05000311/LER-1982-085, Forwards LER 82-085/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

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Forwards LER 82-085/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
ML20069D857
Person / Time
Site: Salem 
Issue date: 09/03/1982
From: Midura H
Public Service Enterprise Group
To: Haynes R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20069D861 List:
References
NUDOCS 8209220299
Download: ML20069D857 (4)
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LER-1982-085, Forwards LER 82-085/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
Event date:
Report date:
3111982085R00 - NRC Website
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O PSEG Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station September 3, 1982 Mr.

R.

C. Haynes Regional Administrator USNRC Region 1 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia,. Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

LICENSE NO. DPR-75 DOCKET NO. 50-311 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 82-085/03L Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No.

2, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 82-085/03L.

This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours,

/f

~

H.

J.

IIidura General Manager -

Salem Operations fdh RH:ks CC:

Distribution 8209220299 820903 PDR ADOCK 05000311 S

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gn Report Number:

82-085/03L Report Date:

09-03-82 Occurrence Date:

08-16-82 Facility:

Salem Generating Station, Unit 2 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Reactor C ulant Loop Channel II Flow Indication -

Inoperable.

This report was initiated by Incident Reports82-235 and 82-237.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 - Rx Power 82% - Unit Load 890 MWe.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 1240 hours0.0144 days <br />0.344 hours <br />0.00205 weeks <br />4.7182e-4 months <br />, August 16, 1982, during routine operation, the Control Room Operator observed that No. 24 Reactor Coolant Loop Channel II indicated flow was reading high.

The channel was declared inoperable and the associated bistables were placed in a tripped condition.

Limiting Condition for Operation Action Statement'3.3.1 Action 7 was entered at 1245 hours0.0144 days <br />0.346 hours <br />0.00206 weeks <br />4.737225e-4 months <br />, August 16, 1982.

The signal isolation amplifier was replaced and a channel calibration was satisfactorily performed.

At 1407 hours0.0163 days <br />0.391 hours <br />0.00233 weeks <br />5.353635e-4 months <br />, August 16, 1982, No. 24 Reactor Coolant Loop Channel II Flow Indication was declared operable, and Limiting Condition for Operation Action Statement 3.3.1 Action 7 was terminated.

Later that day, at 2330 hours0.027 days <br />0.647 hours <br />0.00385 weeks <br />8.86565e-4 months <br />, the Control Room Operator again received indication of a malfunction of No. 24 Reactor Coolant Loop Channel II Flow Indication.

In this case, the channel was reading low.

The channel was declared inoperable and the asso-ciated bistables were placed in a tripped condition.

Limiting Condition for Operation Action Statement 3.3.1 Action 7'was entered at 2330 hours0.027 days <br />0.647 hours <br />0.00385 weeks <br />8.86565e-4 months <br />, August 16, 1982.

The signal isolation amplifier was replaced and a channel calibration check was satisfactorily performed.

At 0005 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />, August 17, 1982, No. 24 Reactor Coolant Loop Channel II Flow Indication was declared operable, and Limiting Condition for Operation Action Statement 3.3.1 Action 7 was terminated.

LER 82-085/03L 9p' DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The cause of both occurrences was determined to be failure of the signal isolation amplifiers.

This caused an inaccurate signal to be sent to the channel flow meter.

Although both occurrences were on the same indication channel, investigation disclosed no common cause for the signal isolation amplifier failures.

The signal isolation amplifier currently installed, shows no indication of malfunction.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The operability of the protective and Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Instrumentation Systems and interlocks ensure that; l) the associated ESF action and or reactor trip will be initiated when the parameter monitored by each channel or combination thereof, reaches its setpoint, 2) the specified coincidence logic is maintained, 3) sufficient redundancy is maintained to permit a channel to be out of service for testing or maintenance, and 4) sufficient system functional capability is available for protective and ESF purposes from diverse parameters.

The operability of these systems is required to provide the overall reliability, redundancy and diversity assumed available in the faciltiy design for the protection and mitigation of accident and transient conditions.

The integrated operation of each of these systems is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analysis.

Redundant Reactor Coolant Loop Flow Indication and trip capability is provided by two other independent channels per loop.

Therefore, this occurrence involved no risk to the health and safety of the general public.

Action Statement 3.3.1 Action 7 requires:

With the number of operable channels one less than the total number of channels, startup and/or power operation may proceed until performance of the next required channel functional test, provided that the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within one hour.

Inoperability of one reactor coolant loop flow channel, therefore, constitutes operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation, and is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9.b.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

As noted, the signal isolation amplifiers were replaced and channel calibrations were satisfactorily performed.

An investi-gation was conducted, however, no common cause of the amplifier failures was discovered.

LER 82-085/03L i FAILURE DATA:

Hagan Corporation Signal Isolation Amplifier Model 110 Prepared By R.

Heller

/

b e

.A General Manager -

Salem Operations SORC Meeting No.

82-80

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