ML20134P400
| ML20134P400 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 02/05/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20134P392 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-302-96-20, NUDOCS 9702250429 | |
| Download: ML20134P400 (17) | |
See also: IR 05000302/1996020
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION 2
Docket No: 50-302
License No: DPR-72
Report :vo: 50-302/96-20
Licensee: Florida Power Corporation
Facility: Crystal River 3 Nuclear Station
Location: 15760 West Power Line Street
Crystal River, FL 34428-6708 1
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Dates: December 1, 1996 through January 11. 1997
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Inspectors: S. Cahill. Senior Resident Inspector l
T. Cooper. Resident Inspector !
Approved by: K. Landis, Chief. Projects Branch 3 i
Division of Reactor Projects
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9702250429 970205
PDR ADOCK 05000302
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! EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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Crystal River 3 Nuclear Station
NRC Inspection Report 50-302/96-20
This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations,
engineering, maintenance, and plant support. The report covers a 6-week
period of resident inspection.
Ooerations
Two weaknesses were identified in the cold weather preparation program: the
lack of routine preventative maintenance on the heat tracing and the lack of
clear guidance to the operations personnel on implementation of the cold
weather checklist. (paragraph 02.1)
The inspectors performed a detailed review of the latest quality program
department's audit report and observed that the audit included an adequate
integrated assessment of the findings. The audit concluded that the number of
issues identified were indicative of the organizational and programmatic
problems identified in recent NRC reports. 5 paragraph 07.1)
The failure to question the normal makeup path availability the incorrect
information presented to the Plant Review Committee (PRC), and the lack of
dissemination of the PRC expectations were indicative of deficiencies in the
PRC process. The licensee's corrective actions were prompt and effective.
(paragraph 07.2)
A Violation (VIO 50-302/96-20-01) was identified for failure to adhere to
Technical 5)ecification reactor coolant system cooldown limits during a past
cooldown. Jnresolved Item (URI 50-302/95-21-04) is closed. (paragraph 08.1)
Maintenance
A Violation (VIO 50-302/96-20-02) was identified for the failure to implement
procedural requirements for the review and development of a maintenance ;
procedure. (paragraph M3.1) l
The surveillance and contingency actions implemented for a battery cell, which
failed the visual inspection, were conducted satisfactorily. (paragraph M3.2)
Plant Sucoort .
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's actions in response to an event
involving falsification of training records. The actions taken were found to
be conservative. (paragraph R5.1)
A weakness was identified in the planning for the security upgrade which has
resulted in large amounts of overtime being scheduled for extended periods of
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j One weakness was identified for the implementation of fire brigade manning
! requirements. (paragraph F6.1)
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Report Details
- Summary of Plant Status I
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The unit began this inspection period in Mode 5. continuing in the outage that i
began on September 2. 1996. The development of modification packages l
continues, although no major modification has begun implementation during thi '
inspection period.
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L. Ooerations
02 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment
l 02.1 Cold Weather Preoaration
a. Insoection Scooe (71714)
The inspectors performed an inspection of the licensee's cold weather
preparation program to determine the program was effectively implemented
to protect safety-related systems.
b. Observations and Findinos
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The inspectors reviewed the licensee's preparations for cold weather.
Licensee Procedure OI-13. Adverse Weather Conditions, requires that Form
0113-1. Freezing Weather Preparations Checklist, be completed when the
predicted temperature will drop below 35 F within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
The inspectors verified that the preventative maintenance (PM) had been
performed on the unit's heat tracing in November, 1996. However, this
was done by scheduling a Work Request (WR), as there was no 3rocedure to
perform PM on heat tracing. All PMs are controlled, both scleduling and
implementation by the WR process. The lack of formal controls for the
performance of PMs on heat tracing was a weakness. providing no
mechanism to assure that preventative maintenance was completed.
Subsequent to discussions with the inspectors. the licensee revised the
program to include a routine PM program for heat tracing.
