05000354/LER-2018-004, High Pressure Coolant Injection System Inoperable Due to Failed Fuse

High Pressure Coolant Injection System Inoperable Due to Failed Fuse

ML18324A614
Person / Time
Site:	Hope Creek
Issue date:	11/20/2018
From:	Casulli E Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
LR-N18-0128 LER 2018-004-00
Download: ML18324A614 (5)

LER-2018-004, High Pressure Coolant Injection System Inoperable Due to Failed Fuse

Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion:	10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
3542018004R00 - NRC Website

text

PSEG Nuclear LLC P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 LR-N18-0128 NOV 2 0 2'018 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-001 Hope Creek Generating Station 0 PSEG Nuclear LLC 10CFR50.73 Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-57 Docket No. 50-354

Subject:

Licensee Event Report 2018-004-00, High Pressure Coolant Injection System Inoperable due to Failed Fuse.

In accordance with 10 CFR 50. 73(a)(2)(v)(D), PSEG Nuclear LLC is submitting Licensee Event Report (LER) Number 2018-004-00, "High Pressure Coolant Injection System Inoperable due to Failed Fuse."

If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Mr. Thomas MacEwen at (856) 339-1097.

There are no regulatory commitments contained in this letter.

~ r Edward T. Casulli Plant Manager Hope Creek Generating Station ttm Attachment: Licensee Event Report 2018-004-00

LR-N18-0128 Page 2 cc:

Mr. Daniel Dorman, Regional Administrator-Region I, NRC Mr. Jim Kim, Project Manager - US NRC 10CFR50.73 Mr. Justin Hawkins, NRC Senior Resident Inspector - Hope Creek (X24)

Mr. Patrick Mulligan, Manager IV, NJBNE Mr. Thomas MacEwen, Hope Creek Commitment Tracking Coordinator (H02)

Mr. Lee Marabella, Corporate Commitment Tracking Coordinator (N21)

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 03/31/2020 (02-2018)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />.

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Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Information Services Branch

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(T-2 F43), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail

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(See Page 2 for required number of digits/characters for each block)

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to lnfocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and

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ol (See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget,

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http://www.nrc.gov/readinq-rm/doc-collections/nureas/staff/sr1022/r3D Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMS control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a oerson is not reouired to resoond to the information collection.

1. Facility Name

12. Docket Number

• Page Hope Creek Generating Station 05000-354 1 OF3

4. Title Hiah Pressure Coolant lniection Svstem lnooerable Due to Failed Fuse

5. Event Date

6. LER Number

7. Report Date

8. Other Facilities Involved Sequential Rev Facility Name Docket Number Month Day Year Year Month Day Year Number No.

05000 09 26 2018 2018

- 004

- 00 11 20 2018 Facility Name Docket Number 05000

9. Operating Mode Abstract (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 14 single-spaced typewritten lines)

On September 26, 2018, at 1530 the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system became inoperable due to a failed fuse in channel 'A' of the system initiating logic. At the time of the failure Hope Creek was in Operational Condition 1 at 100% power. The failed fuse also affected the 'A' channel of the Core Spray and Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) sub-systems. The HPCI system can be initiated by either of two channels, designated as 'A' channel and 'C' channel. The 'C' channel of the HPCI system remained functional. The fault was isolated to a single component associated with the HPCI system high water level trip (level 8). With the fault isolated, power was restored to the remaining effected portions of the 'A' channel EGGS systems at 2101 on September 26, 2018.

With power restored to the other circuits, the 'A' Core Spray and 'A' LPCI subsystems were restored to operable. The HPCI system remained inoperable in accordance with plant Technical Specifications. HPCI was restored to operable status on September 27, 2018 at 1755, following replacement of the effected component, a trip unit, associated with the 'A' channel high water level switch.

These conditions are being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function.

