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Category:TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
MONTHYEARML17241A3541999-06-0101 June 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Section 3.5.2,allowing Up to 7 Days to Restore Inoperable LPSI Train to Operable Status ML17241A3451999-05-24024 May 1999 Proposed Tech Specs 3/4.5.1 Re Safety Injection Tanks ML17229B0711999-03-19019 March 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Pages Requested by NRC for Use in Issuance of Proposed License Amend Re SFP Storage Capacity, Per Soluble Boron Credit ML17229B0201999-02-23023 February 1999 Proposed Tech Specs 3/4.1.2.9 Re Reactivity Control sys- Boron Dilution ML17229A9551998-12-16016 December 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages Revising Administrative Controls & Incorporating Specific Staff Qualifications for Multi- Discipline Supervisor Position ML17229A9161998-11-25025 November 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages,Replacing Insert-A,attachment to 971231 Submittal & Revises LCO 3.4.9.11 & Associated Bases ML17229A9251998-11-22022 November 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Revising Thermal Margin SL Lines of TS Figure 2.1-1 to Reflect Increase in Value of Design Min RCS Flow from 345,000 Gpm to 365,000 Gpm & Change Flow Rates Stated in Tables 2.2-1 & 3.2-1 ML17229A9131998-11-19019 November 1998 Proposed Tech Specs,Revising Administrative Contols TS 6.3, Unit Staff Qualifications & Incorporating Specific Staff Qualifications for Multi-Discipline Supervisor (MDS) Position ML20155C3061998-10-29029 October 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages Revising Terminology Used in Notation of TS Tables 2.2-1 & 3.3-1 Re Implementation & Automatic Removal of Certain Reactor Protection Sys Trip Bypasses ML17229A8441998-08-24024 August 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Removing Obsolete License Conditions & Incorporating Revs Which Clarify Component Operations That Must Be Verified in Response to Containment Sump Recirculation Actuation Signal ML17229A7731998-06-15015 June 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages 6-20,6-20a & 6-20c,correcting Info Supplied by Fuel Vendor Relative to Titles of Approved TRs That Are Referenced in Proposed TS 6.9.1.11.b ML17229A7601998-06-0303 June 1998 Proposed Marked Up TS Pages Modifying Explosive Gas Mixture Surveillance Requirement 4.11.2.5.1 to Provide for Use of Lab Gas Partitioner to Periodically Analyze Concentration of Oxygen in Svc Waste Gas Decay Tank ML17229A7511998-05-27027 May 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Section 6.2.2.f,revised to Allow for Use of Longer Operating Shifts of Up to Twelve Hours Duration by Plant'S Operating Crews ML17229A7481998-05-27027 May 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Section 3.5.1,removing Requirement for SITs to Be Operable in Mode 4,which Will Minimize Potential for Inadvertent SIT Discharge During RCS Cooldown/ Depressurization Evolutions ML17229A7441998-05-27027 May 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Providing for More Efficient Use of on- Site Mgt Personnel in Review & Approval Process for Plant Procedures ML17229A6501998-03-0303 March 1998 Proposed Tech Specs 3.4.7 Re RCS Chemistry/Design Features/ Administrative Controls ML17229A5691997-12-31031 December 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Pages Modifying TS 5.6.1 & Associated Figure 5.6-1 & TS 5.6.3 to Accomodate Increase in Allowed SFP Storage Capacity ML17309A9131997-12-29029 December 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Modifying Specifications for Selected cycle-specific Reactor Physics Parameters to Provide Reference to St Lucie Unit 2 COLR for Limiting Values ML17229A5491997-12-0101 December 