The inspectors reviewed 01-13 and noted that guidance given to the
operations personnel for assuring that heat tracing was functioning was
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weak. The procedure instructed the operator to verify that the heat -
tracing was energized. The panel and breaker numbers for the heat
tracing were provided. The inspectors spoke with several operators
regarding the instructions provided in 01-13. The operators had varying
o)inions as to the intent of the procedure. Some o)erators thought that
t1e instruction meant merely to verify that the lig1t showing the
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circuit was illuminated was lit Some operators thought that placing
their hands on the heat traced piping would be a good indication of the
heat tracing being energized. The lack of clear guidance was a
weakness. Following the identification of this weakness, the licensee
verbally directed the shift personnel to use a pyrometer to verify that
the heat tracing was actually energized during the )erformance of the
l checklist. By the end of this inspection period, t1e licensee was in
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the )rocess of revising 01-13 to include more detailed guidance for cold f
weatler preparations. ;
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c. Conclusions .
Two weaknesses were identified in the cold weather preparation program: ,
the lack of routine preventative maintenance on the heat tracing and the '
lack of clear guidance to the operations personnel on implementation of ,
the cold weather checklist. '
06 Operations Organization and Administration
06.1 Mr. P. Beard. Senior Vice President. Nuclear Operations, announced his l
retirement as of April 1.1997. Mr. R. Anderson will be taking his l
place as of March 3. 1997. '
06.2 Mr. G. Boldt Vice President of Nuclear Production, announced his
resignation as of January 31, 1997. His replacement will be Mr. J.
Cowan. Site Vice President, Nuclear Operations.
06.3 Mr. L. Kelley, Director. Nuclear Operations Site Support, has announced
his resignation, effective January 31. 1997. His replacement will be
Mr. D. Kunsemiller.
06.4. Mr. J. Holden has been appointed Director. Nuclear Operations
Engineering sad Projects, effective February. 1997.
06.5 Mr. H. Koon has been named Scheduling Manager Nuclear Operations. Mr.
D. Roderick has been named Outage Manager. Nuclear Operations.
06.6 Mr. D. Goldstein has been named Health Physics Manager.
06.7 Mr. J. Campbell. Assistant Plant Director. Maintenance and Radiation
Protection, will be transferring to another project. The transfer date
will be determined when a replacement is named.
07 Quality Assurance in Operations
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07.1 3rd Quarter Quality Proarams Deoartment (0PD) Audit Results 1
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a. Insoection Scooe (40500. 92903)
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The inspectors reviewed the results of the licensee's latest quality !
program department's audit. l
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b. Observations and Findinas l
. The inspectors reviewed the 1996 third quarter quality programs
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department audit report of integrated activities at the site, issued on )
December 11, 1996. The integrated audit included aspects of operations,
engineering, maintenance, and plant support. The audit resulted in
sixteen problem reports (prs) and 56 precursor cards (PCs) being issued.
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The audit concluded that the number of issues identified were indicative
of the organizational and programmatic problems identified in recent NRC
reports.
The audit identified that the corrective action program was weak cs
evidenced by numerous examples of overdue corrective actions in the
engineering area. Also,- corrective actions were identified which failed .
to prevent recurrence of original or similar problems in operations,
maintenance, and engineering areas. The licensee concluded that evel
though the problem identification program has improved, it appeared that
resources were not adequately dedicated to finding solutions that would '
prevent recurrence and would lead to improvements.
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Procedural weaknesses were observed by the auditors in all functional
areas. The auditors' assessment concluded that the procedure
development and review process continues to be a secondary function
within the various organizations, resulting in a lack of consistent
quality performance.
Weaknesses in the understanding of regulatory requirements and their
implementation within the security organization were identified by the
audit.
c. Conclusions
The inspectors aerformed a detailed review of the audit report and
observed that t1e audit included an adequate, integrated assessment of
the findings. Conclusions were reached based on the findings, including
assessments where similar findings were found in multiple functional
areas. The findings identified by the audit were similar to those
identified by the NRC in previous reports. No actions beyond those
required to address the programmatic problems previously identified,
were required for these items.
