a minimum of two boron injection flow paths are required to ensure single functional capability in the event an assumed failure renders one of the flow paths inoperable. The boration capability of either flow path is sufficient to provide the requiredSHUTDOWNMARGINof2600pcmfromexpectedoperatingconditions after xenon decay and cooldown to 200 F. The maximum expected boration capability requirement occurs at E0L from full power equilibrium xenon conditions and requires 5900 gallons of 14,000-ppm borated water from the boric acid tank.

With the RCS temperature below 200 F, one boration system is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity changes in the event the single boration system becomes inoperable.

HADDAM NECK B3/4 1-2

1' REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES B0 RATION SYSTEMS (Continued)

The requirement for one charging pump (centrifugal or metering) to be OPERABLE and the Surveillance Requirement to verify one centrifugal charging i pump to be inoperable below 315 F provides assurance that a mass addition ;

pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single overpressure I protection relief train.

The boron capability required below 200 F is sufficient to provide the !

reggired SHUfDOWN MARGIN of 2600 pcm after xenon decay and cooldown from !

200 F to 140 F. This condition requires either 1,500 gallons of 14,000-ppm i borated water from the boric acid tank or 42,000 gallons of 2200-ppm borated j water from the refueling water storage tank. These volumes are worst case values which are expected to bound all future cycles.

The contained water volume limits include allowance for water not available because of discharge line location and other physical characteristics.

The OPERABILITY of one boration system during REFUELING ensures that this-system is available for reactivity control while in MODE 6.

3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES The specifications of this section ensure that: (1) acceptable power distribution limits are maintained, (2) the minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN is maintained, (3) the potential effects of rod misalignment on associated accident analyses are limited. OPERABILITY of the control rod position indicators is .'? quired to determine control rod positions and thereby ensure l compliance with the control rod alignment and insertion limits. I Verification that the Group Rod Position Indicators agree with the bank i Individual Analog Rod Position Indicator within 16 steps provides !

assurance that the Group and Individual Rod Position Indicator Systems are !

operating correctly over the full range of indication.

l The ACTION statements which permit limited variations from the basic I requirements are accompanied by additional restrictions which ensure that the original design criteria are met. Continued operation with an l inoperable rod requires measurement of peaking factors and a restriction in THERML POWER. These restrictions provide assurance of fuel rod integrity during continued operation. In addition, those safety analyses affected by an inoperable rod are reevaluated to confirm that the results remain valid during future operation.

1 HADDAM NECK 23/4 1-3

) .U REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES I

MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES (Continued)

The maximum rod drop time restriction is consistent with the assumed rod droptimeusedigthesafetyanalyses. Measurement with T equal to or greater than 525 F and with four or three reactor coolant $8ps operating ensures that the measured drop times will be representative of insertion.

times experienced during a Reactor trip at operating conditions.

l Control rod Jositions and OPERABILITY of the rod position indicators are

! required to 3e verified on a basis of once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months with more frequent i verifications required if an automatic monitoring channel is inoperable.

These verification frequencies are adequate for assuring that the applicable LCO's are satisfied.

I i

HADDAM NECK B3/4 1-4

e

\

Docket No. 50-213 B13151 q i

Attachment 2 Haddam Neck Plant Description of ' Individual Proposed changes to Technical Specifications and Discussion on Significant Hazards Consideration

.3/4.1 Reactivity Control Systems

)

i March 1989 i

_ ________________ _ A

Attachment 2 B13151/Page 1 Technical Specification Section 3/4.1. Reactivity Control Systems The proposed revised Technical Specification (RTS) Section 3/4.1 has been prepared by converting the existing Technical Specification Scctions 3.5, 3.10, 3.13, and 4.2 to a format consistent with the Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications IM STS). The proposed RTS Section deals with the a Reactivity Control Systems. The proposed changes are compared to the existing j Haddam Neck Technical Specifications and the H STS. A matrix summarizing this comparison is included in Attachment 3. .

i Description _qf_1he Procosed Revised Technical Specification (RTS) 3/4.1.1 Boration Control The boration control section in the proposed RTS for the Haddam Neck Plant is the same as the existing Technical Specification Section 3.10.1. The existing Technical Specificat Section 3.10.1 has previously been reviewed and approved by the NRC g No changes have occurred to this section other than renumbering to achieve consistency with the W STS. The proposed RTS to e an enhancement to the existing Technical Specifications. They provide clear applicability, action, and surveillance requirements modeled after the W STS.

