ML16260A116

September 22, 2016, Public Meeting Presentation Slides

ML16260A116
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	09/22/2016
From:	Southern Nuclear Operating Co
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
WILLIAMS S A, DORL/LPL2-1, 415-1009
Shared Package
ML16260A083	List: ML16260A097 ML16260A101 ML16260A109 ML16260A116 NL-16-0388, Draft Fuel Handling Accident Dose Consequences Using AST Methods NL-16-0388, Draft LOCA Dose Consequences Using AST Methods NL-16-0388, Draft License Amendment Request Regarding Alternative Source Team NL-16-0388, September 22, 2016, Public Meeting Presentation Slides
References
NL-16-0388
Download: ML16260A116 (8)

Text

Alternative Source Term Implementation Farley Nuclear PlantNRC Pre-submittal MeetingSeptember 22 nd , 2016 1 Why Are We Here?Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP) will be requesting a License Amendment to -Implement the Alternative Source Term (AST) Methodology for Design Basis Accident (DBA)

consequence evaluationKey Goals for This Meeting: Brief NRC on LAR and Supplemental Information ScopeEnsure Common Understanding of FNP Request, Technical Scope and Regulatory

ExpectationsObtain Feedback Prior to Formal SubmittalSubmittal Highlights At A Glance:

• Submittal pursuant to Regulatory Guide 1.183, Alternative Radiological Source Terms For Evaluating Design Basis Accidents At Nuclear Power Reactors

• Addresses implementation of AST for the 6 Design Basis Accidents

• Also Implements TSTF 448 Rev. 3, Control Room Habitability

• No Plant Modifications Are Included

• 12 Month Review Requested(October 2017 Target)We appreciate your participation and feedback as we prepare for a "no surprises" transition to the NRC review process

• Pre-Submittal Meeting TODAY*Submittal for Review Oct. 2016*Approval Oct. 2017*Implemented At Site Feb. 2018 2 LAR Content Provides discussion of each DBAIncludes Implementation of Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Traveler, TSTF-448, Revision 3

• License Condition affecting CRIP (Testing)

• Changes to Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.10, Control Room, and 5.5.18, Control Room Envelope Habitability Program Information OnlyTo facilitate review process Under Development Comparison of CurrentLicensing Basis Analyses to Proposed AST Analyses

• Basis for Proposed Change

• Operating Licensing and Technical Specification Changes

• Technical Specification Bases Changes*RegGuide 1.183 ConformanceMap

• Calculation Summaries for Each DBA

• Accident Analysis Input Values Comparaison Tables 3

DBA Dose SummaryCREABLPZDesign Basis AccidentREM TEDEREM TEDEREM TEDELOCA4.713.26.0 FHAContainment 1.02.40.9Spent Fuel Pool 0.20.50.2 MSLBPre-Accident Iodine Spike0.20.90.4Concurrent Iodine Spike 0.51.00.5SGTRPre-Accident Iodine Spike0.84.11.5Concurrent Iodine Spike 0.42.10.8Control Rod Ejection3.73.83.7Locked RotorLess than 51.20.8Acceptance Criteria Normal Limits52525Well Within (25%)N/A6.256.25Small Fraction (10%)N/A2.52.5 Key Points

• DBA LOCA is most limiting for total dose

• Fuel Handling Accident continues to bound

scenarios allowed by

TSTF-312 (implementation

under review)

• All events demonstrate reasonable margins to

acceptance criteria

• Locked Rotor Control Room dose not reported, non-limiting

• TSC doses evaluated incorporating fission product barrier guidance of

NEI 99-01 4 DBA Highlights -LOCA*Most Limiting Accident for Total Dose*Doses from potential leak to Refueling Water Storage Tank are included*Provides Operations & Testing Margin Improvement

• NOTE:Update in Progress (Complete Prior to Submittal)-Need to reconcile normal CR unfiltered intake to meet Control Room Integrity Program (CRIP) Requirement*Current calculation has 1950 cfm vs. 2340 cfm for CRIP*Preliminary conclusion is insignificant increase in doseKey InputCurrent BasisWith ASTUnfiltered In-Leakage (CRPressurization Mode)43 cfm (+10 cfm)315cfm (+10 cfm)ECCSLeakage Outside of Containment6,000 cc/hr20,000 cc/hr 5

DBA Highlights -FHA*Evaluates doses from containment accident and spent fuel pool accident scenarios*Addresses open containment hatch and open personnel airlock configurations*Addresses doses from ingress/egress to the CR-Addresses potentially contaminated Auxiliary Building-Bounds doses from open containment penetrations per TSTF-312*Provides operator action time relief for manually initiating CR pressurization mode-CLB Analysis supports 10 minute Action Time-AST Analysis supports 20 minutes 6

DBA Highlights -Other EventsSteam GeneratorTube Rupture*Closest to the limit for Exclusion Area Boundary (EAB) dose

• Both pre-accident and concurrent iodine spike evaluated

• Continues to support existing operator action time requirement

• Required Action: Terminate break flow within 30 minutes

• Accident releases evaluated for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> with acceptable dose results

• Assumes no SG overfill (margin-to-overfill not in Farley licensing basis)

Control Rod Ejection

• Closest to the limit for Low Population Zone (LPZ) dose

• DG-1199 Gap Fractions are usedMain SteamLine Break*Not a limiting dose event

• Both pre-accident and concurrent iodine spike evaluatedLocked Rotor

• Not a limiting dose event

• CR dose being not reported

• Being updated to account for manual operator actions

• Expect dose remain well less than 5 Rem TEDE 7

What Feedback Do You Have?Scope of Submittal Regulatory Expectations LAR Content Analysis Results 8