07.2 Licensee Self-Assessment Activities
a. Insoection Scooe (71707. 40500)
The inspector attended a special Plant Review Committee (PRC) Meeting
held on January 6. 1997, to review and approve a clearance tagging order
for work on a reactor coolant system (RCS) drain valve. The clearance
needed PRC approval because the drain valve was only isolable from the
reactor by two check valves in series.
b. Observations and Findinas
The inspector observed that the PRC members esked detailed questions on
diverse areas of concern including the amount of water expected to be
drained, maintenance contingencies if a leak developed, and the
potential for hydrogen gas coming out of solution. However, the PRC
members did not question the method of inventory control operators would
use if a leak developed. The PRC was informed that the line to the
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drain valve was already drained and the check valves were not leaking. ,
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The PRC approved the clearance based on contingencies to reinstall the
valve if a leak developed and not to leave the valve unattended with the ,
system breached. !
When the clearance order was brought for operations approval to be .
implemented, the Nuclear Shift Supervisor On Duty (NSSOD) elected to !
postpone it because the normal RCS makeup path was out of service and '
would be returned to service in several days. It was then discovered 4
that the drain line had not been drained and the check. valves leak !
verification had not been done. Additionally, it was discovered that :
the contingency actions approved by the PRC had not been incorporated
into an Operations Night. Order or the maintenance procedure as some :
members of PRC had assumed would be done. ;
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The licensee immediately stopped any further work on the drain valve and '
initiated a PC to implement corrective action. The licensee determined
the PRC presenter made an erroneous assumption and did not verify that ,
the drain line was drained and the check valves tested. Operations '
management took appropriate disciplinary action. The licensee also )
implemented an interim 3rocess to ensure the basis for PRC decisions and
PRC expectations would )e clearly communicated to shift management and
accountability would be established. A revision to Administrative
Instruction AI-300. Plant Review Committee Charter, was planned to
incorporate the process change permanently.
c. Conclusions
The inspector concluded Operations Shift Management exhibited
conservative decision making by electing to postpone the valve work.
However, the inspector concluded the failure to question the normal
makeup path availability, the incorrect information presented to the
PRC, and the lack of dissemination of the PRC expectations were
indicative of deficiencies in PRC questioning and precise
communications. The licensee's corrective action to the deficiencies
was prompt and effective.
08 Miscellaneous Operations Issues
08.1 (Closed) URI 50-302/95-21-04. Excessive RC5 Cooldown Rate -
a. Insoection Scooe (7_1707. 92700. 9290D
The inspectors reviewed the circumstances surrounding the event which
resulted in exceeding the Technical Specification limitations for a past
reactor coolant system pressure and temperature, j
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b. Observations and Findinas j
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Technical Specification 3.4.3. Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure and
Temperature (P/T) Limits, requires that at all times. RCS pressure, RCS j
temperature, and RCS heatup and cooldown rates shall be maintained ;
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within the limits specified in the Pressure Temperature Limits Report l
(PTLR). On January 11, 1996, during unit shutdown for the condenser l
tube outage. the RCS cooldown rate exceeded the limits specified in the -
PTLR for approximately one hour. This was the result of the operators ,
using the decay heat cooler inlet temperature to transition to the l
slower cooldown rate of 10 F per hour instead of the decay heat outlet ,
temperature, as intended by the )rocedure. The licensee evaluated the ;
, actual cooldown and determined t1ere were no detrimental effects due to <
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l The licensee obtained an evaluation which concluded that the cooldown :
, had no effect on the reactor vessel integrity. The Senior Reactor
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Operator (SRO) had noted that the decay heat cooler inlet temperature '
was used for most other functions (i.e. mode changes and heat balance
calculations) that he was aware of and he thought to be consistent, he ;
should use that temperature for this change also. He felt the notes in
the procedures referred to the temperature to use for the cooldown rate "
calculation, and not necessarily for the transition point.
The NRC Office of Investigation conducted an investigation of this event- !
l in 10 Case No. 2-96-018. The investigation Synopsis is an enclosure to :
- this report. The investigators concluded that tne CR3 SRO and R0 '
decision-makers on duty during the cooldown on January 11. 1996, did not
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deliberately violate plant cooldown procedures.
