05000354/LER-2016-006, Regarding Mode Change Without B Channel Level Instrumentation Operable
| ML17009A227 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 01/09/2017 |
| From: | Casulli E Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| LR-N16-0241 LER 16-006-00 | |
| Download: ML17009A227 (5) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
| 3542016006R00 - NRC Website | |
text
PSEG Nuclear U.C P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 LR-N16-0241 JAN 0 9 2017 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555--001 Hope Creek Generating Station Unit 1 10CFR50.73 Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-57 Docket No. 50-354
Subject:
Licensee Event Report 2016-006-00, Mode Change Without B Channel Level Instrumentation Operable In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50. 73(a)(2)(i)(B), PSEG Nuclear LLC is submitting the enclosed Li~ensee Event Report (LER) Number 2016-006-00, uMode Change Without B Channel Level Instrumentation Operable."
If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Mr. Thomas MacEwen at (856) 339-1097.
There are no regulatory commitments contained in thifi letter.
Sincerely, Edward T. Casulli Plant Manager Hope Creek Generating Station ttm Attachment: Licensee Event Report 2016-006-00
LR-N16-0241 Page2 Document Control Desk cc:
Mr. Daniel Dorman, Regional Administrator-Region I, NRC Ms. Carleen Parker, Project Manager-US NRC 10CFR50.73 Mr. Justin Hawkins, NRC Senior Resident Inspector-Hope Creek (X24)
Mr. Patrick Mulligan, Manager IV, NJBNE Mr. Thomas MacEwen, Hope Creek Commitment Tracking Coordinator (H02)
Mr. Lee Marabella - Corporate Commitment Tracking Coordinator (N21}
NRCFORM366 (011-2018}
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U.S,. NUCLEAR "REG"Ui.ATORY COMMISSION APPROVED aTOMs: NO. 3150-0104 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
(Sea Page 2ti'reql.bd numbercf~veach bbciQ (See NUREG-1022, R.3 for Instruction and guidance for completing thJs form http:JiyMw.oo;goy/rpding-rm/dQQ::ClJ!fectiOnslnuregsistafflsr1022/rM E&timsted burdlft per raspcnse ID campty with this mandliory collflcllon mquMt 80 rolli'S.
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- rs. NEOB-1Dm. {3150-01M}, Office of Management and &.!dgat, Wesblngtcn, 00 20503. If a meens used to fmpose an llli)rmatlon oolleetkm does not dis~ a amently valk1 OMB ntml number, the NRC may net conduct or sponsor:. 111d a pei'!OR Ia net requli1Sd to f88pond to, the iilrrytfji.i!!it.~r.. :t~l;;~::inJ~
- 1. FACIUTY NAME 3.PAGE Hope Creek Generating Station
- 2. DOCKET NUMBER 05000354 1 OF3 4.Tin.E
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- 5. EVENT DATE
- 8. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. ontER FACILmES INVOLVED MONTH. DAY YEAR
- ~;;-sm\\JeiiW.-"REV---~;;- DAY __, ~;-- FAWTY NAME___________
DOCKET NUMBER NUM3ER NO.
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=~~~=~~=--~~--~~7 -I On November 9, 2016, at0420 with the Hope Creek reactor in Operational. Condition 2, Startup, the B channel reactor I
level instrumentation was found to be inoperable. The inoperable Instrumentation was discovered as reactor level was 1
j being lowered into the normal band in preparation for plant startup. Hope Creek had made a mode change from Operational Condition 4, Cold Shutdown, to Operation Condition 2, Startup, on November 9, 2016, at 0317, approximately 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> prior to discovering the inoperable instrumentation.
The B Channel reactor level instrumentation is required to be operable in order to enter Operational CondHion 2 to support the B division of the Reactor Protection System (RPS), the Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS), and the Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS). The cause was determined to be an improperly filled reference leg for the B channer reactor level jnstrumentation. This report Is being made under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), as a condition which was prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.
NRC FORM 388A (06-2016)
NRC FORM 3eeA (0&-2016)
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMNIISSJON APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 31S0.0104
~
- 1. FACJUlYNAME Hope Creek Generating Station 05000.. 354 NARRATNE
PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION
General Electric-Boiling Water Reactor (BWR/4)
Reactor Protection System - EllS Identifier {JC/LI}..
ESF Actuation System - EllS Identifier {JE/LI}*
Containment Isolation Control System - EllS rdentifler {JMI Ll}*
EXPIRES: 1013112018 YEAR SEQUENTIAL REV N~R
"""~.2!...
2016
- - 006
- - 00
- Energy Industry IdentifiCation System {EllS} codes and component function identifier codes appear as {SS/CCC}
IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE Event Date: November 9, 2016 Discovery Date: November 9, 2016 CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE When the inoperable jnstrumentation was discovered. Hope Creek was in Operational Condition (OPCON) 2J Startup, with the reactor sub-critical, and a reactor startup in progress. No other structures, systems or components that could have contributed to the event were inoperable at the time of the event.
DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE During the twentieth refueling outage (H1 R20) at Hope Creek, the reference leg for the 8 channel reactor vessel level instrumentation was replaced and rerouted using the design change process. The reference leg is normally maintained at a constant height of water by a condensing pot connected to the reactor vessel steam sp.ace. Initially, the reference leg
. needs to be backfilled with water to remove small pockets of air or voids which may be present. On November 9, 2016, 1 the reference leg had not been backfilled following the re-routing of the reference leg tubing, resulting in an Incorrect level indication on all B channel level Instruments.
