Text

IR 05000272/2015007, 05000311/2015007; on 01/26/2015 - 02/13/2015; Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2; Triennial Fire Protection Inspection Report
	ML15072A227
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	03/12/2015
From:	Rogge J F; Engineering Region 1 Branch 3
To:	Joyce T P; Public Service Enterprise Group
	Rogge J
References
	IR 2015007
	Download: ML15072A227 (33)
	v • d • e

Mr. Thomas President and Chief Nuclear Officer PSEG Nuclear LLC - N09 P. O. Box 236 Hancock's Bridge, NJ 08038

SUBJECT: SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 - NRC TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000272/2015007 AND 05000311/2015007

Dear Mr. Joyce:

On February 13, 2015, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a triennial fire protection inspection at your Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 facility.

The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on February 13, 2015, with Mr. John Perry, Salem Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations, and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed station personnel. The inspectors also reviewed mitigation strategies for addressing large fires and explosions.

Based on the results of this inspection, one finding of very low safety significance (Green) was identified. This finding was also determined to be a violation of NRC requirements. However, because of its very low safety significance, and because it was entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating this finding as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you contest any NCV in this report, you should provide a written response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington D.C. 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Senior Resident Inspector at Salem Nuclear Generating Station. In addition, if you disagree with the cross-cutting aspect assigned to any finding in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region I, and the Resident Inspector at Salem Nuclear Generating Station.

In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records System (PARS) component of the NRC's document system, Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS).

March 12, 2015 ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web Site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,/RA/ John F. Rogge, Chief Engineering Branch 3 Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos.: 50-272, 50-311 License Nos.: DPR-70, DPR-75

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000272/2015007 and 05000311/2015007

w/Attachment:

Supplemental Information

cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ

ML15072A227 SUNSI Review Non-Sensitive Publicly Available OFFICE RI/DRS RI/DRS RI/DRP RI/DRS NAME KYoung WCook GDentel JRogge DATE 03/04/15 03/04/15 03/10/15 0312/15

i Enclosure U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I Docket No.: 50-272, 50-311

License No.: DPR-70, DPR-75

Report Nos.: 05000272/2015007 and 05000311/2015007

Licensee: PSEG Nuclear LLC (PSEG)

Facility: Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2

Location: P.O. Box 236 Hancock's Bridge, NJ 08038

Dates: January 26, 2015 through February 13, 2015

Inspectors: K. Young, Senior Reactor Inspector (Team Leader) Division of Reactor Safety (DRS) W. Cook, Senior Reactor Analyst, DRS Dan Orr, Senior Reactor Inspector, DRS J. Rady, Reactor Inspector, DRS S. Galbreath, Reactor Inspector, DRS Approved by: John F. Rogge, Chief Engineering Branch 3 Division of Reactor Safety ii Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000272/2015007, 05000311/2015007; 01/26/2015 - 02/13/2015; Salem Nuclear

Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2; Triennial Fire Protection Inspection Report.

The report covered a two-week triennial fire protection team inspection by specialist inspectors. One finding of very low significance was identified. This finding was determined to be a non-cited violation. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, "Significance Determination Process." Cross-cutting aspects associated with findings are determined using IMC 0310,

"Aspects Within the Cross-Cutting Areas." Findings for which the significance determination process (SDP) does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC's program for over seeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 5, dated February 2014.

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

Green.

The team identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) involving a non-cited violation of Salem Unit 1 Technical Specification 6.8.1.f. for failure to implement and maintain written procedures for fire protection program implementation. S1.OP-AB.FIRE-0001,

Control Room Fire Response, Revision 6 and by reference S1.OP-AB.CAV-0001, Loss of Unit 1 Control Area HVAC, Revision 3, were procedures for response to plant fires. Specifically, PSEG failed to implement and maintain procedure instructions for several operator manual actions that established temporary ventilation in safe shutdown areas cooled by Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) equipment subject to fire damage within the Unit 1 Chiller Room. PSEG promptly entered these safe shutdown procedure issues into their corrective action program as notifications 20678200, 20678505, 20678294, and 20679351 for evaluation and longer term corrective actions. Immediate corrective actions included improving the accessibility of contingency fans used to establish temporary ventilation.

This performance deficiency (PD) was more than minor because it is associated with the external events (fire) attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. This PD was also similar to more than minor example 3.k of Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, in that non-conservative calculation assumptions and programmatic deficiencies in assessing the feasibility and reliability of operator manual actions associated with temporary ventilation resulted in a condition where there was a reasonable doubt of the success of post-fire safe shutdown for a fire in the Chiller Room. The team used IMC 0609, Appendix F,

Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, and determined that a phase 2 quantitative screening approach was necessary because the finding could affect the ability to reach and maintain a stable plant condition within the first 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months of a fire event or result in a delay in excess of 10 minutes for performing required actions necessary within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

iii

The issue screened to Green, or very low safety significance, in task 2.5.5 of the phase 2 analysis because a safe shutdown success path was maintained through temporary ventilation, temperature monitoring, and operator manual actions. This finding did not have a cross-cutting aspect because it was determined to be a legacy issue and was considered to not be indicative of current licensee performance. (Section 1R05.05)

Other Findings

One violation of very low safety significance, which was identified by the licensee, has been reviewed by the team. Corrective actions taken or planned by PSEG have been entered into the corrective action program (CAP). This violation and the corrective action tracking numbers are listed in Section 4OA7.

REPORT DETAILS

Background

This report presents the results of a triennial fire protection inspection conducted in accordance

with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Inspection Procedure (IP) 71111.05T, "Fire Protection (Triennial)." The objective of the inspection was to assess whether PSEG Nuclear LLC (PSEG) had implemented an adequate fire protection program (FPP) and whether post-fire safe shutdown capabilities had been established and were properly maintained at the Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 facility. The following fire areas (FA) were selected for detailed review based on prior inspection results and risk insights from the Salem Individual Plant Examination (IPE)/Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE).

1FA-EP-100G, Upper Electrical and Piping Penetration Area (Chiller Room)

1FA-TGA-88, Turbine Building (Focus on the 88' Level)

2FA-DG-100E, Diesel Generator Room No. 2B

2FA-DG-100E-1, Diesel Generator Control Room No. 2B Inspection of these areas/zones fulfills the inspection procedure requirement to inspect a minimum of three samples.

The inspection team evaluated PSEG's fire protection program (FPP) against applicable requirements which included plant Technical Specifications, Operating License Condition 2.C.(5) and 2.C.(10) for Unit Nos. 1 and 2 respectively, NRC Safety Evaluation Reports (SER), 10 CFR 50.48, 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, and Branch Technical Position (BTP) Auxiliary and Power Conversion Systems Branch (APCSB) 9.5-1, Appendix A. The team also reviewed related documents that included the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Section 9.5.1, the fire protection plan, the fire hazards analyses (FHA), and the post-fire safe shutdown analysis

report.

The team also evaluated three licensee mitigating strategies for addressing large fires and explosions as required by Operating License Condition 2.C.(16) and 2.C.(32) for Unit Nos. 1 and 2 respectively, and 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2). Inspection of these strategies fulfills the inspection procedure requirement to inspect a minimum of one sample.

Specific documents reviewed by the team are listed in the attachment to this report.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R05 Fire Protection (IP 71111.

05T)

.01 Protection of Safe Shutdown Capabilities

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the FHA, safe shutdown analyses, and supporting drawings and documentation to verify that post-fire safe shutdown capabilities were properly protected.

