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PSEG Nuclear LLC P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 0 t>SI~<i LR-N16-0178 OCT U5 2016 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-001 Hope Creek Generating Station Unit 1 Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-57 Docket No. 50-354 Nuclear LLC 10CFR50.73
Subject:
Licensee Event Report 2016-002-00, High Pressure Coolant Injection System Inoperable.
In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), and 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B), PSEG Nuclear LLC is submitting the enclosed Licensee Event Report (LER)
Number 2016-002-00, High Pressure Coolant Injection System Inoperable.
If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Mr. Thomas MacEwen at (856) 339-1097.
There are no regulatory commitments contained in this letter.
Sincerely, Edward T Casulli Plant Manager Hope Creek Generating Station ttm Attachment: Licensee Event Report 2016-002-00
LR-N16-0178 Page 2 Document Control Desk cc:
Mr. Daniel Dorman, Regional Administrator-Region I, NRC Ms. Carleen Parker, Project Manager-US NRC 10CFR50.73 Mr. Justin Hawkins, NRC Senior Resident Inspector-Hope Creek (X24)
Mr. Patrick Mulligan, Manager IV, NJBNE Mr. Thomas MacEwen, Hope Creek Commitment Tracking Coordinator (H02)
Mr. Lee Marabella-Corporate Commitment Tracking Coordinator (N21)
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 01/31/2017 (02-2014)
~At!~~"\\
, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
- 6. LERNUMBER I
SEQUENTIAL NUMBER YEAR 2016
REVISION NUMBER
. 000
- 3. PAGE 4 OF4 The insulation around the turbine bearings had been repositioned to reduce the possibility of moisture intrusion in to the HPCI control oil.
Other corrective actions may be developed as a result of the cause evaluation.
COMMITMENTS
This LER contains no regulatory commitments.
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| 05000354/LER-2016-001, Regarding High Pressure Coolant Injection System Found to Be Inoperable During Testing | Regarding High Pressure Coolant Injection System Found to Be Inoperable During Testing | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | | 05000354/LER-2016-002, Regarding High Pressure Coolant Injection System Inoperable | Regarding High Pressure Coolant Injection System Inoperable | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000354/LER-2016-003, Regarding As-Found Values for Safety Relief Valve Lift Set Points Exceed Technical Specification Allowable Limit | Regarding As-Found Values for Safety Relief Valve Lift Set Points Exceed Technical Specification Allowable Limit | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000354/LER-2016-004, Regarding Operations with a Potential to Drain the Reactor Vessel (OPDRV) Without Secondary Containment | Regarding Operations with a Potential to Drain the Reactor Vessel (OPDRV) Without Secondary Containment | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000354/LER-2016-005, Regarding Reactor Protection System Actuation While the Reactor Was Shutdown | Regarding Reactor Protection System Actuation While the Reactor Was Shutdown | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000354/LER-2016-006, Regarding Mode Change Without B Channel Level Instrumentation Operable | Regarding Mode Change Without B Channel Level Instrumentation Operable | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) |
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