05000311/LER-1982-129, Forwards LER 82-129/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Forwards LER 82-129/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

ML20066K444
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	11/10/1982
From:	Midura H Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	Haynes R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20066K445	List: 05000311/LER-1982-129, Forwards LER 82-129/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
References
NUDOCS 8211290547
Download: ML20066K444 (4)

LER-2082-129, Forwards LER 82-129/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Event date:
Report date:
3112082129R00 - NRC Website

text

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D >SEG Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station November 10, 1982 Mr. R. C. Ilaynes

, Regional Administrator USNRC Region 1 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 I

Dear Mr. Ilaynes :

LICENSE NO. DPR-7 5 DOCKET NO. 50-311 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 82-129/03L 1

Pursuant.to the - -inirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 2, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are. submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 82-129/03L. This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours,

/bf YY j II . J . Midura i

General Manager -

Salem Operations

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Report Number: 82-129/03L Report Date: 11-10-82 Occurrence Date: 10-24-82 Facility: Salem Generating Station, Unit 2 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Containment Air Locks - Inoperable.

This report was initiated by Incident Reports82-386 and 82-394.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 - Rx Power 82% - Unit Load 910 MWe.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURREUCE:

At 1415 hours0.0164 days <br />0.393 hours <br />0.00234 weeks <br />5.384075e-4 months <br />, October 24, 1982, during routine surveillance of the 130' Elevation Containment Air Lock, an operator observed that there was excessive leakage on the inner door seals. The air lock was declared inoperable and Action State-ment 3.6.1.3.a was entered. The air lock outer door was maintained closed to provide for centainment integrity. Later that day the latch rollers on the inner door were adjusted, and the air ~ock was satisfactorily tested. The 130' Elevation Air Lock was declared operable and at 2130 hours0.0247 days <br />0.592 hours <br />0.00352 weeks <br />8.10465e-4 months <br />, Action State-ment 3.6.1.3.a was terminated.

At 2210 hours0.0256 days <br />0.614 hours <br />0.00365 weeks <br />8.40905e-4 months <br />, October 26, 1982, during similar surveillance on the 100' Elevation Air Lock seals, the leakage on the interior door seals was found to be greater than the test specification. The air lock was declared inoperable and Action Statement 3.6.1.3.a was entered for a second time.

Containment integrity was again maintained by insuring the outer door was closed.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

In the first case, the excessive seal leakage was due to the air lock door latch linkage being out of adjustment. Personnel operating the door handwheels too rapidly impose unnecessary force on the linkage and cause it to prematurely go out of adjustment. Some shift in the adjustment is likely to occur with the frequent operation of the doors.

LER 82-129/03L .

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE: (continued)

In the second instance, the excessive leakage was due to a ,

damaged inner door seal. Opening of the door before the pressure across the seals was fully equalized apparently i resulted in the seal being forced out of the seal groove; subsequent closure of the door with the seal out of the groove resulted in the seal being damaged by the knife edges.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENC'.

The containment air lock doors allow for personnel access to the Containment Building while providing a redundant boundary as part of overall containment integrity. This barrier prevents the release of radioactive contamination to the environment in the event of a design basis accident. Since one door was main-tained closed, providing containment integrity, no risk to the health and safety of the public was involved. Therefore, this event constituted operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation, and is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9.b.

Action Statement 3.6.1.3.a requires:

With one containment air lock door inoperable, maintain at least the operable air lock door closed and either restore the inoperable door to operable status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, or lock the operable air lock door closed.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

As noted, in both instances an operable air lock door was main-tained closed, in compliance with the action statement. In the first case, as mentioned, the air lock tested satisfactorily, was declared operable and the action statement terminated. On the second occasion, the failed seal was replaced, and the air lock was satisfactorily tested. It was declared operable at 0310 hours0.00359 days <br />0.0861 hours <br />5.125661e-4 weeks <br />1.17955e-4 months <br />, October 27, 1982, and Action Statement 3.6.1.3.a was terminated for the second time.

A number of previous problems with air lock operating linkage and door seals have been encountered (see LER's 32-055/03L, 82-056/03L, and 82-090/03L) . Efforts are presently underway to correct the problems including improved personnel training, installation of snubbers on the doors, relocation of test air supply isolation valves and revision of the surveillance test to more accurately simulate desired air lock performance.

Final evaluation of the effectiveness of the measures is pending full implementation.

LER 82-129/03L .

EAILURE DATA:

Not Applicable.

Prepared By R. Frahm //7 M,'

Gerferal Manager -

Salem Operations SORC Meeting No.82-101