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Revising Units 1 & 2 EPP Section 4, Environ Conditions & Section 5, Administrative Procedures to Incorporate Proposed Terms & Conditions of Incidental Take Statement Included in Biological Opinion ML17229A4621997-08-22022 August 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Pages,Revising Specification 4.0.5 Surveillance Requirements for ISI & Testing of ASME Code Class 1,2 & 3 Components,To Relocate IST Program Requirements to Administrative Control Section 6.8 ML17229A4341997-08-0101 August 1997 Proposed Tech Specs,Extending semi-annual Surveillance Interval Specified in Table 4.3-2 for Testing ESFAS Subgroup Relays to Interval Consistent W/Ceog Rept CEN-403,Rev 1-A for March 1996 & Associated SE ML17229A3601997-05-29029 May 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Incorporating Administrative Changes That Improve Consistency Throughout TSs & Related Bases ML17229A1831996-12-20020 December 1996 Proposed Tech Specs Re Safety Limits & Limiting Safety Sys Settings ML17229A1611996-12-0909 December 1996 Proposed Tech Specs 1.9a Re Core Operating Limits Rept ML17229A1191996-10-31031 October 1996 Proposed Tech Specs 6.0 Re Administrative Controls ML17229A1111996-10-30030 October 1996 Proposed Tech Specs 3/4.9.9 Re Containment Isolation Sys & 3/4.9.10 Re Water level-reactor Vessel ML17229A1091996-10-28028 October 1996 Proposed Tech Specs Rev to Allow Type A,B & C Containment Leakage Tests to Be Conducted at Extended Intervals Determined by performance-based Criteria ML17229A1061996-10-28028 October 1996 Proposed Tech Specs 1.6 Re Channel Functional test,1.7 Re Containment Vessel integrity,1.8 Re Controlled leakage,1.9 Re Core alteration,3/4.6 Re Containment Systems & 3/4.6.1 Re Containment Vessel ML17228B5641996-07-15015 July 1996 Revised Tech Specs Re Core Alteration Definition ML17228B5041996-06-0101 June 1996 Proposed Tech Specs Re Thermal Margin & RCS Flow Limits ML17228B3761996-01-0404 January 1996 Proposed Tech Specs Rectifying Discrepancy for Each St Lucie Unit & Providing Assurance That Admin Controls for Hpsip Remain Effective in Lower Operational Modes ML17228B3361995-11-22022 November 1995 Proposed TS 3/4.4.6.1 for RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation,Adapting STS for C-E Plants (NUREG-1432) Spec 3.4.15 ML17228B2451995-08-16016 August 1995 Proposed TS 3.6.6.1, Sbvs. ML17228B2421995-08-16016 August 1995 Proposed Ts,Reflecting Relocation of Selected TS Requirements Re Instrumentation & Emergency & Security Plan Review Process,Per GL 93-07 ML17228B1891995-06-21021 June 1995 Proposed Tech Specs Re Safety Injection Tank Surveillances ML17228B1811995-06-21021 June 1995 Proposed Tech Specs Re Time Allowed to Restore Inoperable LPSI Train to Operable Status ML17228B1791995-06-21021 June 1995 Proposed Tech Specs Re Extended Allowed Outage Time for EDGs ML17228B1471995-05-17017 May 1995 Proposed Tech Specs,Extending Applicability of Current RCS Pressure/Temp Limits & Maximum Allowed RCS Heatup & Cooldown Rates to 23.6 Effective Full Power Yrs of Operation ML17228B1441995-05-17017 May 1995 Proposed Tech Specs Re Administrative & Conforming Update ML17228B0901995-04-0303 April 1995 Proposed Tech Specs Re Incorporation of line-item TS Improvements to TSs 3/4.8.1 & 4.8.1.2.2 for Licenses DPR-67 & NPF-16 ML17228B0591995-02-27027 February 1995 Proposed TS Re Sdcs Min Flow Rate Requirements ML17228B0521995-02-27027 February 1995 Proposed Tech Spec Tables 3.3-3 & 3.3-4 to Accommodate Improved Coincidence Logic & Relay Replacement for 4.16 Kv Loss of Voltage Relays ML17228B0331995-02-22022 February 1995 Proposed TS 4.6.1.3,reflecting Deletion of Refs to Automatic Tester for Containment Personnel Air Lock ML17228A9921995-01-20020 January 1995 Proposed Tech Specs,Relocating Operability Requirements for Incore