The team ensured that applicable separation requirements of Section III.G of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, and the licensee's design and licensing bases were maintained for the credited safe shutdown equipment and their supporting power, control, and instrumentation cables. This review included an assessment of the adequacy of the selected systems for reactivity control, reactor coolant makeup, reactor heat removal, process monitoring and associated support system functions.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.02 Passive Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

The team walked down accessible portions of the selected fire areas to evaluate whether the material conditions of the fire area boundaries were adequate for the fire hazards in the area. The team compared the fire area boundaries including walls, ceilings, floors, fire doors, fire dampers, and penetration seals to the design and licensing basis requirements, industry standards, and the Salem FPP, as approved by the NRC, to identify any potential degradation or non-conformances.

The team reviewed selected engineering evaluations and qualification records for a sample of penetration seals to determine whether the fill material was properly installed and whether the as-left configuration satisfied design requirements for the intended fire

rating.

The team also reviewed recent inspection and test records for fire dampers and the inspection records for penetration seals and fire barriers to verify whether the inspection and testing was adequately conducted, the acceptance criteria were met, and any potential performance degradation was identified. In addition, the team reviewed recent test results for the carbon dioxide (CO 2) fire damper functionality tests for the selected fire areas to verify the testing was adequately conducted, the acceptance criteria were met, and any performance degradation was identified.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.03 Active Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

The team evaluated manual and automatic fire suppression and detection systems in the selected fire areas to determine whether they were installed, tested, maintained and operated in accordance with NRC requirements, National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) codes of record and the Salem FPP. The team also assessed whether the suppression systems capabilities were adequate to control and/or extinguish fires associated with the hazards in the selected areas.

The team reviewed the as-built capability of the fire water supply system to verify whether the design and licensing basis and NFPA code of record requirements were satisfied and to assess whether those capabilities were adequate for the hazards involved. The team reviewed the fire water system design to assess the adequacy of the system to supply the largest single hydraulic load on the fire water system plus concurrent fire hose usage with one fire pump out of service. The team evaluated fire pump performance tests to assess the adequacy of the test acceptance criteria for pump minimum discharge pressure at the required flow rate to verify whether the criteria was adequate to ensure that the design basis requirements were satisfied. The team also evaluated the underground fire loop flow tests and flushes to verify whether the combination of the tests and flushes adequately demonstrated that the flow distribution circuits were able to meet design basis requirements. In addition, the team reviewed recent pump and loop flow test results to verify whether the testing was adequately conducted, the acceptance criteria were met and any potential performance degradation was identified.

The team reviewed initial discharge testing, design specifications, vendor requirements, engineering evaluation and routine functional testing for the CO 2 systems for the selected fire areas to verify adequacy. The team walked down accessible portions of the

CO 2 systems, including storage tanks and supply systems, to independently assess the material condition, operational lineup and availability of the systems. The team also reviewed and walked down the associated firefighting strategies and CO 2 system operating procedures.

The team walked down accessible portions of the detection and water suppression systems in the selected areas and major portions of the fire water supply system, including the two diesel driven fire pumps, interviewed system and program engineers, and reviewed selected corrective action program documents (notifications) to independently assess the material condition of the systems and components. In addition, the team reviewed recent test results for the fire detection and suppression systems for the selected fire areas to verify whether the testing was adequately conducted, the acceptance criteria were met and any potential performance degradation was identified.

The team assessed the fire brigade capabilities by reviewing training, qualification, and drill critique records. The team also reviewed PSEG's firefighting strategies (i.e., pre-fire plans) and smoke removal plans for the selected fire areas to determine if appropriate information was provided to fire brigade members and plant operators to identify safe shutdown equipment and instrumentation, and to facilitate suppression of a fire that could impact post-fire safe shutdown capability. The team independently inspected the fire brigade equipment, including personnel protective gear (e.g., turnout gear) and smoke removal equipment, to determine operational readiness for firefighting. In addition, the team reviewed PSEG's fire brigade equipment inventory and inspection procedure and recent inspection and inventory results to verify whether adequate equipment was available, and whether any potential material deficiencies were identified.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.04 Protection from Damage from Fire Suppression Activities

a. Inspection Scope

The team performed document reviews and plant walkdowns to determine whether redundant trains of systems required for post-fire safe shutdown, located in the same or adjacent fire areas, were subject to damage from fire suppression activities or from the rupture or inadvertent operation of fire suppression systems. Specifically, the team evaluated whether:

A fire in one of the selected fire areas would release smoke, heat or hot gases that could cause unintended activation of suppression systems in adjacent fire areas which could potentially damage all redundant safe shutdown trains or

A fire suppression system rupture, inadvertent actuation or actuation due to a fire, in one of the selected fire areas, could directly damage all redundant trains (e.g. sprinkler caused flooding of other than the locally affected train) and

Adequate drainage was provided in areas protected by water suppression systems.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.05 Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Capability - Normal and Alternative

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the safe shutdown analysis, operating procedures, piping and instrumentation drawings (P&ID), electrical drawings, the UFSAR and other supporting documents for the selected fire areas to verify that the licensee had properly identified the systems and components necessary to achieve and maintain post-fire safe shutdown conditions.

The team assessed the adequacy of the selected systems and components credited by the safe shutdown analysis for reactivity control, reactor coolant makeup, reactor heat removal, process monitoring and support system functions to assess the adequacy of PSEG's alternative shutdown methodology. This review included verification that alternative post-fire safe shutdown could be performed both with and without the availability of offsite power. Plant walkdowns were also performed to verify that the plant configuration was consistent with that described in the safe shutdown and fire hazards analyses. The team verified that the systems and components credited for use during shutdown would remain free from fire damage.

The team verified that the training program for licensed and non-licensed operators included alternative shutdown capability. The team also verified that personnel required for safe shutdown using the normal or alternative shutdown systems and procedures are trained and available onsite at all times exclusive of those assigned as fire brigade members.

The team reviewed the adequacy of procedures utilized for post-fire safe shutdown and performed an independent walk through of procedure steps to ensure the implementation and human factors adequacy of the procedures. The team also verified that the operators could be reasonably expected to perform specific actions within the time required to maintain plant parameters within specified limits.

Specific procedures reviewed for normal and alternative post-fire shutdown included the following:

S1.OP-AB.FIRE-0001, Control Room Fire Response, Revision 6

S1.OP-SO.HSD-0001, Fire Related Alternate Shutdown Equipment, Revision 5

S2.OP-AB.CR-0002, Control Room Evacuation Due to Fire in the Control Room, Relay Room, 460/230V Switchgear Room, or 4kV Switchgear Room, Revision 28

S2.OP-AB.FIRE-0001, Control Room Fire Response, Revision 9

S2.OP-AB.FIRE-0002, Fire Damage Mitigation, Revision 6

S2.OP-SO.HSD-0001, Fire Related Alternate Shutdown Equipment, Revision 8 The team reviewed operator manual actions to ensure that they had been properly reviewed and approved and that the actions could be implemented in accordance with plant procedures in the time necessary to support the safe shutdown method for each fire area. The team also reviewed the periodic testing of the alternative shutdown transfer capability and instrumentation and control functions to ensure the tests are adequate to ensure the functionality of the alternative shutdown capability.

b. Findings

Introduction:

The team identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) involving a non-cited violation of Salem Unit 1 Technical Specification 6.8.1.f. for failure to implement and maintain written procedures for fire protection program implementation. S1.OP-AB.FIRE-0001, Control Room Fire Response, Revision 6 and by reference S1.OP-AB.CAV-0001, Loss of Unit 1 Control Area HVAC, Revision 3, were procedures for response to plant fires. Specifically, PSEG failed to implement and maintain procedure instructions for several operator manual actions that established temporary ventilation in safe shutdown areas cooled by HVAC equipment subject to fire damage within the Unit 1 Chiller Room.

Description:

The team reviewed safe shutdown procedure, S1.OP-AB.FIRE-0001, Control Room Fire Response, Revision 6 which provided procedure instructions to establish safe shutdown conditions for a fire in many plant areas including the Unit 1 Chiller Room.

