05000354/LER-2013-010, Regarding Loss of Both Control Room Chillers

Regarding Loss of Both Control Room Chillers

ML14049A012
Person / Time
Site:	Hope Creek
Issue date:	02/18/2014
From:	Carr E Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
LR-N14-0044 LER 13-010-00
Download: ML14049A012 (5)

LER-2013-010, Regarding Loss of Both Control Room Chillers

Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion:	10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(8)
3542013010R00 - NRC Website

text

PSEG Nuclear LLC P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 fEB 1 8 201~

LR-N14-0044 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-001 Hope Creek Generating Station Unit 1 PS~=G NuclearLLC 10CFR50.73 Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-57 Docket No. 50-354

Subject:

Licensee Event Report 2013-010-00 In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), PSEG Nuclear LLC is submitting the enclosed Licensee Event Report (LER) Number 2013-010-00, "Loss of Both Control Room Chillers."

If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Philip Duca at (856) 339-1640.

There are no regulatory commitments contained in this letter.

Sincerely,

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C _ C _____ **.-*--~-z.----

Eric S. Carr Plant Manager Hope Creek Generating Station Attachment: Licensee Event Report 2013-010-00

LR-N14-0044 Page 2 of 2 cc:

W. Dean, Regional Administrator - Region I, NRC J. Hughey, Project Manager - US NRC NRC Senior Resident Inspector - Hope Creek (X24)

P. Mulligan, Manager, NJBNE LER uploaded to ICES Hope Creek Commitment Tracking Coordinator (H02)

L. Marabella - Corporate Commitment Tracking Coordinator (N21 )

10CFR50.73

NRC F'ORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 01/31/2017 (02-2014)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />.

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Reported lessons learned are incorporated Into the licensing process and fed back to Industry.

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Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

Branch (T-5 F53); U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555*0001, or by internet e-mail to Infocoliects.Resource@nrc.gov, and 10 the Desk Officer, Office of Information and (See Page 2 for required number of Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150*0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB digits/characters for each block) control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

3. PAGE Hope Creek Generating Station 05000 354 1 OF 3

4. TITLE Loss of Both Control Room Chillers

5. EVENT DATE

6. LER NUMBER

7. REPORT DATE

8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED I

SEQUENTIAL I REV FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR NUMBER NO.

MONTH DAY YEAR N/A 05000 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 12 20 2013 2013 -

010 - 00 02 18 2014 N/A 05000

9. OPERATING MODE

11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply) o 20.2201(b) o 20.2203(a)(3)(I) o 50.73(a)(2)(I)(C) o 50.73(a)(2)(vll) 1 o 20.2201(d) o 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) o 50.73(a)(2)(II)(A) o 50.73(a)(2)(viil)(A) o 20.2203(a)(1) o 20.2203(a)(4) o 50.73(a)(2)(II)(8) o 50.73(a)(2)(vlll)(8) o 20.2203(a)(2)(I) o 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) o 50.73(a)(2)(III) o 50.73(a)(2)(lx)(A)

10. POWER LEVEL o 20.2203(a)(2)(II) o 50.36(c)(1)(II)(A)

D 50.73(a)(2)(lv)(A) o 50.73(a)(2)(x) o 20.2203(a)(2)(III) o 50.36(c)(2) o 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) o 73.71(a)(4) 100 o 20.2203(a)(2)(lv) o 50.46(a)(3)(II) o 50.73(a)(2)(v)(8) o 73.71(a)(5) o 20.2203(a)(2)(v) o 50.73(a)(2)(I)(A) o 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) o OTHER o 20.2203(a)(2)(vl) o 50.73(a)(2)(I)(8)

[{] 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)

Specify In Abstract below or in PLANTAND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION General Electric - Boiling Water Reactor {BWR/4}

Control Building Environmental Control System - EllS Identifier {VI}

Control Room Chiller - EllS Identifier {CHU}

Estimated b~rden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />.

Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.

Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T*5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internel a-mail to Infocoliects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150*0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMS control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

YEAR G. LER NUMBER I

SEQUENTIAL I REV NUMBER NO.

2013 010 00

3. PAGE 2

OF 3

• Energy Industry Identification System {EllS} codes and component function identifier codes appear as {SS/CCC}

IDENTIFICATION OF EVENT i

Event Date: December 20,2013 Discovery Date: December 20,2013

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EVENT

Hope Creek was in Operational Condition (OPCON) 1 operating at 100 percent rated thermal power. The B Control Room Chiller

{CI*ru} was inoperable following planned maintenance. There was no other equipment out of service that would have impacted this event.

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On 12120113 at 1303, while the B Control Room Chiller was inoperable following planned maintenance, the A Control Room Chiller

{CHU} was manually secured due to excessive fluctuations in load. The Technical Specification action statement (TS 3.7.2.2 Action a.2) for both Control Room Air Conditioning {VI} subsystems inoperable was entered.

An eight-hour NRC ENS notification was required by 1 OCFR50.72(b )(3)(v)(D) for an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function of structures 01' systems needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The ENS notification

(#49671) was completed at 2010 on 12120/13. This LER is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D).

At 2120 on 12/20/13, the B Control Area Ventilation Train and Chiller were placed in service for post-maintenance testing, returned to operable status, and the action statement was exited.

CAUSE OF EVENT

The cause of this event was the concurrent loss of operability of both control roonl chillers.

The B Control Room Chiller, while available, was inoperable as it had not yet been tested following planned maintenance.

The A Control Room Chiller was removed from service due to excessive fluctuations in load.

A causal evaluation is in progress to determine the cause of the A Control Room Chiller excessive fluctuations in load. The results of the evaluation will be published in a supplement to this LER.

SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS

The Control Room Envelope (CRE) Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) Systems are designed to ensure habitability during any design basis radiological accident. Redundant HV AC systems are provided to control the ambient conditions for safety-related equipment, to ensure operating temperature limits are not exceeded. The chillers provide the accident function of maintaining the temperature of the CRE for equipment performance and operator comfort.

There were no actual safety consequences because of this event and potential safety consequences were minimal. The B Control Room Chiller was available and was returned to service at 2120 on 12120/13.

Throughout the time both chillers were inoperable, the control room temperature was maintained below the TS limit of 90 degrees F.

SAFETY SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL FAILURE A review of this event determined that a Safety System Functional Failure (SSFF) did occur as defined in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline."

The control room chillers provide the accident function of maintaining the temperature of the control room envelope for equipment performance and operator comfort. Therefore, both chillers being out.of service at the same time was an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfilment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

PREVIOUS EVENTS A review of events for the past three years at Hope Creek was performed to determine if a similar event had occurred. No similar events were identified.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

At 2120 on 12/20/13, the B Control Area Ventilation Train and Chiller were placed in service for post-maintenance testing, retul'lled to operable status, and the action statement was exited.

COMMITMENTS

This LER contains no commitments.