05000285/FIN-2013013-07
From kanterella
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Programmatic Failure to Evaluate Safety Impact of Degraded Conditions During Use of Interim Operability Criteria |
| Description | The team identified multiple examples of a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings. Specifically, the licensees failed to follow station procedures for corrective actions, operability evaluations, and performance of calculations for instances where the licensees interim operability procedure was invoked for degraded conditions associated with piping and pipe supports. As a result, nonconservative design inputs were used without entering the non-conformances into the corrective action process or performing procedurally required operability evaluations. The licensees corrective action was to capture the identified instances in the corrective action program and discontinue the use of the interim operability procedure. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as CR 2013-03598. The failure to follow the interim operability procedure was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency is more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it is associated with the human performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, dated July 1, 2012, and guidance from the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Division of Engineering technical staff for issues where the inputs to calculations deviated from approved standards, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance (Green) because: (1) the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation technical staff determined the non-conformances would not render the evaluated component as inoperable or unable to perform its safety function ; (2) it was not a deficiency affecting the design and qualification of a mitigating structure, system, or component; and (3) it did not represent an actual loss of function of one or more non-Technical Specification trains of equipment designated as high safety-significance in accordance with the licensees maintenance rule program. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with work practices component because the licensee failed to define and effectively communicate expectations regarding compliance with station procedures. |
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000285/2013013 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2014 (2014Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | G George H Barrett J Hanna J Jacobson J Josey J Polickoski J Robles J Watkins J Wingebach M Hay N Patel R Deese R Haskell R Telson S Laur S Makor T Lighty A Scarbeary C Baron C Henderson C Sanders C Smith D Loveless F Ramirez |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V |
| CCA | H.8, Procedure Adherence |
| INPO aspect | WP.4 |
| ' | |
Finding - Fort Calhoun - IR 05000285/2013013 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (Fort Calhoun) @ 2014Q1
Self-Identified List (Fort Calhoun)
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||