The Chiller Room houses all of the fans and many major components for the Switchgear and Penetration Area Ventilation System (SPAVS) and most of the Chilled Water (CH)

System components. SPAVS cools the 4kV and 230V/460V safety-related switchgear rooms and the 78' electrical penetration area.

The CH system provides chilled water for the control room areas HVAC system and the emergency control area HVAC system. S1.OP-AB.FIRE-0001 included procedure instructions, specifically within attachment 13, to monitor switchgear room and 78' electrical penetration area temperatures and establish temporary ventilation to the switchgear rooms and 78' electrical penetration area within eight hours. The temporary ventilation lineups included blocking open specified doors and in some cases installing temporary fans of specified flow rates and in the correct flow direction. The details of the temporary ventilation flow rates and direction were included in calculation S-C-CAV-MDC-1878, Salem Units 1 and 2 SPAVS GOTHIC Appendix R Scenarios, Revision 1.

S1.OP-AB.FIRE-0001 attachment 13 additionally provided reference to S1.OP-AB.CAV-0001 for contingency actions for the potential loss of CH system and its impact on control area ventilation. The control area included the main control room, an adjacent electrical equipment room, and a relay room one elevation below the control room. The team reviewed calculations S-C-CAV-MDC-1878, Salem Units 1 and 2 SPAVS GOTHIC Appendix R Scenarios, Revision 5 1 and S-C-CAV-MDC-1583, Salem Generating Station - Compensatory Actions for Appendix R & IPEEE Loss of Ventilation Scenarios, Revision 5, and compared the temporary ventilation assumptions with the procedure instructions and contingency equipment. The team noted several procedure instructions were deficient and contingency equipment necessary to establish temporary ventilation was not readily accessible.

The following deficiencies were identified:

Steps 3.12 and 3.14 of S1.OP-AB.FIRE-0001 required control room operators to align the control room ventilation in FIRE OUTSIDE CONTROL AREA which conflicted with guidance in steps 3.2.1 and 3.3.1 of S1.OP-AB.CAV-0001 to align it to FIRE INSIDE CONTROL AREA.

Contingency ventilation fans to support temporary ventilation from the main control room to the electrical equipment room and for the switchgear rooms were staged about 1600 feet away in the Maintenance Services Building from their intended use locations within the control building. The fans were obstructed by refrigerators and office furniture. The fan ratings were not labelled consistent with procedure instructions or as described in the room heat up calculations for the loss of ventilation scenarios. The operators during a table top review of the procedures were initially confused where the fans were located. When walked down at the Maintenance Services Building, the operators were confused which fans should be used for the loss of SPAV and CH systems.

The most restrictive timeline required two fans be installed at the main control room to electrical equipment room within 40 minutes and the procedure instructed operators to request the Fire Department install these fans. The Fire Department is an inappropriate resource to implement for operator manual actions during a fire scenario.

Ventilation duct to be installed on the contingency fans at the 230/460V switchgear room was the wrong size.

In some cases, the contingency fan flow rates were non-conservative compared to the calculation. S-C-CAV-MDC-1878 assumed flow rates at 5600 cfm but the fans were rated by the vendor at 5200 cfm. The flow rates assumed for fans that required duct to be installed were not adjusted for friction losses introduced by the duct.

Relay room and electrical equipment room doors were to be blocked open within 10 minutes but materials were not staged to block open the doors.

Two double relay room doors at the auxiliary building corridor required four bolted strong backs, each weighing about 160 pounds, be removed and the doors blocked open within two hours. PSEG had not assessed the feasibility and reliability of this operator manual action and did not stage tools or rigging equipment.

Temperature monitoring instruments for the switchgear rooms and electrical penetration area to be used for determining operator actions within the first hour of a loss of SPAV system were not analyzed to be free of fire damage for a Chiller Room fire scenario.

The team noted a deficiency associated with calculation S-C-CAV-MDC-1878, Salem Units 1 and 2 SPAVS GOTHIC Appendix R Scenarios, Revision 1, in that, it assumed the relay room would be at a positive pressure and normal air conditioning established such that a small air flow would help cool the 78' electrical penetration area when adjacent doors were opened. The positive pressure and air conditioning relied on equipment within the Chiller Room and was inappropriately assumed to exist for a fire scenario within the Chiller Room.

The team noted several deficiencies with the temporary ventilation methodology S-C-CAV-MDC-1583 and procedure S1.OP-AB.CAV-0001. S1.OP-AB.CAV-0001 was significantly revised December 5, 2009 based upon engineering evaluation 70102082. Evaluation 70102082 was completed in response to a loss of CH system when all three Unit 2 Chillers were out of service for approximately one hour on May 27, 2008, and the actual control area heat ups were much less severe than predicted by GOTHIC model calculation S-C-CAV-MDC-1583. MPR Calculation 0108-03720001, Evaluation of Control Area Ventilation Loss of Cooling Scenario, Revision 0 subsequently considered actual plant heat up rates with control room ventilation aligned in FIRE INSIDE CONTROL AREA (FICA). The calculation was conservative in regards to a fire scenario because it assumed a concurrent loss of all Unit 1 and Unit 2 Chillers (Unit 1 and Unit 2 share a common control room and cross flow ventilation can be established from one control area HVAC system). The concurrent loss of all Unit 1 and Unit 2 Chillers is not a credible fire scenario because it involves two separate fire areas. However, additional safe shutdown analysis was necessary to ensure the FICA ventilation lineup could be established and associated cables did not exist in the Chiller Room. Additionally, a smoke migration study was not completed for a fire in the Chiller Room with the control room ventilation lineups in FICA. Finally, evaluation 70102082 determined limiting control area temperatures were reached in about 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months and air conditioning must be restored or temporary cooling established.

The evaluation did not determine an acceptable method for establishing temporary cooling beyond 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months and up to at least 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months when a transition to cold shutdown should be assumed to occur for a fire scenario.

The team judged the procedure and calculation deficiencies adversely affected the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a Chiller Room fire. PSEG promptly entered these safe shutdown procedure issues into their corrective action program as notifications 20678200, 20678505, 20678294, 20679351, and 20680391.

Immediate corrective actions included removing the obstructions blocking access to the contingency fans. Longer term corrective actions included procedure revisions to eliminate conflicting instructions and alignment with methodologies evaluated in room heat up calculations. Longer term corrective actions also included performing an apparent cause evaluation to capture all concerns associated with the feasibility and reliability of operator manual actions for establishing temporary ventilation. The team considered PSEG's immediate and longer term corrective actions appropriate.

Analysis:

The failure to assure post-fire safe shutdown procedures correctly implemented temporary ventilation for the safety-related areas cooled by the SPAV and CH systems is a performance deficiency (PD). This PD is more than minor because it is associated with the external events (fire) attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. This PD is also similar to more than minor example 3.k of Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, in that non-conservative calculation assumptions and programmatic deficiencies in assessing the feasibility and reliability of operator manual actions associated with temporary ventilation resulted in a condition where there was a reasonable doubt of the success of post-fire safe shutdown for a fire in the Chiller Room.

Using IMC 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, the team determined that a Phase 2 quantitative screening approach was necessary because the finding could affect the ability to reach and maintain a stable plant condition within the first 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months of a fire event or result in a delay in excess of 10 minutes for performing required actions necessary within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . The following components, or targets, in the Unit 1 Chiller Room were considered in task 2.3.3 of the phase 2 analysis:

three CH system Chillers, three SPAV supply fans, two switchgear room exhaust fans, and two penetration area exhaust fans. The team did not identify any credible ignition sources that could damage more than one CH system Chiller but ignition sources were identified that could potentially damage all three SPAV supply fans, both switchgear room exhaust fans, or both penetration area exhaust fans. However, PSEG completed a GOTHIC heat up calculation for the switchgear rooms and electrical penetration areas using the lower fan rates (5200 cfm) and removing the forced air flow for the 78' electrical penetration area and determined limiting room temperature conditions, 120F, would not exist until about 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months under very conservative conditions of steady state outside air temperature at 96.4F and initial room temperatures at 105F. PSEG additionally determined by cable routing that the room temperature monitoring instruments used by control room operators were not subject to cable damage.

