ML17292B233

Responds to NRC 971218 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-397/97-17.Corrective Actions:Technician Visually Verified Area to Be Clear of Personnel & Immediately Locked Gate & Performed Walkdown to Verify Locked Status of Similar Areas

ML17292B233
Person / Time
Site:	Columbia
Issue date:	01/19/1998
From:	BEMIS P R WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
50-397-97-17, GO2-98-011, GO2-98-11, NUDOCS 9801290057
Download: ML17292B233 (6)

See also: IR 05000397/1997017

Text

CATEGORY j.REGULATORY

INFORMATION

DISTRIBUTION

SYSTEM (RIDS)A CCESSION NBR:9801290057

DOC.DATE: 98/01/19 NOTARIZED:

NO DOCKET FACIL:50-397

WPPSS Nuclear Project, Unit 2, Washington

Public Powe 05000397 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION

BEMIS,P.R.

Washington

Public Power Supply System RECIP.NAME

RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)SUBJECT: Responds to NRC 971218 ltr re violations

noted in insp rept 50-397/97-17.Corrective

actions: technician

visually verified area to be clear of personnel&immediately

locked gate&performed walkdown to verify locked status of similar are s.DISTRIBUTION

CODE: IEOID COPIES RECEIVED:LTR

(ENCL t SIZE: TITLE: General (50 Dkt)-Insp Rept/Notice

of Violation Response NOTES: E RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD4-2 PD INTERNAL: ACRS AEOD ILE CENTER NRR DRPM/PECB NUDOCS-ABSTRACT

OGC/HDS3 TERNAL: LITCO BRYCE,J H NRC PDR COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME POSLUSNY,C

AEOD/SPD/RAB

DEDRO NRR/DRCH/HHFB

NRR/DRPM/PERB

OE DIR RGN4 FILE 01 NOAC NUDOCS FULLTEXT COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 R D 0 U N NOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE.TO HAVE YOUR NAME OR ORGANIZATION

REMOVED FROM DISTRIBUTION

LISTS OR REDUCE THE NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED BY YOU OR YOUR ORGANIZATION, CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK (DCD)ON EXTENSION 415-2083 TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 19 ENCL 19

WASHIV>GTON

PUBLIC POWER SUPPI.Y SYSTElvf I?O.Iiox 968~Ri~%hniil, 11'ashiiigtow

99352-0968

January 19, 1998 G02-98-011

Docket No.50-397 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory

Commission

Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen:

Subjec't: WNP-2, OPERATING LICENSE NPF-21 NRC INSPECTION

REPORT 97-19, RESPONSE TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION Reference:

Letter dated December 18, 1997, B Murray (NRC)to JV Parrish (SS),"NRC Inspection

Report 50-397/97-19" The Supply System's response to the Notice Of Violation, pursuant to the provisions

of Section 2.201, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, is enclosed as Attachment

A.We acknowledge

the additional

concerns that were identified

in the inspection

report and the Supply System is taking steps to address the issues.Should you have any questions or desire additional

information

regarding this matter, please call Mr.PJ Inserra at (509)377-4147.PR is Vi resident, Nuclear Operations

Mail Drop PE23 Attachment

cc: EW Merschoff-NRC RIV KE Perkins, Jr.-NRC RIV, WCFO C Poslusny, Jr.-NRR 980i290057

980ii9 PDR ADGCK 05000397 8 PDR NRC Sr.Resident Inspector-927N DL Williams-BPA/399 PD Robinson-Winston&Strawn IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII

RESPONSE TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION IN INSPECTION

REPORT 50-397/97-19

Appendix A Page 1 of 3 RESTATEMENT

F VI LATION A Technical Specification 5.7.2.a requires, in part, that each entryway to high radiation areas with dose rates greater than 1.0 rem/hour (at 30 centimeters

from the radiation source or from any surface penetrated

by the radiation)

be provided with a locked door, gate, or guard that prevents unauthorized

entry.Contrary to the above, on October 6, 1997, an entryway to the radwaste liner storage room on the 437-foot elevation of the radwaste building, an area with dose rates greater than 1.0 rem/hour (at 30 centimeters

from the radiation source or from any surface penetrated

by the radiation)

was not provided with a locked door, gate, or guard that prevented unauthorized

entry.This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement

IV)(50-397/9719-01).