Detectors to (TS 3/4.3.3.2) to Updated FSAR & Revising Lhr Surveillance 4.2.1.4 & Special Test Exceptions Surveillance 4.10.2.2,4.10.4.2 & 4.10.5.2 ML17228A9031994-11-0202 November 1994 Proposed Tech Specs 3/4.6.2.1 & 3/4.6.2.3,adapting Combined Spec for Containment Spray & Cooling Sys Contained in Std TS for C-E Plants ML17228A8911994-10-27027 October 1994 Proposed Tech Specs,Incorporating Administrative Changes ML17228A6521994-07-28028 July 1994 Proposed Tech Specs Re LTOP Requirements for Power Operated Relief Valves,Per GL 90-06 ML17228A6591994-07-25025 July 1994 Proposed Tech Specs Implementing Enhancements Recommended by GL 93-05, Line-Item TS Improvements to Reduce SR for Testing During Power Operation. ML17228A6561994-07-25025 July 1994 Proposed Tech Specs for Main Feedwater Line Isolation Valves to Be Consistent w/NUREG-1432,standard TS for C-E Plants ML17228A5771994-05-23023 May 1994 Proposed Tech Specs Removing Option That Allows HPCI Pump 1C to Be Used as Alternative to Preferred Pump for Subsystem Operability 1999-06-01
[Table view] Category:TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS & TEST REPORTS
MONTHYEARML17309A9961999-06-30030 June 1999 Rev 35 to HP-90, Emergency Equipment. ML17309A9941999-06-17017 June 1999 Rev 1 to COP-06.06, Guidelines for Collecting Post Accident Samples. ML17241A3541999-06-0101 June 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Section 3.5.2,allowing Up to 7 Days to Restore Inoperable LPSI Train to Operable Status ML17309A9951999-05-27027 May 1999 Rev 0 to COP-06.11, Establishing Remote Lab for Analyses of Accident Samples. ML17241A3451999-05-24024 May 1999 Proposed Tech Specs 3/4.5.1 Re Safety Injection Tanks ML17229B0711999-03-19019 March 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Pages Requested by NRC for Use in Issuance of Proposed License Amend Re SFP Storage Capacity, Per Soluble Boron Credit ML17229B0441999-03-0202 March 1999 Cycle 11 Reactor Startup Physics Testing Rept. with 990304 Ltr ML17229B0201999-02-23023 February 1999 Proposed Tech Specs 3/4.1.2.9 Re Reactivity Control sys- Boron Dilution ML17229B0361998-12-22022 December 1998 Rev 20 to Procedure C-200, Odcm. ML17229A9551998-12-16016 December 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages Revising Administrative Controls & Incorporating Specific Staff Qualifications for Multi- Discipline Supervisor Position ML17229A9161998-11-25025 November 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages,Replacing Insert-A,attachment to 971231 Submittal & Revises LCO 3.4.9.11 & Associated Bases ML17229A9251998-11-22022 November 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Revising Thermal Margin SL Lines of TS Figure 2.1-1 to Reflect Increase in Value of Design Min RCS Flow from 345,000 Gpm to 365,000 Gpm & Change Flow Rates Stated in Tables 2.2-1 & 3.2-1 ML17229A9131998-11-19019 November 1998 Proposed Tech Specs,Revising Administrative Contols TS 6.3, Unit Staff Qualifications & Incorporating Specific Staff Qualifications for Multi-Discipline Supervisor (MDS) Position ML20155C3061998-10-29029 October 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages Revising Terminology Used in Notation of TS Tables 2.2-1 & 3.3-1 Re Implementation & Automatic Removal of Certain Reactor Protection Sys Trip Bypasses ML20153G0781998-08-26026 August 1998 Rev 19 to Plstqp, Guard Training & Qualification Plan ML17229A8441998-08-24024 August 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Removing Obsolete License Conditions & Incorporating Revs Which Clarify Component Operations That Must Be Verified in Response to Containment Sump Recirculation Actuation Signal ML17229A7731998-06-15015 June 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages 6-20,6-20a & 6-20c,correcting Info Supplied by Fuel Vendor Relative to Titles