The temperature instruments were available and were procedurally directed to be monitored and additional electrical loads secured, as necessary, to maintain room temperatures below 120F. The issue screened to Green, or very low safety significance, in task 2.5.5 because a safe shutdown success path was maintained through temporary ventilation, temperature monitoring, and operator manual actions.

This finding did not have a cross-cutting aspect because it was determined to be a legacy issue when S1.OP-AB.FIRE-0001 was created January 30, 2003, in support of a revised safe shutdown analysis and when S1.OP-AB.CAV-0001 was revised December 5, 2009, from conclusions in engineering evaluation 70102082. These issues were considered to not be indicative of current licensee performance.

Enforcement:

Unit 1 Technical Specification 6.8.1.f., in part, requires written procedures be established, implemented and maintained for fire protection program implementation.

S1.OP-AB.FIRE-0001, Control Room Fire Response, Revision 6, and by reference S1.OP-AB.CAV-0001, Loss of Control Area HVAC, Revision 3, are procedures for response to plant fires. Contrary to the above, S1.OP-AB.FIRE-0001 and S1.OP-AB.CAV-0001 were not appropriately maintained and included conflicting procedure instructions to align the control area ventilation and operator manual actions that were not assessed to be feasible and reliable for establishing temporary ventilation.

The conflicting procedure instructions and operator manual actions existed since December 5, 2009, when S1.OP-AB.CAV-0001 was revised and January 30, 2003, when S1.OP-AB.FIRE-0001 was created in support of a revised safe shutdown analysis. PSEG's corrective actions included removing the obstructions blocking access to the contingency fans, performing procedure and calculation revisions, and performing an apparent cause evaluation to assess the identified issues.

Because this violation was of very low safety significance (Green) and was entered into PSEG's corrective action program (n otifications 20678200, 20678505, 20678294, 20679351, and 20680391), this violation is being treated as a non-cited violation (NCV),

consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy. (NCV 05000272/2015007-01, Post-fire Safe Shutdown Operator Manual Actions to Align Temporary Ventilation Not Assessed for Feasibility and Reliability)

.06 Circuit Analysis

a. Inspection Scope

The team verified that the licensee performed a post-fire safe shutdown analysis for the selected fire areas and the analysis appropriately identified the structures, systems and components important to achieving and maintaining safe shutdown. Additionally, the team verified that PSEG's analysis ensured that necessary electrical circuits were properly protected and that circuits that could adversely impact safe shutdown due to hot shorts or shorts to ground were identified evaluated and dispositioned to ensure spurious actuations would not prevent safe shutdown.

The team's review considered fire and cable attributes, cable routing, potential undesirable consequences and common power supply/bus concerns. Specific items included the credibility of the fire threat, cable insulation attributes, cable failure modes and actuations resulting in flow diversion or loss of coolant events.

The team also reviewed cable raceway drawings and/or cable routing databases for a sample of components required for post-fire safe shutdown to verify that cables were routed as described in the safe-shutdown analysis. Additionally, the team reviewed equipment important to safe shutdown, but not part of the success path, to verify that the licensee had taken appropriate actions in accordance with the design and licensing basis and NRC Regulatory Guide 1.189, "Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 2.

Cable failure modes were reviewed for the following components:

1CV40 and 1CV41, Volume Control Tank Outlet Isolation Valves

1FI-128B, Unit 1 Charging Flow Indicator

21RH4 and 22RH4, 21 and 22 RHR Pumps Suction Valves

2CV2 and 2CV277, Normal Letdown Inboard and Outboard Isolation Valves

2CVE20, 21 Charging Pump The team reviewed a sample of circuit breaker coordination studies to ensure equipment needed to conduct post-fire safe shutdown activities would not be impacted due to a lack of coordination that could result in a common power supply or common bus concern.

The team reviewed selected mitigation strategies intended to maintain or restore core cooling and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities under the circumstances associated with the loss of large areas of the plant due to explosions and/or fires. The team assessed whether PSEG continued to meet the requirements of Operating License Condition 2.C.(16) and 2.C.(32) for Unit Nos. 1 and 2 respectively for 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2).

The team reviewed the following mitigation strategies and associated station procedures:

SC.OP-AM.TSC-0001, Manual Depressurizing of Steam Generators using MS10s, Revision 1

SC.OP-AM.TSC-0005, Manual Operation of Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feed Water Pump, Revision 2

SC.OP-AM.TSC-0012, Feeding Steam Generators using Portable Diesel Driven Pump, Revision 3 The team's review included a detailed assessment of the procedural guidance; a walkdown of the strategy with a trained operator to assess the feasibility of the strategy and operator familiarity; maintenance and surveillance testing of all designated strategy equipment and an inventory check of strategy equipment to ensure the appropriateness of equipment storage and availability. The team also evaluated the adequacy of corrective actions associated with issues identified during previous inspections in this area.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

[OA]

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (IP 71152)

.01 Corrective Actions for Fire Protection Deficiencies

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed a sample of corrective action program documents (notifications)associated with the fire protection program, post-fire safe shutdown issues and mitigation strategy issues to determine whether PSEG was appropriately identifying, characterizing, and correcting problems associated with these areas and whether the planned or completed corrective actions were appropriate.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA3 Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion

Main article: IP 71153

.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000272/2013-004-00:

Unfused DC Ammeter Circuits Resulted in an Unanalyzed Condition On November 14, 2013, during a review of industry operating experience, PSEG identified a postulated fire induced circuit failure involving unfused DC ammeter circuits for Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2. The fire induced circuit failures could cause a secondary fire that could adversely affect safe shutdown equipment and cause a loss of alternate shutdown capability which is contrary to License Conditions 2.C(5) for Unit 1 and 2.C(10) for Unit 2 and 10 CFR 50, Appendix R requirements. Specifically, the licensee identified DC ammeter circuits for both units that are not provided with overcurrent protection to limit fault current in the 250 volt, 125 volt and 28 volt DC systems. Postulated fires that result in a short to ground concurrent with an opposite polarity short from the same battery could result in excessive current flow in the ammeter wiring. The excessive current could result in a secondary fire in another fire area. The secondary fire could adversely affect safe shutdown equipment and cause a loss of alternate shutdown capability.

PSEG determined the cause of the condition to be an original design and construction oversight involving the failure to include protective fuses in the DC ammeter circuits.

There were no actual safety consequences of this condition.

The licensee submitted LER 05000272/2013-004-00 to report this event in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) as an event or condition that resulted in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program (CAP) as notification 20630018 and implemented compensatory measures in the affected fire areas pending final resolution of the issue.

The licensee completed an engineering evaluation (902919) of the issue and developed a design change (80110858) to add fuses to the affected ammeter circuits. PSEG completed the necessary modifications for all affected ammeter circuits by October 8, 2014.

The significance and enforcement aspect of this issue are discussed in Section

4OA7 of this inspection report.

LER 05000272/2013-004-00 is closed.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

Exit Meeting Summary

The team presented the inspection results to Mr. John Perry, Salem Site Vice President, and other members of PSEG's staff at an ex it meeting on February 13, 2015. No proprietary information was included in this inspection report.

4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations

The following violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by the licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements. This issue satisfies the criteria of the NRC Enforcement Policy of being dispositions as a Non-Cited Violation.

