ML17292A967

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Requests Enforcement Discretion from Required Actions Associated W/Ts Action 3.6.1.3.A Which Requires That Penetration Flow Path W/Inoperable Primary Containment Isolation Valve Be Isolated
ML17292A967
Person / Time
Site: Columbia Energy Northwest icon.png
Issue date: 08/12/1997
From: PARRISH J V
WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
Shared Package
ML17292A968 List:
References
AL-95-05, AL-95-5, GO2-97-155, NUDOCS 9708210063
Download: ML17292A967 (8)


Text

CATEGORY1'REGULATINFORMATION DISTRIBUTION STEM(RIDS)i~NiACCESSION NBR:9708210063 DOC.DATE:

97/08/12NOTARIZED:

NODOCKETIFACIL:50-397

@PPSSNuclearProject,Unit2,Washington PublicPowe05000397AUTH.NAME;AUTHORAFFILIATION PARRISH-,J.V.

Washington PublicPowerSupplySystemRECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION DocumentControlBranch(Document ControlDesk)

SUBJECT:

Requestsenforcement discretion forperiodof45daysfromTSAction3.6.1.3.A requiredtoisolatepurgeline6,verifypenetration flowpathisolatedevery'31days.DISTRIBUTION CODE:A034DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR ENCLSIZE:TITLE:ORSubmittal:

Containment PurgingNOTES:ATERECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD4-2PDINTERNALACRSNRR/DRPM/PECB RESDERES/DSR/RPSB EXTERNAL:

NOACCOPIESLTTRENCL111111111111RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME COLBURN,T FILECENTERRES/DET/EIB NRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL11111.11111DENOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:

PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE.TOHAVEYOURNAMEORORGANIZATION REMOVEDFROMDISTRIBUTION LISTSORREDUCETHENUMBEROFCOPIESRECEIVEDBYYOUORYOURORGANIZATION, CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK(DCD)ONEXTENSION 415-2083TOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:

LTTR11ENCLll j~

WASHINGTON PUBLICPOWERSUPPLYSYSTEMP.O.Box968~Richland, Washington 99352-0968 August12,1997G02-97-155 DocketNo.50-397DocumentControlDeskU.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission Washington, DC20555Gentlemen:

Subject:

WNP-2,OPERATING LICENSENPF-21REQUESTFORENFORCEMI<2>IT DISCRETION FROMREQUIRE)ACTIONSOFTECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.6.1.3.A

Reference:

USNRCAdministrative Letter95-05datedNovember7,1995,"Revisions toStaffGuidanceforImplementing NRCPolicyonNoticesofEnforcement Discretion" TheSupplySystemherebyrequestsenforcement discretion fromtherequiredactionsassociated

~withTechnical Specification (TS)Action3.6.1.3.A.

TheSupplySystemhasdetermined that.traversing in-coreprobe(TIP)purgelinecheckvalve,TIP-V-6,wasnotverifiedclosedduringthe,recentrefueling outageasrequiredbytheInservice Testing(IST)Program.TSAction3.6.1.3.A requiresthatapenetration flowpathwithaninoperable primarycontainment isolation valve(PCIV)beisolated.

Theactionspecified byTS3.6.1.3.A hasbeentakenbyclosingTIP-V-15, thusisolating thepurgelinepenetration toprimarycontainment.

Becauseofthepotential forTIPsystemdegradation withthepurgelineisolated, theSupplySystemrequestsenforcement discretion foraperiodof45daysfromtheTS3.6.1.3.A requiredactionstoisolatethepurgelineandverifythepenetration flowpathisolatedevery31days.Duringthis45dayperiod,theSupplySystemwillsubmitforstaffapprovalanexigentTSAmendment requestthatwouldexemptTIP-V-6fromtheTS5.5.6ISTProgramrequirements tofullstrokeTIP-V-6totheclosedpositioneachrefueling outage.TheexigentTSAmendment wouldbeineffectforthedurationofthecurrentoperating cycle.Inaddition, theSupplySystemwillverifyTIP-V-6fullstrokestotheclosedpositionshouldtherebeaforcedoutageofsufficient durationthatwouldallowcontainment tobedeinerted andthetesttobeperformed.