Significant Hazards Consideration In accordance with 10CFR50.92, CYAPC0 has reviewed the proposed changes and has concluded that they do not involve a significant hazards consideration. !

The basis for this conclusion is that the three criteria of 10CFR50.92(c) are l not compromised. The proposed changes do not involve a significant hazards '

consideration because the changes would not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an !

accident previously evaluated. The content of the RTS is the same as the 4 previously approved version of the existing Technical Specification Section 3/4.1.1. No changes have occurred to this section other than the renumbering to achieve consistency with the W STS. Therefore, there is no increase in probability or consequences of an accident previously 1 analyzed.

2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated. The proposed changes do not impact the operation of any component or system. The proposed changes do not introduce any new failures. Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from those previously analyzed.

l (1) F. M. Akstulewicz letter to E. J. Mroczka, " Technical Specifications for Cycle 15 Operation," dated November 12, 1987.

l _ _

' ~

' Attachment 2 B13151/Page 2 i 3. Involve a significant . reduction in a margin of safety. Since the

' proposed changes do not affect the consequences of an accident previously analyzed, there is no reduction in the margin of safety.

3/4.1.2 Boration Systems.

3.1.2.1 Boration Systems Flow Path - Shutdown The existing Technical- Specification Section 3.13E requires one charging pump

. capable of injecting borated water to the reactor coolant system (RCS) when changes in core geometry are taking place (MODE 6). However, the flow path and borated water source are not specified. The proposed RTS section'provides

a new limiting Condition for Operation (LCO), ACTION Statements and Surveillance Requirements and is equivalent to the M STS.

3.1.2.2 Boration Systems Flow Paths - Operatina i

The existing Technical Specification Sections 3.5. A.1,2,3, and 5 provide the flow path requirement when the reactor is critical (MODES I and 2). The LCO-in the proposed RTS is equivalent to the existing Technical Specification.

The proposed RTS provides more restrictive Applicability requirements and new ACTION statements and Surveillance Requirements which are more restrictive and is equivalent to the M STS.

3.1.2.3 Charaina Pumo - Shutdown The existing Technical Specification Section 3.13.E requires one charging pump be available when changes in core geometry are taking place. The LCO proposed in the proposed RTS requires one charging pump (centrifugal or metering) consistent with the flow requirements of the proposed RTS Section 3.1.2.1.

The proposed RTS provides more restrictive Applicability requirements and new ACTION statements and Surveillance Requirements and is equivalent to the M STS. The current Technical Specification allows a maximum of one centrifugal charging pump to be operable when low temperature overpressure (LTOPS) protection is required. This is being modified to allow. a maximum of one centrifugal charging pump and one metering charging pump. This configuration was included in the design bases of the LTOPS system.

3.1.2.4 Charaina Pumo - Operatina The existing Technical Specification Section 3.5.A.1 requires either both ,

centrifugal pumps or one centrifugal charging pump and the metering pump be The LCO in the proposed RTS is operable when the reactor is critical.

equivalent. It is noted that the charging pump requirements for reactivity control considerations are less restrictive than the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) considerations, i.e., the configuration of one centrifugal pump l

and the metering pump is allowed for reactivity control, whereas both the centrifugal pumps are required for the ECCS per the proposed RTS 3.5.1.

l l

Attachment 2 B13151/Page 3 .

In addition, the proposed RTS also provides more restrictive Applicability and {

new ACTION statements and Surveillance Requirements and is equivalent to the j M STS.

3.1.2.5 Borated Water Sources - Shutdown The existing Technical Specification Section 3.13 requires a borated water source during changes in core geometry, but the Boric Acid Mix Tank (BAMT) and the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) are not explicitly defined. The LC0 in the proposed RTS is more restrictive and requires either the BAMT or RWST, and associated requirements for volume, boron concentration and temperature.

The proposed RTS also provides more restrictive Applicability and- new ACTION statements and Surveillance Requirements and is equivalent to the M STS.

3.1.2.6 Borated Water Sources - Operatina The existing Technical Specification Section 3.5.A.3 requires the BAMT be -

operable while the reactor is critical, with temperature, volume and boron concentration requirements. The LC0 in the proposed RTS Section 3.1.2.6 is equivalent. 'It is noted that the RWST is not a required water source for reactivity control consideration for the Haddam Neck Plant and therefore not included in the proposed RTS. The RWST is required for ECCS per the existing Technical Specification Section 3.7 and the proposed RTS Section 3.5.3. The proposed Applicability and Surveillance Requirements are more restrictive.

