05000285/FIN-2014002-03
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Maintain Design Control of HPSI Injection Valve |
| Description | Two examples of a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, were identified. The first example involved the failure to establish procedures or Technical Specifications to accomplish required HPSI injection flow balancing. The second example involved the failure to provide controls or testing to ensure that replacement parts for HPSI injection valves were suitable for the application and were capable of supporting the safety-related functions of the HPSI system. The licensee has since implemented Engineering Change 59874 which included throttling of the HPSI loop injection valves. This change was completed on August 20, 2013, restoring the original plant design and overcoming the configuration control errors introduced on three of the eight injection valves. Post-work testing for the completed modification included flow balance testing for the HPSI loop injection lines. The inspectors reviewed the results of this testing and determined that the UFSAR assumptions regarding balanced loop flows were adequately addressed by licensee corrective actions. This finding was more than minor because it adversely impacted the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors reviewed NRC IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, Table 3 SDP Appendix Router. While this issue was identified during a refueling outage, the inspectors determined that the majority of the exposure time for this violation occurred with the reactor at power. As such, the inspectors determined the finding could be evaluated using the SDP in accordance with IMC 0609, The SDP for Findings at-Power, Appendix A, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions. The inspectors answered yes to the question of Does the finding represent a loss of system and/or function? The inspectors determined the finding required a detailed risk evaluation per IMC 0609 Paragraph 6.0, because the operability of the high pressure safety injection system (both trains) was in question. A Region IV senior reactor analyst performed a detailed risk evaluation and determined the flow imbalance did not result in a loss of safety function. Since the high pressure safety injection system was capable of meeting the functional success criteria, there was no quantifiable change to the core damage frequency and therefore was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green). The inspectors determined there was no cross-cutting aspect associated with this finding because events related to identification of needed procedures and specifications occurred in the 1970s and are not indicative of current performance. Additionally, the errant replacement of parts of three HPSI injection valves occurred between 1993 and 2006, and are also not indicative of current performance. |
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000285/2014002 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2014 (2014Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Guzzetta A Sallman J Kirkland J Wingebach M Chambers M Farnan M Hay N Taylor W Lyon W Smith |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion III, Design Control Technical Specification |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Fort Calhoun - IR 05000285/2014002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Fort Calhoun) @ 2014Q1
Self-Identified List (Fort Calhoun)
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