05000311/LER-1982-064, Forwards LER 82-064/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Forwards LER 82-064/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

ML20062L601
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	08/04/1982
From:	Midura H Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	Haynes R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20062L603	List: 05000311/LER-1982-064, Forwards LER 82-064/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
References
NUDOCS 8208190165
Download: ML20062L601 (3)

LER-2082-064, Forwards LER 82-064/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Event date:
Report date:
3112082064R00 - NRC Website

text

-

O >SEG Public Service Electnc and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station August 4, 1982 Mr. R. C. Haynes Regional Administrator USNRC Region 1 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

LICENSE NO. DPR-75 DOCKET NO. 50-311 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 82-064/03L Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 2, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 82-064/03L. This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours,

f. , \&hlbt^"

H. J. Midura General Manager -

Salem Operations RF:ks 2)

'CC: Distribution i

I, 8208190165 820804 PDR ADOCK 05000311 S PDR The Energy People gg,W 7, m m ov m m

, 's Report Number: 82-064/03L Report Date: 08-04-82 Occurrence Date: 07-17-82 Facility: Salem Generating Station, Unit 2 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Emergency Core Cooling System Vital Heat Tracing -' Inoperable.

This report was initiated by Incident Report 82-183.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 - Rx Power 83% - Unit Load 880 MWe.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 2000 hours0.0231 days <br />0.556 hours <br />0.00331 weeks <br />7.61e-4 months <br />, July 17, 1982, during the performance of Surveillance Procedure SP (0) 4. 5.4. 2 (a) , Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)

Heat Tracing Circuits 2610A and 2608B were found to be reading less than required by the surveillance. These circuits are associated with the Boron Injection Tank (BIT) and boron injection flow path piping. The channels were declared inoperable, and Action State-ment 3.5.4.2 was entered, retroactive to the time of discovery.

The redundant heat tracing circuits were operable, and boron injection flow path temperatures were observed to be in specification. ,

DES _IGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

l The problem with Circuit 2610A was found to be a broken wire in i the controller panel. The location of the break was in the wiring l

bundle, and a nick in the insulation suggested the damage existed l at installation.

Heat tracing for Circuit 2608B had apparently been damaged by personnel standing on related piping and lagging (see LER 82-053/03L).

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

Redundant ECCS heat tracing ensures that the bgron injection flow path temperature will be greater than 137 F, which is l

required to maintain a 22,500 ppm boron solution. This concentration, together with the BIT minimum contained volume, is necessary to keep the reactor shutdown in the event of a steam line rupture.

LER 82-064/03L . 6 ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: (continued)

Since in both instances the redundant channel was operable, no risk to the health and safety of the public was involved. The occurrence constituted operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation, and is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9.b.

Action Statement 3.5.4.2 requires:

With only one channel of heat tracing on the BIT or associated flow path operable, operation may continue for up to 30 days, provided the tank and flow path temperaturgs are verified to be greater than or equal to 145 F at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, otherwise, be in hot shutdown within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The flow path and BIT temperatures were verified to be in specification every 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, in compliance with the action statement. The failed wire in Circuit 2610A was trimmed back to the break, and the nearest junction remade. Heat tracing for Circuits 2608A and B was alternately replaced to insure redundancy was maintained. Surveillance of the circuits was satisfactorily completed. The channels were declared operable, and at 1618 hours0.0187 days <br />0.449 hours <br />0.00268 weeks <br />6.15649e-4 months <br />, July 21, 1982, Action Statement 3.5.4.2 was terminated.

Discussion of this report will be incorporated into the station training program as an example of the possible safety significance of damage caused by standing on piping and lagging. Finally, due l

to possible inadequacies in the surveillance procedure with respect to methods, limits, test equipment requirements, and human factors l involved in implementation, an engineering evaluation will be i

requested. Results of the evaluation will be incorporated into a Design Change Request for system modifications and procedural changes as necessary.

FAILURE DATA:

Not Applicable.

Prepared By R. Frahm ,I <'W l

General Manager -

Salem Operations SORC Meeting No. 82-73

_ - _ - . . ._ .. . _ _ . _