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High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) is a system which injects cooling water at high pressure. Similar to RCIC.
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| | Site | Start date | Title | Description |
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| ENS 57036 | Browns Ferry | 19 March 2024 15:30:00 | High Pressure Coolant Injection Isolation | The following information was provided by the licensee via fax or email:
While performing a planned high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system surveillance, an isolation signal was received based upon an exhaust rupture disc high pressure signal. This resulted in an unplanned inoperability of the HPCI system. All systems responded as expected, and the event is under investigation. No other systems were affected by this condition.
This event is reportable as an 8-hour non-emergency notification under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) as HPCI is a single train safety system. There was no impact to plant personnel or the public as a result of this condition. The NRC resident has been notified of this condition. | | ENS 57041 | Cooper | 13 March 2024 10:48:00 | High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Inoperable | The following information was provided by the licensee via email and phone:
At 0548 CDT on March 13, 2024, during a planned (high pressure coolant injection) HPCI maintenance window, a condition was identified not associated with the planned maintenance which caused HPCI to be inoperable. Specifically, the HPCI auxiliary oil pump start stop pressure switch could not be adjusted into calibration. Further investigation found that the pressure switch was not mounted as designed.
Since HPCI is a single train system, this is a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The condition was corrected prior to HPCI being declared operable on March 15, 2024.
The reason for the delay in the event notification beyond 8 hours from the event time was due to not recognizing the need to report the condition while in a planned HPCI maintenance window.
The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. | | ENS 56989 | Cooper | 22 February 2024 17:03:00 | Accident Mitigation - High Pressure Coolant Iinjection Declared Inoperable | The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
At 1103 CST on February 22, 2024, a potential through-wall steam leak was identified on the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) steam supply 1-inch drain line. As a result, HPCI was declared inoperable. Since HPCI is a single-train system, this is a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). Reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) and low pressure emergency core cooling systems (ECCS) remain operable.
Additional investigation is in progress.
There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | | IR 05000220/2023004 | Nine Mile Point | 1 February 2024 | Integrated Inspection Report 05000220/2023004 and 05000410/2023004 | | | ML24032A476 | Browns Ferry | 1 February 2024 | Final Report of a Part 21 Evaluation Associated with Starter Contactors for the BFN Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection Suppression Pool Inboard Suction Valve | | | IR 05000321/2023004 | Hatch | 31 January 2024 | Integrated Inspection Report 05000321/2023004 and 05000366/2023004 | | | ENS 56936 | Peach Bottom | 29 January 2024 17:02:00 | Automatic Reactor Scram | The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
At approximately 1202 EST on 01/29/24, unit 2 experienced a reactor scram caused by a main turbine trip. Investigation is still ongoing.
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
All control rods were fully inserted. The licensee indicated that the turbine trip may have been caused by a power load imbalance, however the cause of the incident is under investigation. The scram was not complex.
Decay heat is currently being removed thru bypass valves dumping to the main condenser. Initially unit 2 lost the use of the bypass valves due to lack of condenser vacuum. Unit 2 used the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system in the condenser storage tank (CST) to CST mode to remove decay heat. Residual heat removal was used to keep the torus cool. Condenser vacuum was regained and unit 2 is back to removing decay heat with the turbine bypass valves.
There was no impact to unit 3.
The licensee confirmed there was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
- * *UPDATE ON 01/29/24 AT 1935 EST FROM PAUL BOKUS TO NATALIE STARFISH* * *
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
Licensee adds 8-hour non-emergency 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) specified system actuation report to original 4-hour non-emergency 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) RPS Actuation report.
At approximately 1202 EST on 01/29/24, unit 2 experienced a reactor scram by a main turbine trip. All control rods inserted. Reactor core isolation cooling system (RCIC) was manually initiated for level control. HPCI was manually initiated for pressure control. Primary containment isolation system (PCIS) Group II and III isolations occurred (specified system actuation). Investigation is ongoing.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | | IR 05000324/2023011 | Brunswick | 26 December 2023 | NRC Fire Protection Team Inspection - FPTI Report 05000324/2023011 and 05000325/2023011 | | | IR 05000254/2023010 | Quad Cities | 20 December 2023 | Comprehensive Engineering Team Inspection Report 05000254/2023010 and 05000265/2023010 | | | ENS 56896 | Hatch | 18 December 2023 07:23:00 | High Pressure Coolant Injection System Inoperable | The following information was provided by the licensee email:
At 0223 EST, on 12/18/2023, while Unit 2 was at 100 percent power in mode 1, the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) outboard steam isolation valve closed resulting in the HPCI system being declared inoperable. The cause of the outboard steam isolation valve closing is under investigation. HPCI does not have a redundant system, therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The safety function was restored at 0512, on 12/18/23, and HPCI has been declared operable. Reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) and low pressure emergency core cooling systems (ECCS) were operable during this time.
There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
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