R P N ET VI LATI N The Supply System accepts the violation.

REA N F RVI LATI N The Supply System agrees with the staff's characterization

of the reason for this event given in the Report Details section of Inspection

Report 50-397/97-19.

The failure to properly secure a chain link gate to a high high radiation area (HHRA)was caused by human error on the part of a health physics technician.

One condition that contributed

to the event was the failure to perform a timely independent

verification

of the door's locked status.A second contributing

condition was the use of a chain to secure the gate, rather than permanently

installed padeyes.RRE A N TAKEN AND R TS A HIEVED Upon identification

of the event a health physics technician

responded, visually verified the area to be clear of personnel and immediately

locked the gate.A walk-down was performed to verify the locked status of all other similar areas.No other doors were found to be improperly

secured.An additional

walk-down was performed by Health Physics to identify any other HHRA or high radiation areas that were secured by means of chain and padlocks.One additional

door (access hatch to the wetwell)was found to be secured in this manner.Supply System staff determined

that this hatch did not require a padeye as it is bolted and secured with a heavy chain and padlock.

RESPONSE TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION IN INSPECTION

REPORT 50-397/97-19

Appendix A Page 2 of 3 A work request was issued to install lockable padeyes on the gate to the radwaste liner storage room on the 437'levation

of the radwaste building.Work was completed December 10, 1997, Lessons learned from the event were discussed and documented

in Health Physics Technician

Continuing

Training.This training was completed December 22, 1997.The appropriate

plant procedure was revised on December 15, 1997 to require performance

of independent

verification

in a timely manner.Appropriate

personnel actions were taken with the health physics technician

who failed to properly secure the gate.RRE TEP T BETAKENT AV IDF EVI LATI N All corrective

actions have been completed.

DATE F L MPLIAN E The gate was immediately

locked on October 6, 1997 upon identification

of the event.R TATEMENT F VI LATI NB 10 CFR 20.1501(a)requires, in part, that each licensee make or cause to be made surveys that may be necessary for the licensee to comply with the regulations

in 10 CFR Part 20 and are reasonable

to evaluate the quantities

of radioactive

material and the potential radiological

hazards that could be present.10 CFR 20.1003 defines a survey as an evaluation

of radiological

conditions

and potential hazards incident to the production, use, transfer, release, disposal, or presence of radioactive

material or other sources of radiation.

10 CFR 20.1201 requires, in part, each licensee to control the occupational

dose to individual

adults to 5 rems for the total effective dose equivalent

or (to)50 rems for the sum of the deep-dose equivalent

and the committed dose equivalent

to any individual

organ or tissue other than the lens of the eye.Contrary to the above, the licensee did not make or cause to be made surveys necessary to comply with 10 CFR 20.1201.Specifically, on April 30, May 30, and July 2, 1997, the licensee failed to perform evaluations

of the radiological

hazards that could have been present when four individuals

were identified

to have potentially

taken radioactive

material internally.

RESPONSE TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION IN INSPECTION

REPORT 50-397/97-19

Appendix A Page3 of 3 This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement

IV)(50-397/971942).

R P NET VI LATI N The Supply System accepts the violation.

REA N F RVI LATI N The Supply System agrees with the staff's characterization

of the reason for this event given in the Report Details section of Inspection

Report 50-397/97-19.

Briefly restated, the requirement

to provide whole-body

counts to personnel found with facial contamination

was not clearly stated in the appropriate

plant procedure.

RR A N TAKEN AND R T A HIEVED Health Physics performed a comprehensive

review of 1997 logs and determined

that a total of six individuals

with facial contamination

were not immediately

given whole-body

counts.These individuals

were contacted and whole-body

counts were performed.

No internal contamination

was identified.

The appropriate

plant procedure was revised January 8, 1998 to clearly state the requirement

that personnel found with facial contamination

will receive a whole-body

count.TEP T BETAKENTOAV

IDF EVI LATI N A review of the procedure will be incorporated

into the Health Physics Quarterly Continuing

Training to be completed by February 20, 1998.DATE F F L MPLIAN E Full compliance

was achieved by December 5, 1997 when affected personnel received whole-body

counts.