Following replacement of the reference leg, the design change package {DCP) did not provide instructions for back-filling '
the reference leg. Instead, the DCP relied on the maintenance department to backfill the reference leg whHe returning the affected instruments to service. The maintenance supervrsor was not cognizant of the DCP scope, and determined that the step to backfill the reference leg was not required. The B channel Instruments were retumed to service by maintenance without completing the backfill evolution. As a result, the reference Jeg for the B channel was not completely!
filled with water, and level on this channel Indicated higher than actual leveL The top of the indicating band for Technical !
Specification required reactor vessel instrumentation is +60 Inches, and water level was being maintained rn a band of 60 !
to 55 inches inches prior to making the mode change. Under this condition, all four channeJs of Technical Specification l required vessel level indication indicated off-scare high, above 60 inches. Vessef level was being monitored using non-Technical Specification required level instrumentation which has a wider Indicating range. Under this condition, the Incorrect indication on the B channel instrumentation was not observable to the plant operators.
Following the mode change. when vessel level was being lowered into the normal band of 30-39 inches, the A, C and D channels of vessel level instrumentation all tracked together Into the indicating range, whJie the B channel remained off-scale high.
At approximately 0420, control room operators recognized the condition. declared the 8 channel inoperable and directed maintenance personnel to investigate.
At 0528 a prompt investigation was Initiated by the Shift Manager.
NRC FORM 3EI6A (08-2016)
U.S. NUcLEAR REGuLAToRY COMMISSION APPROVED *ev*.. oMa: NOa 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 1013112018 Esttmatsd burden per msponsa to comply wltll this mmdatory conecUon request ao houm.
LICE.NSEE EVENT REPORT (LER}
Rspormd lessoos learned am Incorporated Into !11e licensing pl'OC8SB and fad back b !ndua!ly.
Send comments regarding burden estimate to itle FOIA, Privacy and lntlrmaHon COllections CONTINUATION SHEET Branch {f-5 F53}, U.S. Nuctear Regulatol'y Commfss!on, Washington, DC 20555-0001. cr by e-mail t1 lr!foeollects.RE~Gowta~rc.gov, and to tba Desk Ob, Oflk:e of lnfoonalloo aoo Regula!IXy Attars, NEOB-10202, (315i).()104), Ob of Management and BudQSt, Washington, DC 20503. If a (See NUREG-1022, R.31brlnstruc6on and guidance for completing this form means used to Impose an lnfoonstlon collecllon does not display a CUillli'ltly valid OMS control htlp;lJwwtl: nn:;ggy/readjng=tm/docx:ollegtlonslnuooslslaff/sr1022/r3L) number, the NRC may not conduct or aponsct, md a person 18 not requlmd to respond lD, the lnli:lfmatlon collectlcn.
- 1. FACI.rTY NAME Hope Creek Generating Station 05000-354 YEAR SEQUENTJAL.
REV
~.!J.~eR
~Q,_
2016
- - 006
- - 00 Plant Technical Specifications require that aU four channels of vessel level instrumentation be operable prior to making the mode change from OP CON 4, Cold Shutdown to OP CON 2, Startup. The B channel lever instruments are required for the operability of the B RPS {JC} channel~ the B ECCS {JE} channels and B PCIS {JM} channers.
On November 9, 2016 at 1505, the 81 RPS channel and the B Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff System (NSSS) {JM} were placed in the tripped condition to comply with the 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> action for Technical Specification 3.3.1, Reactor Protection System actuation instrumentation, and Technical Specification 3.3.2, Primary Containment Isolation actuatron instrumentation.
Maintenance technicians completed the backtiJI of the B channel reference leg and the 8 channel was returned to operable on November 9, 2016 at 2228.
CAUSE OF EVENT
The cause of the event is personnel error. A causal evaluation is in progress. A supplement to this LER will be submitted to provide the results of the investigation.
- SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS There were no adverse safety consequences as a result of this event The A, C and D channel lever instruments were all operable throughout the duration of the event. The RPS system would have responded properly to shut down the reactor with the B channelle~vel instruments inoperable. The A, C and D ECCS subsystems would have responded to an actual low level condition, and would have provided sufficient capability to restore and maintain vessel level. The reactor coolant
, system pressure remained within the design capability of the low pressure ECCS systems throughout the event. The
, PCIS system would have successfully isolated primary containment with the 8 channel level instruments inoperable since the A, C and D channels were operable.
The B channel level instrumentation was restored to operable prior to the mode change to Operational Condition 1, Run, which occurred on November 11, 2016 at 1423.
SAFETY SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL FAILURE A review of this condition and the associated evaluations determined that a Safety System Functional Failure {SSFF) as defined in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, *Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline,* did not occur.,
PREVIOUS EVENTS The cause evaluation win review similarity to previous events. The result of that review will be included in the suppJement.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
- 1.
The 8 channel reference leg was backfilled and returned to operable status.
- 2. The personnel involved in the decision to not perform the backfill were disqualified from performing similar duties.
COMMITMENTS
There are no regulatory commitments contained In this LER.
NRC FORM 36SA (06-2016)