Licensee Event Report 05000272/2013-004-00 describes an unanalyzed condition in which PSEG identified their DC ammeter circuits were unfused. Specifically, PSEG did not provide overcurrent protection for wiring associated with DC ammeter indication in the control room to prevent wires from overheating due to fire-induced faults and excessive currents flowing through the cable. With enough current flowing through the cable, the potential exists that the overloaded ammeter wiring could damage system wiring or adjacent safety-related circuits in the cable trays needed for post-fire safe shutdown. This condition could result in a loss of the associated safe shutdown components or a secondary fire in another fire area. The failure to protect safe shutdown cables from the effects of postulated fires was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency was a violation of

Operating License Condition 2.C.(5) for Unit 1 and 2.C.(10) for Unit 2, which requires in part, post-fire safe shutdown cables remain free of the effects of fire-induced cable faults during postulated fires.

Contrary to the above, PSEG identified they failed to meet this requirement and the condition existed since initial construction of both units. The issue was more than minor because it was associated with the protection against external events (fire) attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and it adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The team determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green), based IMC 0609, Appendix F, "Fire Protection Significance Determination Process (SDP), Phase 2 screening criteria.

The finding screened to Green based upon, task number 2.3.5, because the affected cables were routed in alternate shutdown fire areas that are protected by detection and automatic suppression systems. Additionally, the cable construction is IEEE 383 (thermoset) with a heavy bronze/copper metal shield tied to station ground which decreases the likelihood of inter-cable and intra-cable interactions. Based on a team walkdown, the team determined that the ammeter cable routing was not routed near a credible fire ignition source in the affected fire areas. Because this finding is of very low safety significance and had been entered into PSEG's corrective action program (notification 20630018), this violation is being treated as a Green, licensee-identified NCV consistent with the NRC's Enforcement Policy.

Supplemental Information

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

J. Perry, Salem Site Vice President

L. Wagner, Salem Plant Manager

M. Adair, Salem Fire Protection Program Engineer

M. Ambrosino, Engineering Programs

B. Booth, Salem R.D.

P. Breslin, Salem Equipment Operator

M. Brunner, Salem NOS Manager

J. Carlin, Fire Department Superintendent

M. Cocking, Fire Department

R. DeSanctis, Salem Operations

F. Dimentel, Emergency Services Performance Manager

T. DiNunzio, Fire Protection System Engineer

A. Fakhar, Engineering Services, Manager

J. Fleming, Salem Senior Reactor Operator

J. Flores, Salem Design Engineering

J. Garecht, Salem WM

T. Grallagaer, Emergency Services Regulatory Compliance

J. Gebely, Salem Fire Marshal

K. Gralley, Fire Department Trainer

K. Grover, Salem Engineering Director

J. Giunta, Salem Plant Entineering

A. Harir, Salem Design Engineer, Safe Shutdown

A. Johnson, Salem Design Engineering Manager

D. Lafleur, Senior Regulatory Compliance Engineer

S. Maetess, Salem Design Engineer Manager

S. Markos, Salem Mechanical Engineering

K. Mathur, Mechanical Design Engineer

D. Maxey, Salem Operations

M. Reeser, Hope Creek Fire Protection Program Engineer

M. Richers, Salem Design Engineering Manager

S. Savar, Appendix R/Safe Shutdown Engineer

T. Sixsmith, Regulatory Assurance

D. Shumaker, Corporate Fire Protection Engineer

B. Thomas, Corporate Licensing

L. Valmonte, Electrical Engineer - Contractor

E. Winsor, Senior Mechanical Contractor

Attachment

NRC Personnel

R. Lorson, Director, Division of Reactor Safety

J. Rogge, Chief, Engineering Branch 3, Division of Reactor Safety

G. Dentel, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 3, Division of Reactor Projects

W. Cook, Senior Reactor Analyst, Division of Reactor Safety

P. Finney, Senior Resident Inspector, Salem Nuclear Generating Station

A. Ziedonis, Resident Inspector, Salem Nuclear Generating Station

State of New Jersey

E. Rosenfeld, Department of Environmental Protection, Bureau of Nuclear Engineering

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened

None

Opened and Closed

05000272,

05000311/2015007-01 NCV Post-fire Safe Shutdown Operator Manual Actions to Align Temporary

Ventilation Not Assessed for Feasibility and

Reliability (Section 1R05.05)

Closed

05000272/LER-2013-004-00 LER Unfused DC Ammeter Circuits Results in an Unanalyzed Condition (Section 4OA3.1)

Discussed

None

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Fire Protection Licensing Documents

DE-PS.ZZ-0001(Q)-A3-SSA, Salem Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Analysis, Revision 5

DE-PS.ZZ-0001(Q)-A3-SSAR (003), SSD Manual Action Feasibility Assessment, Revision 1

DE-PS.ZZ-0001-A3-SSAR, Volume 16, Safe Shutdown Analysis for 1FA-EP-100G &

1FA-PP-100H, Revision 1

DE-PS.ZZ-0001-A3-SSAR, Volume 48, Safe Shutdown Analysis for 2FA-DG-100E &

2FA-DG-100E1, Revision 0

DE-PS.ZZ-0001-A3-SSAR, Volume 67, Safe Shutdown Analysis for 1FA-TGA-88,

2FA-TGA-88 and 12FA-SB-100, Revision 1

NC.DE-PS.ZZ-0001, Programmatic Standard for Fire Protection, Revision 3

NC.DE-PS.ZZ-0001-A6-GEN, Comparison of Salem Fire Program to BTP 9.5-1 App-A,

Revision

2 NRC Branch Technical Position (BTP) APCSB 9.5-1 and Appendix A, Guidelines for Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants Attachment NRC Letter dated 1/7/04, Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit 2,

Issuance of Amendment RE: Request for Changes to License Condition 2.C. (10)

NRC Letter and Safety Evaluation Report (SER), Amendment No. 21 to Facility Operating License - Fire Protection Review (ML011660040), dated 11/20/79

PSEG Letter dated 5/1/02, Request for Exemption from 10CFR50, Appendix R, for Fire Areas 1(2)-FA-AB-64B, 1(2)-FA-AB-84C, and 1(2)-FA-AB-84B,

Salem Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, Docket Nos. 50-272 and 50-311,

Facility Operating License No.

DPR-70 and

DPR-75

PSEG Letter dated 7/1/03, Request for Change to Operating License Condition 2.C.10 " Fire Protection" Salem Generating Station Unit No. 2 Facility Operating License No.

DPR-75, Docket No. 50-311 Safety Evaluation dated 6/24/03, Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 -

Exemption from the Requirements of 10CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Sections

III.G.3 and

III.L.3

For Fire Areas 1(2)-FA-AB-64B, 1(2)-FA-AB-84B, and 1(2)-FA-AB-84C

Salem Unit 1 Facility Operating License Salem Unit 2 Facility Operating License Salem Unit 1 Technical Specification Salem Unit 2 Technical Specification

SC.ER-PS.FP-0001-A2, Salem Fire Protection Report, Fire Hazards Analysis, Revision 0

SC.ER-PS.FP-0001-A2, Salem Fire Protection Report, Fire Hazards Analysis, 12/2/11

SGS-TRM, Salem Generating Station U1 & U2 Technical Requirements Manual, Revision 0

USFAR, Salem Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Section 9.5.1, Fire Protection,

Revision 28

Calculations, Analysis, and Engineering Evaluations

ES-44.018, Units 1 and 2 Electrical Coordination for Appendix R Applications, Revision 1

EVAL-S-FP-00022, U2 Appendix R Emerg. Lighting Units Perf. Criteria Exceeded, 9/13-3/14

EVAL-S-FP-00054, U1 Appendix R Emerg. Lighting Units Perf. Criteria Exceeded, 6/13-12/13 S-C-CAV-MDC-1583, Salem Generating Station - Compensatory Actions for Appendix R