The ACTION statement is a new requirement.

Chemistry Related Parameter for the Proposed Sections 3.1.2.5 and 3.1.2.6 The proposed chemistry related specifications are in all cases more conservative than the existing Technical Specifications as shown in Table 1.

The existing Technical Specifications for the BAMT boron concentration is 8 percent to 13 percent boric acid which is equal to 13,992 to 22,727 ppm boron.

Thus, the proposed range of 14,400 to 22,500 ppm boron is within the currently specified range and is slightly more conservative (the upper range is based upon maintaining boric acid solubility at the minimum tank temperature of 1400F). Comparison of these specifications with the W STS show the proposed values to be more conservative in all cases.

Significant Hazards Consideration In accordance with 10CFR50.92, CYAPC0 has reviewed the proposed RTS and has concluded that they do not involve a significant hazards consideration. The basis for this conclusion is that the three criteria of 10CFR50.92(c) are not compromised. The proposed RTS do not involve a significant hazards consideration because the changes would not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The determination of whether or not a proposed change is equivalent, more restrictive (or a new requirement),

or less restrictive is based on the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) and Applicability Requirements since it is these requirements which will impact the design basis accidents. In general, the conversion to W j

l

' Attachment 2 B13151/Page 4 i

STS yields more extensive and/or restrictive Action and Surveillance Requirements. As described above, most of the changes are more ,

restrictive in that there are no comparable requirements in the existing Technical Specifications, but the proposed changes are equivalent to the ]

W STS. For few changes that are less restrictive, justification is l provided for the changes. The specification identified as more restrictive or new above (Sections 3.1.2.1 through 3.1.2.6), have no negative impact on the design basis accidents.

Requirements from the existing Technical Specifications that are either less restrictive or deleted are discussed below.

Charaim Pumo Operability < 3150F The desig, basis of the Low Temperature Overpressure Protection Systems (LTOPS) has been revised to account for the mass addition of one centrifugal charging pump plpa the metering pump operating at 30 gpm.

The additional 30 gpm flow capacity from the metering pump, when added to the maximum centrifugal charging flow capacity, remains within the relieving capability of the LTOP relief valves. This ensures that the equilibrium pressure is within the Appendix G allowable pressure. The requirement in existing Technical Specification 3.5.B has been revised to account for this change, and is included in the footnotes in proposed RTS 3.1.2.2 and 3.1.2.4 and Surveillance Requirement 4.1.2.3.3.

Table 4.2-1 Minimum Frequencies for Testina. Calibrating and/or Checkina Instrument Channels Item 13 - Charging Flow (calibration)

Item 20 - Boric Acid Control (calibration)

All of the above items deal with calibration of control systems, whose function are not credited in the design basis analyses. In addition, the H STS format does not require these parameters in Technical Specifications.

Based upon the above discussion, the proposed RTS will not increase the probability or consequences of any accident previously analyzed.

2 Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated. Because there are no hardware modifications associated with the proposed changes, the performance of safety related systems remains unaffected during operations. The operability requirements are increased over the current requirements thus enhancing the performance of safety systems. Therefore, the proposed RTS will not l modify the plant response to the point where it can be considered a new accident nor are any credible failure modes created.

3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. Because the changes proposed herein provide acceptable results for the design basis accident, no additional burden will be placed on the protective boundaries for postulated accidents. In addition, there are no plant hardware modifications associated with this change and hence, there is no

. _ _ ____ _ _A

Attachment 2 B13151/Page 5 direct impact on the protective boundaries. The proposed RTS do not affect the safety limits of the protective boundaries and the bases of the proposed RTS have been modified to reflect the proposed changes.

3/4.1.3 Movable Control Assemblies The movable control assemblies section in the proposed RTS for the Haddam Neck Plant is the same as the existing Technical Specification Section 3.10.2. The l existing Technical Specigation Section 3.10.2 has previously been reviewed and approved by the NRC. With the exceptions noted below, the only change is in the numbering system:

(1) The ACTION statements in Section 3.1.3.1, Movable Control Assemblies Bank Height, provide a nuclear overpower trip setpoint that is consistent with the new terminology in the proposed RTS 2.2, Limiting Safety Settings, that provides a trip setpoint and an allowable value. The proposed allowable value accounts for drift, and is equivalent to the current trip setpoint in the existing Technical Specification Section 2.4, Maximum Safety Setting - Protective Instrumentation.