of Approved TRs That Are Referenced in Proposed TS 6.9.1.11.b ML17229A7601998-06-0303 June 1998 Proposed Marked Up TS Pages Modifying Explosive Gas Mixture Surveillance Requirement 4.11.2.5.1 to Provide for Use of Lab Gas Partitioner to Periodically Analyze Concentration of Oxygen in Svc Waste Gas Decay Tank ML17229A7441998-05-27027 May 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Providing for More Efficient Use of on- Site Mgt Personnel in Review & Approval Process for Plant Procedures ML17229A7481998-05-27027 May 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Section 3.5.1,removing Requirement for SITs to Be Operable in Mode 4,which Will Minimize Potential for Inadvertent SIT Discharge During RCS Cooldown/ Depressurization Evolutions ML17229A7511998-05-27027 May 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Section 6.2.2.f,revised to Allow for Use of Longer Operating Shifts of Up to Twelve Hours Duration by Plant'S Operating Crews ML17229A6751998-03-27027 March 1998 Cycle 15 Reactor Startup Physics & Replacement SG Testing Rept. W/980402 Ltr ML17229A6501998-03-0303 March 1998 Proposed Tech Specs 3.4.7 Re RCS Chemistry/Design Features/ Administrative Controls ML17229A6381998-02-12012 February 1998 Rev 19 to C-200, Offsite Dose Calculation Manual. ML17229A6151998-01-12012 January 1998 Rev 0 to ISI-PSL-1, St Lucie Nuclear Plant Unit 1 ISI Plan. ML17229A6141998-01-12012 January 1998 Rev 0 to ISI-PSL-1, Third Interval ISI Program for St Lucie Nuclear Power Plant,Unit 1. ML17229A5691997-12-31031 December 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Pages Modifying TS 5.6.1 & Associated Figure 5.6-1 & TS 5.6.3 to Accomodate Increase in Allowed SFP Storage Capacity ML17309A9131997-12-29029 December 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Modifying Specifications for Selected cycle-specific Reactor Physics Parameters to Provide Reference to St Lucie Unit 2 COLR for Limiting Values ML17229A5851997-12-12012 December 1997 Rev 0 to ADM-29.01, IST Program for Pumps & Valves. ML17229A5491997-12-0101 December 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Revising Units 1 & 2 EPP Section 4, Environ Conditions & Section 5, Administrative Procedures to Incorporate Proposed Terms & Conditions of Incidental Take Statement Included in Biological Opinion ML17309A9171997-11-26026 November 1997 Rev 0 to PSL-ENG-SENS-97-068, Spent Fuel Pool Dilution Analysis. ML17229A5931997-09-26026 September 1997 Rev 4 to Procedure QI-5-PSL-1, Preparation,Rev,Review/ Approval of Procedures. ML17229A5921997-09-18018 September 1997 Rev 0 to Procedure ADM-17.11, 10CFR500.59 Screening. ML20211Q5841997-09-10010 September 1997 Rev 18 to Training & Qualification Plan ML17229A4621997-08-22022 August 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Pages,Revising Specification 4.0.5 Surveillance Requirements for ISI & Testing of ASME Code Class 1,2 & 3 Components,To Relocate IST Program Requirements to Administrative Control Section 6.8 ML17229A4341997-08-0101 August 1997 Proposed Tech Specs,Extending semi-annual Surveillance Interval Specified in Table 4.3-2 for Testing ESFAS Subgroup Relays to Interval Consistent W/Ceog Rept CEN-403,Rev 1-A for March 1996 & Associated SE ML17309A8951997-06-11011 June 1997 Rev 0 to PL-CNSI-97-004, Transportation & Emergency Response Plan for St Lucie Unit 1 SG Project. ML17229A3601997-05-29029 May 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Incorporating Administrative Changes That Improve Consistency Throughout TSs & Related Bases ML17229A2981997-03-0606 March 1997 Final Analysis of Radiological Consequences of Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment for St Lucie Unit 1 NPP Using NUREG-0800 Std Review Plan 15.1.5 App A. ML17229A1831996-12-20020 December 1996 Proposed Tech Specs Re Safety Limits & Limiting Safety Sys Settings ML17229A1611996-12-0909 December 1996 Proposed Tech Specs 1.9a Re Core Operating Limits Rept ML17229A1191996-10-31031 October 1996 Proposed Tech Specs 6.0 Re Administrative Controls ML17229A1111996-10-30030 October 1996 Proposed Tech Specs 3/4.9.9 Re Containment Isolation Sys & 3/4.9.10 Re Water level-reactor Vessel ML17229A1061996-10-28028 October 1996 Proposed Tech Specs 1.6 Re Channel Functional test,1.7 Re Containment Vessel integrity,1.8 Re Controlled leakage,1.9 Re Core alteration,3/4.6 Re Containment Systems & 3/4.6.1 Re Containment Vessel ML17229A1091996-10-28028 October 1996 Proposed Tech Specs Rev to Allow Type A,B & C Containment Leakage Tests to Be Conducted at Extended Intervals Determined by performance-based Criteria ML17229A0951996-10-24024 October 1996 Rev 0 to 00000-OSW-16, In-Situ Pressure Test Results for St Lucie Unit 1 Spring 1996 Outage. ML17229A0861996-10-18018 October 1996 Startup Physics Testing Rept. W/961018 Ltr ML17229A2441996-09-23023 September 1996 Rev 18 to Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (Odcm). ML17228B5641996-07-15015 July 1996 Revised Tech Specs Re Core Alteration Definition ML17229A0961996-06-12012 June 1996 Rev 0 to TR-9419-CSE96-1101, Test Rept - SG Tube In-Situ Hydrostatic Pressure Test Tool Hydro Chamber Pressure Determination. 1999-06-30
[Table view] |
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ATTACHMENT l Marked-up Technical Specification Pages 3/4 7-I 0 B 3/4 7-3 (with insert)87i2300081 871222 i Da.~DOCK-O500OZ89-
--I DI 9 E JW4/0 I 7/2 I 4 II t PLANT SYSTEMS MAIN FEEDWATER LINE ISOLATION VALVES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.1.6 Each main feedwater line isolation valve shall be OPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:
MODES.1, 2, 3, and 4.ACTION: MODE 1 With one main feedwater line isolation lve inoperable but open, POWER OPERATION may continue p'rovided he inoperable valve is restored to OPERABLE status within hours;otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.MODES 2, 3-With one main feedwater line isolation valve inoperable, and 4 subseqent operation in MODE 2, 3, or 4 may proceed provided::a.The isolation valve is maintained closed.b.The'p>ovisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.
Otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.7.1.6 Each main feedwater line isolation valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by: a.Part-stroke exercising the valve at least once per 92 days, a'nd b.Verifying full closure within 5.15 seconds on any closure actuation signal while in HOT STANDBY with Tavg>515'F during each reactor" shutdown e'xcept that verification of full closure within 5.15 seconds need not be determined more often than once per 92 days.ST.LUG IE-UNIT 2 3/4 7-10 Amendment No.B
.PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.1.4.ACTIVITY The limitations on secondary system specific activity ensure that the resultant offsite radiation dose will be limited to a small fraction of 10 CFR Part 100 limits in the event of a steam line rupture.This dose also includes the effects of a coincident 1.0 gpm primary to.secondary tube leak in the steam generator of the affected steam line and a concurrent loss of offsite electrical power.These values are consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses'/4.7.1.5 MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES The OPERABILITY of the main steam line isolation valves ensures that no more than one steam generator will blow down in the event of a steam line rupture.This restriction is required to (1)minimize the positive reactivity effects of the Reactor Coolant System cooldown associated with the blowdown, and (2)limit the pressure rise within containment in the event the steam line rupture occurs within containment.
