05000285/FIN-2014009-10
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Finding | |
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| Title | Deficient Evaluation of NRC Bulletin 88-04, Strong Pump Weak Pump Due to Failure to Consider the Effect of Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Discharge Check Valves Leakage |
| Description | A cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, was identified involving the failure to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and design bases were correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. Specifically, the licensee failed to properly evaluate NRC Bulletin 88-04, Potential Safety- Related Pump Loss, for strong pump weak pump interaction regarding auxiliary feedwater pumps FW-6 and FW-10. The evaluation failed to consider pump-to-pump interaction that may result due to pump discharge check valve leakage. In addition, the licensee failed to re-evaluate the condition after surveillance testing performed on November 28, 2010, and September 1, 2012, identified leakage past both pump discharge check valves. The licensee entered this issue into its corrective action program as Condition Report 2014-08381 and initiated actions to re-evaluate NRC Bulletin 88-04. This performance deficiency was more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it was associated with the equipment attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and affected the associated cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The NRC performed an initial screening of the finding in accordance with NRC Manual Chapter IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At- Power. Using IMC 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, dated July 1, 2012, the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it: (1) was not a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating structure, system, or component, and did not result in a loss of operability or functionality; (2) did not represent a loss of system and/or function; (3) did not represent an actual loss of function of at least a single train for longer than its technical specification allowed outage time, or two separate safety systems out-of-service for longer than their technical specification allowed outage time; and (4) did not represent an actual loss of function of one or more non-technical specification trains of equipment designated as high safety-significant in accordance with the licensees maintenance rule program. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance because the licensee failed to demonstrate a conservative bias in decision making-practices. Specifically, the licensees determination that the event is not credible failed to consider documented check valve leakage in the auxiliary feedwater system. |
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000285/2014009 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2014 (2014Q3) |
| Type: | Violation: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Vegel B Davis B Hagar C Henderson C Smith D Holman E Coffman G Khouri G Warnick I Anchondo J Groom J Mateychick M Williams W Deschaineb Tharakanc Alldredge D Reinert E Ruesch J Braisted L Brandt M Hay M Hayes |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion III, Design Control Technical Specification |
| CCA | H.14, Conservative Bias |
| INPO aspect | DM.2 |
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Finding - Fort Calhoun - IR 05000285/2014009 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Fort Calhoun) @ 2014Q3
Self-Identified List (Fort Calhoun)
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