(2) The terminology, described in Section 3.1.3.2, Position Indication Systems - Operating and Section 3.1.3.3, Position Indication Systems -

Shutdown, has been revised to be consistent with the Haddam Neck Plant terminology. No requirements have been changed.

The above clarification in the proposed RTS is not considered a change relative to the existing Technical Specifications. Therefore, there is no impact on the design basis accidents.

In addition, the proposed RTS are an enhancement to the existing Technical Specifications. They provide clear Applicability, Action, and Surveillance Requirements modeled after the H STS.

S_ianificant Hazards Consideration In accordance with 10CFR50.92, CYAPC0 has reviewed the proposed changes and has concluded that they do not involve a significant hazards consideration.

The basis for this conclusion is that the three criteria of 10CFR50.92(c) are not compromised. The proposed changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration because the changes would not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The content of RTS is the same as the previously approved version of the existing Technical Specification Section 3/4.1.3 except as noted above. The above noted exceptions are not considered a change relative to the existing Technical Specifications. There is no impact on the design basis accidents.

Therefore, there is no increase in probability or consequences of an accident previously analyzed.

(1) F. M. Akstulewicz letter to E. J. Mroczka, " Technical Specifications for Cycle 15 Operation," dated November 12, 1987.

Attachment 2 B13151/Page 6

2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any-

previously evaluated. The proposed changes do not impact the operation of any component or system. The proposed changes do not introduce any new failures. Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the i possibility of a new or different kind of accident from those previously l- analyzed.

3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. Since the proposed changes do not affect the consequences of an accident previously analyzed, there is no reduction.in the margin of safety.

l

TABLE 1 CHEMISTRY-RELATED PARAMETERS FOR PROPOSED HADDAM NECK PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REVISION SECTIONS 3/4.1.2.5 AND 3/4.1.2.6 EXISTING HADDAM PROPOSED HADDAM WESTINGHOUSE NECK PLANT (1) NECK PLANT STS TECH SPECS TECH SPECS a

IL11 Minimum Boron Not less than 2200 ppm 2000 ppm refueling concentration requirements Minimum Temperature ---

600F 350F BORIC ACID MIX TANK Minimum Boron 8% Boric Acid 14,000 ppm 7,000 ppm Maximum Baron 13% Boric Acid 22,500 ppm ---

Minimum Temperature 1400F 1400F 650F (1) Applies only when r9 actor is critical.

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> Docket No.-50-213 3, 4 g

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' Attachment 3 Technical Specification Comparison Matrix p

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March 1989 h,

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Attachment 3 Page 1 L .

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION COMPARISON MATRIX Introduction The Technical Specification Comparison Matrix (TSCM) was prepared to facilitate the revision of the existing Haddam Neck Technical Specifications (T.S.). The TSCM is set up denoting the proposed revised Technical l Specification (to be referred to as RTS) section numbers in the left hand j column followed by a short description. The next column lists the I corresponding existing T.S. section number. The final two columns compare the requirements contained in the proposed section with the existing T.S.

and the Westinghouse STS, respectively. The key at the bottom of each page provides an explanation for the symbols located in the two comparison columns. The equivalent notation "E" may either denote that exact wording has been transposed from the existing T.S. or different verbage conveying equivalent requirements has been used. In many cases, there was not a one-for-one relationship, but rather multi-section relationships whereas the ,

requirements in a given T.S. section may be divided between several different sections in the proposed Technical Specification. The additional requirement notation "++" denotes that the proposed Technical Specification is more restrictive because it is an entirely new requirement as compared to the existing T.S. or it is more restrictive in the sense that the existing T.S. requirements have been changed such that they are more restrictive.