TheSupplySystemherebyaddresses beloweachofthe12criteriaidentified intheReference, 97082i006$

9708i2PDR-ADQCK0500039'7 P.'"PDRP0&)II!IIII!Illlllllllllllllllllllllllllllll If/'

ttPage2REQUESTFORF<22/FORCEMRPlT DISCRETION FROMREQUIR1H)

ACTIONSOFTECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.6.1.3.A TheSupplySystemrequeststhattherequiredactionofTS3.6.1.3.A.1 andA.2notberequiredforTIP-V-6duringa45daytimeperiodstartingwithstaffapprovalofthisrequestforenforcement discretion, TIP-V-6ispresently inoperable becausearefueling intervalISTtestrequirement toverifythevalvefullstrokestotheclosedpositionwasnotperformed, TSAction3,6.1.3.A.1 requiresthatapenetration flowpathwithaninoperable primarycontainment isolation valve(PCIV)beisolated"bytheuseofatleastoneclosedandde-activated automatic valve,closedmanualvalve,blindflange,orcheckvalvewithflowthroughthevalvesecured."

Technical Specification Action3.6.1.3.A.2 requirestheaffectedpenetration flowpathbeverifiedisolatedevery31days.TheSupplySystemmettherequiredactionsofTS3.6,1.3.A.1 byclosinganddeactivating TIP-V-15toisolatetheTIPpurgelinepenetration.

2.OnJuly17,1997theISTProgramLeadEngineerdiscovered anerrordocumented inanISTprocedure, Theprocedure isusedtoexerciseTIP-V-6openandclosedasrequiredbytheWNP-2ISTProgramPlanandistobeperformed eachrefueling outage.Theprocedure allowscredittobetakenforsuccessful completion ofaLocalLeakRateTest(LLRT)ofthevalveiftheLLRTisperformed duringthecurrentrefueling outage.InlieuofcurrentLLRTresults,theprocedure providesdiscretestepsforverifying valveclosurebypressurizing theTIPpurgelinefromapointdownstream ofthecheckvalve.TheSupplySysteminitially concluded thatTIP-V-6wasoperablebutnonconforming usingGenericLetter91-18guidance.

However,afterdiscussion withthestaffonAugust12,1997,theSupplySystemhasdetermined thatLCO3.6.1.3mustbedeclarednotmet.NoLLRTofTIP-V-6wasperformed (orrequired) duringthisrefueling outage(R-12)andthediscretestepsforclosepositionverification werenotperformed.

Instead,LLRTresultsforthisvalvefromthepreviousrefueling outage(R-11)wereerroneously used(asindicated bya1996testdate)andtheprocedure wasincorrectly acceptedascomplete.

PromptactionisrequiredtopermittheTIPpurgelinepenetration toremainunisolated.

Itisessential toallowtheTIPsystemtoremainpressurized topreventdegradation ofTIPcomponents andallowaxialneutronfluxtracesofthereactorcore.TheNitrogenpurgekeepsmoisturefrom.enteringtheTIPindexersandtubing.Moisturecandegradethelubricant usedinsidetheTIPtubing,potentially causingobstructions toTIPprobetravel.Obstructions couldprecludetheuseofTIPforthecalibration

function, ultimately resulting inaplantshutdown.

3.Allowingtheaffectedpenetration toremainunisolated untilanexigentTSAmendment canbeapprovedbythestaffdoesnotcreateasafetyconcern.AlthoughTIP-V-6isconsidered inoperable duetoatestnotbeingperformed, thevalveisstillconsidered tobefunctional andcapableofclosingduringdesignbasisaccidentconditions, TIP-V-6isrequiredtobeverifiedclosedeveryrefueling outagebasedontherefueling outagejustification ROJ04providedintheISTProgramPlan.Reviewofhistorical maintenance andtestdatahasshownthatthisvalvehadonlyoneLLRTfailure,in1989.Subsequent disassembly foundasmallamountofdebrisontheseatofthevalve.Thevalvehaspassedsubsequent leakrateandISTprogramtests.Thisvalvewas U+tl'IIt+Q4444-11' ttREQUESTFOREAFORCE1VH<JllT DISCRETION FROMREQUIRE&ACTIONSOFTECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.6.1.3.A disassembled asapartoftheCheckValveReliability Programduringthe1996refueling outageandwasfoundtobeinexcellent condition.

Freedomofmovementandsystemcleanliness wereverified.