& IPEEE Loss of Ventilation Scenarios, Revision 5

S-C-CAV-MDC-1878, Salem Units 1 and 2 SPAVS GOTHIC Appendix R Scenarios, Revision 1

S-C-CAV-MEE-1580, Effect of Loss of Ventilation on Operation of Safe Shutdown Equipment Served by SPAV System Appendix R Analysis, Revision 2 S-C-CAV-MEE-1703, Effect of Loss of Ventilation on Operation of Safe Shutdown Equipment

Served by CAV System - Appendix R Analysis, Revision 1

S-C-FP-FEE-1746, Acceptable Operator Response Times to Appendix R Failures, Revision 2

S-C-FP-FEE-1808, Assessment of Control Room Habitability for Smoke Events, Revision 0 S-C-ZZ-NEE-0839, Time Analysis of Alternate Shutdown Capability for an Appendix R

Fire Scenario, Revision 4

SC.ER-PS.FP-0001-A3, Safe Shutdown Manual Action Feasibility Assessment, Revision 0 S-PSA-21.02, Salem Unit 1 and Unit 2 Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA)

Plant Partitioning and Fire Ignition Frequency Development, Revision 1

S-PSA-21.03, Salem Generating Station Fire PRA Model Development Notebook, Revision 0

S-PSA-21.05, Salem Gen. Station Fire PRA Risk Assessment Fire Scenario Notebook,

Revision 0

Attachment S-PSA-21.06, Salem Fire PRA Summary & Quantification Notebook, Revision 0 S-PSA-21.07, Salem Generating Station Fire PRA Hot Gas Layer and Multi-Compartment Analysis, Revision 0

2919,

EE-SNGS-004, Common Enclosure Analysis for Fire Induced DC Ammeter and SPDS Circuit Failures, 6/5/14

8N44/T3.11, Individual Plant Examination of External Events for Salem Nuclear Generating

Station Units 1 and 2, Revision 2

Fire Protection Evaluations of Modifications and Design Changes

S-C-M500-EDM-0612, UHF Radio Communication System Modification to comply with

BTP ASCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A & 10

CFR 50, Appendix R, Revision 0 S-C-M500-EEE-1636, Availability of the UHF Radio Sys. Following an Appendix R Fire,

Revision 0

80110858, DC Ammeter and SPDS Shunt Circuits Protection, Revision 0

Review of NRC Information Notices

70098495, OPEX Review of NRC

IN 2009-02

70105122, OPEX Review of NRC

IN 2009-29

70169671, OPEX Review of NRC

IN 2014-10

Procedures

CC-AA-211, Fire Protection Program, Revision 5

FP-AA-001, Precautions Against Fire, Revision 1

FP-AA-002, Fire Protection Impairment Program, Revision 2

FP-AA-002-F5, Form 5 Transient Combustible in Safety Related Areas Impairment Log, Revision 0

FP-AA-005, Fire Protection Surveillance and Periodic Test Program, Revision 0

FP-AA-006, Tracking Incomplete Testing of Fire Protection Equipment, Revision 0

FP-AA-007, Fire Reports, Revision 0

FP-AA-008, Fire Prevention for Hot Work, Revision 7

FP-AA-009, Control of Temporary Heat Sources, Revision 1

FP-AA-010, Pre-Fire Plans, Revision 1

FP-AA-011, Control of Transient Combustible Material, Revision 3

FP-AA-012, Fire Protection Organization, Duties and Staffing, Revision 2

FP-AA-014, Fire Protection Training Program, Revision 2

FP-AA-015, Compensatory Measure Firewatch Program, Revision 5

FP-AA-024, Fire Drill Performance, Revision 0

FP-SA-003, Actions for Inoperable Fire Protection, Revision 3

NC.DE-PS.ZZ-0001(Q), Programmatic Standard Fire Protection, Revision 3

NC.DE-PS.ZZ-0001-A6-GEN, Programmatic Sta ndard

SFPR-General (SFPR General &

Comparison to App. A of BTP APCSB 9.5.1), Revision 2

NC.FP-PM.ZZ-0007(Z), Firefighting and Rescue Equipment Inventory, Revision 8

NC.FP-ST.FS-0005(Q), Fire Engine Operability Test and Firefighting Equip. Inventory, Revision 9

OP-AA-102-106, Operator Response Time Program, Revision 0

OP-SA-102-106-F1, Master List of Time Critical Actions, Revision 0

Attachment S1.FP-ST.FS-0009(Q), #1 Diesel Fire Pump Operability Test, Revision 26 S1.FP-PM.LTS-0039(Q), "Appendix R" Self-Contained Battery Powered Emergency Light Unit Inspection & Preventive Maintenance, Revision 14

S1.FP-ST.LTS-0039(Q), "Appendix R" Self-Contained Battery Powered Emergency Light Unit Test, Revision 17

S1.FP-ST.LTS-0070(Q), "Appendix R" Self-Contained Battery Powered Emergency Light Unit 8

Hour Functional Test, Revision 8 S1.IC-CC.CVC-0017, 1FT-128 Charging Flow Control, Revision 7

S1.OP-AB.FIRE-0001, Control Room Fire Response, Revision 6

S1.OP-PT.HSD-0002, Hot Shutdown Panel/Local Panel Functional Test, Revision 8

S1.OP-SO.HSD-0001, Fire Related Alternate Shutdown Equipment, Revision 5 S2.FP-ST.FS-0009(Q), #2 Diesel Fire Pump Operability Test, Revision 23 S2.OP-AB.CR-0002, Control Room Evacuation due to Fire in the Control Room, Relay Room,

460/230V Switchgear Room, or 4kV Switchgear Room, Revision 28

S2.OP-AB.FIRE-0001, Control Room Fire Response, Revision 9

S2.OP-PT.HSD-002, Hot Shutdown Panel/Local Panel Functional Test, Revision 8

SC.FP-ST.FS-0004(Q), Fire Suppression Water System Flush, Revision 8

SC.FP-ST.FS-0006(Q), Fire Pump Capacity Test, Revision 13

SC.FP-ST.FS-0008(Q), Fire Main Flow Test, Revision 4

SC.MD-AB.ZZ-0001, Installation of Temp. 4kV Power Cables to CCW and RHR Motors, Revision 7

SC.MD-IS.4KV-0001, 4kV and 13kV Magne-Blast Circuit Breakers Inspection and Test,

Revision 28

SC.MD-PM.4KV-0009, Siemens 4kV Breaker Preventive Maintenance, Revision 4

SC.MD-PT.230-0001, Thermal Overload Relay Overcurrent Trip Testing, Revision 9

SH.FP-EO.ZZ-0002(Q), Fire Department Fire Response, Revision 3

Operations Procedures

S1.OP-AB.CAV-0001, Loss of Unit 1 Control Area HVAC, Revs. 2 & 3 S1.OP-AB.FIRE-0001, Control Room Fire Response, Revision 6

S1.OP-PT.HSD-0003, Alternate Shutdown and Appendix R Equipment Storage Cabinet Inventory, Revision 6

S1.OP-SO.CH-0001, Chilled Water System Operation, Revision 28 S1.OP-SO.CVC-0023, CVCS Cross-Connect Alignment to Unit 2, Revision 8 S1.OP-SO.HSD-0001, Fire Related Alternate Shutdown Equipment, Revision 5

S2.OP-AB.CR-0002, Control Room Evacuation Due to Fire in the Control Room, Relay Room,

460/230V Switchgear Room, or 4kV Switchgear Room, Revision 28

S2.OP-AB.FIRE-0001, Control Room Fire Response, Revision 9 S2.OP-AB.FIRE-0002, Fire Damage Mitigation, Revision 6 S2.OP-PT.HSD-0003, Alternate Shutdown and Appendix R Equipment Storage Cabinet Inventory, Revision 10