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1 l

p TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION COMPARISON MATRIX Comparison Com)arison Existing With Existing .Witi W T.S.#. Description T.S. # T.S. STS

'3.1.1.1 S/D Margin - Modes 1 & 2 3.10.1.1 E E Applicability 3.10.1 ~.1 E E(1)

Action 3.10.1.1 E E 4.1.1.1.1.a Inoperable Control Rod 3.10.1.1 E E 4.1.1.1.1.b Keff 2 1 3.10.1.1 E E 4.1.1.1.1.c Keff 1 1 3.10.1.1 E E 4.1.1.1.1.d Consideration of 6 factors 3.10.1.1 E E 4.1.1.1.2 Comparison of Reactivity Bal. 3.10.1.1 E E 3.1.1.2 S/D Margin - Mode 3 3.10.1.2 E E Applicability. 3.10.1.2 E E(1)

Action 3.10.1.2 E E 4.1.1.2.a Inoperable Control Rod 3.10.1.2 E E 4.1.1.2.b Consideration of 6 factors 3.10.1.2 E E 3.1.1.3 S/D Margin - Modes 4 & 5 3.10.1.3 E E Applicability 3.10.1.3 E E(1)

Action 3.10.1.3 E E 4.1.1.3.a Inoperable Control Rod 3.10.1.3 E E 4.1.1.3.b Consideration of 6 factors 3.10.1.3 E E-3.1.1.4 S/0 Margin 3-Loop 3.10.1.4 E ++(2)

Applicability 3.10.1.4 E E(1)

Action 3.10.1.4 E E 4.1.1.4.1.a Inoperable Control Rod 3.10.1.4 E E 4.1.1.4.1.b Keff 1 1 3.10.1.4 E E 4.1.1.4.1.c Keff < 1 3.10.1.4 E E 1 4.1.1.4.1.d After each fuel loading 3.10.1.4 E E 4.1.1.4.1.e Consideration of 6 factors 3.10.1.4 E E 4.1.1.4.2 Comparison of Reactivity Bal. 3.10.1.4 E E 3.1.1.5 MTC a) BOL, HZP 3.10.1.5 E E b) BOL, RP 3.10.1.5 E ++(3) c) E0L, RP 3.10.1.5 E E Applicability 3.10.1.5 E E

\

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l TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION COMPARISON MATRIX 1

Comparison Comparison ]

Existing With Existing With W

-T.S.# Description T.S. # T . S . ___ STS !

Action a) more positive 3.10.1.5 E E b) more negative 3.10.1.5 E E 4.1.1.5.a Measured & compared to BOL 3.10.1.5 E E Limit 4.1.1.5.b Adjusted to BOL conditions 3.10.1.5 E ++(3) 4.1.1.5.c Adjusted to E0L conditions 3.10.1.5 E *(4) !

3.1.1.6 MIN Temp. Critical 3.10.1.6 E E l Applicability 3.10.1.6 E E !

Action 3.10.1.6 E E 4.1.1.6.a Within 15 minutes prior 3.10.1.6 E E to critical 4.1.1.6.b Once per 30 minutes 3.10.1.6 E E 3.1.2.1 Flow Path - S/D a) Boric acid tank flow path -(5) ++ E b) RWST flow path -

++ 'E Applicability -

++ E Action -

++ E 4.1.2.1.a Verify Temp. of heat-traced -

++ E portion 4.1.2.1.b Boric acid pumps Table 4.2-2 E ++

Item 11 4.1.2.1.c Verify valve positions -

++ E 3.1.2.2 Flow Path-0ps a) Boric acid tank flow paths 3.5. A1, 2&5 E ++(20)

! b) RWST tank flow paths - -

++

Applicability 3.5.A ++(6) E Action -

++ E 4.1.2.2.a Verify temp. of heat-traced -

++ E l portion 4.1.2.2.b' Boric acid pumps Table 4.2-2 E ++

ltem 11 4.1.2.2.c Verify valve positions -

++ E i 4.1.2.2.d Automatic valve tests -

++ E !

4.1.2.2.e Verify flowrate -

++ *(27) !

L..__.___ __ _ __ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ , , . _ _ _ . . _ . __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ u

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION -l COMPARISON MATRIX Com)arison Com)arison Existing Witi Existing WitiW 4 TM Description T.S. # T.S. STS I 3.1.2.3 Charging - S/D 3.13E E E J Applicability 3.13E ++(7) E l Action -

++ E 4.1.2.3.1 Centrifugal pump - ++ *(28) 4.1.2.3.2 Metering pump -

++ ++(8) 4.1.2.3.3 Demonstrated inoperable 3.5.B *

(21) 3.1.2.4 Charging - Ops 3.5.Al E E Applicability 3.5.A&B ++(6) E Action -

++ ++(9) 4.1.2.4.1 Centrifugal pump -

++(17) *(28) 4.1.2.4.2 Metering pump -

++(17) ++(8) 4.1.2.4.3 Demonstrated inoperable 3.5.B E E(21) 3.1.2.5 Borated Source - S/D a) Boric acid mix tank -

