ML17229A434
| ML17229A434 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 08/01/1997 |
| From: | FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17229A433 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9708050356 | |
| Download: ML17229A434 (8) | |
Text
St. Lucie Unit 2 Docket No. 50-389 Proposed License Amendmcnt ESFAS Sub ou Rcla Surveillance ATTACHMENT3 ST. LUCIEUNIT2 MARKED-UPTECHNICALSPECIFICATION PAGES Page 3/4 3-22 Page 3/4 3-23 Page B3/4 3-1 Insert - A 9708050356 970801 POR ADGCK 05000389 P
TABLE 4.3"2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTAION SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS FUNCTIONAL UNIT SAFETY INJECTION (SIAS) a.
Manual (Trip Buttons) b.
Containment Pressure - High c.
Pressurizer Pressure - Los d.
Automatic Actuation Logic CHANNEL CHECK N.A.
S S
N.A, CHANNEL CALIBRATION N.A.
R R
N.A.
CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST R
H H
H(a),
MODES FOR WICH SURVEILLANCE Rtltll 2.
3 ~
CONTAINMENT SPRAY (CSAS) a.
Manual (Trip Buttons) b.
Containment Pressur e-Nigh " High c.
Automatic Actuation Logic CONTAINMENT ISOLATION (CIAS) a.
Manual CIAS (Trip Buttons) b.
Safety In]ection SIAS c.
Containment Pressure - High d.
Containment Radiation - High e.
Automatic Actuation Logic N.A.
S N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
S S
N.A.
N.A.
R N.A.
N.A.
N. A.
R R
N.A.
H H(l),
Rb)
H H(1),
1, 2, 3, 4
1,2,3 1, 2, 3, 4
1, 2, 3, 4 4.
HAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION a.
Manual (Trip Buttons)
N.A.
b.
Steam Generator Pressure
- Low S
c.
Containment Pressure
- High S
d.
Automatic Actuation Logic N.A.
N.A.
R R
N.A.
a(~)
H(a),
as 2E 3
5.
CONTAINt1ENT SUMP RECIRCULATION (RAS) a.
Hanual RAS (Trip Buttons)
Refueling Mater Storage Tank - Low c.
Automatic Actuation Logic N.A.
S N.A.
N.A.
R'.A.
R R(s)
H H(1),
N.A.
ls2o3
a TABLE 4.3.-2 Cont.inued ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE RE UIRENENTS IInM rn FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHANNEL CHECK CHANNEL CALIBRATION CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST NODES FOR WllICH SURVEILLANCE RBRIIEll 6.
LOSS OF POWER {LOV) a.
- 4. 16 kV and 480 V Emergency Bus Undervoltage
{Loss of Voltage) b.
- 4. 16 kV and 480 V Emergency Ous Undervoltage (Degraded Voltage) 1, 2, 3, 4
1, 2t 3, 4
7.
AUXILIARYFEEDWATER {AFAS) a.
Hanual {Trip Buttons) b.
SG Level (A/0) - Low c.
Automatic Actuation Logic 8.
AUXILIARY FEEDLIATER ISOLATION a.
SG Level (A/0) - Low and SG Differential Pressure (BtoA/Ato0) - High b.
SG Level {A/0) - Low and Feedwater Header Differential Pressure (Btoh/Ato0) - High N. A.
S N.A.
N,A.
N.A.
N.A, R
N.A.
R H
H(l), SA(2) 1, 2, 3
1, 2, 3
1, 2, 3
1,2,3 1, 2, 3
TABLE NOTATION m
(1)
Testing of Automatic Actuation Logic shall include energization/de-energization of each initiation relay (solid-state corn onent) and verification of the OPERABILITY of each initiation relay (solid-state gheh f,
~p'omponent),
p~ ~4ua+ioq c+
O" (2) relay test shall be performed which shall include the energization/de-energization of each relay
.rand verification of the OPERABILITY each rel ay JnQ+~~ o 'soctnaklart
- 3) A subgroup relay test shal be performed which shall include the energization/de-energization of each subgroup relay and verification of the/
DPERABILITYofeachsubgroup relay. Tcstlng ofthe ESFAS subgroup relays shall be performed on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS at sublntervalsg of6 months, such that each subgroup relay is tested at least once per 18 months.
C 1
ll l,
3/4.3 'NSTRUMENTATION BASES 3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 REACTOR PROTECTIVE AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEMS INSTRUMENTATiON The OPERABILITY of the reactor protective and Engineered Safety Features Actuation Systems instrumentation and bypasses ensure that (1) the associated Engineered Safety Features Actuation action and/or reactor trip will be initiated when the parameter monitored by each channel or combination thereof reaches its setpoint, (2) the specified coincidence logic is maintained, (3) sufficient redundancy is maintained to permit a channel to be out of service for testing or maintenance, and (4) sufficient system functional capability is available from diverse parameters.
The OPERABILITY of these systems is required to provide the overall reliability, redundancy, and diversity assumed available in the facility design for the protection and mitigation of accident and transient conditions.
The integrated operation of each of these systems is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.
Tke Surveillance Requirements specified for these systems ensure that the overall system functional capability is maintained comparable to the original design standards.
The periodic surveillance tests performed at the minimum requencies are sufficient to demonstrate this capability.
p The measurement of response time at the specified frequencies provides
~f'~ assurance that the protective and ESF action function associated with" each channel is completed within the time limit'assumed in the safety analyses.
No credit was taken in the analyses for those channels with response times indicated as not applicable.
Response
time may be demonstrated by any series of sequential, overlapping, or total channel test measurements provided that such tests demonstrate the total channel response time as defined.
Sensor response time verification may be demonstrated by either (1) in place, onsite, or offsite test measurements or (2) utilizing replacement sensors with certified response times.
The Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS) provides direct actuation of the Containment Isolation Signal (CIS) to ensure containment isolation in the event of a small break LOCA.
3/4.3. 3 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION.
3/4. 3. 3.1 RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the radiation monitoring channels ensures that:
(1) the radiation levels are continually measured in the areas served by the ST.
LUCIE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 3-1 Q~~QQiC W+
tW I 4
'L J
St. Lucic Unit 2
.Docket No. 50-389 proposed License Amcndmcnt ESFAS Sub ou Rela Surveillance INSERT - A CE Owners Group topical rcport CEN-403, Revision 1-A, March 1996, provides the basis to allow ESFAS subgroup relay testing on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS. Such testing requires each subgroup relay to bc tested at least once pcr 18 months (refueling cycle), with approximately equal numbers ofrelays being tested at 6 month subintervals.
Subgroup relays which cannot be tcstcd with the unit at power should be scheduled for testing during plant shutdowns.
Iftwo or morc ESFAS subgroup relays fail in a 12-month period, thc design, maintcnancc, and testing ofall ESFAS subgroup relays should be considered to evaluate the adequacy ofthe surveillance interval. Ifit is dctcrmincd that thc survcillancc interval is inadcquatc for dctccting a single relay failure, the survcillancc interval should bc dccrcascd such that an ESFAS subgroup relay failure prior to occurrcncc ofa second failure can be dctectcd.