S2.OP-SO.CAV-0001, Control Area Ventilation, Revision 39

S2.OP-SO.HSD-0001, Fire Related Alternate Shutdown Equipment, Revision 8

SC.OP-AB.CR-0003, Control Room Habitability, Revision 6

Attachment Large Fires and Explosions Mitigation Strategies Documents

SC.OP-AB.CR-0004(Q), Security Event, Revision 0

SC.OP-AB.CR-0005(Q), Airborne Threat, Revision 0

SC.OP-AM.TSC-0001, Manual Depressurizing of Steam Generator using MS10s, Revision 1

SC.OP-AM.TSC-0005, Manual Operation of Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feed Water Pump,

Revision 2

SC.OP-AM.TSC-0012, Feeding Steam Generators using Portable Diesel Driven Pump, Revision 3

SC.OP-AM.TSC-1000, Salem EDMG Initial Plant Response, Revision 0

SC.OP-AM.TSC-1001, EDMG Initial Damage Assessment, Revision 0

SH.OP-AM.TSC-0001, Supplemental Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SSAMG),

Revision 2

Completed Tests/Surveillances

NC.FP-ST.FS-0005(Q), Fire Engine Operability Test and Firefighting Equipment Inventory,

Performed 12/21/14

NC.FP-PM.ZZ-0007(Z), Firefighting and Rescue Equipment Inventory, Performed 10/9/14

NC.FP-PM.ZZ-0007(Z), Firefighting and Rescue Equipment Inventory, Performed 7/11/14

NC.NA-AP.ZZ-0043(Q), Form-1 Vendor Information, Performed 11/3/99

SC.FP-ST.FS-0004(Q), Fire Suppression Water System Flush, Performed 10/6/13

SC.FP-ST.FS-0006(Q), Fire Pump Capacity Test, Performed 6/2/12

SC.FP-ST.FS-0006(Q), Fire Pump Capacity Test, Performed 11/23/13

SC.FP-ST.FS-0008(Q), Fire Main Flow Test, Performed 11/28/09

SC.FP-ST.FS-0008(Q), Fire Main Flow Test, Performed 8/10/13

S1.IC-CC.CVC-0017, 1FT-128 Charging Flow Control, Revision 7, Performed 5/1/13

and 10/31/14

S1.FP-PM.LTS-0039(Q), "Appendix R" Self-Contained Battery Powered Emergency Light Unit

Inspection & Preventive Maintenance, Performed 5/27/14 S1.FP-ST.LTS-0039(Q), "Appendix R" Self-Contained, Battery Powered Emergency Light Unit Test, Performed 12/14/14

S2.FP-ST.LTS-0039(Q), "Appendix R" Self-Contained, Battery Powered Emergency Light Unit Test, Performed 12/14/14

S2.FP-PM.LTS-0039(Q), "Appendix R" Self-Contained Battery Powered Emergency Light Unit

Inspection & Preventive Maintenance, Performed 3/26/14 S1.FP-ST.FS-0009(Q), #1 Diesel Fire Pump Operability Test, Performed 11/27/14

S1.FP-ST.FS-0009(Q), #1 Diesel Fire Pump Operability Test, Performed 12/11/14

S2.FP-ST.FS-0009(Q), #2 Diesel Fire Pump Operability Test, Performed 12/4/14

S2.FP-ST.FS-0009(Q), #2 Diesel Fire Pump Operability Test, Performed 12/18/14 S2.FP-ST.LTS-0070(Q), "Appendix R" Self-Contained Battery Powered Emergency Light Unit 8

Hour Functional Test, Performed 8/20/14

S1.FP-ST.LTS-0070(Q), "Appendix R" Self-Contained Battery Powered Emergency Light Unit 8

Hour Functional Test, Performed 8/20/14

S1.OP-PT.HSD-0002, Hot Shutdown Panel/Local Panel Functional Test, Revision 8, Performed 10/24/14 S2.OP-PT.HSD-0002, Hot Shutdown Panel/Local Panel Functional Test, Revision 8,

Performed 5/5/14

Attachment Quality Assurance Audits and Self Assessments

NOSA-HPC-14-07 (80112479), NOS Hope Creek and Salem Stations Audit (Fire Protection),

10/1/14

NOSPA-SA-10-1C (70162989), NOS Objective Evidence Report, Fire Protection Equipment Readiness, Appendix R Inventory, 3/30/10

70162989-0020, Salem Fire Protection FASA Report, 11/11/14

System Health Reports Salem Units 1 and 2, 115V Systems, 3

rd and 4 th Quarters 2014 Salem Units 1 and 2, 125Vdc Systems, 3

rd and 4 th Quarters 2014 Salem Units 1 and 2, 230V Systems, 3

rd and 4 th Quarters 2014 Salem Units 1 and 2, 460V Systems, 3

rd and 4 th Quarters 2014 Salem/Common - Fire Protection, 3

rd and 4 th Quarters 2014 Salem Program Health Report Fire Protection/ Fire Safe Shutdown, 3

rd and 4 th Quarters 2014 Salem ELU System Health, 4

th Quarter 2014

Drawings

and Wiring Diagrams

203000, Units 1 and 2 Generators and Main Transformers One Line Diagram, Revision 59

203001, Unit 1 4160V Group Buses One Line, Revision 31

203002, Unit 1 4160V Vital Buses One Line, Revision 34

203003, SNG Station No. 1 460V. & 230V. Vital & Non Vital Bus One Line Control, Revision 45

203007, Unit 1 125Vdc One Line, Revision 30

203061, Unit 2 4160V Vital Buses One Line, Revision 34

203062, Unit 2 4160V Group Buses One Line, Revision 29

203210, Unit 1 Relay Room Auxiliaries Control System Terminal Cabinet TP12-2, Revision 26

203215, Unit 1 Relay Room Auxiliaries Control System Relay Cabinet RC12-7, Revision 17

207574 A 8802, Sht. 1, Yard-Fresh Water & Fire Protection Piping Arrangement, Revision 35

211341 B 9483, U1 Auxiliary bldg. Control Area No. 1 250V D.C. Bus, Revision 6

211347 B 9483, U1 & U2, 1A & 2A 28V D.C. Buses, Revision 19

211353 B 4016, Sht. 1, U1, No. 1A-125 Volt Storage Battery Inst. & Alarm Circuit, Revision 20

211353 B 4016, Sht. 2, U2, No. 2A-125 Volt Storage Battery Inst. & Alarm Circuit, Revision 19

211505, Sht. 2, Unit 2 Residual Heat Removal System Suction Isolation Valves, Revision 32

211506, Sht. 2, Unit 2 Residual Heat Removal System Suction Isolation Valves, Revision 13

211507, Sht. 2, Unit 2 Residual Heat Removal System Suction Isolation Valves, Revision 35

211582, Sht. 1, Unit 1 CVCS 1CV40 Volume Control Tank First Discharge Stop Valve, Revision 14

211586, Sht. 1, Unit 2 CVCS 2CV2 Letdown Isolation Valve, Revision 11

211587, Sht. 1, Unit 2 CVCS 2CV277 Letdown Isolation Valve, Revision 7

211587, Units 1 and 2 CVCS 1CV277 and 2CV277 Letdown Isolation Valves, Revision 7

218723 A 8921, Sht. 2, Fresh Water & Fire Protection Piping Arrangement, Revision 17

218198

AB 3636, Fire Protection General Location Plan, Revision 1

218861, Unit 2 CVCS 21 Charging Pump, Revision 14

605819, Unit 1 & 2 Auxiliary Bldg. Boundary Locations Floor Plan, Revision 0

605820, Unit 1 & 2 Auxiliary Bldg. Boundary Locations Floor Plan, Revision 0

605821, Unit 1 & 2 Auxiliary Bldg. Boundary Locations Floor Plan, Revision 0

605822, Unit 1 & 2 Auxiliary Bldg. Boundary Locations Floor Plan, Revision 0

605830, Unit 1 Turbine Gen. Area Boundary Locations Basement Floor Plan, Revision 0