NRG FORM 366 (02-2018)

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION

General Electric-Boiling Water Reactor (BWR/4)*

High Pressure Coolant Injection (BJ ) - EllS Identifier {BJ}

Core Spray (BM) - EllS Identifier {BM}

Low Pressure Coolant Injection (BO) - EllS Identifier {BO}

YEAR 2018 SEQUENTIAL NUMBER

- 004

• Energy Industry Identification System {EllS} codes and component function identifier codes appear as {SS/CCC}

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE Event Dates: September 26, 2018 Discovery Dates: September 26, 2018 CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE Hope Creek was in Operational Condition (OPCON) 1 - Power Operation, at 100% power.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE REV NO.

- 00 On September 26, 2018, at 1530 the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) {BJ} system became inoperable due to a failed fuse in channel 'A' of the system initiating logic. At the time of the failure Hope Creek was in Operational Condition 1 at 100% power. The failed fuse also affected the 'A' channel of the Core Spray and Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) sub-systems. The HPCI system can be initiated by either of two channels, designated as 'A' channel and 'C' channel. The 'C' channel of the HPCI system remained functional. The fault was isolated to a single component associated with the HPCI system high water level trip (level 8). With the fault isolated, power was restored to the remaining effected portions of the 'A' channel EGGS systems at 2101 on September 26, 2018.

With power restored to the other circuits, the 'A' Core Spray and 'A' LPCI subsystems were restored to operable.

The HPCI system remained inoperable in accordance with plant Technical Specifications. HPCI was restored to operable status on September 27, 2018 at 1755, following replacement of the effected component, a trip unit associated with the 'A' channel high water level switch. The HPCI system was inoperable for 26 hours3.009259e-4 days <br />0.00722 hours <br />4.298942e-5 weeks <br />9.893e-6 months <br /> and 25 minutes.

These conditions are being reported in accordance with 1 O CFR 50. 73(a)(2)(v)(D) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function.

CAUSE OF EVENT

The failed fuse was removed and a short circuit to ground was identified on the load side of the fuse. The effected trip unit modules were then removed one at a time until the module containing the HPCI high water level trip, 1 BJLS-N693A-B21, was removed and the resistance increased, indicating that the short circuit was removed. The fuse and trip unit module were replaced and the system functions were restored.

Analysis of the failed module found it to be working correctly during subsequent testing. Review of operating experience found a Part 21 notice, 1999-31-0 containing information that capacitor C25, connected across the de input power to the trip unit, has a potential to short circuit. Measurements made on the C25 capacitor found it to be open and outside of tolerance, reading 0.13 nanofarads instead of 1 microfarad. The capacitor age was within the date range identified in the Part 21 notice. Based on this, the likely cause of failure is a short circuit of capacitor C25 on trip unit 1 BJLS-N693A-B21, HPCI high water level trip.

NRG FORM 3668 (02-2018)

Page 2 of 3 (04-2017)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

CONTINUATION SHEET (See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r3Q APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150*0104 EXPIRES: 3/31/2020 Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Information Services Branch (T-2 F43), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to lnfocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMS control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

3. LER NUMBER Hope Creek Generating Station 05000-354 YEAR 2018 SEQUENTIAL NUMBER

- 004 REV NO.

- 00 There was one similar failure identified at Hope Creek in 1996. A search of industry operating experience (OE) identified eight failures in the industry since 1998. Based on the relatively low number of industry failures and the time that has passed since the part 21 was issued, this is considered to be a random failure.

SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS

There were no safety consequences as a result of this event.

The operating crew responded correctly to the event. The event was within the analysis of UFSAR chapter 15. There was no release of radioactivity associated with this event.

During the event, the ADS system, the 'B' Core Spray system and the 'B', 'C' and 'D' LPCI systems remained operable. The combination of operable low pressure ECCS pumps and the ADS system was sufficient to provide the required safety functions needed to protect the health and safety of the public.

PREVIOUS EVENTS A review of Licensee Event Reports and the corrective action program for the past three years identified no LERs issued for similar conditions.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The failed fuse and trip unit module were replaced and the system functions were restored.

COMMITMENTS

This LER contains no regulatory commitments. Page 3 of 3