The OPERABILITY of the main steam isolation valves within the closure times of the Surveillance Requirements is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.3/4.7.1e 6 MAIN FEEDWATER LINE ISOLATION VALVES The main feedwater line isolation valves are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that (1)feedwater is terminated to the affected steam generator following a steam line break and (2)auxiliary feedwater is delivered to the intact steam generator following a feedwater line break.If feedwater is not terminated to a steam generator with a broken main steam line, two serious effects may result: (1)the post-trip return to power due to plant cooldown will be greater with resultant higher fuel failure and (2)the steam released to containment will exceed the design.u to re ova of th m in fee c ck val from the lant des gn and it repla ent wit second in feedwa er line'tion al th e is t ng other t an the in feedw e line o tion alves o revent ck flow o W fol win a fe d ne br ak.his may re 1 in a 1 of con ens in ntory a the p e ial r ot being le to fe the st am ge r or.The concern is the fai lure of one main feedwater line isolation valve to close with the other main feedwater line isolation valve in that line being inoperable (i.e., stuck open).It is thus desired to preclude operation for extended periods with a main feedwater line isolation va'.ve known to be stuck in the'open position.~X~Scnf+g s~n,k+I 8 3/4 7"3 INSERT 8'1 Two redundant main feedwater isolation valves (MFIV's)are provided in each main feedline to assure feedwater isolation in the event of a steam line break with a single failure.Also, redundant MFIV's assure that backflow in the feedlines is prevented following a feedline break.INSERT P2 A time limit of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> on operations with an inoperable main feedwater isolation valve provides assurance that operations will not continue for an extended period with a failed, open MFIV.
ATTACHMENT 2 SAFETY EVALUATION I.INTRODUCTION The existing ACTION statement for the St.Lucie Unit 2 Technical Specifications Section 3/4.7.1.6, Main Feedwater Isolation Valves (MFIV)allows operations to continue four (4)hours with an inoperable, open MFIV.This ACTION statement does not provide adequate time to analyze an MFIV problem and effect repairs.As a result, there exists the potential for unnecessary plant shutdowns.
This proposed change to the Technical Specifications will modify the Section 3/4.7.1.6 ACTION Statement for an inoperable, open MFIV to allow operations to continue for up to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> instead of the present four (4)hour limit.If the valve cannot be restored to OPERABLE, the plant would be placed in HOT STANDBY in the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following twenty-four (24)hours.II.DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS The MPIVs are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that feedwater flow to the affected steam generator is terminated in the event of a main steamline break (MSLB).If main feedwater flow is not terminated, two effects may result: (1)the post-trip return to power may be greate'r with resultant higher fuel failure and, (2)the steam release to the containment may exceed containment design pressure if the break is inside containment.
Additionally, the MFIVs function to ensure that auxiliary feedwater (AFW)can be delivered to the intact steam generator in the event of a main feedline break (MPLB).Back flow of the AFW to the Main Feedwater System following a feedline break could result in a loss of condensate inventory and the potential for not being able to feed the intact steam generator.
The closure of a single MPIV in each feedline, as required by the safety analysis, provides isolation of main feedwater and availability of AFW following a steamline or feedline break.The second MPIV ensures that a single failure which precludes closure of one valve will not preclude main feedwater isolation or AFW availability.
