05000285/FIN-2013013-15
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Finding | |
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| Title | Lack of an Adequate Operability Evaluation for Class 1 Raw Water Piping in Non-Class 1 Service Building |
| Description | The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, associated with the licensees failure to follow Station Procedure NOD-QP-31, Operability Determination Process, to adequately assess and document the basis for operability when a nonconforming condition was identified. Specifically, the licensee did not determine the effect of a ruptured 6-inch pipe in the raw water system with respect to the safety function provided by the raw water system during a design seismic event. To address this issue the licensee revised the operability evaluation and established a reasonable basis for operability. The licensee entered this deficiency into their corrective action program for resolution as CRs 2013-13410 and 2013-13634. The failure to adequately assess and document the basis for operability of the raw water system with respect to the non-conforming seismic design criteria is a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor, and therefore a finding, as it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the associated cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, dated July 1, 2012, this finding was determined to have very low safety significance (Green) because it: (1) was not a deficiency affecting the design and qualification of a mitigating structure, system, or component, and did not result in a loss of operability or functionality; (2) did not represent a loss of system and/or function; (3) did not represent an actual loss of function of at least a single train for longer than its allowed outage time, or two separate safety systems out-of-service for longer than their Technical Specification allowed outage time; and (4) did not represent an actual loss of function of one or more non-Technical Specification trains of equipment designated as high safety-significance in accordance with the licensees maintenance rule program. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution, associated with the corrective action program component, because the licensee did not thoroughly evaluate the problem such that the resolutions address causes and extent of conditions. This includes properly classifying, prioritizing, and evaluating for operability and reportability conditions adverse to quality. |
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000285/2013013 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2014 (2014Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | G George H Barrett J Hanna J Jacobson J Josey J Polickoski J Robles J Watkins J Wingebach M Hay N Patel R Deese R Haskell R Telson S Laur S Makor T Lighty A Scarbeary C Baron C Henderson C Sanders C Smith D Loveless F Ramirez |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V Technical Specification Technical Specification - Procedures |
| CCA | P.2, Evaluation |
| INPO aspect | PI.2 |
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Finding - Fort Calhoun - IR 05000285/2013013 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Fort Calhoun) @ 2014Q1
Self-Identified List (Fort Calhoun)
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