++(5) E

& heat tracing b) RWST -

++ E Applicability -

++ E Action -

++ E 4.1.2.5.a 1) Boron concentration Table 4.2-2, ++(18) E Item 3 4.1.2.5.a 2) Water volume Table 4.2-1, ++(15) E Items 15 & 16 4.1.2.5.a 3) Solution temperature -

++ E 4.1.2.5.b RWST temperature -

++ E 3.1.2.6 Borated Source - Ops a) Boric acid mix tank ,

1) Water volume 3.5A.3, 3.5.A.4 E E l

2) PPM boron 3.5A.3 (16) E

3) Minimum solution temp. 3.5A.3 E E b) RWST -

-(19) (19)

Applicability 3.5A ++(11) E Action -

++ E 4.1.2.6.1.a Boron concentration -

++ E l

4.1.2.6.1.b Water volume Table 4.2-1, E E Item 15 4.1.2.6.1.c Solution temperature -

++ E 4.1.2.6.2.a RWST Boron & Volume -

4.1.2.6.2.b RWST temperature - -

(19)

i TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION COMPARISON MATRIX Comparison Com)arison Existing With Existing Witi W T.S.# Description T.S. # T.S. STS 3.1.3.1 Bank Height 3.10.2.1 E *(12)

Applicability 3.10.2.1 E E Action 3.10.2.1 a) one or more rods 3.10.2.1 E E inoperable b) one rod trippable but 3.10.2.1 E(22) E ino )erable c) witi more than one rod 3.10.2.1 E E misaligned 4.1.3.1.1 Individual rod positions 3.10.2.1 E E(23) 4.1.3.1.2 Determination of operability 3.10.2.1 E E 3.1.3.2 Pos Indicate - Ops 3.10.2.2 E ++(13)

Applicability 3.10.2.2 E E Action a) one individual rod 3.10.2.2 E +

)osition indicator per aank inoperable b) one group rod position 3.10.2.2 E *(14) indicator per bank inoperable-c) More than one 3.10.2.2 E ++

4.1.3.2 Agreement 3.10.2.2 E *(24) 3.1.3.3 Pos Indicate S/D 3.10.2.3 E ++(13)

Applicability 3.10.2.3 E E I Action 3.10.2.3 E E l 4.1.3.3 Agreement 3.10.2.2 E E l 3.1.3.4 Rod Drop Time 3.10.2.4 E E(25) ,

Applicability 3.10.2.4 E E l Action 3.10.2.4 E E 4.1.3.4 Demonstrated through 3.10.2.4 E E measurement 3.1.3.5 S/D R.I.L. 3.10.2.5 E E Applicability 3.10.2.5 E E Action a) fully withdrawn 3.10.2.5 E E b) declare inoperable 3.10.2.5 E E 4.1.3.5 Fully withdrawn 3.10.2.5 E E

l TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION l

CONPARISON MATRIX Comparison Comparison Existing With Existing With M T.S.# Description- T.S. # T.S. STS 3.1.3.6.1 Control G.I.L. - 4 loop 3.10.2.6 E E Applicability 3.10.2.6 E E Action 3.10.2.6 -

a restore control. banks 3.10.2.6 E E b reduce power 3.10.2.6 E E c hot standby 3.10.2.6 E E 4.1.3.6.1 Verify individual rod 3.10.2.6 E *(26) positions 3.1.3.6.2 Control G.I.L. - 3 loop 3.10.2.7 E E Applicability 3.10.2.7 E E Action a) restore control banks 3.10.2.7 E E b) reduce power 3.10.2.7 E E c) hot standby 3.10.2.7 E E 4.1.3.6.2 Verify individual rod 3.10.2.7 E *(26) positions i

1

)

l ILQ19_U E - Equivalent Requirements

- Less restrictive requirements

++ = Additional requirements (1) The MODES have been regrouped (i.e., MODES 1 & 2, MODE 3, and MODES 4-5 for the proposed revised Technical Specification (RTS) and MODES 1-4 and MODE 5 for the Westinghouse STS).