The proposed change is acceptable for the following reasons: (A)Under current Technical Specifications, operation with an inoperable, y C~1 ATTACHMENT 2 Page 2 of 3 open MFIV is allowed for four hours.In the event of a Design Basis Event (DBE)during this period, failure to terminate feed flow would require that: 1)the second MFIV in the same line as the first valve must also fail open, 2)a main steam line (or feed line)break must occur and the affected steam generator (or feed line)must be the one fed by the line which has two failed MFIVs, and 3)this series of events must occur during the action time (4.hours)identified in the LCO.The likelihood of this sequence of events occurring is very low.In order to gain perspective on the significance of the proposed change, from 4 to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, 1)an estimated MFIV fail open frequency per NUREG 2728 (lE-3 per demand)can be combined with 2)an estimate of the frequency of MSLB as given in the Zion PRA (9.4E-04)to provide a conservative estimate of the failure to terminate flow given a MSLB event occurs during operation with one MFIV inoperable, open.Review of NPRDS data for January, 1985 to May, 1987 revealed one LER written on the MFIVs.Therefore, an assumption of entering an LCO once per year is conservative.
Using the described rationale provides a conservative estimate which can help illustrate the relative significance of a change from a 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> to a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> action time.(MFIV fails open)x (MSLB)x (LCO Action Time)=frequency of failure to terminate flow during MSLB (1E-03/d)x (9.4E-4/Rx yr)x (4 hr)(1/8760 yr/hr)=4.3E-10/d (1E-03/d)x (9'E-4/Rx yr)x (72 hr)(1/8760 yr/hr=7.7E-09/d The ranges of.0000000077 and.00000000043 are such low occurrence events that for practical purposes the difference between the two (7.3E-09)is not significant.
A similar argument and low frequency of occurrence can be demonstrated for the feedline break scenario.B)If an MFIV becomes inoperable and is open, the present Technical Specification Section 3/4.7.1.6 allows operations to continue for only four (4)hours prior to proceeding to HOT STANDBY.As stated in NUREG 1024, Tech Spec allowable outage times for inoperable equipment have been established on the basis of engineering judgment considering the use of standard intervals (e.g.1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, etc.).It is also stated that ATTACHMENT 2 Page 3 of 3 outage times that are too short can result in unnecessary plant trips, transients and fatigue cycling.The proposed 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> allowable outage time for an inoperable, open MFIV is consistent with the standard time interval selected for other safeguards systems.For example, with an inoperable Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)subsystem, Section 3/4.5.2 allows operations to continue for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> while the redundant subsystem is restored to OPERABLE.Similar situations exist with the Containment Spray Systems (Section 3/4.6.2)Containment Fan Coolers (Section 3/4.6.2.3), Intake Cooling System (Section 3/4.7.4)and Component Cooling Water System (Section 3/4'.3).In each case, the above systems have redundant subsystems and the ACTION time in each Tech Spec allows operations to continue for up to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> while an inoperable subsystem is restored to OPERABLE.Also, the MFIVs function as a portion of the flow boundary of the AFW and the proposed change is consistent with the AFW Tech Spec ACTION TIME (Section 3/4.7.1.2) given a single inoperable component in redundant trains.Thus, an extension of the MFIV ACTION TIME TO 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> provides the same time to repair an inoperable subsystem as other safeguards systems.
ATTACHMENT 3 DETERMINATION OF NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION The standards used to arrive at a determination that a request for amendment involves no significant hazards consideration are included in the Commission's regulations, IO CFR 50.92, which states that no significant hazards considerations are involved if the operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (I)involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2)create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3)involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.Each standard is discussed as follows: (I)Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
The proposed 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> ACTION statement with an inoperable Main Feedwater Isolation Valve (MFIV)is consistent with other safeguards equipment outage times.The likelihood of a feedline or steamline break with a concurrent failure of the second valve in the same feedline is remote during the outage time.Thus, the proposed 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> allowable outage time will not significantly increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
(2)Use of the modified specification would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
This change will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously analyzed because it does not introduce a new mode of normal or emergency plant operation.
In addition the proposed change does not involve a physical modification to the plant.(3)Use of the modified specification would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.Because failure of the second MFIV in the same feedline with a simultaneous feedline or steamline break during the seventy-two (72)hour al lowable outage time is unlikely, this change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.Based on the above, we have determined that the amendment request does not (I)involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, (2)create the probability of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated, or (3)involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety;and therefore does not involve a significant hazards consideration.
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