! Licensee Procedure SP-422. RC System Heatup And Cooldown Surveillance,
was revised and issued on February 22. 1996 to clarify which temperature
should be used to transition to a slower cooldown rate. ,
TS 3.4.3. Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure and Temperature (P/T)
Limits, requires that at all times. RCS pressure. RCS temperature, and
RCS heatup and cooldown rates shall be maintained within the limits '
specified in the Pressure Temprature Limits Report (PTLR). On '
January 11. 1996, during unit cooldown the RCS cooldown rate exceeded -
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the limits specified
Specifically, in therate
the cooldown PTLR
wasfor
notapproximately
decreased fromone
25 Fhour'per half- ,
hour to less than 10 F per hour at a RCS temperature of 150 F measured
by the decay heat cooler outlet temperature as required by the PTLR i
curve entitled. Reactor Coolant System Pressure-Temperature Limits for .
Cooldown for First 15 EFPY. This is identified as Violation -
50-302/96-20-01. Failure To Adhere To Reactor Coolant System Cooldown
Limits.
c. Conclusions }
A violation was identified for failure to adhere to Technical <
Specification reactor coolant system cooldown limits. URI 50-302/95-21- ,
04. Excessive RCS Cooldown Rate, was closed. p
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IL. Maintenance l
H3 Maintenance Procedures and Documentation !
H3.1 Maintenance Procedure Problems
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- a. Insoection Scooe (37551. 62707. 92902) l
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The. inspectors reviewed the development of maintenance Procedure PM-191.
Main Turbine / Generator. Feedwater Turbine Layup, as a result of problems !
, identified in the licensee's precursor card program.
{ b. Observations and Findinas
On December 17. 1996. Revision 0 to licensee Procedure PM-191. Main i'
Turbine / Generator. Feedwater Turbine Layup. was issued. On that day.
Precursor Card (PC) 96-5766 was written for the failure to include an
Instrumentation and Controls (I&C) qualified technical review during the j
development of the procedure. On December 19. 1996, this PC was ~
classified as a D level PC and was assigned to Nuclear Plant Technical i'
Support (NPTS) for dispositioning. NPTS was the group which originally
developed the new procedure. The procedure was not revised prior to
implementation. :
The inspectors reviewed the original Enclosure 1 for PM-191 and noted
that three technical reviews were conducted by personnel in NPTS, with
no other departments performing technical reviews. Qualified reviews
were performed by NPTS. mechanical maintenance and o)erations. I&C did
not sign as having performed any of the reviews of t1e procedure.
When the procedure was presented to the Shift Supervisor on Duty (S500)
for implementation. he canceled the work and issued a PC for the
procedure failing to adhere to the procedure standards required by AI-
4028. Procedure Writing (Except for Abnormal and Emergency Operating
Procedures). The SSOD identified that no sign-offs or place keeping
techniques were employed and that guidance for emergency shutdown was l
unclear, with insufficient instructions to complete the required I
actions. Procedure AI-400C. New Procedures and Procedure Change
Processes, required that all qualified reviewers of a procedure were to
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Revision 17. dated December 8. 1995, of AI-400C was in effect when the
development process began on PM-191. Enclosure 1. Originator's
Checklist. required that if interfacing department's actions or !
procedures would be impacted, then the interfacing department must
perform a qualified review. Instructions were provided in the procedure
as to whom was to perform a qualified review and what the review was to
accomplish. Enclosure 10. Qualified Review / Technical Review. to AI-400C
had sign-off blocks for the completion of the qualified reviews i
separately from the technical reviews, there were no directions either i
in the body of the procedure or in Enclosure 1 as to whom was to
complete a technical review and what was expected of a technical review. l
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Prior to Procedure PM-191 being implemented, discrepancies in the
developmental reviews were identified by the I&C department. No review
was performed between the identification of the discrepancies and the
attempted implementation of the procedura. The SSOD noted additional :
discrepancies and halted further implementation of the procedure. The
failure to respond promptly and adequately to the original PC resulted
in the procedure not conforming to the applicable procedural standards.
Technical S)ecification (TS) 5.6.1. Procedures, requires that written
procedures Je established implemented, and maintained for the
recommendations in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.33. Revision 2. Appendix A.
February. 1978. RG 1.33 as implemented by TS 5.6.1 requires that
administrative procedures be established for control of procedure review
and approval. The failure of the licensee to review PM-191 adequately,
as required by AI-400C. is a violation, and will be tracked as VIO 50-
302/96-20-02. Failure to Follow Procedure AI-400 C for the Review and
Development of Maintenance Procedure PM-191.