ReviewofLLRTdataforthisvalvesincedisassembly in1989indicates thatvalveleakagehasbeenwellbelowtheestablished ASMEleakagelimit(ASMEleakagelimitis74standardcubiccentimeters perminute(sccm);previoustestresultsrangefrom0to23sccm).TheWNP-2PrimaryContainment LeakageRateTestProgramdeveloped inaccordance withAppendixJ,OptionB,hasprovidedaleakratetestingintervalforTIP-V-6offiveyearsbasedonpreviousvalveperformance.

Basedonpreviousperformance thevalvecanbeexpectedtoreliablyperformitscontainment isolation functionuntilthenextrefueling outage;Sincethecomponent reliability assumedintheProbabilistic SafetyAssessment (PSA)remainsunchanged bythiscondition, coredamagefrequency andconditional containment failureprobabilities arenotaffected.

Duringaccidentconditions, containment integrity isprovidedbyclosureofTIP-V-6.TIP-V-6hasdemonstrated reliability throughtestingandinspection.

Theoutboardprimarycontainment automatic isolation valve,TIP-V-15, providesredundant isolation forthispenetration.

4.Allowingtheaffectedpenetration toremainunisolated forupto45daysdoesnotrepresent asituation thatispotentially detrimental tothepublichealthandsafety.Asdiscussed initem3above,TIP-V-6isexpectedtocloseduringdesignbasisaccidentconditions.

Primarycontainment integrity willalsobemaintained duringdesignbasisaccidentconditions byautomatic isolation ofTIP-V-15.

Basedonareviewofhistorical maintenance andtestdata,allowingtheTIP-V-6penetration toremainunisolated forupto45daysdoesnotrepresent anunreviewed safetyquestionnordoesitinvolveasignificant hazardsconsideration perthecriteriaof10CFR50.925.Allowingtheaffectedpenetration toremainunisolated forupto45dayswillnothaveanadverseimpactontheenvironment.

Basedonareviewofhistorical maintenance andtestdata,TIP-V-6isexpectedtofunctionasdesignedtoisolatetheaffectedpenetration.

Therefore, thereisnosignificant changeinthetypesorsignificant increaseintheamountsofanyeffluents thatmaybereleasedoffsite.Additionally, thereisnosignificant increaseinindividual orcumulative occupational radiation exposure.

6.Therearenocompensatory measuresproposed.

Historical valveperformance reflectsahighdegreeofcomponent reliability, andassuch,nocompensatory measuresarenecessary.

7.Itisrequested thatenforcement discretion fornon-compliance withTSAction3.6.1.3.A beineffectfor45daystoallowtimeforprocessing ofanexigentTSAmendment request.Pasttestingandinspection demonstrates thefunctional condition ofthevalve,andprovidesreasonable assurance ofperformance.

8.Therequested enforcement discretion hasbeenapprovedbythePlantOperations Committee.

,~~j~ttREQUESTFORENFORCEMENT DISCRETION FROMREQUIREDACTIONSOFTECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.6.1.3.A 9.Thisrequested enforcement discretion meetscriterion 1(a)ofsectionBofPart9900.Enforcement discretion isrequiredtoavoidthetransient associated withaforcedplantshutdownwhichwouldresultfromlongtermisolation oftheTIPpenetration.

TheSupplySystemconsiders repetitive openingofTIP-V-15underadministrative

controls, aspermitted byTS3.6.1.3,tobeundesirable.

10.AnexigentTSAmendment request.willbesubmitted tothestaffwithin48hours.Attachedismarked-up page5.0-11showingtheproposedchange.11.Adoptionof"Improved" Technical Specifications atWNP-2hasnoteliminated theneedforthisrequestforenforcement discretion.

12.TheSupplySystemknowsofnoadditional information thatwillbeneededbythestaff.Shouldyouhaveanyquestions ordesireadditional information regarding thismatter,pleasecontactP.J.Inserraat(509)377-4147.

Respectfully,

~~J.V.ParrishChiefExecutive OfficerMailDrop1023Attachment EWMerschoff

-NRCRIVKEPerkins,Jr.-NRCRIV,WalnutCreekFieldOfficeTGColburn-NRRNRCSr.ResidentInspector

-927NDLWilliams-BPA/399PDRobinson-Winston&Strawn