Attachment

605831, Unit 1 Turbine Gen. Area Boundary Locations Floor Plan, Revision 0

605815, Unit 1 & 2, Combustible Control Zones Turbine Building, Revision 0

613717, Sht. 1, Unit 1 CVCS Charging Pumps Discharge Flow 1FT128, Revision 3

613717, Sht. 2, Unit 1 CVCS Charging Pumps Discharge Flow 1FT128, Revision 3

23600, Sht. 1, U2 21 Charging Safety Injection Pump 2CVE20 Motor Winding Temp., Revision 2

623680, Sht. 1, U2 CVCS Regenerative Heat Ex. Letdown Inlet Valve 2CV277-AO, Revision 1

Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams

205201, Sht. 1, Unit 1 Reactor Coolant, Revision 64

205201, Sht. 2, Unit 1 Reactor Coolant, Revision 39

205201, Sht. 3, Unit 1 Reactor Coolant, Revision 37

205216, Sht. 1, Salem Nuclear Generating Station No. 1 & 2 Units Chilled Water, Revision 64

205216, Sht. 2, Salem Nuclear Generating Station No. 1 & 2 Units Chilled Water, Revision 72

205216, Sht. 3, Salem Nuclear Generating Station No. 1 & 2 Units Chilled Water, Revision 58

205222 A 8760, Sht. 1, U1 & 2, Fire Protection, Revision 62

205222 A 8760, Sht. 2, U1 & 2, Fire Protection, Revision 62

205222 A 8760, Sht. 3, U1 & 2, Fire Protection, Revision 59

205222 A 8760, Sht. 4, U1 & 2, Fire Protection, Revision 62

205222 A 8760, Sht. 5, U1 & 2, Fire Protection, Revision 2

205222 A 8760, Sht. 6, U1 & 2, Fire Protection, Revision 1

205222 A 8760, Sht. 7, U1 & 2, Fire Protection, Revision 6

205228, Sht. 1, Unit 1 Chemical and Volume Control System, Revision 74

205228, Sht. 2, Unit 1 Chemical and Volume Control System, Revision 84

205228, Sht. 3, Unit 1 Chemical and Volume Control System, Revision 49

205231, Sht.1, Unit 1 Component Cooling System, Revision 66

205232, Sht. 1, Unit 1 Residual Heat Removal System, Revision 43

205232, Sht. 2, Unit 1 Residual Heat Removal System, Revision 40

205237, Sht. 1, SNG Station No. 1 Unit Auxiliary Building - Ventilation, Revision 47

205242, Sht. 3, Unit 1 Service Water System, Revision 98

205248, Sht. 1, SNG Station No. 1 Unit Aux. Bldg. Control Area Air Cond. & Ventilation, Revision 37

205248, Sht. 2, SNG Station No. 1 Unit Aux. Bldg. Control Area Air Cond. & Ventilation,

Revision 49

205328, Sht. 2, Unit 2 Chemical and Volume Control System, Revision 68

205332, Sht. 1, Unit 2 Residual Heat Removal System, Revision 37

205332, Sht. 2, Unit 2 Residual Heat Removal System, Revision 33

205334, Sht. 1, Unit 2 Safety Injection System, Revision 60

600256 A 8703, U2 Carbon Dioxide Fire Protection System, Revision 18

600658 A 8727, U1 & 2 Fire Protection Legend Sheet, Revision 18

Attachment Penetration Seal Documents

748-134, BISCO Test Report Utilizing BISCO

SF-20 & BISCO

SE-FOAM, 5/14/84 S-15504-002, Penetration Design History (Original Installation), 10/21/89

S-15504-002, U1 PENE Seal Detail 7 - 1/2", 6/12/99

S-15504-002, S1FBR-S-15504-002, Penetration Seal Data

S-15504-005,

Penetration Design History (Original Installation), 12/4/90 S-15504-005, U1 PENE Seal Detail 7 - 1/2", 6/12/99

S-15504-005, S1FBR-S-15504-005, Penetration Seal Data

SN-3,

309896, Brand Inst. SE FOAM with Cable Thru Fire and/or Pressure Barrier, Revision 4

Fire Fighting Strategies (i.e., Pre-Fire Plans)

FRS-III-211, Salem- Unit 1, (Unit 2) - Pre-Fire Plan Turbine Generator Area and Service

Building, Revision 5

FRS-III-221, Salem- Unit 1, (Unit 2) - Pre-Fire Plan Turbine Generator Area,

Revision 4

FRS-III-231, Salem- Unit 1, (Unit 2) - Pre-Fire Plan Turbine Generating Area,

Revision 4

FRS-III-445, Salem- Unit 1, (Unit 2) - Pre-Fire Plan Diesel Generator Area, Revision 11

FRS-III-521, Salem- Unit 1, (Unit 2) - Pre-Fire Plan Inner Piping Penetration Area & Chiller

Rooms, Revision 3

Fire Brigade Drills and Critiques

FP-AA-014, Fire Drill Cover Sheet, Performed 2/7/13

FP-AA-024, Fire Drill Record, Performed 12/16/14

FP-AA-024, Fire Drill Record, Performed 11/10/14

FP-AA-024, Fire Drill Record, Performed 12/3/14

FP-AA-024, Fire Drill Record, Performed 12/17/14

Fire Brigade Training

53655424, Fire Brigade Quals - Annual Verification, 12/31/14

53655425, Fire Brigade Quals - Annual Verification, 12/31/14

53655426, Fire Brigade Quals - Annual Verification, 12/31/14

53655653, Fire Brigade Quals - Annual Verification, 12/31/14

Operator Safe Shutdown Training & Job Performance Measures (JPM)

N0S05ABCR01, Control Room Evacuation, Revision 4 N0S05ABCR02, Control Room Evacuation Due to a Fire, Revision 4

N0S05ABFIRE, Control Room Fire Response and Fire Damage Mitigation, Revision 2

Hot Work and Ignition Source Permits Hot Work Authorization Log, Hot Work Permit Numbers

SA 14988 - SA14100

Transient Combustible Permits and Evaluations Trensient Combustibles in Safety Related Areas Impairment Log, 8/29/14 - 1/10/15

Attachment Corrective Action Program Documents (Notifications)

20562418

20562419

20580803

20621582

20628264

20630018

20630603

20631451

20634395

20634568

20636062

20636939

20637781

20639930

20640511

20641457

20641536

20641560

20641642

20648431

20655687

20658809

20658811

20656921

20660144

20661277

20663029

20663403

20663029

20663744

20665779

20666890

20667198

20667422

20670000

20670355

20671529

20672308

20673722

20675260

20676554

20676911

20677314*

20677445*

20677446*

20678200*

20678292*

20678293*

20678294*

20678385*

20678413*

20678432*

20678449*

20678505*

20678621*

20678561*

20678745*

20678763*

20679351*

20680391* * NRC identified during this inspection Vendor Documents Technical Data Sheet, Viking Model C-1 Thermostatic Release Vendor Technical Document

304068, PREFCO Products Installation Instructions for

5000 Series Combination Fire Leakage Rated Dampers (1 1/2 Hour Rated/3 Hour Rated),

Revision 12, (for dampers 2DGF809, Diesel Area Fire Damper and 1CVF16, Chiller Room

Fire Damper)

316967, Lightguard Model B200 12 Volt 175 Watt Output Sealed Maintenance Free Lead Calcium Lec-36 Battery, Revision 2

24403, Lightguard Models F100/F85, 6 Volt, 87 or 85 Watt Output Sealed Lead Calcium

Batteries, Revision 2