Revision 18. dated December 6. 1996, of AI-400C, Enclosure 1. requires i
that the qualified review be conducted to ensure compliance with AI- '
4028 which requires that user signoffs be included. This is the )
revision that was in effect when PM-191 was approved.
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AI-400C Enclosure 1 requires that a human factors review be performed
from the end-user department. This procedure does not address the
- situation where there are multiple end-user departments, such as PM-191.
I Enclosure 1 also requires that a technical review be performed.
l independent of the originator, by the de]artment that the procedures
! interpretation contact is a member of. Even though the current revision
l of AI-40uC provides better guidance for the performing of the qualified
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and technical reviews, the licensee has recognized a need for further
I clarification to the procedure and is in the process of developing a new
procedural control system. The development process has not progressed
sufficiently to allow assessment.
c. Conclusions
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One violation was identified for the failure to implement procedural
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requirements for the review and development of a maintenance procedure.
M3.2 Surveillance Observations
a. Insoection Scooe (61726. 62707)
i The inspector observed the performance of surveillance testing to
observe that all prerequisites were being met, that the procedure was
followed in the performance of the test, that the results were as
expected and, if not, that adequate corrective actions were taken.
b. Observations and Findinas
The inspectors observed the performance of licensee Procedure SP-521.
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Quarterly Battery Check, performed on the B Engineered Safeguards (ES) [
batteries. This procedure performs the surveillance to satisfy-TS
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Surveillance Requirements (SP,) 3.8.4.2. 3.8.5.1, 3.8.6.2, and 3.8.6.3,
on a quarterly basis. ,
The inspectors attended the pre-job briefing conducted in the main
control room.for this evolution. The SS00 conducting this briefing was
thorough, covering safety, possible problems that could be encountered 1
during this test, job assignments and contingency actions. The ;
communications between the SSOD..the systems engineer and the !
maintenance personnel were comprehensive and clear. j
Discussions were held concerning the possibility of one cell failing its
cleanliness inspection. due to a history of this cell not meeting i
acceptance criteria. The discussion addressed the allowable corrective. J
compensatory actions for this condition, which included taking .
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connection resistance readings per MP-401, Battery: Battery Maintenance
If a cell's readings were outside of the allowable values, the cell may a
be jumpered out of the battery. The decision was made during this
meeting to pre-stage the necessary equipment to jumper a cell .out, if ,
needed. :
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During the visual inspection of the batteries, cell 61 did not meet the I
acceptance criteria for the visual cleanliness inspection. A small
breach of the terminal post seal and had allowed minute amounts of. ;
battery acid to migrate up the terminal post,-causing corrosion. The {
connection resistance readings, conducted per MP-401, were satisfactory. :
No other discrepancies were identified during the performance of the l
surveillance. l
c. Conclusions ;
The surveillance and contingency actions implemented for the battery l
cell which failed the visual inspection were conducted satisfactoriiy. j
LL Plant Support
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R5 Staff Training and Qualification in RP&C l
RS.1 Falsification of Trainino Records (71750. 92904) l
The licensee has a three art training program for radiation workers. }
The workers must successf lly complete computer based training, an j
instructional class with a health physics technician, and a practical i
factors walkdown with a qualified person inside the radiation control !
area (RCA). !
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On December 20, 1996, a PC was issued by a Health Physics technician
concerning the results of a spot check of training records. The
technician noted that one of the contract personnel who conducts
practical factors walkdowns had completed and signed off a person's :
training records on December 20, 1996. The technician verified that the !
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- cerson completing the pa)erwork had not logged onto a Radiation Work
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permit for entering the RCA since December 5, 1996. The technician t
notified the Manager of Health Physics of the finding. !