(2) Additional requirements are provided for three loop operation. The ACTIONS and SURVEILLANCE are equivalent to the 4 loop case.

(3) An additional limit on HFP is imposed to take advantage of the reduction !

in MTC with increasing temperature in the Chapter 15 reanalysis.

(4) The proposed revised Technical Specification does not require a late cycle MTC measurement, consistent with the existing Technical Specifications.

(5) The existing Technical Specification requires one charging pump capable of injecting borated water to the RCS be available when changes in core geometry are taking place (Mode 6). However, the borated water source is not specificed. An emergency boration ACTION statement in existing Technical Specification requires a flow path of borated water a conce'ntration greater than or equal to 14,000 ppm (for subcritical modes) or equivalent.

(6) The existing Technical Specification does not have a formal requirement for MODES 3 and 4.

(7) The existing Technical Specification is only applicable when changes in core geometry are taking place.

(8) The W Standard Technical Specifications doesn't distinguish between the charging and metering pumps.

(9) The shutdown margin requirement is 2600 pcm at 200 F vs. 1% K/K in the W Standard Technical Specification.

(10) The existing Technical Specification requires the RWST be OPERABLE whenever core cooling or containment spray systems are required to be OPERABLE.

(11) The existing Technical Specification does not have a formal requirement for MODES 3 and 4.

(12) The group height requirements of 24 steps is less restrictive than the W Standard Technical Specification requirement of 12 steps. The Haddam Neck step size is 3/8", while the H Standard step she is 5/8". The total allowable misalignment for Haddam Neck is 9", compared to 7-1/2" for the Standard W plant.

,,m b

(13) The proposed revised . Technical Specification of 16 steps- (6 inches) is more restrictive than the W Standard Technical Specification of 12 steps (7.5 inches), since W Standard Technical Specification step size is 5/8 inches, and the CY step size is 3/8 inches. The proposed Technical 1 Specification requires that the most and least withdrawn rods be.within 1

32 steps of each other, while the W STS requires that the rods be within l 12 steps of each other.

L (14) If the rods are not verified within the specified limit, the proposed l Technical Specification limits operation to $65% - power while the W I

Standard Technical Specification uses 50%.

(15) The RWST water volume is to be verified at least once per 7 days vs. the existing Technical Specification requirement of testing RWST levels once l per 90 days. The BAMT surveillance requirements are equivalent.

(16) A boron concentration of between 14,000 and 22,500 ppm of - boron is specified in the proposed revised Technical Specification vs. between 8 and 13% boric acid in the existing Technical Specification.

(17) The existing Technical Specification 4.3.B.2 requires a monthly test run of the charging pumps to meet ECCS requirements during " normal operating periods."

(18)The proposed revised Technical Specification verifies the boron concentration of the boric acid mix tank and RWST while the existing Technical Specification verifies the RWST only.

(19) The only borated water source for reactivity control considerations is the BAMT. The RWST is a backup, and the RWST requirements are provided in the existing and proposed ECCS Technical Specifications.

(20) The proposed Technical Specification does not allow the BAMT to be taken out of service in MODES 1-4. The W STS allows the use of the RWST in the two required flow paths.

(21) The design basis for the Low Temperature Overpressure Protection Systems has been modified to include the mass addition from the 30 gpm metering pump. Refer to discussion on significant hazards consideration !

(Section 3.1.2). j (22) The setpoint for the Nuclear Overpower Trip is consistent with proposed Specification 2.2, and accounts for setpoint drift in the Allowable Value. !

(23) The proposed and existing Technical Specification requires individual rod position verification every 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months when the deviation monitor is inoperable. The W STS requires verification every 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . ,

(24) The proposed and existing Technical Specification requires comparison of the group and individual rod position once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months when the rod j position deviation monitor is inoperable. The W STS surveillance '

frequency is once per 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . ,

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(25) The Haddam Neck rod drop time is based on the bottom of the dashpot. The H STS drop time is based on entry into the dashpot. l (26) The Haddam Neck Plant does not have a rod insertion limit monitor. The individual rod positions are verified at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

(27) The proposed Technical Specification requires that flow delivery be verified, but does not specify a flowrate. The H STS specifies a flowrate.

(28) The proposed centrifugal charging pump Surveillance Requirements does not include a differential pressure requirement when testing is performed pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

_ _ .

B13151, Proposed Tech Specs 3/4.1, Reactivity Control Sys

Text

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