05000285/FIN-2013017-01
From kanterella
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Ensure Tornado Missile Protection for Site Components |
| Description | The team identified multiple examples of a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, involving the failure to establish applicable tornado missile protection design requirements for components needed to ensure the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition. Specific examples included the steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump exhaust stack, auxiliary feedwater components located in Room 81, raw water pump electrical pull boxes PB-128T and PB-129T, and diesel generator fuel oil storage tank fill and vent lines. The licensee implemented plant modifications to adequately protect all affected equipment from tornado generated missiles and entered the deficiencies into its corrective action program for resolution as Condition Reports CR 2013-03839, 2013-03842, 2013-14117, and 2013-14246. The failure to ensure that station components were adequately protected from tornado missiles was a performance deficiency. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening, the performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it was associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and affected the associated cornerstone objective to ensure availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the finding affected the reliability of required components following a postulated tornado-generated missile impact. The team evaluated the finding using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings at Power, Exhibit 4, External Events Screening Questions. The finding required a detailed risk evaluation because it involved the lack of equipment specifically designed to mitigate a severe weather initiating event (tornado) and could have degraded two or more trains of a multi-train system. The Region IV senior reactor analyst performed a detailed risk evaluation in accordance with Appendix A, Section 6.0, Detailed Risk Evaluation. The NRC concluded the finding was characterized as having low to moderate safety significance (White). The calculated change in core damage frequency of 2.6 x 10-6 was dominated by a tornado-induced non-recoverable loss of offsite power with the failure of the emergency power supply system. The analyst determined that the finding did not affect the internal events initiator risk and would not involve a significant increase in the risk of a large early release of radiation. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program component because the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate problems such that the resolutions address the causes. |
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000285/2013017 Section 1R21 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2014 (2014Q1) |
| Type: | Violation: White |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.21 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Vegel J Josey J Kirkland J Wingebach |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion III, Design Control |
| CCA | P.2, Evaluation |
| INPO aspect | PI.2 |
| ' | |
Finding - Fort Calhoun - IR 05000285/2013017 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (Fort Calhoun) @ 2014Q1
Self-Identified List (Fort Calhoun)
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||