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The licensee immediately restricted the individuals involved access to !
the RCA and removed their thermoluminescent dosimetry (TLD) from the
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storage rack. Licensee management terminated the person completing the !'
paperwork and barred him from return to site. The licensee reviewed the
com)leted documentation that the individual had completed on other ;
worcers and found no additional discrepancies. The inspectors reviewed
the licensee's actions in response to the event and found their actions
to be conservative. ,
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S6 Security Organization and Administration ,
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S6.1 Security Schedulina j
a. Insoection Scooe (71750)
The inspectors reviewed the working hour schedule for the security i
officers since the end of the 10R refueling outage and ~during the t
present outage. . During this period of time, the licensee was conducting i
a planned upgrade of the security system at the plant. j
b. Observations and Findinas l
The inspectors reviewed the schedule and the actual hours worked for
officers from each security team. The licensee, during the upgrade
implementation, scheduled each officer an average of approximately 60
hours per week, with increases to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> per week between 45 and 50
percent of the time. To maintain the scheduled Overtime (OT) at these i
levels, the licensee has supplemented the normal security force with !
four unarmed watchmen and periodically with four security officers from
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another nuclear plant. These personnel have been used in areas that do
not require an armed security officer to relieve response team members. *
Even with these supplementary forces, the licensee had to maintain the ;
normal security force on long hours for extended periods of time. This ,
is a weakness in the planning for the security upgrade.
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The licensee has announced that an additional four unarmed watchmen are ;
being hired to help reduce the burden on the normal security force.
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c. Conclusions
A weakness was identified in the planning for the security upgrade which ,
has resulted in large amounts of overtime being scheduled and worked for
extended periods of time.
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F4 Fire Protection Staff Knowledge and Performance
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F4.1 Resoonse to Smoke in Auxiliary Buildina (64704. 71750)
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At 1:45 p.m. on December 3.1996 roving fire watch personnel smelled
and observed smoke in the overhead of the 119 foot elevation of the
Auxiliary Building (AB) near the outside door adjacent to the emergency
diesel generator rooms. The fire watch immediately notified the control
room. The fire team leader (FTL) responded to the area.
The FTL also smelled and observed the smoke. The FTL notified the
control room and activated the fire brigade. At the time of the
incident, a hot roofing process was being worked on the diesel generator
building. Two electric shop technicians working in the area were
dispatched by the FTL to stop the roofing work on the building. The
electricians reported to the FTL that the work had been stopped and that
the smoke appeared to have been coming from that location but had
stopped when the roofing work was stopped. At 1:55 p.m., the FTL
notified the control room that the fire was out. The FTL had the
members of the fire brigade check out other areas of the AB for
additional signs of smoke. No additional smoke or signs of fire were
located.
Fire protection personnel continued the investigation, after being
briefed by the FTL. Interviews with the fire watch on duty for the
roofing work and with the job su3ervisor revealed that they had observed
no signs of a fire, but that smoce was being generated as a normal
byproduct of the roofing process. The work that was being performed was
)utting in the flashing materials at the junction point where the diesel
Juilding roof adjoins the AB roof. The supervisor informed the fire
protection personnel that the preheating of the roofing materials, along
with the propane torches used for the heating. produces substantial
amounts of smoke. The licensee reviewed the layout of the job and
concluded that the smoke being produced by the roofing job was being
drawn into the AB through the exterior door, due to the slight negative
pressure of the AB.
The licensee im31emented additional fire watches in the AB during the
completion of t1e roofing work on the diesel building. The findings of
the post incident investigation were discussed with the Director of
Nuclear Plant Operations, the Shift Manager, and the Shift Supervisor on
Duty prior to resuming the roofing work.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's investigation report and
interviewed involved aersonnel. The licensee's actions for this
incident appeared to 3e adequate. No further actions are required in
this area.
F6 Fire Protection Organization and Administration
F6.1 Fire Briaade Mannina
a. Insoection Scooe (64704. 71750)
The inspectors reviewed manning practices for the fi a brigade, as a
result of several concerns identified in precursor cords.
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l b. Observations and Findinas !
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In Inspection Reports (IR) 94-22 and 95-02. the inspectors identified
concerns with fire brigade manning and turnover practices. One of the j!
problems identified was with the fire team leader being verbally ;
l notified which members were on site and assigned to the fire brigade. i
At the time, the licensee informed the NRC that the practices would be i
changed to require a written notification. This was accomplished using 1
a interoffice communication to express this expectation to the fire
brigade members.
