05000354/LER-2019-001, Manual Scram and Manual Actuation of Reactor Core Isolation Cooling

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Manual Scram and Manual Actuation of Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
ML19274D127
Person / Time
Site: Hope Creek PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 10/02/2019
From: Poorman S
Public Service Enterprise Group
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
LR-N19-0095 LER 2019-001-00
Download: ML19274D127 (4)


LER-2019-001, Manual Scram and Manual Actuation of Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion: 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)
3542019001R00 - NRC Website

text

PSEG Nuclear LLC P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 0PSEG N-<<clear LLC LR-N 19-0095 OCT O 2 2019 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-001

Subject:

Hope Creek Generating Station Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-57 Docket No. 50-354 Licensee Event Report 2019-001-00, 10CFR50.73 Manual Scram and Manual Actuation of Reactor Core Isolation Cooling In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), PSEG Nuclear LLC is submitting Licensee Event Report (LER) Number 2019-001-00, "Manual Scram and Manual Actuation of Reactor Core Isolation Cooling."

If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Mr. Francis D. Possessky at (856) 339-1160.

There are no regulatory commitments contained in this letter.

Sin~()OM,I.V-_..,

Steven R. Poorman Plant Manager Hope Creek Generating Station Attachment: Licensee Event Report 2019-001-00 cc:

Regional Administrator - Region I, NRC US NRC NRR Project Manager - Hope Creek US NRC Senior Resident Inspector - Hope Creek

  • NJ Department of Environmental Protection, Bureau of Nuclear Engineering Commitment Coordinator, Hope Creek Generating Station Corporate Commitment Coordinator, PSEG Nuclear LLC

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY 0MB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 03/31/2020 (04-2018)

, the NRG may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to htt1:1://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r3D respond to, the information collection.

3. PAGE Hope Creek Generating Station 05000354 I OF3
4. TITLE Manual Scram and Manual Actuation of Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
5. EVENT DATE
6. LER NUMBER
7. REPORT DATE
8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED I

SEQUENTIAL I REV FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR MONTH DAY YEAR NUMBER NO.

05000 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 08 03 2019 2019 -

001

- 00 10 02 2019 05000
9. OPERATING MODE
11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply) r 20.2201(b) r 20.2203(a)(3)(i)

L 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) r 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 1 r 20.2201(d)

C 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)

C 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)

C 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)

C 20.2203(a)(1)

C 20.2203(a)(4) r 50.73(a)(2)(iii)

C 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)

C 20.2203(a)(2)(i)

C 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) p* 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)

C 50.73(a)(2)(x)

10. POWER LEVEL C 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)

L 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)

C 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)

C 73.71 (a)(4)

C 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) r 50.36(c)(2)

C 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)

C 73.71(a)(5)

C 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)

C 5o.4s(a)(3)(ii) r 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)

D 73.77(a)(1) 037 D 20.2203(a)(2)(v) r 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) r 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)

C 73.77(a)(2)(i) 0 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) r 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)

C 50.73(a)(2)(vii) r 73.77(a)(2)(ii) r 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) r OTHER Specify in Abstract below or in N RC Farm 366A

12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER LICENSEE CONTACT TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Cade)

Francis D. Possessky 856 - 339 - 1160 CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU-REPORTABLE

CAUSE

SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU-REPORTABLE FACTURER TO EPIX FACTURER TOEPIX X

KE ISV B040 y

X JB LCV F130 y

14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED
15. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR C YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)

PNO SUBMISSION DATE ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)

At 1906 EDT on August 3 2019, while in OPCON 1 at 93.8 percent power, operators identified degrading main condenser vacuum and commenced reducing power. Degrading vacuum was due to the circulating water cooling tower bypass valve failing open. At 1947, the reactor was manually scrammed from 37 percent due to loss of condenser vacuum. Reactor feedwater pumps (RFP) tripped when reactor pressure vessel (RPV) water level rose to level 8 (+54 inches) because the reactor feedwater startup level control valve (SULCV) failed open. Operators initiated the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system, recovered a RFP and secured RCIC after establishing control of RPV water level. The failed equipment was replaced.

This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).

NRG FORM 366 (04-2018)

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION

General Electric - Boiling Water Reactor (BWR/4)

Feedwater System (SJ) - EIIS identifier {SJ}*

2. DOCKET 05000354

, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

3. LERNUMBER YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 2019
- 001
- 00 Feedwater/Steam Generator Water Level Control System (JB) - EIIS identifier {JB}*

Heat Rejection System (KE) - EIIS identifier {KE}*

Reactor Protection (JC) - EIIS Identifier {JC}*

Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (BN) - EIIS Identifier {BN}*

  • Energy Industry Identification System {EIIS} codes and component function identifier codes appear as {SS/CCC}

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE Event Dates: August 03, 2019 Discovery Dates: August 03, 2019 CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE Hope Creek was in Operational Condition (OPCON) 1 - Power Operation, 37 percent power.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE At 1906 EDT on August 3, 2019, while in OPCON 1 at 93.8 percent power, operators identified degrading main condenser vacuum and commenced reducing power. Degrading vacuum was due to the circulating water {KE} cooling tower bypass valve failing open. At 1947, the reactor was manually scrammed from 37 percent due to loss of condenser vacuum.

Reactor feedwater {SJ} pumps (RFP) tripped when reactor pressure vessel (RPV) water level rose to level 8 (+54 inches) because the reactor feedwater startup level control valve (SULCV){JB} failed open. Operators initiated the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC){BN} system, recovered a RFP and secured RCIC after establishing control of RPV water level.

The failed equipment was replaced.

This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50. 73(a)(2)(iv)(A).

CAUSE OF EVENT

A Bailey solid-state logic module failure caused the cooling tower bypass valve to open; which led to loss of main condenser vacuum. A pneumatic relay failure caused the SULCV to fail open.

SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS

There were no safety consequences as a result of this event. The Reactor Protection System {JC} system operated as designed to shut down the reactor. The RCIC system operated as designed to inject water into the reactor core.

PREVIOUS EVENTS A review of station Licensee Event Reports and the corrective action program for the past three years was performed.

No LERs were identified and no issues were documented in the corrective action program for similar conditions.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

3. LERNUMBER YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 2019
- 001
- 00 The Bailey solid-state logic module for the cooling tower bypass valve was replaced and guidance was issued to tag the cooling tower bypass valve closed to prevent spurious opening when not needed. The SULCV pneumatic relay was replaced.

COMMITMENTS

This LER contains no regulatory commitments. Page 3 of 3