05000311/LER-1982-043, Forwards LER 82-043/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

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Forwards LER 82-043/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
ML20063D425
Person / Time
Site: Salem PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 06/16/1982
From: Midura H
Public Service Enterprise Group
To: Haynes R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20063D428 List:
References
NUDOCS 8207020187
Download: ML20063D425 (3)


LER-1982-043, Forwards LER 82-043/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
Event date:
Report date:
3111982043R00 - NRC Website

text

,

.O PSEG Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station

~ June 16, 1982 4

i Mr.

R.

C. Haynes Regional Administrator USNRC Region 1 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

I LICENSE NO. DPR-75 DOCKET NO. 50-311 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 82-043/03L Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No.

2, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 82-043/03L.

This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours,

$. a ?lYN w w

/

H.

J.

Midura General Manager -

Salem Operations RF:ks CC:

Distribution 8207020187 820616 PDR ADOCK 05000311 S

PDR [g

The Energy People i

m m m u n ei

, Report Number:

82-043/03L

- Rep' ort Date:

06-16-82 Occurrence Date:

05-24-82 Facility:

Salem Generating Station, Unit 2 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Primary Containment - Missed Surveillance.

This report was initiated by Incident Report 82-139.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 - Rx Power 100% - Unit Load 1130 MWe.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 1700 hours0.0197 days <br />0.472 hours <br />0.00281 weeks <br />6.4685e-4 months <br />, May 24, 1982, during the performance of Surveillance Procedure SP (O) 4. 6.1. lAl, the Shift Technical Advisor discovered several valves which appeared to be missing from the procedure.

The valves were determined to be of a type required to be tested in accordance with Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.1.

A rapid survey of piping systems penetrating the con-tainment boundary, showed a total of 16 valves not covered by Surveillance Procedures SP (O) 4. 6.1.lAl and 2.

The valves were immediately checked; all were found to be in the closed position, and they were locked and tagged as found.

A review of valve lineups in the appropriate operating instructions showed the valves were required to be closed in the modes for which the surveillances were applicable.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The valves were apparently omitted from the surveillances due to oversight at the time the procedures were written.

The fact that the valves were missing subsequently escaped the attention of individuals performing the tests.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

Surveillance Requirement 4. 6.1.1.a requires :

In order to demonstrate primary containment integrity, at least once per 31 days all penetrations not capable of being closed by operable containment automatic isolation valves and required to be closed during accident conditions shall be verified, closed by valves, blind flanges, or de-activated automatic valves secured in their positions.

Vents, drains, test connections, etc. which are:

1) one inch nominal pipe diameter or less, 2) located inside containment, and 3) locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the closed position, shall be verified closed at least once per 92 days.

The valves were typically isolation valves, in 3/4 inch vents and drains from sections of piping immediately adjacent to containment penetrations, and included Valves 2SJ330, 2SJ331, 2SJ332, 2SJ333, 2SJ338, 2SJ339, 2SJ340, 2SJ341, 2SJ344, 2SJ345, 2RH58, 2RH72, 2HY923, 2HY927, 2SJ368 and 2SJ369.

The omission of the valves from the surveillances resulted in entering Technical Specification Action Statement 3.6.1.1, due to failure to satisfactorily demonstrate containment integrity.

As such, the occurrence involved events leading to operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation, and is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9.b.

Because the valves had never been included in the surveillance, the time of entry into Action Statement 3.6.1.1 dates back to initial plant operation.

Containment integrity was maintained, however, as shown by the as found valve positions, and results of the study of the operating instructions.

Penetrations of the type involved are capped, providing a boundary in addition to the closed valves.

Finally, no leakage from the systems involved was observed, substantiating the. conclusion that no degradation of the containment boundary occurred.

Consequently, the occurrence in no way involved a risk to the health or safety of the general public.

Action Statement 3.6.1.1 requires:

Without primary containment integrity, restore integrity within one hour, or be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

As demonstrated, the primary containment integrity was maintained, in compliance with Action Statement 3.6.1.1.

On-the-spot changes have been incorporated into Surveillance Procedures SP(O) 4.6.1.lAl l

and 2, to include the missing valves.

An in-depth investigation of piping systems for additional valves missing from the surveillances is presently being conducted.

A Supplemental Report will be sub-mitted upon final correction of the problem.

i FAILURE DATA:

(

l Not Applicable b

Prepared By R..Frahm p

l V General Manager -

i Salem Operations j

SORC Meeting No.

82-59 l