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On December 19. 1996 and December 21. 1996, the fire team leader wrote
l PCs 96-5781 and 96-5884 to document the failure of those fire brigade
l members who are'not in the operations department to notify the fire team
l leader of the composition of the fire brigade. The author of the PCs
! noted that no procedural requirements existed to ensure the notification
existed. The inspectors consider this a weakness in the implementation
'
of the fire brigade requirements. Subsequent to discussions concerning
the PCs. the licensee began the revision of AI-2205. Administration of
'CR-3 Fire Brigade Organization. to include provisions for notification
l
of the fire team leader at the beginning of each shift.
l c. Conclusions
l
One weakness was identified for the implementation of fire brigade
manning requirements.
f y Manaaement Meetinas
l
X1 Exit Meeting Summary
l
l The inspection scope and findings were summarized on January 13, 1997.
Proprietary information is not contained in this report. Dissenting
comments were not received from the licensee.
X3 Management Meeting Summary
X3.1 On December 2.1996, a public meeting was held at the Crystal River site
to discuss the Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP)
-
results. The results are discussed in Inspection Report 50-302/96-99.
l X3.2 -On December 3. 1996, a public meeting was held at the Crystal River site
l to discuss items on the NRC Manual Chapter 0350 restart matrix. A
meeting summary will be issued separately.
X3.3 On December 12. 1996. Commissioner Nils Diaz visited the site, met with
senior management and toured the plant. A press conference was held the
same day. Accompanying Dr. Diaz were two technical assistants. Anthony
- Hsia and George Constable.
.
X3.4 On January 9.1997 a public meeting was held at the Crystal River site
to discuss the status of the licensee's Corrective Action Plan (CAP).
and to discuss items on the restart matrix. A meeting summary will be
issued separately.
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p.
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12
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Licensees -
.K. Baker Manager Nuclear Configuration Management l
P. Beard Senior Vice President. Nuclear Operations l
G. Boldt. Vice President. Nuclear Production
J. Cam) bell. Assistant Plant Director. Maintenance and Radiation Protection ,
W. Conclin. Jr.. Director. Nuclear Operations Materials and Controls !
R. Davis Assistant Plant Director. Operations and Chemistry '
D. DeMontfort. Manager. Nuclear Operations
M. Donovan. Supervisor. Rapid Engineering Response Team
R. Fuller. Manager. Nuclear Chemistry j
B. Gutherman. Manager. Nuclear Licensing l
G. Halnon, Assistant Director Nuclear Operations Site Support !
B. Hickle. Director. Nuclear Plant Operations !
L. Kelley. Director. Nuclear Operations Site Support "
H. Koon. Manager Nuclear Production and Nuclear Outage
K. Lancaster. Manager. Nuclear Projects
J. Maseda. Manager. Engineering Programs
P. McKee. Manager. Nuclear Plant Operations Support i
R. McLaughlin. Nuclear Regulatory Specialist
W. Rossfeld. Manager. Site Nuclear Services '
J. Stephenson, Manager. Radiological Emergency Planning
F. Sullivan. Manager. Nuclear Engineering Design l
J. Terry, Manager. Nuclear Plant Technical Support ;
D. Watson. Manager. Nuclear Security j
R. Widell Director. Nuclear Operations Training i
D. Wilder. Manager. Safety Assessment Team i
P
NRC
C. Casto. Engineering Branch Chief. Region II (December 3,1996 January 9. !
1997) :
B. Crowley Reactor Inspector Region II (December 2 through 6, 1996) i
P. Fredrickson. Special Inspection Branch Chief. Region II (December 5 thiaugh !
6. 1996)
R. Hannah Public Affairs Officer. Region II (January 9,1997)
F. Hebdon. Director. Directorate 11-3, NRR (December 2 through 3. 1996. !
January 8 through 9. 1997)
J. Jaudon. Director. Division of Reactor Safety. Region II (December 2 througF :
'
3. 1996. January 8 through 9. 1997)
J. Johnson. Director. Division of Reactor Projects. Region II (January 9. l
1997)
K. Landis. Branch Chief. Region II (December 2 through 6. 1996. December 12,
1996. December 19 through 20, 1996. January 8 through 10, 1997)
L. Raghavan. Project Manager, NRR (December 2 though 3. 1996. January 8
through 9. 1997)-
L. Reyes. Regional Administrator. Region II (December 2. 1996. December 12.
1996 January 9, 1997)
R. Schin. Reactor Inspector. Region II (December 2 through 6. 1996. January 8
through 9, 1997)
W. Stansberry. Physical Security Specialist. Region II (December 2 through 6.
1996)
__ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ - _ - _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ - _ _ - _ _ _._
.
. .-
,
s
4
. 13
i
L. Stratton, Physical Security Specialist, Region II (December 2 through 6.
December 16 through 19, 1996)
M. Thomas, Reactor Inspector, Region II (December 2 through 6, 1996)
D. Thompson, Physical Security Specialist, Region II (December 2 through 6,
1996)
G. Tracy. Executive Director Operations (ED0) Coordinator, Region II (January
, 8 through 9, 1997)
INSPECTION. PROCEDURES USED
'
IP 37551: Onsite Engineering
. IP 40500: Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying, Resolving and
Preventing Problems
IP 61726: Surveillance Observations-
IP 62707: Conduct of Maintenance
IP 64704: Fire Protection Program
IP 71707: Plant Operations
i IP 71714: Cold Weather Preparations
"
IP 71750: Plant Support Activities
IP 92700: Onsite Followup of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power
Reactor Facilities
- . IP 92901
- Followup - Operations
IP 92902: Followup - Maintenance
-
IP 92903: Followup - Engineering
- IP 92904: Followup - Plant Support
,
ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Ooened
Typ_q Item Number Status Descriotion and Reference
'
VIO 50-302/96-20-01. Open Failure to Adhere to Reactor Coolant l
. System Cooldown Limits. (paragraph
l 08.1)
[ VIO 50-302/96-20-02 Open Failure to Follow Procedure AI-400C
,
For Review and Development of
- Maintenance Procedure PM-191.
-
(paragraph M3.1) -
Closed
,
]
Iy.g_q Item Number Status Descriotion and Reference
i URI 50-302/95-21-04 Closed Excessive Reactor Coolant System
i Cooldown Rate. (paragraph 08.1)
i
4
li
. _ . _ _.
. - _ _ _ ._ . - _ - . _ _
,
.
.-
.
'
14
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
AB - Auxiliary Building
CAP - Corrective Action Plan
EDO - Executive Director. Operations
EFPY - Effective Full Power Years
ES - Engineered Safeguards
FPC - Florida Power Corporation
i FTL - Fire Team Leader
I&C - Instrumentation and Control
IR - Inspection Report
NPTS - Nuclear Plant Technical Support
NRC - Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NSS0D - Nuclear Shift Supervisor On Duty
OT - Overtime
PC - Precursor Card i
- Preventative Maintenance
'
PR - Problem Report
PRC - Plant Review Committee
P/T - Pressure & Temperature
PTLR - Pressure and Temperature Limits Report
OPD - Quality Programs Department
RCA - Radiation Control Area :
RCS - Reactor Coolant System l
RG - Regulatory Guide
, SALP - Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance
- SR - Surveillance Requirement
SR0 - Senior Reactor Operator
SSOD - Shift Supervisor on Duty '
TLD - Th ermoluminescent Dosimetry
TS - Technical Specification
URI - Unresolved Item ;
'
VIO - - Violation
WR - Work Request
. . .
1
- ,
y .o
.-
SYNOPSIS
On May 22, 1996, the Office of Investigations, Region II. U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission initiated an investigation to determine if a senior t
reactor operator (SRO) and/or reactor operators (R0s) at the Florida Power
Corpration Crystal River Nuclear Plant (CRNP), Unit 3, had deliberately
violated plant cooldown rate procedures on January 11, 1996,-by selecting a
tem >erature indication during cooldown that caused the plant to exceed i
tec1nical specification cooldown rate limits. '
l
Based upon the evidence developed during this investigation, it is concluded I
that the CRNP SR0 and R0 decision makers on duty during the CRNP Unit 3 i
cooldown on January 11, 1996, did not deliberately violate cooldown
procedures.
l
!
l
1
l
I
Case No. 2 96 018 1 Enclosure 3